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INTRODUCTION 
We flatter ourselves, complacently, that 
we live in an era of light and science; 
when the real truth is that we are still 
bogged down in the most rudimentary and 
infantile -Forms or intellectual endeavour. 
Teilhard de Chardin 
z. 
I 
The phrase "socio-economic" is one of the most frequently 
encountered epithets in the literature of the social 
sciences. Strangely, it does not derive from a recognised 
noun phrase. That is to say that there is as yet no 
field of study which attempts to bring to bear on human 
behaviour, the simultaneous and integrated insights of 
sociology and economics. 
There have been certain scholars who produced major 
work in sociology and in economics, for example, Marx and 
Pareto. However, there exists in the contemporary border- 
lands between the two disciplines, no large, well-articulated 
body of knowledge and theory such as one finds, for example, 
in social psychology. Tt may be doubted whether this gap 
is explicable in terms of the mutual hostility between some 
economists and sociologists, though undoubtedly such hostility 
dces oV Bain, a similar 
hostility 
is Q1, 
irres appal enU 
between psychology and sociology. Nor can the gap be 
explained in terms of the intellectual disparity between 
economics and sociology, since although economics is more 
developed than sociology, the same disparity exists between 
.J 
Jý 
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of the former has not prevented its being combined with 
the latter in social psychology. 
There are difficulties in the decision as to what to 
call interdisciplinary work in sociology and economics. 
"Social economics" is no good, since it is the name for the 
area where economics and social administration overlap. I 
have decided on "socio--economy" because it sounds very 
different from "social economics" and has some of the flavour 
of the long established (and reviving) "po, li_tical economy". 
If international example will serve, the reader will be 
interested to know that although I conceived of the term 
"socio-economy" independently, I attended a conference at 
the State University of Mons in Belgium in April 1978, at 
which one of the papers presented bore the title: "Le Point 
de la Recherche en Socio-Economie de l'Enseignement". 
(1) 
Whether one refers to "socio-economy" or "economic 
sociology", there are vast possibilities for intellectual 
cross-fertilization between economics, sociology, psychology, 
history, and so on. George Psacharopoulos refers to the gap 
between virtuous intention to proceed in an interdisciplinary 
way and practice failure to do so. 
(2) 
He himself is notable, as 
a leading educational economist, for having interested himself 
in certain sociological questions and modes of analysis. 
In this thesis, an attempt is made to derive the 
sociological implications of one of the most important 
developments of neo-classical economics of recent decades, 
Ir 
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contain: considerable historical material none of which, 
I hasten to add, is based on original research. There is 
also l urmi ng through the thesis, I hone by way of a unifying 
thread, the following philosophical- question: what are the 
socio-economic conditions of a "free" society? In the 
remainder of this introductory chapter, I shall outline 
some of the main areas of discussion. 
it is often claimed against the neo-classical tradition 
in econo ics that it is too remote from social reality to 
have rauch explanatory power. Thus, for example, r_eo- 
% 
classicis ,s are held in contempt for their inability to 
explain the distribution of wealth and income by social class. 
(4) 
This crit1_Cism is misconceived, in that although traditional 
text-book price theory comprises a mast formidable set of 
analytic techniques (can the recent massive rise in oil prices 
be better conceptualized than in to , -, s of large leftward 
shifts 11 SU7IJ_i_J in -k he face o inelas cic oi üsocial 
class is not numbered amongst its explanatory variables. 
Moreover, I would like to suggest that the deficiency is 
the 
other way round, and that sociology has. -much to gain from the 
insights of human capital theory -- a highly developed branch 
of modern economics so idly within the riee-ciassicai paradigm. 
In his An introduction to the Economics of Educations 
Mark Flaug insists that the economics of education has a 
potentially protean contribution to make to economic analysis. 
There are many :, ranches of economics which can be enlivened 
5. 
by the insights of human capital theory, and indeed the 
economics of education "shades off imperceptibly. into 
labour economics, public sector economics, welfare economics, 
growth theory and development economics". 
(5) 
The argument of this thesis, is that human capita? 
theory is also rich in sociological potential. The widening 
of the concept "capital", effected by human capital theory, 
seems to me to have huge implications for such questions as 
social control, social stratification, the occupational 
st irtn. re and comparative social systems. Much sociology 
suffers, I believe from a fixation on what Peter Wiles calls 
"Marxist and Victorian" notions of property and capital. 
(6) 
iill-S lJi1Ca71.7 1s Q F. L V111121ý1C11 yuvv. a,. j. v .. 
here. It is not an empirical work. Rather it is an attempt 
to discover how certain major sociological questions might 
be reconceptualized, initially, in the light of the huge 
theoretical and empirical work done within the theory of 
(7 
human capital in recent decades. / Let us first make clear 
what we understand by "human capital". 
The basic similarities between physical and human capital 
are by definition economic. Capital may be considered a fit 
name for any asset which both incurs costs, and yields a 
flow of income or other returns over time. 
(8) 
The rationale 
for applying the concept "capital" to human beings, has been 
the growing awareness in recent decades of the increasing 
differentiation and heterogeneity of labour. 
C 
ri_, iý-2. n capital is i_nveciment in n. urnan beings maRRing 
therrý more produ. c ýti ire . The investment may take many corm, . 
It may, consist in education or training, in health-treatments, 
in migration or in job search. Whatever the nature of the 
inve tment, from the individual point of view, human capital 
is the capi-cal ised value (i. e. the present net value) of 
any productivity the individual may derive from his education, 
training and so on. This capitalised value is equal to the 
present value of the stream over time of pecuniary and 
non-pecan; . ary benefits flowing from the activity (decisions 
i ith regard. to education, training, migration and so on) 
minus t presen value of the over time stream of `costs to 
him of acquiring: it. 
There have been at times objections among economists 
to the concept human capita i, 
(9) 
but human capital theoL r 
has now gathered what is probably an irresistible momentum. 
It ems to me, 
. 
indeec'., that onf, could not really exoect -i; o 
lind in an ndust. n_i_d: iiss economy, possessing universal 
:. d. ucation and health systems, good examples of "rute 1° labour , 
embodying no human capital formation whatsoever. "Raw a your" 
should perhaps he considered ideal typical. Such a notion 
may be us` fuß for analytical Purposes but has no empirical 
reality. 
The real. difficulty is not the explanatory power o 
human c= Y_ ,a± as a concept but its amenability to measurement. 
The ecoro m-i _s 
t will robabi y have to settle for the rea l isati: _n 
t. ha c Cacý -measure only part of the total forma ti o'n of -_. , --- 
7. 
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is entangled in'the nature versus nurture debate and partly 
because of the co-existence of different sources of human 
capital formation. The idea of indentifying the educational 
and medical and migration components in a person's life- 
time earnings, for example, summons up problems of horrendous 
complexity. It will perhaps never be possible to measure 
the total accumulation of human capital in society though 
in my view this does nothing to diminish the validity of 
"human. capital" as a concept. 
(10) 
That there should be strong affinities (more significant 
than the distinctions) between physical and human capital, 
is a logical condition of the latter concept. There are, 
however, significant differences between the two, and indeed 
a second's reflection will bring to mind the more intangible, 
more abstract nature of human as opposed to physical capital. 
To begin with, though both forms of capital give rise 
to income, human capital can do so only if its possessor 
I- 
relationship to the income from his investment, whilst the 
works. 'ahe human capitalist there ore stands in an active 
physical capitalist may stand in a passive relationship. 
There are obvious grounds for believing this distinction 
iccaii y oir, llii. Cäilt Thus qua ria-man capitalist, a 
man can not, be a rentier. 
Next, human capital. is less closely linked to single 
distinct processes than is physical capital. A machine may 
have many productive functions, but these are always amenable 
Na 
J-. (-) snp ifi ra' i n-n _ 
Rtr con+ra ct the cov»te -t c± . iniwr. a i. ap to 
operation is obviously an area for very fine investigation. 
For example, the professional man may perform actions 
during his work which do not relate to the "skill" which 
his human capital involves. We shall discuss this issue 
in our chapter on the professions. 
A further distinction between these two forms of capital, 
I 
I- 
is that, human capital formation is more intimately connected 
with costless (i. e. non-economic) stocks of culture and 
attitude than is the case with more orthodox capital. For 
example, one crucial determinant of human capital formation 
is language. One cannot precisely define the role of 
language in education, training and so on, but at least there 
is no doubt that language is the key variable in the process 
of concept and skill acquiring. Neither is there much 
doubt that certain language forms are beneficial to those 
whose social milieu employs them, relative to other language 
forms. 
(11) 
The important point, economically, is that much 
(probably most) of the language involved in human capital 
formation, in the initial stages is'costless. Only a 
conscious deployment of language by a child's parents, 
siblings and acquaintances, in order to foster his cogniL. ive- 
vs, vv.. v.. u ,Lv ý1Vl. Jllll.. 11 V, VVllV1 
li 
the t1-111C. consumed is deliberalte-Ly 
traded against other, remunerative uses of scarce time, 
really qualifies for the epithet "costs". It may reasonably 
be posited that such trade-of-=s are probably rare. By 
contrast, the role of language in physical capital 
5. 
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there are no links between linguistic and cultutal stocks 
and physical capital formation. Obviously there must be; 
but the connection seems less central than is the case in 
human capital formation where, for example, educational 
achievement is so significant. 
The American sociologist, Jonathan Kelley, 
(12) 
following 
on the work of the French scholars, Bernard and Renaud, ''Jý 
has wished to locate "education" as an "inclusive" good, 
that is to say one which families can bestow on their children, 
without depriving themselves. Inclusive goods are distinguished 
from. "exclusive" goods -- those such as capital and land, 
which cannot be given to another, without the donor depriving 
himself. This, like so many "economic" distinctions made 
by sociologists, is quite false. Insofar as education 
involves individual or collective decisions to incur costs 
(such as direct educational expenditures, or indirect costs 
such as foregone earnings) then opportunity costs are -involved, 
and the inclusive/ exclusive di sti nc-tion breaks down. That 
part of a person's education which is embraced by an economic 
calculus constitutes an "exclusive" good. 
An especially important distinction between physical 
and human capital. is that in industrialised societies at 
least, the latter is much more evenly distributed in the 
population than is the former. Relatively few people own 
much property in industrialised societies. However suspect 
the available figures for wealth and distribution may be, 
in 1V 
1 
they all show that at least industrial property is 
concentrated in relatively few hands. 
(14) 
By contrast 
virtually all citizens in complex societies are involved 
in universal education and health systems. This is not to 
argue that the sole, or even principal, function of education 
and medicine is private or social human capital formation. 
I am asserting only that these activities do increase and 
protect labour productivity. Labour productivity may 
similarly be enhanced by migration (a common phenomenon in 
a av nco scc ety) an by Job Search. Participation in these 
activities is more widespread than the ownership of tangible 
capital. This distributional distinction, it will be argued 
't ss +hooryy an r7 for later, is of extreme s gnificaýlce gor c_a ý.... ý, 
the ruling class versus pluralism debate in the sociology 
of government. it is heavily loaded with implications. It 
may help to explain why in industrialised societies income 
is invariably more evenly distributed than wealth. (There 
are obviously many other reasons -- changes in the capital/ 
labour ratio, progressive income tax, etc. ) 
However, despite the greater equality of distribution 
of human than of physical capital, there are grounds for 
believing that the former imposes a stronger constraint 
on the achievement of greater , income equality. For in reality 
the contribution made by property to income inequality is 
relatively slight in advanced economies, where most income 
is earned income. If all private property were expropriated 
and red stri buted the equality benefits would be surpris in, ly 
. 1_i 
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egalitarian. implications, though, since physical property 
is not inalienable from its owners, there is no clear 
logical or moral limitation on society's right to confiscate 
physical capital. The popular faith in the egalitarian 
benefits of public ownership of the means of production is 
rather naif. It has never been clear to me why public 
ownership should be expected to increase the sensitivity of 
decision-makers to the public in general. Why should it 
reduce the law's delay, or inhibit the insolence of office? 
What I shall try to show in my chapters on Marxism and 
socialism is the massively wrong-headed analysis of the nature 
and effects of private property that has both characterized 
much critical writing on capitalist society, and informed the 
ambitions and policies of the Marxist state. At the crudest 
level, it may be claimed that the whole Marxist tradition has 
simply got it wrong about the economic and social effects 
of private physical capital. In the event, in societies 
where physical capital is predominantly publicly owned, there 
is an increase in inequality in some senses, for example in 
terms of the average citizen's access to information and 
decision-making. We shall stress this in our chapter on 
Socialism. Iii capitalist society, wiiut; ever the effects of 
private wealth on social stratification, its effects on 
income distribution are simply not very great. 
Human capital formation, however, contributes vastly to 
the unequal distribution of earned income, and there is no 
L 
conceivable way of nationalising it. Its very essence 
is its inalienable character. In any case, as we have said, 
the determinants of human capital formation are enormously 
more problematic than is the case with physical capital 
formation. As should perhaps be more readily admitted, we 
- know relatively little about educability. This means that 
while we may make more or less successful attempts to measure 
educational human capital formation, we are ignorant of 
many of its determinants. 
From the policy point of view the significant implication 
I- 
here, is that we may find it very difficult to redistribute 
human capital more equally. Certainly adult training 
programmes dP_Si fined fn help low-nai d workers do not seem to 
have worked in the United States; and there is little reason 
for thinking that "compensatory education" has been successful 
anywhere. It is of course true that greater knowledge of 
learning failure would greatly help governments attempting 
to change the human capital distribution. At the moment, 
however, we are stuck with Bernstein's epigram: "The 
1 (16) 
institution is in error and/or the child is in deficit. " 
Thus while Dr. Psacharopoulos may insist that educational 
policies can effect a slight redistribution of the national 
1 ., --7 N 
income in favour of poorer social groups, l'f this is a 
long way from arguing that it is a simple matter for governments 
to alter the distribution of human capital in a markedly 
egalitarian way. 
1 _i 
, 
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are, and they seem to me to show how difficult to draw is 
the line between social administration and socio-economic 
theory, my concern is a more purely theoretical sociology of 
human capital. Human capital theory is predicated on the idea 
of a widely understood calculus of scarcity and choice in 
relation to skill formation, on the belief that people calculate 
the costs and benefits of different courses of action. The 
individual calculus is associated with private human capital. 
The collective calculus is associated with social human 
capital. it is the sociological implications of the existence 
of sU. a. ch a calculus that I shall attempt to derive. 
What I shall propose in subsequent chapters is that it is 
sociologically productive to distinguish two orders of capital 
the "physical capital order" and the "human capital order". 
These two orders ma, be conceived as partly over-lapping, 
partly separate. It will be argued that the simultaneous 
presence of these two orders of capital in advanced societies 
is associated with an immensely complex class and occupational 
structure. I shall attempt to construct a socio-economy of 
the professions which will seek to explain how certain 
occupational groups relate to the creation, privatization 
e 
such a socio-economy might and human capital 
also aid our understanding of the extraordinary mix of 
consensus and conflict which characterizes modern occupational 
structures. 
Physical and knowledge capital may be thought of as 
1 
Y 
I- 
supporting different (though partly over-lapping) class 
structures. The bourgeois and the proletarian are 
differentiated from each other by their different relations 
to property. However, the "raw differences" as exemplified 
in early nineteenth--century capitalism, are, under modern 
capitalism, powerfully modified by the superimposition on 
this structure of physical capital relationships, of another 
social structure related to the distribution of human capital. 
This latter structure is more finely differentiated (less 
clearly articulated) than the former. Thus the difficulties 
involved in "placing" modern occupations in a logically 
coherent class tructý re, reflect the coexistence of two 
different major sources, of we^-, ] tli/income _ de is o- a't'i g 
and prestige. In particular, the human capital order may be 
seen to have implications for the question of the differential 
distribution of status -- long ago identified by Weber as a 
crucial variable in stratification, and one notably untreated 
by Marxists. (This will be treated more fully in later chapters. ) 
i shall argue that Mar xst explanations of class are 
unsatisfactorily predicated on the single notion of physical 
capital. Moreover, i would suggest that such explanations 
of social class and conflict present physical capital in an 
objectionably reified form. If one locates this concept in 
the practices of men (Marxists now always require us to 
look for men's actual practices) , it w ill be. seen 
that physical 
capital is meaningless without the invocation of human 
knowledge and ills . , dich is primal and which epi-phenomenal 
I U-1 
. 
need not concern us here. WJnat does concern us is that 
much learning and skill formation in modern industrial 
society are embraced by the human capital calculus. 
A socio-economy of the middle classes (which might well 
k 
develop from a study of the professions) might prove 
especially fascinating. It has always been rather difficult 
to locate this class, which is not a class in the Marxist 
sense. The constant and in Marxian terms, incorrect, 
switching from the term "bourgeois" to the term "middle class" 
as if they were synonymous, bears witness to the difficulty 
of conceptualizing the position of professional and other 
highly educated groups in the social relations of production. 
Even Marx - pace himself -- is guilty of -ý be same faul t 
(18) 
vJ 
Had he had access to human capital theory he might have 
abandoned his view of the middle class as a non class, the 
mere hangers-on of the bourgeoisie. For the middle class 
may now perhaps be regarded as a genuine class in relation to 
the human capital order. Like the bourgeoisie, the middle 
classes, in varying degrees create, distribute, appropriate, 
privatize and control capital. In their case, however, 
human capital formation is the source of their social class, 
their status, their income, their life-style. What may be 
called the "scientific middle class" is especially important. 
Consider, for example, the concept "technology". It 
clearly involves the notions both of physical and human 
capital. There is perhaps a consensus that technology is 
now the main engine of socio-economic change, and in modern 
!Va 
ecunumi c5 text-books it figures as a aeierminant in chapters 
on the elementary theory of supply, 
ý9) 
I shall argue that 
the rise of modern technology with its comprehensive and 
finely differentiated demands for specialised manpower, has 
made the Marxist explanation of the "social relations of 
production" unacceptably uni-dimensional. To locate class 
entirely in terms of the relationship of groups to physical 
capital perhaps had some explanatory power in the nineteenth 
century. In the twentieth century, such a procedure is 
glaringly unhelpful. 
To celebrate the kind of contribution to sociology which 
k 
human capital theory might anake, one might consider the 
political economy of J. K. Galbraith. For it is indeed an 
irony that such an arch-opponent of the neo-classical paradigm 
can be defended in terms of the very orthodoxy he rejects. 
His thesis that effective "power" has passed from capital 
(i. e. the owners of physical capital) to the technostructure, 
(20) 
can be restated: some forms of human capital formation 
bring greater access to decision-making to those who possess 
them in a "high technological age" than can derive from the 
mere ownership of physical capital. Galh 
alluding to, and effectively deriving the 
the proposition that modern technology is 
intensive". Malgre lui, he is expounding 
implications of human capital formation. 
raith is unwittingly 
implications of, 
Whunan capital 
the sociological 
I shall argue later that ownership of physical capital 
can be a contingent fora, of control only, i. e. one which does 
17. 
not possess any logical necessity. rurtnermore, 1 sna11 
throughout be hostile to the crude "power" analyses of 
the Marxist tradition, which attempt, first to show that 
coercive power (force) or manipulative power (intentional 
or unintentional misrepresentation) is the basis of social 
order under modern capitalism, and second that such "power" 
relates intimately to private ownership. I would argue that 
while power in both these senses is a real social phenomenon, 
it cannot constitute the total basis of social control in any 
society, it does not relate very obviously to private property, 
and is in fact less important in the case of modern capitalism 
than under previous social formations or alternative actual 
ones . While t}he r oncent 11-nr) pr" ma, -, r 'hi- !:; averl 
by i is hP no 
employed in a non-"zero sum" sense, as a synonym. for. "discre non-ion" , 
where one man's power does not detract from another's (the 
precise opposite of the Marxist view), I judge this use to be 
terminologically ill-advised, though i find it 
(21) 
conceptually 
impeccable for the examination of much socio-economic activity. 
I will attempt to show that the heterogeneity of the working 
force, the wide variations in the distribution of human 
capital, must indicate the need for new approaches to 
sociological analysis in areas such as social strati. ýicrtion 
and the structure of decision-making. It will be a reitet ted 
theme of this thesis, that human capital formation must be 
numbered among those phenomena of advanced capitalist society 
which have centrifugal rather than centripetal implications 
for the structure of decision--making. I shall see!;, to 
18. 
refivt tbi- Maryi st pi(ý. tiyrP of tl')¬ ci-ti z ns of carnal is 
as helpless, discretion-less, manipulated beings. As one 
who has always been wary of the over-employment of the 
concept of alienation -- so central to the Marxist version 
of the social relations of capitalist production; as one 
who is disposed to believe that there are large sections of 
the non-bourgeois population who are neither powerless nor 
alienated: I shall argue that the interdependence of the 
two separate orders of capital calls into doubt the concept 
of alienation. Alienation implies a deficit model of non- 
bourgeois man. The recognition of human capital formation ) 
confounds the impotence which is the essence of such a deficit. 
Human capitalists of all countries unite: you have nothing 
to lose but your alienation! 
I must, however, explicity disavow any commitment to 
I- 
the ernbourgeoisement thesis. Class lines may be more blurred 
than they were, but I see no reason for believing that large 
differences between social groups vis-a-vis the distribution 
of wealth, income, status, etc., will not persist. 
(22) 
Indeed as we have said earlier, the'human human capital order 
may imply a radically greater obstacle to social equality than 
does physical property. 
It tc, v s-con är,, c-a 
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., ýlýr of social class 
is in something of a mess. In the sociology of education 
we are normally offered two classes only -- the middle and 
the working class, identified in Registrar General terms. 
Some Marxist influenced sociology is no more convincing here 
19. 
than the conventional sociology of education it has sought 
to replace. Even so sophisticated a work as M. F. D. Young's 
Knowledge and Control rests on a distressingly simplistic 
view of class. 
(23) 
The very title of the book is a 
potential evocation of human capital theory, yet its economic 
scenario in so far as it has one at all, is truly crude. All 
that happened, as between classical Marxism and Marxian 
phenomenology, was that the duo bourgeois/proletarian, came 
to be replaced by the duo middle-class/working class, with 
no discussion of the extremely important fact that "bourgeois" 
and lillddiý C; lcz-: ýýý are no t synonymoL . ýýi any lase LLL 
'. earlier version has now reasserted itself with a vengeance. 
It may be that to some degree, progress in sociological 
theories of occupation, of social class and of government, 
must await progress in our knowledge of the working of the 
economy. Nineteenth-and early twentieth-century sociology 
drew much inspiration from the dichotomy between capital and 
, 
labour that sat at the heart of nineteenth--century economics. 
Late twentieth-century economics has irreparably shattered 
this dichotomy. It is time for social theory to follow suit, 
"I 
and this thesis is an attempt to see how sociology might 
absorb what Mary Jean Bowman has called the "human investment 
revolution in economic thought". 
(24) 
I^lp now turn, 1- our 
first two chapters, to the key issue of the relationship 
between human capital formation and the structure of social 
control. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
HUMAN CAPITA. AND AGRARIAN SOCIETY 
Oderint dum metuant 
Let them hate, so long as they fear. 
Lucius Accius, 176-86 BC 
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INTRODUCTION 
The following two chapters have a marked historical 
flavour. The focus in both cases is on the relationship 
between skill formation and social control, in the first 
case in pre-industrial societies , and r_ ;, ýýe second ý_. _ 
industriäl capitalist society. The fascinating issue as 
to the connections between skill-formation and modern 
communist society, is left mainly to a later chapter. 
I must initially state what these two chapters are 
not intended to be. They make no claim to being a contri- 
bution to economic history. I happen to believe that there 
are no determinate stages in history. In a later chapter, 
on modern socialism, I shall argue briefly that human capital 
theory can throw some light on this question. This, however, 
is not my concern here. Neither shall I address the question 
of the causal role of human capital formation in industriali- 
zation, though I am persuaded that 1-iman capital formation 
is of profound etiological significance. 
My fundamental concern, in these pages, is to assert 
that variations in skill-formation, as between different 
I. 
GU 
i 
kinds of structures of economic decision-making, 
particularly different kinds of labour market, are 
associated systematically with variations in social 
control. My basic propositions are as follows: 
1. Human capital formation may be -thought of as standing 
on a continuum of human behaviours, conceptions and 
productive capacities, stretching from primitive skill 
formations to sophisticated and economically sensitive 
competencies. Skill-formations which constitute human 
capital, involve the 1ritenG1(Ur1c 1 use of scarce i CsVÜi'c; cs 
for the enhancing, maintenance or mobilisation of human 
productivities, either collectively (social human capital) 
or individually (private human capital). The accumulations 
of skill and/or human capital in a society, and the socio- 
economic relations which they comprise and generate, may 
be referred to as that society's "skill order". 
2. As I have already suggested, there are systematic, 
sociologically significant distinctions between the skill 
orders of pre--industrial and industrial societies. Comparably 
. significant sociological 
distinctions can also be made 
between the skill orders of modern capitalist and socialist 
societies. In particular these differences in skill orders 
are associated with differences in the modalities of social 
control. 
3. In broad abstraction, the structure of social control 
can be regarded as a tri-partite one, comprising: 
I 
7s. 
`u) iile a ciiil_L. Ci_LSLi"al. iVe IliaLcix (). L Society, that is 
its structures of state and government, of regulation 
and compulsion, the legal system, police, and so on. 
To the extent that there are compulsory aspects of 
modern education and health systems, these too will 
form part of this matrix. 
(b) The structure of hierarchy. This is determined 
by the patterns of wealth, income, expertise, knowledge, 
status and so on. (This preliminary list is of course 
oral ya sub- e of the factors l Y1Z7o ýc. It ;s 
important to note that the structure of hierarchy is 
never either synonymous with, nor fully independent 
of, Lii administrative matrix. ii1U 
Maid ist posiLJUl1 
is that the latter in a capitalist society must be 
largely the creature of the former. We shall later 
reject that view, and also argue in our chapter on 
socialism, that in modern socialist society the reverse 
is the case, domination of the matrix becoming a major 
source of hierarchy. r 
(c) The social value consensus. Again this connects, 
overlaps, with the other two elements in the structure 
of social control, but can never be fully collapsed 
into them, nor derived fully from them. We shall 
repeatedly emphasize, however, that in liberal 
capitalist society, consensus assumes an unprecedented 
influence in social control, and massively shapes both 
30. 
the administrative matrix and the structure of social 
hierarchy. 
We have derived this extremely terse tri-partite 
schema, in relation to the even more abstract dichotomy: 
power or agreement? The argument of this thesis is that 
where social control rests heavily on consent, the value 
consensus will shape arid set' limits to the other two elements 
in social control. Where power, or compulsion, predominates, 
consensus will be weak, and social control will be forcibly 
scV ta. i 
cd" 1vvr ci uz t+ U. 
in 
i 
this 
J sense, 
is social LUIIL 
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not 
validated by consensus. The argument in this thesis is that 
a social control structure relying heavily on power is very 
precarious. I believe that modern capitalist society, by. 
historical or alternative actual comparisons, restsvery 
heavily on consensus, and that an important part of the 
character of that consensus relates to the widespread 
phenomenon of human capital formation. 
4. Social control and development are related phenomena. 
In fact, development may be conceived as a change in the 
modality of social control. I shall argue that this is 
especially the case with capitalist development. I shall 
want to claim that under mature capitalism, the structure 
in the of hierarchy beccmcs a less significant element 1-1 U 
structure of social control, whilst consensus becomes a 
more important element. To this extent, the administrative 
matrix becomes rather distinct from the structure of 
hierarchy, ný and both become more reliant on the force of 
31. 
consensus. 1 shah argue in a later chapter, that under 
modern socialism the reverse is the case, with the 
administrative matrix merging with the pattern of 
hierarchy to which it partly gives rise, into a structure 
of power with which aspects of the consensus may become 
actually dysfunctional. The consensus in advanced 
capitalist society is implicit, largely unplanned, and 
highly successful. In socialist societies, an explicit, 
planned dissemination of ideology is secured by the 
dominant social elite, but it does not coalesce into a 
coherent consensus, and an unacceptable "capitalist" 
consensus tends to emerge, reflecting both the emulation 
effect caused by knowledge of canital_ist societies, and by 
the presence within socialist societies of capitalist or 
proto-capitalist elements. Here again, the concept "human 
capital" will enliven our analysis. 
Classification and Frame 
Another way of conceptualizing the structure of social 
control is to say that it comprises a society's complexes 
of "classifications" and "frames". These two concepts by 
Bernstein, 
(1) 
after the manner of Durkheim, are analytically 
fertile perhaps even beyond Bernstein's realization, and 
this thesis will have frequent recourse to them. Classifi- 
cation refers to the principles by which boundaries are 
established between different social-structural phenomena. 
Bernstein introduces the concept first in his analysis of 
lk 
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(ýl 
tue curriculum, to refer to vie principles through which 
different contents in a curriculum are brought into relation- 
ship. Where boundaries are clear he speaks of strong 
classification; where they are blurred he speaks of weak 
classification. In subsequent articles he has extended 
the concept classification to refer, for example, to the 
degree of structural separation of the labour force, as 
between skilled and unskilled and so on; 
(3) 
and finally, in 
his most macro use of the term, to identify the degree of 
separation between education and what he calls "production". 
4) 
He does not raise the possibility of discussing the degree of 
classification between education and the state, but plumps 
for the question of the classi f c'ati_on (l inýYc/se aration) 
between education and production. 
(5) 
He makes it clear 
that by some additive process, classifications constitute 
the structure of "power", though he does not claim that all 
classifications are additively significant. Nor does 
Bernstein address the question of the precise meaning of the 
concept "power". Were he quite the fully-fledged Durkheimian 
he is often seen as, he would surely have used some other 
term. Certainly it will already be apparent from the text 
that my emphasis in the analysis of contemporary capitalism 
will centre on consensus rather than power; in other words 
that for this thesis, power, either in its overt sense of 
coercion or its covert sense of manipulation will not be 
treated as the main variable to be explained. 
33. 
Frame refers initially to the principles whicn 
regulate the g gi peda os relationship. °ý Strong framing 
of a pupil means he has weak discretion over the organiz- 
ation, selection and pacing of knowledge, weak framing the 
reverse. Again in subsequent essays, Bernstein has extended 
frame to explain the principles which regulate people 
engaged in "economic" production. Strong framing implies 
a kind of Braverman-ist powerlessness, weak framing the 
reverse. 
Framing is a functional-control rather than a structural 
concept, since it refers to the processes which initiate 
social actors (either educands or employees) into the 
structural power principles of society. Framing is the 
regulation on school or production socialisation. 
(') 
In every case, classification and frame are combined 
by Bernstein in a matrical way, to yield codes defining 
the essence of different systems of education and production. 
The sum of school classifications and frames yields the 
transmi structure of (school-based) cultural ssion. The 
classification and framing of production yield different 
types of economic structure. The overarching matrix in 
every society is its dominant cultural category. In 
f8) 
capitalist society this is class. ' 
This explanatory system is both enormously persuasive 
and aesthetically elegant. Though it is not historically 
argued, it cries out for historiographical treatment as well 
as general empirical research. Our thesis, however, in fact 
ýn .. 
differs from Bernstein's schema in several important 
regards. First, we maintain that the fundamental problem 
in modern capitalist society is not power but consensually 
based social control. Second, it will be argued that the 
dominant cultural category of capitalist society, its 
"deep code", is not class, but the market. Third, we find 
that the antithesis "education" and "production" is not 
entirely happy, since it carries a sense that education is 
not itself production. However, the enormous heuristic 
potential of Bern. ste; n' s formulaticrýo is their Sup 'eIILe 
virtue. Since classification and framing are master 
categories, higher order analytic devices, their use can 
be extended and 1''_"" ,n 
., . ý... ý 
Ullld 1 G1111C11 ýrýt initely, as phenomena conceived 
at widely differing levels, are analytically ac Ico: -m-no dated to 
them. It is this fecundity which makes Bernstein's essays 
so exciting. 
In this thesis, classification, at the highest level of 
abstraction, is taken to be the set of principles announcing 
the distinction between state and non-state, between the 
domains of the public and private, between collective 
imperative and individual action, between the agencies of 
external regulation and coercion and that which they regulate 
and coerce, between those elements of social control based 
on administration, and those secured through agreement, 
internalized consensus. 
In terns of the tci-. partite model of social control 
developed earlier, I argue that strong classification 
35. 
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indicates a limited but clearly defined competence 
accorded to government and state machinery -- the 
administrative matrix. Next, I claim that a related 
consequence is a weakening of hierarchy in the structure 
of social control, a lessening of the ability of minority 
classes or other strata to impose their 'Rills arbitrarily. 
Finally, and this is the most crucial point, a strengthening 
of classification presupposes a strong societal value 
consensus, a situation where society comes increasingly to 
constitute il iü ' duals 'ci iiE i l. ý'icl l [ilc iii , ei iicL-L- 
regulating them. Another way of putting this, is to say that 
men's involvement in consensus, establishes in their minds 
strong internalized classifications between those aspects 
r 
of human behaviour where external regulation is deemed 
appropriate, and those where it is seen as otiose or offensive. 
Naturally in all this i must stress the ideal-typical 
character of my distinctions. I am fully aware that all 
societies turn on a mixture of agreement and coercion. 
It is the balance between them which is my concern, and the 
reader will already have discerned my belief that in our 
kind of society, the conception of the rule of law, and the 
existence of `""'ý r ly shared.. VPý_L10S ic? 'r be Cýism. _S`ýe 
`'c 
J 
outcomes of "power" manipulation.. What I shall also stress, 
is that they cannot be disassociated from the phenomenon 
of human capital formation. 
Frame, as ý want to employ the term, is the set of 
principles or circumstances which regulate individuals and 
crrntrnc in irari Wile -Pr rmc rý f ire f-nrýn4-- nn Tl, n ' 
of frame are differentially tractable. One may well speak 
of the "natural" frame on the lives of citizens, insofar 
as this is constructed through the scarcities of nature. 
In a sense, the history of human development represents 
a potential secular weakening of the frames imposed by 
harvest uncertainty and disease. At another level, an 
increase in gross national product and, a fortiori, an 
increased complexity in its composition, weaken the 
"economic" frame on the citizenry, permitting the emergence 
of the citizen consumer. The composition of output, unlike 
the vicissitudes of harvest and disease, which are merely 
circumstantial, constitutes a partly principled frame in 
Bernstein's sense, since it is, at least in some societies, 
very powerfully influenced by the administrative matrix. 
In socialist societies, the state largely determines the 
composition of output, at least of official output. This 
clearly involves a weaker classification than is found in 
capitalist societies. For our immediate purposes it is 
the framing consequences on the citizenry which concern us. 
Insofar as the state determines output composition, it cannot 
be set by citizens as economic decision-makers. Insofar as 
it is iivt s, & "i, by iitiZciis t, S i: oIi o 0ii must l. i mit the 
choices, the economic discretion of the individual. Beyond 
a certain level, the composition of output is more important 
in living standards than gross volume. The living standard 
gap between western and eastern Europe is greater than 
37. 
observation of comparative G. N. P. might suggest. A high 
social wage and an investment emphasis on heavy engineering 
and infra-structural development, constitute powerful 
economic frames on the citizenry, as well as presupposing 
a weak classification of government vis-a-vis general 
socio-economic life. By the same token, widely distributed 
generalised capital--formation decisions, represent a 
weakening of external economic frames. Frames may also be 
constructed in terms of age, sex, race, intelligence, 
domicile. religion, migration, and sn on.. In the evert, 
I take the "general" external frame on the citizens of 
modern liberal capitalist economies to be unprecedentolly 
l; crl-i+ mod-- . 
Frames may be conceptual/ideological, arising from 
the administrative matrix, from the structure of hierarchy, 
or the general value consensus, or from all three. Frames 
may be positive, enunciating what the citizen must do. 
They may be negative, determining what he must not do. 
They may be perceived or unnoticed. Frames may be legal 
or even illegal. They may be entirely coercive in character, 
or entirely internalized. 
Above all, I want to assert that these distinctions are 
systematically, differentially, discernible in different 
societies. 
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Pre-Industrial Agrarian Society 
With the discovery of farming in the ancient Near 
East, what we may call agrarian society was born. Its 
history of some 10,000 years makes it a very durable form 
of social organisation compared with its industrial 
successor. On the other hand, it is an ephemeral formation 
compared with the hunting and gathering economy it replaced. 
The latter reaches back into the hidden pre-human history of 
mankind, man having clearly a socio-economic life before 
the advent of language permitted the Droperly human being 
to make his appearance. 
"Agrarian society" covers a multitude of types. It is 
nl and sr T-%n+P i ^. I l wT i m-r1 i ni -i ri movr IT l n+n c-l-nr)n orro ^i-el -H r+c c 
Though capable of diffusion and emulation, as for example 
from the ancient Near East, it has occurred spontaneously 
elsewhere, as in pre-Columbian America. Agrarian society 
is still with us in varying degree in parts of the Third 
World, where its continuance constitutes a dual economy in 
many societies, as it occurs alongside more modern elements. 
Agrarian societies may be literate or pre-literate. They 
have varied historically in terms of their technologies, 
for example, there is the absence of the wheel in pre- 
Columbian America, in terms of their intellectual lives and 
in terms of their institutions. Oriental despotism, slavery, 
feudalism, and sometimes tribalism are all versions of the 
agrarian worm of society. 
I agree entirely with Perry Anderson's view that Marxist 
; -i j. 
ö. 
iiüicLl ä iiclvC i; yliiý; ý1_ Ly UVCi'°u5ed Lilt concept -ieuaaiisrn 
to embrace a multitude of post-slave, pre-industrial 
economies. 
(9) 
I also accept Anderson's point that 
Wittfogel's work 
(10' 
illegitimately brackets a very 
disparate collection of societies under the loose rubric 
"Oriental Despotism". 
(11) 
1 would also add that Wittfogel's 
sub-title is conceptually preposterous; there is no such 
( 
thing"as "total power" . 
12) 
However, I am not engaged here in a refined typological 
analysis. That agrarian societies constitute a most unruly 
aggregate for typological purposes is incontestable. This 
does not imply, however, that they might not possess, 
universally, some common characteristics massively 
distinguishing them all from modern capitalism. 
Indeed, Anderson himself offers us a universal distinction 
between capitalism and its predecessors which I hold to be 
false. He says that capitalist society is the first "to 
separate the economy as a formally self-contained order". 
(13) 
He goes on to say that under capitalism, surplus is extracted 
by a purely economic mechanism: the wage-contract. This 
distinguishes capitalism from agrarian societies where 
superstructural arrangements are themselves constitutive of 
Ll l 
the mechanism oi surplus extraction. 
There are two deficiencies here. The first is the 
predication of the argument on the labour theory of value 
and its derivations. This theory has been exploded so often 
that it seems a wonder that anyone is prepared to parade it. 
aý 
My deeper concern, however, is the much less frequently 
addressed deficiencies of the Marxist sspecification of 
production, a specification which is massively erroneous. 
What Marxists call the "superstructure" of government, law, 
education and so on, cannot be regarded as "non-economic". 
Such institutions are indispensable parts of the economy. 
The failure to recognize this vitiates much of the Marxist 
critique of education in capitalist society, as we shall 
see in our last chapters. 
Wi1Pre Anderson (an indeed Týarx) ;c4 ^rl"'t ;c in __ .. `.... ýý... ý .... v v aw ýý r s_b as V' 1U 11 
stressing the vast importance of wage-labour in the attempt 
to conceptualize capitalism as a distinctive form of society. 
Similarly, 
,i would 
stress haL Whatever their extreme 
variations, pre-capitalist agrarian societies do possess 
common features in contra-distinction to industrial capitalism. 
Thus at a high level of abstraction, we may broadly 
distinguish agrarian from modern capitalist society in the 
following principal ways: 
(a) They were/are massively different in terms of 
their skill orders; 
(b) They were/are massively different in terms of 
their modalilities of social control; 
(c) They were/are different in tern s of technological 
dynamism. Agrarian societies are characterized 
by relatively stable technologies, industrial 
societies by irrepressibly dynamic technology. 
All these three considerations are inter-related. Let us deal 
tI s: 
initially with the first of them. 
Skill-formation in Agrarian Society 
The key distinction between modern and pre-modern 
society in this regard, is that in the latter, skill- 
formation is not, typically, marketized. Throughout most 
history, skill-formation has been managed through the 
costless inter-generational transmission of techniques, 
mainly through the family. Often this has been very 
sophisticated and complicated, and it is inherently 
remarkable, such that the human species may be compendiously 
identified as the one in which learned skills replace or 
modify instincts. But in all agrarian societies most such 
skill-formation has not constituted a deliberated capital. 
The distinction does not lie in the complexity of the 
skill, though, pace Braverman, 
5II believe that modern 
industrial society is enormously more skilled than its 
predecessors. Nor even does the difference reside in its 
level of remuneration, financial or otherwise. History is 
replete with examples of esoteric and highly rewarded skills, 
which nevertheless were not capital. The craft of bowyer 
is a good example in many societies. 
(16) 
It took years to 
learn, and indeed the bows themselves sometimes took years 
to make. Yet costless learning within the family seems 
to have been the norm. Among such men as bowyers, and, to 
take just one of many possible examples, among the specialised 
guild workers of the Middle-Ages, we sometimes find expertiEe 
42. 
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Indeed one distinction between human capital formation and 
mere skill-formation, may be the greater liability of 
the latter, under some circumstances, to privatization. 
In this respect, as we will see in our chapter on the 
professions, professionalism may be highly continuous with 
pre-industrial society, and in a sense dysfunctional in a 
modern context. Certainly I shall argue of the professions 
that they involve rather untypical (because closed and 
privatized) human capital formation. One of the character- 
istics of modern capitalist society is its relative open-ness, 
the way in which more and more people are brought into 
capital investment and other economic decisions. Writ: we do 
not find in agrarian societies, except insofar as such 
societies now incorporate a "modern" sector, is this relative 
open-ness, the rather deliberate weighing of costs and 
returns which serves to convert skill into a human capital. 
A widespread awareness of the calculus of costs and benefits 
is the sine qua non of a "capitalism of occupations", the 
term by which we may characterize the occupational structure 
of a modern capitalist economy. Pre-agrarian societies 
lacked this awareness. They lacked the mental atmosphere 
of which cLv; areness is a part. Thus it is not surprising 
to find Roston in his recent book 
(17) 
explaining the 
etiology of capitalism in mainly conceptual/intellectual 
terms. While nineteenth-century economists were right that 
the degree of complexity of the division of labour is limited 
43. 
by the volume/ saleability of output, such complexity 
is also massively constrained by the dominant mental life 
of the community. 
Clearly the connections between the conceptual lime 
of a society and its complex economic phenomena, such as 
skill-formation, are highly problematic. But that the 
former constrains the latter, cannot be doubted. Without 
effective concepts like the individual, like freedom of 
action with regard to resources, both understood and 
practised, you cannot have generalized capital formation. 
As Weber grasped, ideas can never be regarded as merely 
(18) 
epi-phenomenal. The correct picture is of a "chicken 
a»rl ocrcrt? rAe-i nrnr-i +Ir a rý i al Aý ti ral nrnrýAr7iýrrý 1A1Hc rý ýhanc'i ncr 
ideas feed and are fed by the processes of changing socio- 
-economic forms. In the Ancient Economy, by which Moses 
Finley means classical Greece and Rome (and the same applies 
to all pre-industrial formations) the concepts labour, 
production, capital, investment, income, circulation, demand, 
-entrepreneur, utility and so on, are all absent. indeed 
/ýnl 
11 
these concepts are post 1750. '`'f Paul Johnson's book thus 
attributes to the Ancient Economy a capitalist modernity 
it simply did not possess. 
(20) 
Among the labour forces of the huge cities of agrarian 
civilization, Babylon, Carthage, Rome and so on, there must 
have been socio-economic behajiour which to some degree 
approximated private human capital formation. The categories 
of labour were very diverse and the division of labour 
,44. 
considerable. Moreover, these were in part money economies. 
It also seems likely that could we penetrate the occupational 
structures of Abbassid Bagdad or of late sixteenth-century 
London, 
(21) 
we would also find some elements of private 
human capital. But in general, agrarian society lacked both 
the occupational specialization and the conceptual apparatus 
which are indispensable to private human capital formation. 
In fact, it seems probable that before the advent of 
modern industrialism, social human capital formation was 
a ph omono an private _. 
r; overnments and more cc=on Ji1V11V111\ tVli than r, _ _ 
ruling elites clearly did devote resources having alternate 
uses to the formation of particular skills in their work- 
forces. . This was evidently igle ease with tolle sold-Le y. 
The training of slaves, serfs or peasants for warfare, as 
opposed to other uses (the opportunity costs are not as 
it happens obvious) clearly represented a form, of social 
human capital formation, though the analogy was not felt 
and would not have been understood in a society with no 
articulated sense of capital. 
In general terms I would want to assert that, to take 
for example, our present concern, human capital theory, such 
theory is meaningless outside the context of a relatively 
open society and unthinkable without the establishment of 
the individual as a virtually unchallengeable feature of 
the in tel-3-ectual landscape. 
LI I 
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Social Control in Agrarian Society 
I subscribe to the school of sociological opinion for 
N 
which the question: why does society cohere? is the 
paramount question in social theory. The answer at a very 
vague and general level is: always through a mixture of 
agreement and force. Durkheim's magisterial On the Division 
of Labour in Society 
(22) 
takes the view that in pre- 
industrial societies agreement tended to issue from the 
sameness of people, from their lack of differentiation. 
DurkhA1m tc ri nri ag eemon vii 
f". C v ý: ýýC1cc. 
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tribalism and agrarian society. "Mechanical solidarity" 
is a good way of conceptualizing social control in the 
foi, uuex": it is not nearly so good for the latter. I shall 
argue below that, in fact, modern capitalist society enjoys 
a more powerful consensus than its historical predecessor 
did, and that in that consensus we find precisely, among 
other ideas, ideas which are very favourable to that form 
of skill-formation which we call "human capital". 
Thus, without denying the existence of consensus in 
agrarian society, I will argue that such society rested 
very heavily, by our standards, on coercion and force. 
In terms of our tri-partite structure, we may argue that 
the administrative matrix had a direct and formidable part 
to play in the structure of social control. The second 
element, the structure of hierarchy, related mainly to 
ownership or control of land. Only a small minority of 
the population occupied the upper reaches of the hierarch;, 
-r ü 
and tI? e administrative matrix of society was often in 
considerable degree the theocratic instrument of this 
landed ruling class. Obviously I am bunching together. here, 
societies of widely differing character. There are huge 
differences between European feudalism and the ancient 
slave states for example. Under feudalism, monarchy was 
often weak, and the nobility strong. This suggests tensions 
and contradictions among the wealthy and favoured few, as 
was indeed the case. It is also the case that the excluded 
11C. A U uE'ý ci iiü. L. ooct, i c; s 'vy e -L aIu by any means 
entirely homogeneous socially. There were many fiercely 
guarded distinctions. That I pass lightly over these issues, 
does not imply that I am unaware of them, only that I wish 
to maintain, as reasonable, the proposition that all agrarian 
societies, whatever their huge variations, have polarized 
between the favoured few and the excluded mass, and that 
the apparatuses of administration have been mainly at the 
service of the former. 
Finally, the third element in social control, consensus, 
often failed to attach the mass of agrarian poor to the 
status quo. lt is this relative fragility of consensus which 
partly explains the savage penal system we observe in all 
these societies . The fearful 
punishments which attached to 
various crimes reflected only in part the outraged 
"conscience collective". They also represented a society 
where social. order depended heavily on naked force. As 
On'dreski says : ". tie have innume n"bl e Ü. 1.111V \, U mpleLs of domination l. L 11 -1 t_A--V l/ V 
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through sheer terror and fear in the face of an almost 
(23) 
unanimous hatred of the rulers. " Sometimes riots 
and rebellions broke out. There are cases in all known 
agrarian societies. The punishments were always hideous. 
But even when order reigned, we cannot infer that the poor 
internalized the manifest principles of their society - the 
gross disparities in wealth and the often naked reliance on 
power. This is a point made most eloquently by the late 
John Plamenatz. 
(24) 
It may well be the case that much of 
the social order of agrarian society was a sullen 
cence, rather than an internalized acceptance. Consider, 
for example, the caste system, slavery, droh de seigneur - 
all are retrospectively _horribl e. T\Toýy , 
to imagine that their victims recoiled 
the same spirit of disgust we feel, it 
infer from the absence of a Pugachev o 
village, an index of approval. 
vvi . . '. 
_. 
it is ad history 
from them in precisely 
is also invalid to 
ra Spartacus in every 
The socially dominant groups in agrarian society were 
in fact more removed from the masses, stood at a greater 
social distance from them, than is the case in industrial 
society. In a sense, indeed, such an outcome is functional 
for a poor society. The choice was really whether a few 
should be rich or whether no one should be. But the down- 
trodden helot or serf cannot be construed as approving his 
lot. Can we not, indeed, interpret Jack Cade, Spartacus 
and the countless other examples, as deep spasms of 
underlying structural revulsion and rejection? In my view. 
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police control, a fact which explains their affinity with 
modern socialism. I repeat, as will appear from these 
remarks, that i find Durkheim's "mechanical solidarity" an 
unsatisfactory conceptualization of social control in an 
agrarian society, though it seems highly appropriate to 
primitive tribalism. I shall argue later, however, that 
"organic solidarity" is a brilliant partial explanation of 
social cohesion under industrial capitalism. A safe 
generalization about most agrarian societies is that they 
were often hideously unpopular with the masses. Thus, as 
Johnson points out, burning alive was the standard punishment 
for a whole range of offences under the late Roman Empire. 
(25) 
Crucifixation, also, was a widespread punishment in the 
ancient Near East. The annals of the Assyrian emperors 
boast of their vast cruelties in the face of social unrest. 
(26) 
Their control strategies, like those of the Incas, two 
thousand years later, prefigure the reigns of Hitler and 
Stalin, involving, as they do, the wholesale deportation of 
(27) 
subject peoples, as well as routine torture and execution. 
Perhaps Durkhei? n' s "mechanical solidarity" produced 
social cohesion only for the immediate context of social life 
in agrarian Dc iety , reglUla iilg only 
the interactions between 
the slave or serf and his fellows in like condition. Certainly 
the recent article by Abercrombie and Turner can be inter- 
preted in this way, since they claim that in all eras, 
ruling-class ideology has had the function of integrating 
`t :. 
the elite rather than the mass. 
(28) 
Abercrombie and Turner argue that in pre-industrial 
society, the rich and the powerful lacked the administrative 
or technical means to implant ideology in the masses. 
(29) 
We shall argue, in our chapter on socialism, that the 
instilling of specific ideology in the masses, is not a 
feasible proposition even in societies which do possess 
universal education systems and control over the instruments 
of propaganda. 
Abercrombie and Turner's article is a welcome source of 
lig ht file confused, seif-denigratory darkness that the 
" current spate of guilt-ridden "radical" scholarship has 
created with its insistent emphasis on the ubiquitous 
ideology of the bourgeoisie. Though modern capitalist 
societies possess institutions, such as education systems, 
which could disseminate bourgeois ideology, in fact, argue 
Abercrombie and Turner, ideological coherence is no longer 
so important as in the pre-industrial world, even for the 
"dominant" class, since with the rise of the large-scale 
corporation, the family has ceased to be the principal 
wealth holding institution, and its cohesion is no longer 
(30) 
essential to the preservation of property. 
NeverthP1 ess, ti'° , i±ereE t4nb y'% I.. ýtion is: how 
effective in securing e ile cohesion, were the social 
processes of a pre-industrial society? The answer, it seems 
to me, is: only partly. It will be a central thread of 
argument in this thesis, that widespread active decision-making 
r- rl 
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by the populace, decision-making in which calculations 
about the costs and benefits of skill-formation are crucial, 
both generates and reflects the powerful integrative 
consensus of liberal capitalism. Now, while the majority 
in pre-industrial society were relatively passive, takers 
of orders rather than makers of decisions, 
(31) 
the elite 
surely dominated active decision-making, whether economic, 
administrative, military or religious in nature. Whatever 
the degree of development of the money economy, for example, 
elite lýrg-el j 
dominated it Qomo degree of olit e the 
_.. 
ly....... 
.... bam .. 
cohesion must be assumed an indispensable condition of 
social control, given a sullen and resentful majority. 
However', IL may be doubted how secure consensus was, even 
for the elite. 
I believe that in pre-industrial society, the social 
cohesion of the elite was itself highly problematic and 
incomplete. Its noteworthy that there was a standard 
problem of succession for the actual rulers, and of stability 
and continuity in senior office-holding. In storage cultures 
and in feudal society, accession. was as often as not achieved 
through conpiracy and murder. Those who read the political 
history of ancient Assyria, Chaldea or Persia, encounter 
the murder of the monarch or internecine feuding amongst 
putative heirs, as a common phenomenon. 
U2) 
Everyone knows 
that Pizarro murdered Atahualpa. It is rather less commonly 
known that Atahualpa himself murdered his half-brother, the 
rightful Inca, Huascar. 
(33) 
Attila the Hun is better know 
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Bleda . 
(34. ) 
For all their manifest differences. slavery, feudalism 
and semi-nomadic empires do seem to have in common this 
precariousness among the dominant groups. However different 
from oriental despotism, feudalism may have been, it too 
was characterized by problems of succession. The same can 
even be said of the "early modern" centuries - the sixteenth 
and seventeenth - in England. It would be revealing to 
count the number of English monarchs from William Rufus 
to Charles I, who died by violence or intrigue. 
As with heads of state, so with their ministers. In 
sixteenth-century Europe, at the height of the Renaissance, 
Elizabeth I of England was distinctive in her forty years 
of loyalty to William Cecil, for during this time, "the 
Catholic sovereigns of France, Spain and Scotland had all 
disembarrassed themselves of their counsellors by treachery 
and murder". 
(35) 
Elizabeth herself was the daughter of 
that capricious and disloyal monarch, Henry VIII. 
It is, in fact, modern liberal capitalist society which 
has created continuity and order in government. Only in this 
society has the murder of heads of state and their ministers 
ceased to be a routine phenomenon, gild become, on the cQntrary, 
regarded as abominable. The modern totalitarian regimes, 
corporatisrnms that they are, have remained true to corporatiso 
in this matter also. Not only is coercion essential to 
control of the masses; but violence and conspiracy have 
c J /_ 
been characteristic also of life at the top. The 
betrayal (and murder) of their erstwhile colleagues, even 
friends, has been characteristic of the rules of Hitler, 
Stalin and Mao Tse Tung, 
(36) 
Why should so many societies, historically or actually, 
k 
be thus constituted? The question is enormously complex; 
but I would. suggest, as a preliminary hypothesis, that in 
societies which regulate the masses largely by coercion, 
the coercive apparatus required has a constant tendency 
to turn on its own. The relative stability and security 
of the rich and influential in advanced society, in large 
measure reflects the fact that they do not violently and 
niscrl-i r nnnrncc +kn mn -nri -Hr TAT]oi- +l i -Fl-, oaic T. r; ll c+r+; tro 
to do, is to uncover the part played by generalized human 
capital formation in this extraordinary historical trans- 
formation. 
Technology in Agrarian Societies 
The most significant characteristic of the technology 
of agrarian society, retrospectively, is its relative 
stability, its relatively inelastic charcter. This partly 
explains the vulnerability of agrarian society to famine 
through harvest failure or population growth, what Hecksher 
has called "nature auditing her accounts with a red pencil" . 
(37) 
The technology was not entirely static. Medieval 
European agriculture undoubtedly outstripped all previous 
cultures in its skills and producLiveness. 
(38) 
Neither is 
C7 
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life easy to specify. The superior agriculture of 
medieval Europe was accompanied by a much poorer urban 
life than obtained in many parts of the ancient world. 
Cities were smaller and urban technology (plumbing and 
so on) and urban administration less developed. Yet we 
can say generally, whatever these variations, that unlike 
modern technology, agrarian technology did not endlessly 
dissolve and reconstitute the conditions of production; 
it did not constantly alter the structure of relative 
scarcities; it did not induce a dynamic structure of 
occupations, nor provoke widely disseminated opportunities 
for economic decision-making. It did not increase the 
complexity of the labour market and make possible the 
.. 
deliberated accumulation and deployment of productivities 
by very large numbers of people, as capital. Thus agrarian 
technology was a source only of passive, undifferentiated 
sameness for most of the labour force. It was not, unlike 
its modern counterpart, a source of what I would term 
"cohesive heterogeneity" of "organic solidarity" of what 
functionalists call the "societal value consensus". Modern 
technology loosens some of the frames on the citizenry; 
(ýa) 
others it doubtless tightens a la Braverman. '*-- Agrarian 
technology imposed many of the frames within which men lived, 
and then simply left most of them relatively undisturbed 
for millenia. It was part oa society where social change 
went at a glacial pace compared to the conditions of 
54. 
industrialism. In our terms: technology was not a 
promoter of human capital formation. The latter can arise 
only in a society characterised by open decision-making, 
and considerable geographic and social mobility. In other 
words, human capital formation requires a dynamic technology, 
one which has achieved a high degree of complexity in the 
division of labour. Durkheim is right that the complex 
division of labour is a source of solidarity. 
(40) 
it is 
through our perceived, active interdependencies that we 
cohere. A prlSS iVe, undifferentiated l I-Nin, -P N--- _1_ 
silent and sullen, and likely periodically to weigh its 
rulers and their gods in savage terms which are merely the 
cbvcrso of the savagery whit h is the real instrument of that 
passivity. This, i take it, is the basis of the horrendous 
cruelty which down the ages has attended the rebellions of 
serfs and slaves. The underlying resentments of the 
agrarian poor are brilliantly depicted in the work of Norman 
Cohn. 
(41. ) 
It is highly significant that when social turbulence 
occurs in the advanced economies, it is rarely or never 
directed against any group seen as "rulers". 
Classification and Frame in Agrarian Society 
The implication of the foregoing remarks, if we translate 
them into Bernsteinian terms, is as follows: agrarian 
society is characterised by a weak classification of 
government and society and by strong frames on members of 
society. We may note with Wittfogel the huge power of the 
9c 
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state in storage cultures, such as the Inca Empire. 
Baechler has even wanted to reverse directly Wittfogel's 
argument in this regard. Wittfogel takes it that despotic 
bureaucracies are set up to ensure the maintenance and 
repair of hydraulic systems. 
(43) 
Baechler prefers to argue 
that the etiology is the other way round. It is the fact 
that there is the establishment of a successful bureaucracy 
which permits maintenance and repair work to be initiated. 
And Baechler might have gone 
ancient Ceylon and Peru. 
(44) 
further in his examples of 
He might have argued that 
without such a strong central bureaucracy, the constructions 
could not have been undertaken in the first place. if 
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and provision in most countries, how could the giant roads 
of Peru, the huge dams of Ceylon, the Pyramids of Egypt 
been built? Given the limitations of pre-modern technology, 
do not these feats bespeak an irresistible central bureau- 
cracy, a structure of social control based above all on power 
and coercion'? What seems to be involved is the establishment 
of formidable, coercive frames on the population and a 
comprehensive weakly classified structure of government 
(buttressed by religion from which in turn government was not, 
generally, strongly classified). 
It may be claimed that in the agrarian societies of the 
past, the state as broadly defined, was not clearly marked off 
from other socio-economic activity, either administratively 
or conceptually. This is not a question as to whether the 
5R_ 
formal machinery of government and state was highly 
developed, but of the principles defining the degree of 
separation between state and non-state. 
There were very considerable variations in the role 
and scope and formal structures of state and government. 
The Inca state. was apparently ubiquitous, undertaking even 
the direct provision and distribution of goods through a 
system of allotment. 
(45) 
In Ancient Egypt, China and India 
the state machine was formidable also. 
(46) 
In ancient 
Mesopotamia there seems. by contrast. to have been a much 
greater degree of independent economic authority, a private 
sector - the Karum. 
(4-7) 
The "ancient economy" by which 
Mr cc? C Pi n-1 rrtr t11 as ýnc nl n ccynol (0! -nnnn nrrl AýmcN lýni7 " zri' 
marked private ownership system, and, especially in the case 
of Imperial Rome, a highly developed bureaucracy also. 
In feudal Europe, on the other hand, while the formal agencies 
of government and state were fairly rudimentary, reflecting 
the lack of a strong centralised monarchy, private ownership 
was in the main absent. 
So there were great variations in agrarian society. 
Nevertheless, a highly general abstract statement can be made 
to cover all these types of society. Namely, that they all 
exhibit little or no sense of a principled separation between 
the domains of private and public. Even where formal govern- 
ment was sometimes institutionally rudimentary, as under 
feudalism, it was nevertheless powerfully underwritten by 
other agencies of regulation such as church and guilds. 
7/e 
Thus, in all agrarian societies, the machinery of social 
regulation had a more or less indefinite competence in 
principle; the agencies of administration and order 
were weakly classified in relation to the general life of 
the community. 
This is seen clearly in the intellectual life of such 
communities. We have said that much of the central language 
of economic theory is post-1750. But 'he differences 
were deeper than that. The concept of the indi: z dual was 
n+ moot- v. L, .. 1 -- irl 
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was certainly no sense of the individual as the proper 
focus of political and social administration. A principal 
reason for the weak classification of government in 
agrarian societies, is precisely the amorphous and 
undifferentiated conceptions of social, economic and 
political phenomena that obtained in them. Government could 
not be clearly marked off from other areas of life, till it 
emerged as a clear, distinct concept. 
Precisely the same is true of economic life. The 
inhabitants of agrarian societies lacked many concepts which 
we take for granted. Thus Paul Johnson is guilty of a 
failure in historical empathy when he attributes to ancient 
X50 
Greece and Rome a free enterprise economy. The Greeks 
and Romans lacked the philosophical outlook, and the 
internalized psychology appropriate to capitalism. As 
Finley points out in some brilliant pages, you cannot have 
or 
-1 
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cannot retreat unless the citizenry possess a sharp sense 
of what government is, of what its limits are or ought to be. 
While, under modern socialism, the conception of a separation 
between state and non-state may have been weighed in the 
balance and found wanting, in the agrarian societies 
of the past the question did not even arise. Finley puts 
it thus of the ancient economy: "The authority of the state 
was total, " 
(52) 
and again, "There were no theoretical limits 
to the power of the state, no activity, no sphere of human 
behaviour in which the state could not legitimately intervene. "ý, 'j 
The usefulness of "frame" in the analysis of agrarian 
society, is thus easy to exemplify. We find, with considerable 
degrees of variation, that individuals had typically little 
. 
discretion in the making of economic and political decisions. 
People were framed tightly, both negatively and positively. 
Slavery, serfdom, caste, settlement laws, guilds, military 
conscription and religion are only a subset of the principled 
factors regulating (framing) most lives under agrarianism. 
In many cases, and the question is ultimately impenetrable 
empirically, it seems likely, as we have argued, that frames 
were kept intact by the savagely coercive power of the rich 
and/or priestly and bureaucratic groups. Thus I repeat 
that Durkheim's "mechanical solidarity" is somewhat strained 
in relation to agrarian society, though it is probably 
apposite for primitive tribalism, where there is little or 
no gap of a systematic kind between haves and have-nots. 
59. 
Clearly, in all societies thi 
and indeed the very concept 
notion of agreement; but I 
relative depth and ubiquity 
slavery, serfdom or caste. 
Widespread illiteracy, 
ire 
of 
am 
in 
lo, 
must be a degree of consensus, 
a society subsumes the 
inclined to doubt its 
societies characterised by 
w incomes and lack of 
differentiation in production, also represented tight frames 
on the population, as did high interest rates, official 
opposition to usury and so on. Only when intellectual 
, and : 'he economi c p11-f-p 
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achieves a certain volume and complexity, can the individual 
begin to emerge either as a concept or as an active 
decision-maker, or as the welfare desidera Lum of public 
policy. The philosophical bias of this thesis, is to the 
effect that the emancipation of the many depends on the 
emancipation of the one. The individual as idea and as actor 
is the sine qua non of modern social progress. Individualism 
is not an obfuscating ideology of capitalism but the 
indispensable basis of its economic and social system. This 
is a large proposition, and the next chapter will accordingly 
seek to uncover the part played by the phenomenon of human 
capital formation, in the control structure of modern 
capitalist society. 
60. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE LIBERAL ORDER 
And it shall come to pass in the day that 
the Lord shall give thee rest -From thy 
sorrow, and -From thy fear, and -From the 
hard bondage wherein thou wast made to 
serve. 
Isaiah, Chapter XIV 
67. 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter seeks to develop further the suggestion of 
the last chapter, that the structures of economic decision- 
making and. social control are linked phenomena. The 
basic proposition is simple: modern capitalist society 
combines a highly consensual structure of social control 
with a relentlessly dynamic technology, which endlessly 
dissolves and reconstitutes the pattern of relative 
scarcities. S 
This apparent contradiction between a stable consensus 
and an unstable pattern of scarcity can be reconciled in a 
recognition of the decision-making structure of modern 
capitalist society as essentially decentralized, devolved 
upon the individual. This decentralized structure of 
decision-making may be regarded as "functional" to the 
conditions of modern technology. The corporatisms of pre- 
industrial society, with their generally tight circumscription 
of i. dividu. i action and their generally coercive systems of 
social control, would have revealed themselves as dysfunctional 
in a modern technological context, incapable of the rapid 
and sensitive redeployment of resources required by 
unpredictably changing technology and tastes. Indeed, as we 
RA_ 
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is in fact difficult to square with the requirements of 
modern technology. 
While decentralized economic decision-making (as 
to buying and selling, saving and consuming, investing in 
one's labour and so on) is functional to the conditions of 
modern technology, it is also, on the other hand, crucial 
in the generation of social consensus. Decentralized 
economic decision-making both depends on, and generates, 
the market code, the deep regulatoryprinciples of capitalist 
society. The citizens of contemporary capitalist society 
internalize ý. hese principles. This internalization 
constitutes the economic core of the general value consensus, 
which, we have suggested above, plays so large a part in 
social control in such society. 
A signally important element in this decentralized 
pattern of economic decision-making is the complex of 
decisions which may be regarded as leading to human capital 
. formation. We shall leave mainly to the next chapter 
the 
fascinating question of the relationship between human 
capital formation and social stratification. Our concern in 
this chapter is to attempt to establish the part played by 
human capital formation in the general social value consensus. 
ö"9 
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Development, we have suggested, constitutes, at a high 
level of abstraction, a change in the modality of social 
control.. In terms of our tri-partite model of social 
control, we can argue that development involves changes in 
the administrative matrix of society, changes in its 
hierarchies, and, crucially, changes in its value consensus. 
There is a clearer definition and narrowing of the role of 
government and state. This can be thought of as an intellec- 
tual and structural differentiation between different 
agencies of regulation and coercion, as a stronger classifi- 
cation between the realms of the public and the pr Brate 
Alongside this change in classification go related changes 
in frames. The external frames of agrarian society are 
largely dissolved by capitalist development. The individual 
appears, both conceptually and phenomenally. He becomes 
the prime focus of economic action, of politics, and of 
social administration. 
Industrialization is a massive change in the structure 
of economic decision-making. Sociologically, and relatedly, 
it is a complex of changes in the principles of social 
control. The structures of regulation and obligation are 
transformed, both in the case of those agencies which 
externally control the individual, and those which are 
constitutive of him, whose influence he internalizes. 
7n 
Iý1dusýLidliýdtierý involves yraduai dissemination, 
in place of the principles of a sluggish subsistence 
economy, of a market code, the principles of buying and 
selling, of saving and consuming, a calculus of investment 
and return. An active socio-economic life involving most 
citizens comes to reduce the significance of coercion and 
sullen acquiescence in social control. 
We find changes in socio-intellectual life, changes in 
the law, changes in social stratification, changes in the 
functions and spirit of government and state, changes in 
the regulation of industry and economy. Now while all 
development is social change, it is worth stressing the 
revolutionary character of the British industrialization. 
precisely because, as i shall attempt to show in my chapter 
on socialism, some versions of modern development are not 
especially discontinuous in character, at least as far as 
the modalities of social control are concerned. 
The advance in Great Britain, as everywhere, was uneven. 
In a sense, a kind of economic and social democracy preceded 
the development of the degrees of political and other 
freedoms characteristic of mature capitalist society. In 
particular, the tendency for achievement to replace ascription 
as the basis of social location, became more generalized. 
As Landes says: "The essence of the bourgeois is that he is 
what the sociologists call 'upwardly socially mobile'. " 
(1) 
The Industrial Revolution in fact furnished unprecedented 
7 !.. 
opportunity for social. mobility . 
Ruut:! iii 1y A. H. riciibey 
has reminded us of the 'very considerable social mobility 
of modern Great Britain, a pattern certainly found also 
in other industrial society, whether capitalist or socialist. 
(2) 
An increase in the potentiality for upward mobility 
represents, in fact, an enormous increase in the individual's 
command over his own economic and social situation. Ashton 
has traced a number of cases of the rise of the industrious 
poor during the late eighteenth century to successful 
bourgeois status. 
(3) 
The phenomenon was admittedly not 
entirely new. Peter Bauer has recently argued that English 
society has been reut i ve open since the Reformation, and 
he takes the widely believed notion that modern Great Britain 
is dominated by ancient and immovable elites as largely 
fallacious. 
(4) 
Professor Phelps-Brown is of the same 
'r 
opinion. ý5/ 
We repeat trat such a massive charge -in the structure 
of hierarchy, and in the principles of social control, is only 
hesitatingly embraced at first, and is applied in some 
spheres before others. The proletarian can make himself a 
bourgeois earlier, and with greater impunity, than he can 
become trades-unionist. Such unevenness in the dissolution 
and reconst. itLition of the frames o individual and group 
action. should not surprise us. Another way of putting it 
is to say that individual emancipation preceded collective. 
Since it can be claimed that, logically, individual welfare 
is prior to collective welfare, such being the quintessential " 
77 
ct Wttptiofs both of a liberal politics and of neo-classical 
economic theory, the contingent historical precedence is 
interesting. 
In early nineteenth-century Great Britain, as in Spain 
during the 1950's and 1960's, and as occurs in societies 
- such as modern Singapore, the external socio-economic frame 
on the citizenry was rather weak, the politico-administrative 
frame was rather strong. 
(6) 
Those external frames which 
locked men into particular structural positions were rapidly 
attenuated: there was no objection to the poor becoming 
rich. Those which regulated men within a particular position 
remained intact: there were deep, indeed savage resistances, 
for example, to demands for changes in emnl o yer empl ogee 
relationships. This is in no sense contradictory. In such 
cases we find two overlapping dispensations of social control, 
in which the partial survival of an earlier form reflects 
the still immature and uncertain character of the modern. 
We find in such a mixture a continued heavy reliance on 
coercion, since though the integrative consensus characteristic 
of the market code is developing apace, it has not yet 
become sufficiently coherent and ubiquitous. 
The development of the dominant symbolic category of 
capitalism, namely the market, requires the accumulation of 
huge capital stocks, physical and human. The physical and 
human capital stocks presuppose each other, are the logical 
condition of each other's extension. The accumulation of 
human productivities in the absence of a sufficient physical 
7'1 
capital to absorb them, is rendered an idle skill fnrmatinn, 
On the other hand, an elaborate physical stock is pointless 
without the skills to man it, and indeed inconceivable 
without those skills necessary to create it. It is 
apparent that modern technology, that endlessly shifting 
and recomposing phenomenon of advanced society, spans both 
the capital stocks. 
Historically, it is easy to see how the inadequacies 
of nineteenth-century social science, particularly in the 
case of Marx's economic sociology, arose. 
(7) 
For there is 
a lag between the two capital formations, occasioned by the 
insistent demand of early capitalist employers for relatively 
brute labour. When Marx describes the middle class as the 
"class which is not a class, the stratum which is not a 
stratum", 
(8) he is illegitimately inferring a permanent 
character to that brute labour for which the demand was so 
insistent in the conditions of early industrialism. He did 
not grasp that a "bourgeois" ascendancy presupposes, under 
the exigencies of a dynamic technology and occupational 
structure, its own rather rapid supplantation, not by an 
impoverished and finally revolutionary proletariat, but by 
a middle-class ascendancy. 
The nin'_c,. centh century is a at. - sh. -d. fo any socio_. 
economic history. In the nineteenth century there occurred 
the emergence of the citizen consumer, the rise of the mass 
agencies of capital and credit mobilization, religious, 
political and social emancipation -- all the central elements 4 
7a 
in the creation of liberal capitalist society. ys 
Duzkheim grasped, the social cohesion of such a society 
depended on perceived relations of interdependence. (9) 
As Weber pronounced, the application of science, law and 
reason to the problems of an industrial order, could be 
interpreted as a process of rationalization. 
(10) 
Above 
all, from our specific viewpoint, we find in the nineteenth 
century, for the first time in history, the emergence on 
a large scale of the phenomenon which is our principal concern: 
human capital formation. In the nineteenth century there 
developed the significant beginnings of mass-schooling, mass 
medicine, and the large-scale means of intra-national and 
international transport. These vast societal sub-systems 
and the differentiated labour market with which they so 
intimately connect, were the conditions sine qua non of 
human capital formation and maintenance. I do not claim that 
they are sufficient conditions of such; they require the 
development of a certain kind of generalized intellectual 
and conceptual life, and they demand a certain form of 
government, incorporating and disseminating these mental 
shifts. Only then can schooling, medicine, transport and 
the complex division of labour, promote human capital formation. 
Liberation, as every page of history reveals, is as much an 
intellectual and cognitive phenomenon as a material one. 
Progress is not only the conquest of material nature. It is 
also the restructuring of the intellectual and moral landscape. 
a 
75. 
With reference to the intellectual advances of the 
sixth 'century B. C., Arthur Koestler says that there are 
moments when we are swept by "a March breeze..... stirring 
men to life, like the breath in Adam's nostrils. "('') 
It may well be suggested that the intellectual and material 
history of the nineteenth century in the West, however 
cruelly disappointed its posterity in some respects, 
was a liberation of this kind. 
Perhaps the origins of that extraordinary phenomenon, 
industrialism, are in some measure imponderable. This essay 
is not, fundamentally, concerned with the etiology of 
industrial capitalism, though I would willingly insist on 
private human capital formation as a necessary condition 
of spontaneous industrialization and, if pressed, would be 
inclined to combine Baechler's view that the origins of 
capitalist society lie in political life, 
(12) 
with Rostcw's 
assertion that the genesis of capitalism is fundamentally 
conceptual. 
(l? ý 
That is to say I would reject the primacy 
of economic phenomena, would reject the base/superstructure 
metaphor and, above all, would specifically deny that 
capitalist socio-economic life is largely determined by the 
socio-economic organization of physical capital. If, as I 
assert, the dc=. -elopmert of a s', ] -cri°r of a s^ecif Z;, " ' -, 
capitalist kind is a necessary condition of 'industrialism, 
it follows inexorably that the main embodiments of that 
human capital formation, for example, the occupational 
structure, must also be crucially important in the structure k 
76. 
and regulation of human affairs in an industrial society. 
Not that this conceptualization goes far enough. It 
merely, however correctly, adds to stress on one capital 
' formation, an emphasis on another. Even in harness these 
considerations are insufficient. The emergence and the 
rapid widening and deepening of human capital formation in 
industrial society, are only one element in a general 
economic transformation. That which is invested must come 
from that which is saved. A stream of savings in turn 
presupposes a flow of i. ncome, which ii-self presupposes 
production. In turn production presupposes consumption. 
These remarks, I hope, are not so much the parading of 
Ju. iLc: iiL. J_cýI czý 0. 
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etiology of capitalism is attempted, when the definitive 
examination of the socio-economic aspects of industrialization 
is achieved, it will prove to be a socio-economic history of 
consumption and saving. The whole Marxian tradition may 
thus come to be seen as massively erroneous. It has studied 
the phenomenon as one of production, when it is just as 
significantly one of consumption, or more finely, of the 
increasingly calculated trade-offs between consumption and 
saving. 
The most sophisticated modern studies of industrialism 
are inclined to view development as stochastic. 
(14) Clearly 
what is required is an explanation of that' conjunction of 
forces which converted the necessary conditions of industrial- 
ization into sufficient conditions. This chapter cannot 
77_ 
rollow triis line or reasoning very far. What we ýuu, L 
on, however, is that human capital formation be rated as 
one of the necessary conditions of this transformation. 
- The processes by which skill-formation is made increasingly 
accessible, is mobilized, maintained, rendered economically 
sensitive and geographically and occupationally flexible 
in a word those processes whereby mere skill-formation 
becomes human capital. -- are of the essence of the first 
Industrial Revolution and at the very core of the changed 
modality of social control. 
Industrial Revolution brought enormous changes in 
government and state, in what we have called the administrative 
matrix, The change was not the abolition of the state but 
its replacement by a different state. Government, in some 
respects withdraws from economy and society; in other 
respects there is a massive intrusion by the state into 
men's lives. 
(15) 
The process was not abrupt. When jean 
Baechler says, "The more the state undertakes to arrogate 
the (economic) surplus to itself and to redistribute it 
as well, the less will any capitalist activity be able to 
take place, "(16) he is considering an oriental despotic 
society and the obstacles to radically new development which 
such a society presents. He is not talking of early modern 
Great Britain. Some of the administrative and conceptual 
changes requisite to industrialization in Great Britain 
had: been developing slowly over centuries. There was the 
gradual separation of church and state, the secularization 
'70 
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of the law. There was the er_sdual and nrearpssi -ý7P 
abandonment of trade taxes for fiscal purposes. 
(ii) 
There 
was the continuous erosion of the Settlement Laws during 
a period of centuries. 
(18) 
There were the changes in 
the laws of tenure, permitting the alienation of land. 
There was the gradual evolution of company law. There 
were profound conceptual changes such as the progressive 
diminution of the age-old Christian prejudice against usury, 
and the crucial emergence during the Enlightenment of that 
most Promethear of modern European ideas: the manageability 
of nature. 
My proposition here is that all these changes, which 
by reciprocal causality accelerated under the spur of 
technological dynamism from the 1780's onwards, can be 
regarded as the conditions, mechanics and outcomes of 
changes in the structure of social control, that is changes 
in society's classifications and frames, associated with a 
new societal administrative matrix, a new pattern of hierarchy 
and, above all, a radically new societal value consensus. 
Changes in Classification 
ý-r. ecia1lly exr_poi ts, and Lne raising of revenue, JCcame 
structurally differentiated, that is distinct areas 
of socio-economic life. During the Middle Ages the 
taxes on exports, especially of woollen cloth, were 
a main source of government revenue. 
-i n 
s 
Government and the manaye11t n. vi L yraüüai1Y 
became separate concerns. In particular, the govern- 
ment ceases, substantially, to regulate the geographi- 
cal (and social) mobility of labour. 
3. Production and the administrative matrix of society 
become distinct. Since governmental and legal activity 
are themselves forms of production, it would perhaps 
be more appropriate to say that there is an increasing 
differentiation between different types of production, 
market based production becoming strongly classified 
vis-a-vis governmental production. (19) Certainly the 
decay of the guilds implies a general strengthening 
of classification between the administrative matrix 
of society, and the production of market-directed 
goods and services. The retreat of the administrative 
matrix in this regard is signally revealed in the end 
of the usury laws, the evolution of company law 
(especially in the matter of limited liability) and 
the development of distinctive, highly articulated 
money and credit systems. Clearly this is the process 
of structural differentiation with which writers like 
Herbert Spencer were so concerned. 
(20) 
Limited liability is a particular advance, notable for 
its simultaneously conceptual and administrative 
character. From its origins in Scotland in the early 
nineteenth century, to its enactment in England in 
mid-century, to its adoption as a ubiquitous element 
an 
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astonishing speed. It obtained in France by the late 
1860's. 
(21) 
Limited liability betokens a withdrawal 
from economic management by the state. It is as 
significant in terms of the relaxation of the external 
economic frames on the citizen as it is for the re- 
classification of government. 
4. Of immense importance were the changes in the principles 
of social stratification. In general terms, it may 
be claimed that the social strata of modern industrial 
society are not strongly classified from one another. 
There are implicit barriers such as those of sex and 
race; hilt these have no legal under-pinning and 
where they have, as in the matter of race in South 
Africa, this represents an obstacle to the development 
of a fully fledgPdhuman capital order. It is to the 
modern socialist world we must look for an intentionally 
strong classification between social strata. There, 
the division between communist party members and non- 
members creates a more dichotomous structure of social 
hierarchy than any to be found in advanced capitalist 
society. 
(22) 
It may be claimed that the massively dichotomous social 
structure of pre-industrial society has been irreparably 
eroded under capitalism. The structure of social 
hierarchy under modern capitalism is much more finely 
graded and continuous. In this transformation, human 
Ö1. 
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part. This is a very important consideration, and we 
will devote some separate space to it in the next chapter. 
We repeat that historical change is not even or smooth. 
Only after protracted struggle did government withdraw from 
the crude management of labour. Long before industrialization 
it had relinquished, at least in Great Britain, its claim 
to supervize and enforce labour prices; but to this day the 
process of reclassification as between state and labour market 
remains incomplete and controversial, as is clearly indicated 
by governmental intrusions such as prices and incomes policies. 
Not till the late nineteenth century did she state retreat 
sufficiently even to allow full rights of unionization to 
British workers. 
(23) 
However, the general tendency of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, a trend which accelerated in the nine- 
teenth century, is clear. There was a major redefinition 
and reclassification of government and state and related 
agencies of regulation and compulsion, what we have called 
the administrative matrix. A new sense and definition of 
the realms of the public and the private emerged. The clear 
recognition of the individual as the proper focus of 
political and social administration c, 3valcpcd. 
It must not be imagined that I am proposing that a 
diminution in the scale and resources oT state and government 
occurred. The bureaucratic forms of modern administration 
4 
82. 
1UU LZ.. LpJ 1E'C. i., tr'Sý. iCl,: ldl. i. x L1 V1LL 1111U-111.116 tann 1.. 11 CCril L-ur . iaa 
areas such as public welfare we find the New Poor Law, the 
Factory Acts, the Public Health Acts and so on, an 
interventionist pattern characteristic of the secondary 
and tertiary experience of industrialization in all societies. 
(24) 
Libertarian conservatives like Hayek 
(25) live in dread of 
this "creeping socialism", and will have no truck with 
prices and incomes policies and other governmental intrusions. 
We shall discuss these issues in a later chapter. Here we 
are concerned with the release of the West's economic 
energies, progressively, during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. The generation of capital formation, physical 
and human, is at the heart of the economic changes which 
occurred. Sociologically this involved a dramatic change 
in the principles of social control. We have spoken of 
classification. What of the changes in frames? 
Changes in Frame 
The changes in frames associated with capitalist industrial- 
ization are almost legion. The individual gains, especially 
in the mature, twentieth-century phases of capitalist 
development, economic, political, intellectual, religious 
and geographical freedoms surpassing anything hitherto 
imaginable. The long-term fall in the rate of interest 
permits greater levels of capital formation and greater 
accessibility and mobility of credit. Changes in tenure 
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product, rising productivity, and a growing complexity in 
the composition of output, increase the incomes and the 
purchasing choices of the citizen, permitting the beginnings, 
for the first time ever, of a society based on the citizen 
as an active economic decision-maker. The greater complexity 
of the labour force, afforded by a dynamic technology, 
promoted active human investment decisions. Many gloomy, 
even bellicose critiques have been directed against 
capitalist society. I would argue that modern capitalism 
is in general terms a brilliant civilization, based on the 
individual decision-maker. Capitalism has extraordinary 
powers of socialization, and establishes deep internalized 
frames on the citizenry, as the condition of the dissolution 
of external, often coercive frames. 
l 
II 
It is a matter for detailed empirical research as to how 
the patterns of production and consumption we observe today, 
evolved. Since, as Blaug points out, we lack, even now, a 
truly credible theory of occupational choice, 
(26) it must be 
the case that our understanding of the role of human capital 
formation in the successive stages of industrialization will 
8 1f 
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remain inchoate. We do not have the necessary data on 
relative earnings to understand very fully the pattern of 
economic decision-making vis-a-vis employment and training 
in the nineteenth century. Neither do we know to what 
extent the consumption of goods and services compensated 
for alienating and de-skilled work circumstances. Some 
recent Marxist writing, notably that of Braverman, 
(27) 
embraces rather fulsomely the master's lopsided view of man's 
species-being, that is the proposition that man is defined 
and fulfilled by work. Even if man's productive situation 
under capitalism were justifiably described as "alienation'", 
it would be possible to regard an increase in consumer 
welfare and an alienated work-situation as examples of the 
ambiguity, the Janus-face, of social progress. There are 
certainly good grounds for regarding man as fulfilled by 
consumption as well as by production. It is Herbert Gintis 
himself who points out that for the foreseeable future many 
unpleasant jobs will remain to be done. 
(28) 
Perhaps 
consumption is a main social release and self-definition 
of man. 
In any case, there are strong a priori grounds for 
thinking that human capital formation was from the beginning 
a significant phenomenon in industrialization, not just 
among the middle classes, but also among the workers them- 
selves. The decision to migrate seems an obvious case in 
point. The early decades of nineteenth-century Britain are 
problematic. We are not certain whether living standards 
HI; 
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rose nr fAll_(29) and it j. S difficii]t to distinguish push 
from pull factors in the pattern of rural-urban migration. 
(30) 
After mid-century, when there was an unambiguous rise in 
living standards, and the development of railways and 
steam-shipping, it becomes reasonable to assume a strong 
capital element in the process of intra and international 
migration. Even in the earlier decades, however, it can 
be postulated that an element of active decision-making 
was present in the process of urbanization. However wretched 
early nineteenth-century Manchester was, it is not evident 
that its denizens originated from some vastly preferable 
bucolic alternative. J. H. Plumb has noted how hideous 
by our standards was life in pre-industrial society. 
(31) 
There is in fact a hatred of industrialism which links 
conservatives like Leavis, Eliot and Lawrence with those 
who, in the Marxist tradition, identify capitalism as the 
villain of the piece. 
(32) 
To some extent they partake of 
the same mythology. Harry Braverman's skilled workman of 
the past is surely of the same romantic world as the 
(33) 
villagers admired by Bantock and others. 
33) 
Clearly the Industrial Revolution demanded a good deal 
of brute labour. Clearly also, some occupations, for example 
hand-loon weaving, were de-skilled. 
(34) 
Neither of these 
propositions runs truly counter to the view that industrial- 
ism is, au fond, a creative liberator. Charles Wilson has 
argued that capitalism freed a growing number of people from 
the age-old threats of "famine, starvation, disease and 
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the process has freed people for? It has freed them 
humanly. By progressive stages, culminating in the 
extraordinary affluence of the advanced Western world since 
the Second World War, capitalism has emancipated people. 
It has increased their autonomy, the arena of their respon- 
sible decision-making. The masses have been freed, compelled 
even, if the reader will forgive the Sartrean paradox, 
to learn and internalize the logic of the market, to engage 
in what is part of the underlying logic of capitalism itself: 
human capital formation. 
The adage that nineteenth-century railway building 
occasioned the presence of investors in every street may be 
supplemented. For we may say that the burgeoning occupational 
structure, the skilled trades in engineering, mining, 
metallurgy, transport and so on, the mushrooming of 
apprenticeship schemes, and other forms of occupational 
training, the huge numbers of supervisory grades, the rapid 
proliferation of clerical jobs, the growth of the professions 
and the semi-professions, the progressive widening of the 
medical and educational franchise, and the ever-increasing 
transport network, must have occasioned a far greater 
incidence of human capital formation. 
Naturally we are looking back with a hindsight based 
on recent intellectual advances. Nevertheless, neither the 
fact that the notion of capital was not applied to the analysis 
of labour in the nineteenth century, nor the fact that we do 
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understand the economic decision-making involved, should 
deter us from the view that nineteenth-century capitalism 
had a significant human capital order. 
Not all human capital involves greater social open- 
ness. As we shall see in our analysis of the professions, 
human capital can be privatized, and support relations 
characterized by social distance and alienation. Nevertheless, 
on balance, human capital formation is a liberating phenomenon, 
indeed a crucial element in the emergence of an open society. 
The appearance of the individual, of which private 
human capital formation is a reflection, presupposes a strong 
societal value consensus. Without such, socio-economic 
decision-making cannot be devolved upon the citizenry. 
The consensus, if it is to combine social control and a 
coherent economic life, must involve widespread acceptance of 
ideas like the rule of law and the rights of the citizen. 
Precisely this mental environment favours human capital 
formation. 
The consensus, and the market code which it encapsulates, 
are extraordinarily robust. This is a necessary feature 
of any society with an exceedingly dynamic pattern in the 
use of economic resources. For example, modern technology 
has since the last century effected huge changes in the 
pattern of output. Railways, coal, iron, textiles and 
shipbuilding have all contracted (especially as employers 
of labour) as automobiles, modern precision engineering, 
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have occurred with astonishing swiftness -- think of the 
half-millenium in which wool or woollen cloth were 
England's only significant exports. The fact is that 
though market forces do redistribute resources more 
efficiently than any planning agency could, including 
human resources, there is neverthless an inevitable massive 
problem., especially with regard to the redeployment of 
labour.. That it can be done without putting intolerable 
strains on the social fabric, is prima facie evidence of 
the deep hold which the consensus ana its economic core, the 
market code, have on the populace. Of course the consensus 
can fail, or prove inadequate. It is interesting to consider 
the urgent contemporary phenomenon of inflation in this 
regard. Sociologically it can be argued that inflation 
reflects the insufficiency of consensus, either because it 
is still inchoate (the dual economies of Latin America today) 
or because it has in some degree withered and weakened 
(Great Britain and Italy in the 1970's? ). Certainly 
inflation represents a deep alteration in the terms on which 
men are prepared to engage in economic activity, a fracturing 
at some key point of the market code and the general value 
consensus. (37 
It is during the earlier stages of industrialization, 
such as the West in the nineteenth century, or in the 
countries of the Pacific Rim in recent times, that the 
consensus is relatively fragile. At this stage social control 
89. 
tenors to rest very heavily on coercion. P. nurrner of 
reasons can be adduced for this. In nineteenth-century 
Great Britain, for example, the landed interest, with its 
savagely repressive instruments such as the game laws, 
remained significant. Next, early industrial labour is 
often primitive, as industrialization, so far from replacing 
muscle by machine, initially augments the demand for 
unskilled labour. Under such conditions, labour is 
plentiful and cheap, capital scarce and expensive. It is 
only in the subsequent stages of industrialization that the 
labour: capital ratio becomes favourable to the former. 
In the early stages of industrial. ization capitalists 
inevitably claim a massive share of the national income. 
No conspiracy is involved -- only the inexorable forces of 
supply and demand. Under early industrialization, the 
presence of mi11ions of uneducated and often uprooted ooted persons, 
in huge slum cities, does indeed pose a problem of contra- 
diction between capital accumulation and the reproduction 
of the conditions of production. Though rural conditions 
may have been as bad, or worse than urban conditions, it 
can scarcely be predicated that the luxury and privilege 
of the few in early nineteenth-century Great Britain can 
have been anything but offensive to millions of wretchedly 
housed and fed human beings, constantly at the margin of 
survival, and in constant touch with thousands of their 
fellows in like condition. Accordingly the consensus was 
fragile and a form of police control crucial in the overall 
90. 
, (39) structure of social control. 
There is a gap between the demise of agrarianism and 
the crystallizing of the new consensus, a gap which is 
problematic in the extreme for the structure of social 
control. The transition is not, actually, so much the move 
from the rural and agrarian to the urban and the industrial, 
as from pre-capitalist to capitalist organization, whether 
agricultural or industrial. During the transition the 
bourgeoisie have tended to possess very great powers over 
their fellows. They have tended to favour social arrangements 
which eventually would appeal to most members of society; 
but the gap of some decades before the masses have accommodated 
themselves to the new system, has in most cases been precarious 
vis-a-vis social control. Thus Giddens is fully justified 
in his claim that it is the early stages of capitalism, not 
the more mature, which are revolution prone., 
(40) 
witness the 
repressive nature of social control in societies like South 
Korea, Ivory Coast, Mexico, Brazil and Singapore. This is 
true despite the success of some of these societies in terms 
of economic growth and improvements in living standards. 
Both nineteenth-century European society and twentieth- 
century "early" capitalist societies, have also been 
characterized by relatively articulate revolutionary threat, 
by socialist ideologies which challenge the whole basis of 
social control. Pace Julius Gould 
(41) 
there is little 
evident "danger" from this source in the advanced capitalist 
societies. The French experience, for example, seems to be 
o1. 
that a successful capitalist economy is not inconsistent 
with a widespread Marxist persuasion among the intelli- 
gentsia. But early capitalist institutions are too uncertain, 
and early capitalist consensus too embryonic, to accommodate 
such revolutionary challenge easily. Since contemporary 
Marxist regimes actively promote Marxist revolutionary 
movements in those parts of the world which have not yet 
been gathered to the bosom of the faithful, it is not 
surprising to find even very successful early capitalist 
k 
societies like Taiwan and South, Korea asseciäted with 
massively repressive apparatuses of coercion. 
What tends to happen under early capitalist modernization 
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human capital stock. Those trends in society which make 
for class war, for social resentment, for relations perceived 
as exploitation, develop faster than those which, like a 
developed human capital order, tend to generate deep-rooted 
integrative consensus. However, contrary to Marxian 
eschatology, much of the evidence before us points, not to 
an ultimate cataclysm, the last stages of pre-history, not 
to an unbridgeably polarized class structure, but to a 
powerful accommodation. The two capital stocks come to achieve 
a marked degree of functional interdependence, as, brilliantly 
perceived by Durkheim, the complex division of labour 
generates an organic solidarity. 
(42) The occupational 
structure comes to dominate the anatomy o class, 
(43) 
as 
the social relationships generated by human capital formation 
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come in considerable degree co uus L 1. 
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existence of private property. Conflict is not eliminated; 
indeed any society which recognizes scarcity, and the 
concept of a variety of interests, necessarily recognizes 
conflict. 
(44) 
This implies both a recognition of those 
rules within which conflict will operate and also of the 
necessity for periodic redefinition of the rules. To some 
extent'these flexibilities are formally codified; to some 
extent they are spontaneous, reflecting the insistently 
changing technology which they also facilitate. It may 
fairly be claimed of the evidently lightly policed states 
of modern capitalism, that the bitter fires of earlier 
conflict have burned themselves out, as a growing proportion 
of the population come to feel they have gained, or anyway 
act as if they have gained, a capital stake in society. 
A new, deeply internalized rule-system, 'the market code, 
the dominant cultural category of capitalism, comes to 
characterize socio-economic life. 
A new society is born, based on hitherto unimagined 
assumptions and achievements. Prosperity and comfort which 
under previous dispensations would have seemed regal, become 
commonplace. Pace Illich(45) there develop unprecedented 
longevity and standards of health. Pace Braverman' 
there is the most extraordinary diffusion of knowledge in 
the population. Yet against the celebrations of Spencer, 
Parsons, Keynes, Popper, Aron, Friedman and Hayek, must be 
ranged the indictments of Marx, C. Wright-Mills, Althusser, 
93. 
Sartre and Marcuse. Thus we may ask questions the responses 
to which we have till now only adumbrated. What is 
capitalism? What is the structure of social control under 
capitalism? Where does the individual stand as between 
coercion and consensus? What is the socio-economic 
significance of human capital formation in this stance? 
It is to a consideration of these issues that we now turn. 
III 
The Socio-Economy of Contemporary Capitalism 
One sad feature of human capital theory has been its failure, 
so far, to enliven other branches of social science. This 
is unfortunately as true of taxonomic studies as elsewhere. 
Yet it may be claimed that the classificatory question: 
what is capitalism? can be partly answered in terms of 
human capital theory. By this I mean nothing so immodest 
as the claim that I am going to offer a definitive socio- 
economic char c eriza. tion of capitalism. "Capitalism" is an 
intellectual construct, not an entity. What I am suggesting 
is that it is not possible to explain satisfactorily the 
differences between our kind of society and the society it has 
displaced, without taking account of human capital as an 
historically distinctive type of skill-formation. 
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has never been in doubt. The essence of capitalism is 
the conflict between capital and labour, 
(47) 
the former 
in huge accumulations and the latter dominated by a system 
of generalized exchange, both on a scale distinguishing 
capitalism from previous social formations. I believe this 
to be a false formulation, as I shall try to show, though 
the descriptive elements, capital formation and a "free" 
labour market, are perfectly correct in themselves. 
Can capitalism be defined in terms of private ownership 
of property? Not very satisfactorily, for many past 
societies we would not call capitalist were also character- 
ized by considerable private ownership. This was the case 
in ancient Mesopotamia, and also in classical Greece and 
Rome. 
(48) 
Yet we do not think of these societies as 
capitalist. In such cases, as in modern Socialist and Third 
World societies which have varying degrees of private 
enterprise and exchange systems, it is perhaps best to speak 
of a "proto-capitalism" 
But is ownership alone the key? Is it not rather the 
co-existence of private ownership and a competitive economy 
that is significant? In fact there may be grounds for 
denying this. As Blaug 
(49) 
and Brittan 
(50) 
point out, 
the competitive character of an economy bears no logically 
indispensable connection with private ownership. Indeed 
there are a priori grounds for thinking that a nationalized 
economy could achieve greater competitiveness than one 
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characterized iay widespread privciLe ewiýýrsh1p, sillue the 
state could remove or reduce the obstacles to the 
efficient working of the price mechanism, such as monopolies, 
unions, arbitrary conventions and other rigidities. However, 
a prioriis indeed the correct term. Such an approach might 
even be called economistic, since it leaves out the psycho- 
logical question as to the felt relationship between private 
ownership and economic action and the sociological issue as to 
the relationship between economic action and social consensus. 
In other words, the degree of competitiveness has unavoidable 
psychological and sociological elements. As Raymond Aron 
says: "There is no logical contradiction between the 
collective ownership of the means of production and consumer 
sovereignty; but there is both a social and psychological 
incompatibility. Why should we now witness, for the first 
time in history, a powerful minority of such virtue that 
it bows before the wishes of a majority which it has the 
effective power to constrain? " 
(51) 
In the event, it is the case that empirically we do 
indeed find that competition involves private ownership. 
The connection does not work however, or at least not nearly 
so fully, the other way round. Private ownership does not 
imply competitiveness, as the fascist experience shows. 
This has particular significance in the case of the labour 
market, as we shall see in our chapter on socialism. Fascism 
shares with communism a tendency to emasculate the labour 
market, to secure a bias of social human capital compared 
96. 
to private or even to render human capital, by a 
historically retrograde process, a mere skill-formation. 
True, we may nevertheless say that modern Western 
societies are characterized by relative private ownership, 
and by relative competitiveness, while modern Marxist 
societies are based mainly on public ownership and planning. 
This, however, is to paint empirical pictures. It does not 
conceptualize the problem. 
What, has Max Weber to say on the subject? He quite 
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action as one which rests upon the expectation of profit 
by the utilization of opportunities for exchange. " 
(53) 
While this is true, weber immediately puin L out that we will 
find this in ''all civilized countries''. 
(54) 
In fact, the 
specific feature of modern Occidental capitalism, says Weber, 
a very distinctive form is "the rationall organization of 
labour". (55) Even this, however, would seem to distinguish 
the modern West only in degree. For that reason Jean 
(56) 
As we shall see in our finds it wanting. 
56) 
chapter on modern socialism, there is a peculiar tension 
between the ideological egalitarianism of such society and 
the inequality that the wage-labour system, which also 
characterizes such society, inevitably brings with it. No 
socialist society to date has been able t. o dispense with 
the wage-labour system, presumably because wage-labour and 
indeed the money economy in general, are not dispensable in 
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wage-labour cannot be identified as the only sine qua non 
of capitalism. Wage-labour is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition of capitalism. 
In fact a useful socio-economic glimpse into the 
character of modern capitalism is given by a leading 
contemporary Marxist in his critique of Ivan Illich: 
from Ho_rbert Gintis we learn that the "normal operation" 
of capitalism involves "markets in factors of production". 
57) 
Evidently "consumer consciousness is generated through the 
day-to-day activities and observations of individuals in 
capitalist society- j, 
(58) 
Furthermore there is "a market 
in labour'°{ýýý and the price of a particular type of labour 
(skilled or ür_sk lled, white-collar or blue-collar, physical, 
mental, managerial) is determined essentially by pjy and 
demand'' (60) (my italics). 
Gintis also identifies the land market as dominated by 
supply and demand, and goes on to speak of "income determina- 
tion on the basis of market-dictated returns to owned factors 
of production". 
(6i) 
Finally Gintis opines that "individuals consume as they 
do -- and hence acquire values and beliefs concerning con- 
sumption -ý because of the place consumption activity holds 
among the constellation of available alternatives for social 
expression". 
(62) 
This is well said. ýt is also worth noting, sing 
Gintis is not always consistent, that here it is the capitalist 
98. 
economy he is rejecting. not the economics. There could, 
after all, scarcely be a straighter neo-classical picture. 
Obviously I am being selective. There are statements in 
the same essay, necessarily contradictorily it seems to 
me, which are extremely hostile to the neo--classical view. 
But what is interesting in the views which I have 
extracted is a thumb-nail sketch both of the economic 
workings of a market economy and of the economic socia. li- 
zation of individuals, the process of their internalizing 
the market code. 
However, what these various approaches do not, and 
cannot do, is to refine the discussion with the conceptual 
advances wrought by modern students of the division of labour. 
When we bring human capital theory into tie portraiture, we 
see at once that the Marxist formulation is wrong. There 
is not one capital: there are many and of these, one, human 
capital, is as important in modern capitalist society as 
physical capital. 
Extrapolating from Gary Becker 
(63) 
and the other 
exponents of human capital theory, we may say that modern 
capitalism is characterized by a highly generalized tendency 
to individual capital formation, both with regard to product- 
ive plant ar.; ý ý, uchi: `rY , and 'VitIL r -, j", la,, r. This 
is not a sufficient character 1_zation, but it is a necessary 
one, that is to say that any society which does not meet 
these criterLais not a capitalist society. 
The fine print of our skeletal characterization can 
üü 
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be spelled out. Namely, that a situation of yC1lCtüiizcA 
capital decision-making presupposes one of economic 
decision-making more broadly conceived. One cannot make 
savings decisions, by definition, if one cannot make consump- 
tion decisions. Furthermore, this whole complex of economic 
behaviours, since by observation they are clearly only very 
lightly policed, requires a. facilitating mental machinery, 
a powerful consensus, whatever the incidence of observable 
conflict. 
The c pital formation aspects of education, training, L 
medicine, migration, job search and so on, must be counted 
as indispensable to any comprehensive notion of a capitalist 
Ina- ed ýhc burden of this whole thesis may well society. , 
be that such is the indispensable capital, the real logic 
of industrialism, the basis of capitalism of labour, a 
capitalism of occupation. 
Raymond Aron says, "today's industrial society is not 
the capitalist society Max Weber knew. It is no longer 
essentially bourgeois or even essentially capitalist, if 
capitalism is defined primarily by the ownership and 
initiative of the private entrepreneur. " 
(64 ) 
Here Aron 
is referring to such issues as the shift of industrial power 
away from ownership to control, and the rise of a middle- 
class ascendancy in place of the bourgeois domination of 
early industrialism. This is an issue we-shall discuss 
later. But for the present may we presume to extend Aron's 
position? Cannot human capital theory serve as a focal point 
100. 
of that extension? Does not human capa. tal theory peýýuiL a 
tighter formulation of the managerial thesis, and of the 
idea of a "techno-structure"? 
(65) 
Capitalism is still about 
capital, but physical property does not exhaust capital, 
or even predominantly define it. 
What has emerged from my remarks so far, however, is 
that no definition of capitalism in purely economic terms 
will suffice. An economy is also a social entity, a set of 
social arrangements. What must be incorporated into any 
satisfactory analysis of capitalism, is a study of the set vj 
of social arrangements which support, indeed constitute it. 
We must stress this social character of economic life, for 
even 5o distin uishcd a philosopher as Sir Karl Popper some- 
times reveals an inadequate sense of the social. Speaking of 
the "paradox" of freedom, Popper takes economic freedom as an 
example in point. 
(661/ 
It leads, he believes, to the 
virtual enslavement of the poor. For this reason an economic 
interventionism is justified. More specifically Popper asks: 
"Which freedom should the state protect? The freedom of 
the labour market or the freedom of the poor to unite? " 
(67) 
This seems to me a false view of economic life. 
Constraints are always brougit to bear on an economy. The 
question is what balance social control shall take between 
formal, legal or governmental compulsion on the one hand, 
and consensual control on the other. Obviously there is an 
overlap between the external and the internalized sources of 
control -- for example, law may often reflect consensus and, 
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. What i am driving 
at is the distinction between agreement and coercion. An 
economy where the few could systematically exploit the many 
(68) 
not be a consensual society. 
68) 
Similarly, a labour 
market where the poor are not free to unite is not a free 
labour market, though this is not to say that such freedom 
does not bring tensions, difficulties and conflicts. 
(69) 
All socio-economic life is subject to control. A liberal 
capitalist economy can more easily facilitate the interactions 
of consumers and producers than its unfree alternatives such 
as fascism and communism. In that sense it is freer. 
However, it is not less controlled than they but more so. 
It is true that control under capitalism is not centralized, 
indeed it is highly diffuse; but it is far more effective 
than control in communist society. The endless, surface 
administration of men under totalitarianism is. not evidence 
of the ability of such societies to control their members. 
Quite the contrary: it expresses their inability to do this. 
They depend on coercion. They have little ability to 
disseminate an internalized pattern of control. Let me 
emphasize that the presence of legitimated, consensually 
based control, which is both the basis and masterpiece of 
the liberal capitalist order, is indispensable to capitalist 
economic life. The opposite condition is not freedom, but 
anarchy or despotism. This is to make large claims for the 
consensus. Thus in the next section we must analyse in detail 
what we understand by consensus in the advanced capitalist world. 
102. 
IV 
Capitalism and Consensus 
According to Jean Baechler, "one could maintain ..... that 
the capitalist system is precisely the first economic 
organization that makes possible a more or less widespread 
participation of workers in decisions that concern them. " 
(70) 
Here Baechier is referring to men's discretion over their 
productive situation, and reaching a conclusion sharply at 
odds with Harry Braverman's de-'skiiling thesis, a lugubrious 
attack on modern capitalism which we shall consider in 
(71) detail later. ýlý It is in relation to pre-industrial 
societies that Baechler feels able-to make his pronouncement. 
In a succinct statement on social control in the pre- 
industrial world, Baechler says: "In pre-industrial 
agricultural systems the decision-making power of those who 
(72) 
out orders is, so to speak, non-existent. 
" 7`) 
However, it is not in the matter of men's control over 
their direct, productive situation, that capitalism really 
excels. 
(73) 
The real liberation, surely, is in the power 
over resources which a system of decentralized spending 
presupposes. This is as true for Geig ýý ated inýestment 
in skills as it is for the purchase of goods and services. 
Such a position, it is clear, is merely an elaboration 
of Samuelson's famous "The Consumer is King". 
(74) 1 believe 
that this epigram tells us much about capitalist society. 
1. U3. 
It is the essential individualism of Samuelson's dictum 
which engages me. The debate in advanced capitalist 
society, it seems to me, comes to this: is the individual 
citizen to be construed as the passive, helpless plaything 
of monopoly caprice or remorseless structural exigency, or 
as an active, negotiating agent in his/her own affairs? 
We repeat that there is no inevitable conflict between 
social, control and freedom. 
(75) 
Quite the reverse: 
freedom presupposes control. Only the deeply socialized 
being can become an autonomous social actor. The absence 
of deep and effective socialization is not freedom but anarchy 
or despotism. Indeed these two latter conditions are akin. 
Modern despotic regimes involve 
.a 
savagely repressed dis- 
equilibrium. The attempt to organize a social order which 
is uncongenial to the mass of people, generates anarchic and 
disruptive social behaviour which can be held down only by 
a highly coercive police regime. South Africa is a good 
example. The government there seeks to fetter the majority 
of people within an artificial 'Life. For example, there is 
the policy of paying black labour below its marginal productiv- 
ity, a policy which reflects social principles that most black 
people will never internalize, and which prevents the 
Ll ll\rl y t. l ýrgenVc,. t.. --L f Zith Africa as a fully ý'? v eloped capitalist V fully 
economy, since the crucial feature -- a rational labour 
market -- is absent. 
If we apply our tri-partite model of social control to 
modern: industrial capitalism, we find that modern capitalism 
i04. 
has a light structure of external social control, and a 
strong structure of internalized social control. Even 
critics as hostile as Barrington Moore are prepared to admit 
admit the relatively free character of advanced liberal 
society. 
(76) 
The implication is a considerable diminution 
in the role of the administrative matrix in the securing of 
social control (though it may well increase in terms of 
social administration), and an enhancing of the role of the 
societal consensus. 
Und pr r. r tali_sm, the administrative matrix comes to 
be drawn and structured in such a way that a very considerable 
private domain is allowed to the individual. This does not 
i_1_ J_ the Lr.. ctures of goverrýmeni- and state Are. not 111ed l l. llal 1.. 110 L uý, ui c. 2 v yv... a....... __ 
costly or elaborate. On the contrary, government and related 
agencies in modern capitalist society absorb vast resources 
and employ very large numbers of people. In earlier societies, 
little interest was taken in the health and instruction of 
the masses. Today no citizen can legally evade the 
ministration of society's formal matrix in this regard. 
The issue is not scale or expense, but the social principles 
embodied in and expressed through the-administrative matrix, 
the significance of state activities in the securing of 
social control, In the event, whilst there has been a 
weakening of classification between government on the one 
hand, and the instruction of children and the health care 
of the citizenry on the other, I strongly cleave to the 
view that, in general terms, under modern capitalism the 
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external frames on the citizenry are rather weak. 
For the conceptual proof of the pudding lies in the 
evidential eating. The citizens of contemporary Great 
Britain, France, U. S. A. and other capitalist societies have 
unprecedented choices over where they work and at what, 
how much they spend and on what, how they do or do not 
worship, eat, dress, travel, read, write and speak. In this 
sense our citizens are not merely freer than the citizenry 
in other parts of the world: they are also immeasurably 
freer than their own ancestors. 
The governments of contemporary capitalism are not in 
general weak, but strong. They are strong because they rave 
the authority of consensus. They can be contrasted with 
modern socialist governments which are not so much strong 
as coercive, reflecting a lack of authority deriving from 
the weak socializing power of socialist society. In this 
regard it is instructive to consider Machiavelli. // 
His genius lies in his recognition that civilization requires 
strong government, and involves, in the end, sheer compulsion. 
His insight that the preferred system will be that which 
seeks, in the words of one of his admirers, "an economy of 
violence", 
(78' 
that is, a minimization of coercion, can be 
expressed in Bernstein's language. Classification will be 
strong, and coercive, external, frames will be minimized, 
under a civilized dispensation. The great Renaissance scholar 
could not, however, have understood the socio-psychological 
1 (i F4 
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do we grasp that society does not merely regulate but also 
constitutes, in some degree, its individual members. 
(79) 
Thus in his treatment of coercion, Machiavelli takes it 
to be a basis, while in reality it is only an instrument. 
What crucially separates my position from a Marxist 
I 
approach to society under capitalism, is the view of 
consensus espoused. That consensus is enormously powerful 
in modern capitalist society is scarcely at issue. The 
relatively light imposition (by all actual and historical 
standards) of direct administrative control, is quite obvious. 
The question then concerns the character of the consensus. 
In the Marxist critique of capitalist society, consensus 
is a false consciousness, embracing bourgeois and proletar- 
ian alike. Society is essentially a power hierarchy. 
Consensus is one of its instruments, the state and related 
agencies another, and private ownership in the means of 
production its fulcrum. 
(80) 
In my schema, consensus is seen as the fons et on 
of social order. Let me stress that I am engaged in an 
analysis of circular reciprocities. In a discussion of 
inter-related phenomena, it is always hard to know where to 
intrude one's analysis. i choose consensus not because I 
view it as an actual independent variable -- that would be 
an absurd reification -- but because consensus seems to me 
a crucial confluence of influences and a crucial source of 
outcomes. 
t! 1/ 
The determinants of consensus are many and nomnlax_ 
and may, like the industrialization in which they are 
embedded, have a genesis which will remain forever in some 
degree inscrutable. We can be sure, however, with regard 
to the maturation of the consensus in advanced capitalist 
society, that human capital formation is a condition sine 
qua non. I am speaking of an im lý icit notion of human 
capital, such as the belief that special skills should 
receive incremental pay. Such a belief expresses the insistent 
imperatives of the "human capital order"_ Under mature 
capi alism, government itself comes increasingly to be an 
agency of consensus and in general I would argue that the 
outstanding characteristic of a society based significantly 
and increasingly on a human capital order, is that the balance 
between coercion and consensus must move significantly and 
increasingly towards the latter. 
The structure of hierarchy also reflects the consensus 
in considerable d9gree inthat there is a large measure of 
agreement that hard work should be rewarded by income and 
status recognition, and there is a belief that people should 
be able to pass on their property to their children. In a 
word: there are strong meritocratic and proprietory elements 
in t: ýe C3.. L ar s in capitalist socie Ly . Bo L-h in the admini s- 
trative matrix a., d in the structure of hierarchy, we find, 
of course, some behaviours which are at variance with the 
general consensus. Thus we find governments abolishing 
capital punishment in the teeth of majority opinion, and 
industrialists, governmental agencies and trade unions 
acting in ways which evoke extreme public hostility. Many 
strikes are a good example. 
In other words there are groups which possess "power" -- 
an ability to make decisions which have significant out- 
comes for individuals and groups other than the decision- 
makers. Power is an arbitrarily derived ability to constrain 
the behaviour of others. 
In a sense some forms of hierarchy derive initially 
from consensus, and then, as it were, partly break free from 
it, gather a degree of autonomy which can even contravene 
consensus. For example, there is widespread agreement that 
men should be allowed to save, to accumulate capital, to 
make themselves rich, and also that they should be allowed 
to form associations to protect their livelihoods. We find 
expression of this formally enacted in law. At the same 
time there is widespread resentment at the closure of 
workplaces and at the interruption of production by industr- 
ialists or workers. In other words, consensus is never 
total, and always partly ambiguous or ambivalent. 
(81) 
Thus it may be said both of the administrative matrix 
and of the structure of hierarchy, that they in considerable 
gart derive ýv^ý. con se?, sus, part ' eav free of ý t, ýn 
part by a process of back-reflection themselves inform it, 
and in part contravene it. The hierarchies among men, and 
their administrative arrangements, always afford a degree of 
power to some individuals or groups. There is clearly, also, 
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administrative matrix, as central and local government and 
other agencies in the administrative matrix are pushed and 
pulled by various power and interest groups. What may, 
however, be claimed of advanced capitalist society is that 
it is unique in the extent to which hierarchy and government 
derive from consensus rather than coercion, distinctive 
in the degree to which it prevents men from exercising 
arbitrary control (power) over their fellows. We argued in 
our chapter on pre-industrial societies that over and above 
their extreme variety in some regards, they shared the 
common characteristic of brutal and intractable social 
divisions. upheld by coercion, that is to say, based on 
power relations. This, we shall argue in a later chapter, 
is also characteristic of modern socialism. 
The consensjsis widely disseminated in modern capitalist 
society. It is economic, social, political, philosophical, 
ideological and legal. Indeed these adjectives are only a 
few of those which could be applied. The consensus is 
differentially distributed, partly sub-rational in character, 
and though no citizen can avoid internalizing many of its 
imperatives, no one person will be entirely dominated by it. 
To argue that a person's behaviour could be totally reyüi ýýý 
by social values is a gross sociologism, and we will leave 
reductionist views to those arrogant or partial enough 
to espouse them. In any case modern industrial society is 
characterized by rapid and endless technological change, 
Ili 
with the impl_cation that a functional fit between 
consensus and technology must involve a flexible lodging 
of the principles of the former in the outlooks and behaviour 
of individuals. The consensus must, therefore, embrace not 
only stability but the inevitability of change, for example, 
the need for the frequent reallocation of resources. The 
extraordinary prevalence of intra and international migration 
in the advanced economies, an extremely important kind of 
human capital formation, brilliantly exemplifies this 
flexible socialization. 
The 
.L Ic 'I i, 1 i ü. i'. i: ý icas of 
the consensus may be listeä 
tentatively, as the concept of the market, the rule of law, 
the idea of the individual, the possibility of socio- 
economic progress, and the tractability of nature. Such 
ideas can be incorporated under the Weberian concept of 
rationalization. T realize that such notions may appear 
arbitrary, plucked, as it were, from an impressionistic air. 
In. a sense this criticism seems va id. These ideas have no 
common reduction; in that sense they are arbitrary. On the 
other hand they do slot into a unifying conceptual framework: 
the idea of a human capital order. I shall try to establish 
this position. 
I have- r",,, "«-oned up Weber 's Conceit `-rationalization" 
to serve as a catch-all for the central notions of the liberal 
consensus. However, though I am in strong general sympathy 
with Weber's extremely voluntarist view of man -- he seems 
to me the sociologist most reconcilable with the economic 
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an expression -- and I have throughout this thesis stressed 
the active, participatory character of individual life under 
capitalism, I am also plainly indebted to Durkheim and 
Parsons, and the whole functionalist tradition of a 
governing consensus. In so far as I leave any room for a 
Marxist view, it will be in following Brian Davies in his 
claim that while functionalist questions often make perfect 
sense -- it is usually reasonable to ask of socio-economic 
phenomena of an enduring kind, what they do -- it is also 
the case that the answers to such questions come back to 
us from individuals and groups with widely differing interests 
in , an i over over, the status auo. 
(82) 
The consensual ideas i have listed above, whatever 
their -- inevitable -- refraction through interested special 
pleading and manipulation, are some of the central features 
of the mental atmosphere of advanced liberal society. They 
are the consensus, and without their general internalization, 
however modifiable by human will and whim, mature capitalist 
society is unviable. 
Certainly I am proposing that the transition from a 
pre-industrial society to a capitalist one, requires a much 
more deep-rooted code shift than is the case when the change 
is towards socialism. Indeed, if there is a central view- 
point in this thesis, it consists in these two linked 
statements: first, in terms of social control it is capitalism, 
not socialism, which is the historical newcomer; second, that 
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cannot be understood without reference to human capital 
formation. 
I shall deal with the first of these propositions in 
a subsequent chapter. I have already argued that I have 
listed the components of the consensus at a rather low, 
impressionistic, sub-theoretical level. However, if one 
component approaches, in some degree, a matrical position 
in relation to the others, it would seem to be the idea of 
the market. It behoves me first, perhaps, to analyze this 
conception. 
f 
The Market Code 
For Basil Bernstein the "deep code" of capitalist society, 
its "dominant cultural category", is class. 
(83) 
T believe 
that this conceptualization is wrong, or anyway incomplete. 
The core code of capitalist society is the market code, the 
principles of buying and selling, of prices and scarcity, of 
consuming, saving and investing, of cost and return. We may 
even say that capitalist man may be termed "homo calculans". 
This code is the quintessence of capitalism, and is a wider 
concept than class, partly subsuming the latter. Class is 
obviously an important social fact. Its origins in some 
respects do lie within consensus, but it is also related to 
the issue of power -- that is, a form of social control, a 
11 13. 
hierarchical situation not validated by consensus. We 
repeat- that the socio-economic life of capitalism requires 
a consensus which in some degree generates social stratifi- 
cation. However, hierarchical positions themselves generate 
semi-autonomous power relations. The hierarchies of modern 
capitalism are a confluence of power and consensus. Thus 
we can say that the class structure of contemporary society 
lies both within and without the value consensus. This, 
in turn, implies that class cannot be the dominant cultural 
category as far as our schema is concerned. The market 
Code, however, is ý: eiltýiclZ %-44 %. üaiilJL 
imagine 
d market 
economy without a market code. one can conceive, however 
far-fetchedly, of a capitalist economy with a very 
drastically attenuated class-structure. 
The code is internalized by all individuals, though 
differentially and incompletely. It comes to the individual 
refracted through class interests, to which in turn, some 
of its principles, we repeat, do correspond. In some measure, 
the consensus actually celebrates hierarchy. Along with 
the principles of buying and selling go derivative hierarch- 
ical notions like the legitimacy of property, of income 
differentials and so on. 
If I am r ghy in arguing; ana i r°* T)urkheim, that in 
agrarian society, socialization was much less complete and 
effective than under capitalism, I am arguing that such 
society did not generate a significant market code. The 
economic socialization of the individual was much less 
thorough as well as less complex. For the market 
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code, and the wider consensus of which it is an integra? 
part, announce the emergence of new societal classifications 
and frames, a general emancipation in the relations between 
the collectivity and the individual. The consensus regulates 
the general pattern of experience. The individual is not 
heavily policed because society has built its principles 
into the very structure of his being. 
There is a school of psychological thought which takes 
man to be an inherently scientific being, in that his 
prch? em-solving behaviour involves continuous hyuot, hesis 
4 
creation and empirical testing. 
(8' 
The idea has intuitive 
appeal, and it could perhaps be argued that modern, capitalist 
society, which is certainly the creation of man's extra- 
ordinary mental faculties, is a better adjusted functional lo 
locus -For them, than any presently conceivable alternative. 
In a sense also, the modern capitalist world is more 
"economic" than its predecessors or present rivals. It 
involves the knowledge of a complex rule-system. It forces 
every citizen into economic decision-making. In some degree 
every citizen is now an economist, and his economic decision- 
making can be regarded as an emancipated expression of 
his inherently scientific nature. This can be appreciated 
by a brief examination of the concept "scarcity". 
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A striking aspect of the problem of scarcity, a problem 
which , 'I 
take to be binding, is the following paradox: namely 
that one can make inroads into the problems caused by 
scarcity only when it is generally recognized that scarcity 
is a problem. The general recognition of scarcity, however, 
can occur only in the context of generalized economic 
behaviour. For to say that the problem is not recognized 
in economic behaviour is only to say that the problem is 
not recognized. The incorporation of the notion of scarcity 
to the general economic behavioural repertoire of the 
citizenry wid capitalism is a. central element in the 
internalization of the market code. This is to say that the 
effects of scarcity can be ameliorated only when the economic 
system is such that a fairly sensitive market registration 
of scarcity (especially via price signals) becomes the 
general rule. The only way to transcend a problem, if it 
can be transcended at all, involves an initial recognition 
of its existence. The price system, predicated on the calculus 
of scarcity and choice, distributes much more accurate 
information on the structure of relative scarcities than could 
a more primitive economic system. Its ability to create 
relative abundance depends on its ability to identify 
relative scarcities. This is why we may take the concept 
of scarcity as a crucial feature in the market code which 
sits at the heart of the value consensus of modern capitalism. 
It would be a mistake to assume that the consensus is 
associated with a smooth, untroubled, always harmonious 
ilC 
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social order. The market c'r e in t9 the rar,; +a lj z+. soc ety 
it reflects and governs are Janus-faced. Capitalist 
society generates conflict as well as agreement. Some 
aspects of ideas about sex and race and age, some aspects 
of competitive consumerism and the occupational rat-race 
doubtless do have their origin in the social organization 
of capitalism. One must avoid at all costs confusing an 
elegant model of society, like the neo-classical model, 
with society itself. For neo-classicism, like functionalism, 
like Marxism, is a model. Let us again beware reductionism. 
There are no grounds for assuming that in a capitalist 
economy age-less, sex-less, race-less individuals make 
perfect economic choices, that is, choices based on a perfect 
understanding of utility, of opportunity costs and so on. 
I obviously believe that this perfect model has its uses, 
and a cautious version of it is, indeed, a key to this whole 
thesis. However, it is vital to recognize its somewhat 
remote and stylized character, which yields only partial 
insights. Thus, when we approach the warts of capitalist 
society, identified by hostile critics as structural flaws 
irremovable this side of a revolutionary res, tructuration, 
(85) 
but viewed as incidental abuses by tentative supporters, 
(86) 
we are indeed confronted w tri an identification probiema 
Are greed, consumerism and competitive striving, trans- 
cendable demerits of the private capital order? Or, as I 
suspect, the issue not being fundamentally amenable to 
metrication, are these blemishes in considerable degree b 
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derivatives of our very human substance? 
(87) 
1 take it 
that to some extent these demerits do not relate in a 
logically necessary sense to private property or the 
pursuit of profit. To assume that they do is to engage in 
gross reductionism, to assume that everything socially 
visible has a social origin. Such a procedure fails to 
recognize that conditions such alienation and anomie may 
originate in a sub-stratum of our humanity which economic 
and social theory can never fully penetrate. 
There is a sociological hubris which consists in 
regard inc. he social order as he only significant order fo 
our species. Such a stance combines ignorance and arrogance. 
The evident fact that a phenomenon as complex as a capitalist 
society can cohere without massive, obvious coercion, is a 
testimony, sufficient in itself, to the extraordinary 
social powers of man. There is no need to attribute 
explanatory force to society over and above its already 
extraordinary attributes. We are indeed such stuff as dreams 
are made of. It is only a colossal vanity of some social 
scientists that such dreams could arise exclusively from 
social life. 
The Rule of Law 
I am not in any sense a scholar of jurisprudence. Yet it 
seems clear that the rule of law is crucial to modern 
6 
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civilization. Let us nuL. c, for c, the 
of the independent judiciary to the analytical schema we 
have espoused. The independent judiciary presupposes 
strong classification between legal and non-legal instru- 
ments in the structure of social control. For the purposes 
of our analysis, the rule of law presupposes the defence 
of person and property. The latter must be defended if 
a rational market for the deployment of physical capital 
is to be created and sustained. Without clearly articulated 
legal protection of persons, the inalienable rights which 
human capital formation involves cannot exist. Indeed, 
the gradual regularization of the overall legal frames 
on 1_bour, so far from enslaving the masses in the chains 
of the corporate state, is a main condition of their 
emancipation. 
(88) 
The conception of the rule of law in advanced 
capitalist society connects to a related notion of the 
limits of governmental and state competence. Au fond, 
classifications and frames together constitute the informal 
codes of social control. Classification defines the extent 
to which there are principled divisions between areas of 
social life. Frame 'is the management of individual or 
group action. The principles underlining societal frames 
define the individual's or group's powers over the contents 
of action, over the range of choices, over the weighing 
of preferences, over the selection, organization, timing 
and pacing of activities. In advanced liberal society, the I 
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'- individual has unprecedented aiscrezicji uvt, 
of his life. The rule of law celebrates this discretion. 
A fully developed human capital order is inconceivable 
outside such a dispensation. 
The Individual: The Idea of Competence 
The idea of the competent individual is crucial to the 
market code, indispensable to the control structure of 
advanced society. It expresses the optimistic psychology 
characteristic of capitalism. Marxists like Gintis 
}, 1 ; sm a-o hA inhere_nt. 
ly pessimistic. 
(89) 
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view it is modern socialism which is pessimistic, it is 
collectivism which distrusts the individual. It is capital- 
ism, the supreme expression of the Enlightenment, which 
celebrates the individual, competent person. It is in the 
modern capitalist world that intellectuals hostile to the 
existing order are allowed to flourish. In the most relaxed 
of modern socialist societies, Yugoslavia, we find her 
greatest intellectual scion, Milovan Djilas, either confined 
in prison, or languishing without rights of travel or publi- 
cation. 
(90) 
That, surely, is the -fundamental pessimism.. 
It is an optimistic dispensation, falsely dismissed as 
"repressive tolerance", 
(91) 
which can permit a Sartre, a 
Hobsbawm, a Marcuse. 
These distinguished scholars, and the freedom accorded. 
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The competent individual is crucial to the capitalist 
consensus, crucial in the notion of a "property-owning 
democracy". Without a widely established notion of 
competence, there cannot be widely disseminated economic 
decision-making. Clear competence accorded to the individual 
presupposes a clear delimitation of the proper functions of 
government, and an attendant weakening and diminution of 
the frames on the citizenry, or rather the replacement of 
external by internalized frames. The opposite, centralism 
or collectivism, presupposes, as the Mackenzies make clear 
in their study of the Webbs, a strongly oligarchic conception 
of government. 
(92) 
The notion "competence" is applied in liberal society 
to institutions and sub-systems as well as to individuals. 
The family is competent, the church is competent, the civil 
service is competent, the firm is competent. interestingly, 
the first and last items in this list are perhaps the two 
crucial units of analysis in the study of capitalism. As 
we shall see in our later analysis of the educational 
sub-system, the notion of competence has extremely interesting 
outcorceswith regard to the non-capitalist sectors of liberal 
society. Specifically, it helps to engender a partial 
unpredictability between societal system-parts. 
The conception has its dangers. Children and citizens 
can through it be left to the mercy of ignorance, philistin- 
ism, pejorative advertising, pejorative bureaucracy, monopoly a 
,ý 
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the family in which the state does not intrude, the school 
it does not dominate, the productions it does not manage, 
the citizen it does not regulate (except in a clearly 
defined limited way), the ideologies it does not manage. 
Private human capital decision--making presupposes 
competence. It presupposes the citizen who is allowed to 
move,, the youth who is allowed to train as he chooses, 
the student with discretion over his studies. Competence 
presupposes the liberal consensus and its attendant market 
code. its emergence represents a sea-change compared to 
the restrictive principles of social control in pre- 
industrial societies, principles which we shall later find 
intact, indeed ambitiously enlarged beyond all precedent. 
in modern socialist society. 
The idea of competence co-exists with the idea of 
incompetence. The notion that many people are incompetent 
underlies much welfare administration. Modern states, 
in some vital respects, classify official government more 
weakly, and frame their citizenry more strongly, than was 
the case in pre-industrial societies. Generally the citizens 
of modern capitalist societies have greater freedom with 
regard to decision-riak . ng, as we 
have tried to 
show. But in regard. to the management of education and 
health expenditures in particular, the role of the state has 
been greatly expanded. Thus we encounter the seeming 
paradox that an indispensable element of modern capitalist 
122, 
society, its human capital stock, is in considerable 
degree accumulated, modernized and maintained in institutions 
which are 
n° hemselves capitalist, that is, their productions 
are not bought and sold according to market principles. 
This has profoundly significant outcomes as we shall see 
in our later chapters on education. 
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The notion that the world we live in is manageable, that 
various forms of engineering can contain and massively 
modify it, is of comparatively recent origin. To the 
ancients it would have seemed dangerously Promethean. 
Today, whatever the dangers it brings, the notion that we 
can conquer our problems through reason and action is wide- 
spread. Indeed, there is a hubris in some of its manifesta- 
tions. For example, we find widespread beliefs that the 
future is readily predictable, and reductionist notions like 
the absurd claim that all reality is socially constructed 
and that we can make the world what we like. I believe 
that the charge of sociologism can b laid at times at the 
door of such different persuasions as Marxism, functionalism 
and phenomenonology. This last's tendency to over-stress 
the ability of individuals and groups to put their world 
together, pays as little attention to physical and biological 4 
i23, 
orders of human reality, as its antipathetic structural 
opponents. 
Rostow, as we have already seen, locates the sources 
of modernization in the profound intellectual changes 
from the seventeenth century onwards, for example in the 
works of Descartes, Newton and Leibniz. 
(93) 
The change 
was specifically European, unique both historically and 
geographically. Thus it is apparent that Marx's famous 
nineteenth-century pronouncement is actually false: 
"thiios-cphers have hitherto sought only to understand the 
world; the point however is to change it. , 
(94) 
This is not one statement, but two. The first is 
,. _, tcmc"+- since he very a take aescri. ptive-lýlsCorlcaý sýa* very 
core of the Enlightenment is a belief in the manageability 
and perfectibility of the world. The second statement is 
an arbitrary prescription which cannot be derived from the 
first. The two statements are meretriciously coupled to 
create the impression that they constitute a logical unity. 
We have argued that the shifts in the intellectual life 
of early modern Europe were essential to the development of 
industrial capitalism in general, and that this is notably 
true of the characteristic nature of skill-formation in such 
society: its organization as human capital. 
Thus while Koestler may be right that the Enlightenment 
signalled a dangerous split, a divided house of reason and 
faith, (95) it is proper to note that a kind of faith has 
been linked with the scientific rationalism of the industrial 4 
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society. There has developed a faith in the Progressive 
economic development of the world, the belief that 
hopeless, grinding poverty and toil are not the givens of 
an impermeable order, but transcendable constraints. The 
hope for the poor of the world, from Adam Smith's day 
onward, has been the belief that wealth is not finite as 
the mercantilists had claimed. The realization is only 
initially the work of geniuses like Smith, Mill and Marshall. 
Its full development requires that it becomes common coin. 
a central principle in the market code. Donald Coleman 
has pointed out C; e widespread be1iei of seventeenth- 
and eighteenth-century English writers that it was desirable 
for the poor to remain poor. 
(96) 
This expresses a pre- 
capitalist view that production is limited. Such an outlook 
imposes a massive invisible frame on economic action if it 
is generally internalized. In fact, as Coleman makes 
implicitly clear, in the hundred-year stretch before 
industrialization some writers, e. g. Defoe, took up a much 
more "modern" view, advocating a high-wage economy. 
(97) 
It is impossible to demonstrate the precise etiology of the 
disintegration of those conceptual frames which impede 
development, but the attitudes of a Defoe afford us at 
least a glimpse of this salut°r j° i : tellectsül emancipa ihn. 
Of course there is pollution, of course there are 
slumps, inflation, unemployment, exploited marginal work- 
forces, wars and national and international conflict. May 
be Koestler's repeated claim that there is a slip in our 
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(98) 
Wh i-. ic worth 
saying, however, if we lay our normative cards on the 
table, is that by all known historical and actual standards, 
advanced western society is characterized by extraordinary 
wealth, affluence, longevity, knowledge, freedom and 
tolerance. 
Thus there is something deeply perverse in the modern 
gloom. and doom brigade. There was Herbert Marcuse, the 
shaman-general of that age-old self indulgence of the rich 
and free -- the woe-woe cult. 
(99) 
There is Clarence Karier, 
the high priest of American Marxist hysteriagraphy. 
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There is Foucault, who represents modern capitalism, 
absurdly, as a kind of super-Borstal. 
(101) 
There are the 
blood-thirsty Sartre, 
(102) 
Althusser who wants France to 
be like Russia, 
(103) 
Galbraith who thanks God that he is 
not like other men, the fools and knaves of past eras. 
(104) 
Kenneth Minogue has properly laid many of Galbraith's 
pretensions bare in some merciless pages. 
(105) 
How neurotic 
and ill-focussed it all is, how sensitive to the blemishes, 
how blind to the achievements! 
I maintain that the average citizen through his human 
capital, variously formed through education, on-the-job 
training, I diLh care, migration, job search and so on, 
gains astake in the in the overall capital formation and 
general economic decision-making of the community. Human 
capital formation implies a general greater manageability 
and tractability of the social world. In our next chapter 
126. 
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theory, for the study of social class and the analysis 
of the state. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
HUMAN CAPITAL AND SOCIAL THEORY 
Une vie d'analyse pour Line heure 
de synthese. 
Fussel de Coulanges 
141. 
INTRODUCTION' 
Private human capital is productivity created in human 
beings by their individual, rational, deliberated decisions 
to acquire marketable knowledge and skills, to protect 
these by medical care and to mobilize them by migration 
and job Search . 
The concept presupposes awareness ' and 
acceptance of money and psychic costs for the sake of money 
and psychic returns. Social human capital involves collect- 
ive decisions in regard to these activities. 
In previous chapters we argued that one cannot under- 
stand modern capitalist society without recourse to human 
capital theory. What we must now ask is: what significance 
does such theory have for some of the broad issues of 
social theory generally? In all societies economic action 
and social structure are linked phenomena. Those economic 
actions whose outcome we conceptualize as human capital 
formation, and whose sociological implications we have been 
seeking to derive, are only one element, though an important 
one, in the changed relationship between economic action 
and social life which characterizes advanced capitalism as 
compared with earlier formations. Specifically, modern 
capitalist society is highly consensual in character, because 
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market relations into men's lives, a huge increase in 
the number and variety of the economic decisions people 
make. 
We have argued in earlier chapters that the rise of 
mature capitalism is associated with the liberation of 
the individual. Against the Marxists we hold that the 
money economy does not fetter but emancipates men, that the 
division of labour does not typically alienate them but 
permits their fuller development. Not that there are no 
minuses in the tally. The meritocracy of advanced capitalism 
is as merciless in its revelation of the ordinariness of 
some men_, as it is salutary in its illumining the excellence 
of others. Arid for those for whom, faute de mieux, 
meritocracy is the only practical equality, there remain 
grave problems. For the human capital stock, differentially 
distributed among men, is actually accumulated in conjunction 
with non-economic stocks of knowledge and attitude, whose 
. distribution appears intractably unequal. 
However, the genius of capitalism finds its full 
expression at the socio-political level as well as at the 
economic. The relationship is not mechanistic. Capitalist 
society is capable of degeneration and degradation: witness 
the horrendous story of Nazi Germany. Furthermore, it is 
possible for a mainly pre-capitalist society such as India 
to display a sophisticated politics. But Crick is surely 
correct in ider: tify-ing the "po 1_tical" form of government 
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as mainly typifying advanced complex society. kL) Indeed, 
he might have said advanced "capitalist" society. Insofar 
as politics is taken to be the recognition of conflicts, 
the Marxist tradition is unapologetically anti-political, 
positing a non--antagonistic future against a strife-torn 
present. 
(2) 
I am here accepting Crick's line that "politics" is 
not a synonym for "government" but a term describing a 
type of government. Its essence is the recognition of 
competing interests whose reconciliation requires public 
debate, under a body of binding but changeable law. In other 
words politics involves a consensus on procedures for the 
resolution of CGr1J'_'L_LCt 
Contemporary social scientists, including Marxists, 
tend to a very wide use of the term "politics". 
(3) 
If we 
follow Crick's approach, we will regard most of the world's 
societies as actually anti-political. In the event, I 
would go further than Crick: the full flourishing of 
I 
politics presupposes a human capital order. In this chapter 
I shall address the sociological implications of human 
capital theory in advanced political society in terms of 
three broad issues: the general sociological tradition; 
the theory of social stratification; and the theory of the 
state. Once again, I shall have some recourse to the 
Bernsteinfan concepts of classification and framing. 
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Human Capital and the Sociological Tradition 
Personally I view with deep favour Mark Blaug's strictures 
on the dangerous cult of intellectual ancestor worship. 
(4) 
If we look hard enough we can offer to many of the past's 
intellectual giants the paternity of this or that branch 
of modern socia? science. The game is a meritricious one. 
Aristotle may have said what can be represented as the 
proposition that demand curves slope downwards. More 
famously, he said that man is a social and political 
animal. The former proposition does not identify the 
Stagyrite as a proto-neo-classical economist. Neither 
does the latter establish him as the founder of sociology. 
Thus while I find Aron's view that Weber is the 
greatest of sociologists convincing, 
(5) 
1 shall not propose 
that his is a sociology of human capital. Weber died 
half a century before the main intellectual genesis of 
human capital theory. Yet I shall claim that of the three 
most influential sociologists of the past, Weber is the 
one whose wJ. Lk is most reconcilable with human capital 
theory. Any Marxist sociology will perforce be hostile 
to human capital theory, unless domain assumptions as to 
the conceptual discreteness of labour and capital are shed, 
and then one must ask to what extent the residue is still 
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"Marxist". Durkheim is reconcilable with human capita., 
but at a remove. He is the theorist of consensus and 
solidarity, and as we saw in our last chapter, human 
capital formation does indeed pre-suppose that elaborate 
division of labour which is a source of organic solidarity, 
and does both depend on and generate social consensus. 
Durkheim, however, was not an economist, and his brilliant 
sociology was not an economic sociology, that is to say it 
exhibits no sense of scarcity and economic calculation. 
What rýe ; cr does is to prefigure. with unprecedented 
i clarity, the intellectual ambience of human capital theory. 
It is worth remembering that he was a professor of economics, 
-ýc of he fal si tv cif and as Aron points out, was as PerSUCil. ý a L _j 
the Marxist theory of surplus--value extraction, preferring 
instead to see wages as tending to settle at the level of 
marginal productivity. Qua economist Weber does share a 
domain assumption with human capital theory. However, the 
overlap is far stronger than this. Qua sociologist, 
as Hamilton points out, 
(7) 
Weber. concentrates in his 
analysis "pre-eminently on the market relations and ethos 
of calculative rationality". Human capital theory, and the 
phenomena it seeks to explain, can be slotted, retro- 
spectively, into the Weberian notion of rationalization, 
what Hamilton calls "a situation of greater technical- 
v purposive control over nature, society and culture". 
R 
Weberian sociology and human capital theory share a 
voluntarist view of -man. The metaphysic of neo-classical 
ý. _ 
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economics is indeed this picture of man as active, an 
assessor of pain and pleasure, a weigher of present and 
future and a judge of cost and benefit. What is human 
capital theory, sociologically, but a conceptual bridge 
between relatively free--wheeling action and relatively 
enduring structure? Human capital theory convincingly 
links the individual, choosing man with the comparative 
(cross--. sectionally speaking) fixities of the occupational 
structure, the division of labour. 
in his- stiidy ef Weher, Freund lists the central 
components of capitalist rationality as follows: 
(9) 
(a) The appropriation of all the material 
i'e5uuree5 (terrain, plant, machines, tools 
etc. ) as the undisputed property of private 
and autonomous production enterprises. 
(b) A free market, instead of the irrational 
restriction of the flow of trade. 
(c) A rational. technique, giving rise both to 
prevision and to considerable mechanization, 
both in the area of production and in that 
of the distribution of goods. 
(d) A rational legislation which can be clearly 
evaluated. 
(e) Freedom of labour, in the sense that 
individuals who sell their abilities do 
so not merely out of legal obligation but 
for economic reasons. 
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(f) The commercialization of the economy. 
These conditions overlap with the schema we advanced 
in the last chapter. The conditions of capitalist rationa- 
lity apply to human capitalism as well as to physical. 
These conditions as they arise historically, can also be 
expressed as constituting, at least in the long run, a 
change in the principles of social control -- a tighter 
classification between the realms of the private and the 
public, and an attendant dissolution in many of the external 
fialmes on socio-economic actions. 
There is nothing illegitimate about an attempt to marry 
Weberian approaches and those of human capital theory. The 
now vast neo-Marxist theory of education is an extrapolation 
from an exiguous base in Marx's sociology of knowledge. 
Weber's "rationalization"(l0)is far less embryonic than 
Marx's tautology about the ruling ideas in all eras being 
the ideas of the ruling class. 
(11) 
I say "tautology" 
because in the ideal-typical sense, any ruling class must 
by definition control the distribution of ideas, since if 
it does not, it is not a ruling class. In fact, however, 
it may be doubted whether any class or stratum, historically 
or actually, has ever achieved incontestable dominance 
over the ideas of men. The brutal control methods of 
agrarian society, modern socialism, or early capitalist 
society, illustrate their relative ideological fragility. 
In the case of the Nazi nightmare, is it not the extraordinary 
s 
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ease with which liberal capitalism has established itself 
in modern Germany, eloquent testimony of totalitarian 
failure to transform men's minds? 
A human capital order may be said to be "functional" 
in the context of modern technology. Modern technology 
endlessly changes the pattern of relative scarcities; 
of comparative advantages. The much more rigid skill 
order of a pre-industrial society would be dysfunctional 
in such a context, could not cope with the unpredictable 
character of social Change. ei dY or may noL have 
been economically rational in the ante-bellum American 
South. 
(12) 
The grounds for agreeing with Max Weber in 
counting it dysfunctional in an industrial context are 
very strong. 
(13) 
Though the Nazi and Soviet despotisms 
have involved a massive use of slave labour, there are few 
grounds for thinking that this has been consistent with 
economic efficiency. There are indeed powerful reasons for 
believing that the pitiful track record of the Soviet Union 
as a system for improving living standards, does indeed 
relate to its ideologically based failure to generate 
economic rationality, its entrapment, through its own 
self-defeating social philosophy, in a posture which Paul 
Johnson calls a "slave state" 
(14) 
and which Peter Wiles, 
only slightly more euphemistically, terms a "loose 
Prison". 
(15) 
Slavery, caste, serfdom, socialism and other 
social orders of a rigidly constrained type are simply 
inappropriate in industrial society. They cannot cope 
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With the unpredictable outcomes of modern technology. 
Weber is the supreme indeterminist. For Weber, as 
Aron points out, science can neither tell us what our 
future will be, nor how we should live. 
(16) 
The process 
of rationalization which Weber observed in science and 
government, in culture and economy, is the response of 
contemporary society to this open future, to this root 
uncertainty in the human condition, an uncertainty multiplied 
geometrically by modern technology. 
Yet though Weber does not believe in a predictable 
future, nor in a perfect comprehension of the past, 
(17) 
he is alive to the irreversible character, in some respects, 
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such as the abolition of the money economy. Freund perhaps 
rather overstates the case: "Capitalism, as Weber saw it, 
is a system which cannot be destroyed by a revolution, 
however radical, since some aspects of it correspond to 
the needs of economic rationalization and will continue 
to influence the new social structures which men may 
establish. " 
(18) 
This all needs unpacking. We must distinguish between 
"capitalist" and "industrial" society. The irreversible 
character of industrial society means not that such a society 
cannot begin to de-industrialize. It is conceivable that 
such a retrogression is at work in contemporary Great 
Britain. Irreversibility refers to the logical imperatives 
of industrial society, such as legal/rational procedures, 
SSC 
imperatives which must Sul V1 VC as , _ýýýy as i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survives. 
In the case of industrial capitalism, similar 
reflections hold. A society can remain industrial and, 
nevertheless, lose many of its capitalist features. Nazi 
- Germany is the classic case. The boundless pre-eminence 
k 
of the Nazi corporate state, involved the abolition of the 
open labour market. Closed labour markets are characteristic 
of pre-capitalist society, though modern totalitarianism 
continues, revives and perpetuates them. A fascist society, 
which removes the rights of workers to negotiate their 
earnings in the market place, attentuates that process of 
rational_ calculation which human capital theory assumes. 
To this extent a fascist economy is less "capitalist" 
than a liberal capitalist economy. It seems to me, moreover, 
no accident that all highly developed capitalist economies 
are relatively liberal societies, though only time will 
tell whether autocratic capitalist regimes like Singapore 
will liberalize as they mature, or indeed whether the 
liberalism of advanced capitalism is sustainable in the 
long term. 
Fascism and communism in fact result in societies 
which are reminiscent of the base/superstructure metaphor 
of Marxism, a metaphor which we shall later argue is false 
when applied to capitalist society. In relation to 
totalitarian society it is a persuasive metaphor, though 
in an odd way. For the Marxist metaphor locates ideas as 
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superstructural in capitalist society, unconvincingly, 
as I would. argue. But is not ideology infra-structural, 
in totalitarian society? Does it not become the binding 
interest of the party and bureaucratic elites? Does it 
not attenuate the rationalization process, interfere 
with cybernetic imperatives, and produce huge dysfunctional- 
ities? Does ideology not become a "base" constraining 
the rest of socio-economic life? What we shall argue in 
our chapter on socialism is that totalitarian regimes 
are associated with a restricted skill order, that we do 
not find in them the widespread, freely calculative weighing 
of costs and benefits which characterizes skill formations 
in the advanced Western soci eties .T am not advancing the 
absurd thesis that there is no rationality as to skill 
formation in socialist society, only that human capital 
formation there is at a relatively low and restricted 
level. In Soviet Russia and China, for example, there is 
massive restriction on the geographical mobility of labour, 
that deliberated mobility which is so important a source 
of human capital formation in capitalist society. I shall 
also argue that the further economic development of 
socialist societies implies the emergence of social 
stratification on the basis of the differential distri- 
bution of human capital. This process will threaten the 
ideologically inspired structure of social control. 
The rationalization which Weber detects in capitalist 
development is particularly clear in the case of economic 
LI l- 
phenomena. lt is true that the margin or scarcity is 
rolled back by industrialization, true that leisure 
preference, having been initially diminished by industrial- 
ization, is subsequently enhanced by it, true also that 
liberation from primary (low income) poverty, and the 
increase in leisure it has secured, in some ways have 
amplified, in capitalist society, the partial indeterminacy 
between' economic and mental life which obtains in all eras. 
Nevertheless it is reasonable to propose that industrial 
capitalism renders social reality in some ways increasi j 
economic, by widening the arenas of economic decision- 
making, by increasing the role of the citizen as producer, 
consumer; saver and investor, Thus economic sociology 
suggests a continued relevance for the central concept 
"role". This concept has been challenged by those who see 
it as a dehumanizing notion which reifies the world, 
obscuring the fluidity of human action, or legitimating 
an oppressive order, the alienated world of the division 
of labour. 
(19) 
1 prefer to regard the division of labour 
grosso modo, as a liberating phenomenon, releasing and 
harnessing the endless, though always precarious, inventive- 
ness of man. I would follow Brian Davies in his defence 
of role as a concept necessary for the analysis of the 
interface between human identity and social structure. 
(20) 
This dramaturgical conceit is appropriate for the discussion 
of socio-economic action in all eras; and in particular, 
'k, 
the rationalization, the increasing calculative marketization 
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signifies an increased rather than a diminished relevance 
for the idea of role. Thus we can claim that in addition 
to its conceptual affinities with Weberian ideas, human 
capital theory is also highly consistent with that recently 
much maligned body of thought loosely known as "functionalism". 
The citizens of advanced capitalist society have clear 
functional roles as consumers, savers and investors. The 
economy is indeed a structure of economic roles. No slight 
on the richness and variety of humanity is implied here. 
Just as human capital formation does not constitute a 
man's humanity, but only those productivities variously 
vested in him, so man's role as general economic decision- 
maker is not the measure of man. 
Once again it is proper to note that Talcott Parsons, 
the doyen of functionalism, was originally an, economist. 
At times his words sound like a pure sociology of capitalism, 
though they attempt to identify perennial prerequisites 
rather than those of modern capitalist society: "the 
major functional problem concerning the social system's 
relation to the personality system involves learning, 
developing and maintaining throughout the life cycle 
adequate motivation for participating in socially valued 
and controlled patterns of action. Reciprocally a society 
must also adequately satisfy or reward its. members through 
such patterns of action if it is continually to draw upon 
their performances for its functioning as a system "(21)(my 
italics). 
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Through this clumsy, spiky language, there can be 
discerned an unerring grasp of the modern social world. 
Brian Davies puts it thus of Parsons: "Parsons' schema 
may be overly formal, pretentious, wordy and inherently 
conservative, but they also pick out vital aspects of man 
and society. Men in some degree are socially formed, 
consensus in society does derive from widely shared values, 
social process is end-directed and partially self- 
monitoring and so one"(22) The extract from Parsons is 
1 
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society and, if by chance, of the metaphysical core of 
human capital theory. My guess is that history will rank 
Parsons as a maestro, in the same league as Smith, Marx, 
Durkheim, Weber and Keynes -- a name to be conjured with 
`and revered, when the lesser spirits and petits maitres who 
have reviled him have been consigned to a merciful oblivion. 
(23) 
Functionalism, like Marxism, like monetarism, like psycho- 
analysis, has passed into the mainstream of intellectual 
history. It can demand from human capital theory an 
infusion of new blood and indeed it is a sign of its intellect- 
ual viability that functionalism can absorb new insights, 
which also illumine it. Role we have briefly discussed, 
but there are also the significant conceits "function" and 
"consensus" to which more attention must be given. 
Brian Davies has stressed that social life is end- 
directed. (24) Such a teleology makes "function" an unavoidable 
Concept. In fact, both social institutions and societal 
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sub-systems of education, medicine, law and transport, 
perform many functions; but can we reasonably doubt their 
purposive significance in the skill order? The educability 
of the individual, conceived from our specific viewpoint 
as his potentiality for the deliberated and costly accumu- 
lation of knowledge and skill as capital, is largely formed 
in the family, school has the function of creating that 
capital, individually or socially, medicine of maintaining 
it, law of protecting it and transport of mobilising it. 
Those institutions and sub-systems have indispensable 
functions in the economic aspects of social life. Certainly 
in relation to family, school, law, health, medicine and 
transport, i think we ýýii u good grounds for 
John Eggleston that the proposed jettisoning of terms like 
"role" and "function" by some sociologists, has been both 
cavalier and premature. 
(25) 
We have previously argued at length that there is 
unprecedented consensus in advanced capitalist society. In 
modern capitalist society there is a light burden of 
external control, and a massive incidence of internalized 
control. Human capital formation spans these conditions, 
for though the overwhelming majority of those possessing 
it 
have never heard of it as an articulated notion, the 
deeply 
entrenched view that skill and status differentials, 
having 
been expensive to achieve; are legitimate and should 
be 
maintained, is a striking example of internalized economic 
rationality. 
1.1 I 
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of external control also relate to general economic 
rationality, and though economic sociology has not yet 
much penetrated the area, the human capital order of the 
advanced Western world is vital to an explanation of the 
huge gulf in living standards and economic efficiency between 
industrial capitalism and industrial communism. As Sir 
Karl Popper asserts, the notion that the imperatives of 
science require a planned society (in our case including 
a planned skill-formation) combines two errors: the first 
as to the nature of science, the second as to the nature of 
society. 
(26) 
It is precisely the openness and uncertainty 
of the future that render the organization of sk; ll_formation 
as private human capital, both rational and functional. 
By this I mean simply that a society based on planned skill- 
formation, could-not conceivably respond to the changing 
structure of scarcity as efficiently as one characterized 
by individual decision-making. Technological change is 
not predictable -- whatever the gloomy predictions about 
silicon-chips and their effects on labour -- simply because 
the future in general is not predictable. Uncertainty is 
part of our human condition, and uncertainty is magnified 
by the dynamism of modern technology. It is for this reason 
that I regard human capital formation as "functional" in 
the conditions of modern society. This is"why I would 
endorse the extreme scepticism as to manpower forecasting 
adopted by Blaug(27) and Psacharopoulos. 
(28) 
l1. 
I .Iý 
No economic phenomena are more human than those of 
human capital formation. Machinery and raw materials 
are separate from man. Human capital formation is integral 
to him, inalienable from him. Human capital formation 
involves a. Purposive weighing of the likely outcomes of 
investment decisions. How much foregone income is involved 
in taking a degree? How much psychic pain and monetary cost 
are irivoived in moving to a higher wage area or economy? 
What is the risk of disappointment and failure? Now, while 
there is undoubtedly much in the income distribution of a 
capitalist economy which does not relate to the decisions 
emerging from such calculations, the whole edifice of 
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which does. 
The concept of the consensus raises fascinating issues 
in the philosophy of social science. Specifically, shall we 
follow D-.. r". <he ird cr Marx in a 31: -olis- 
is view of society? 
Or, alternatively, is Weberian methodological individualism, 
which finds a parallel in neo-classical economics, the most 
convincing perspective? 
"Interpretive sociology considers the individual and 
his action as the basic unit, as its 'atom'..... In general, 
for sociology, such concepts as 'state', 'association', 
'feudalism' and the like, designate certain categories of 
human interaction. Hence it is the task of sffciology to 
reduce these concepts to 'understandable' action, that is, 
without exception, to the actions of participating 
i5a. 
individual Men. tI Individual human capital decisions, 
though they can be conceptualized as aggregately coalescing 
into a structure -- the human capital order -- are precisely 
the "understandable" actions of individual participating 
men. 
Weber is right if he intended to say that the individ- 
ual is the ultimate human reality. Institutions do consist 
only of their members. If Weber be taken as expressing a 
preference for the individual as the focus of social science, 
I would not dcmur. The individual as ultimate constituent 
always, and ultimate analytical focus where possible, seems 
to me an important credo. 
some writings of holistic inspiration seem to dispense 
for ever with the idea of the individual. Gintis' attack 
on mainstream micro-economics is of this sort, whatever his 
intentions. His claim is that exterior manipulations are 
built into the ostensibly individual preference demonstra- 
tions we observe. 
(30) 
I prefer to stress the degree of 
rational autonomy the individual has in weighing up the 
flow of information coming to him. You pays your money; 
and you takes your choice. But it is notable that it is 
my view which is optimistic. Gintis is the pessimist. 
For what grounds can he offer theoretically that socialist 
society would secure greater rational autonomy, i. e. a 
situation where manipulative exterior influences are not 
constitutive of individual action? Moreover, empirically it 
seems to be the case that in some societies which do not 
e 
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West, e. g. Poland, there are patterns of consumption 
preference very much like ours, on the basis of much less 
information. Here the official "structure" is telling the 
individual one thing, and the individual is doing another. 
The ease with which the emulation effect penetrates Eastern 
Europe suggests to me that advanced capitalism is indeed a 
system which expresses, additively, what individuals actually 
want. If capitalist output is not the sum of all 
preferences, grosso mod. o; but the result of the implanting 
in the masses of ideas serving the interests of capitalists, 
how do consumer patterns of a "capitalist" type so easily 
take root in societies where capitalist agencies of 
manipulation are largely absent? Let us note that Ronald 
Dore comes close to suggesting in his critique of Ivan 
filch that "consumerist" is what we really are. 
(31) 
I am temperamentally disposed to individualism and 
convinced that methodological individualism is far more often 
viable than its critics will allow. I think the theory 
of private human capital is a laudable case of methodological 
individualism. Nevertheless we need to recognize that what 
we may call "conceptual individualism" -- the conviction 
that there is nothing, ultimately, in society other than 
the sum of its members -- does not mean we can dispense with 
methodological holism. Some collective phenomena are 
experienced as if they were entities -- families, monarchies, 
social classes are among the many examples. Furthermore, 
I n-n 
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employing aggregate variables. Macro-economics and social 
many forms of socio-economic analysis must proceed by 
human capital theory are among the many examples. 
(32) 
Thus while the consensus can only be the sum of its 
individual parts and should be seen as an intellectual 
construct rather than an entity, I would also claim that 
the consensus of the Durkheim-Parsons tradition is not a 
myth as Bourdieu would have it, 
(33) 
but at the leve? of 
experience a reality, a reality above all in societies 
characterized by widespread incidence of the market code 
and its attendant phenomena of voluntarist spending and 
savings decisions. 
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out, in the firm belief that the sociological derivations 
of human capital theory are rich in their explanatory 
power in the study of such consensus, is also antithetical 
to Weber's view of the fundamentally conflictful nature 
of society, a view that, according to Aron, is as deeply 
held by Weber as by Marx. 
(34) 
On such a view power must be 
be the basis of social order. For Weber such conflict is 
eternal; for Marx it will be ended when the future non- 
antagonistic society comes into being. Such views either 
exaggerate the degree of conflict in actual Western society 
(Marx and Weber), overlooking the consensual element 
in social control, or they sublimely ignore those sources 
of conflict which seem in all likelihood to prove permanent. 
For example, there is Marx's belief in the abolition of 
1 f;; 
cn rr+i 4> >o ni nr1 i crc. n, 1. l c, n1 c, m. -, ý f - i rN 4-- 1-%, m -n l-Nr 14 4-4 . ý.. 
of the class struggle. There are good grounds, however, 
for believing that scarcity can be attenuated . only, 
never abolished. 
All great sociologies are characterized by internal 
tension and contradiction. In Weber's case, his view of 
power as the basis of social order is difficult to 
reconcile with the extreme voluntarism of his view of man. 
Perhaps this is what Davies has in mind when he speaks 
of Weber's "missing middle". 
(35) 
The core of this thesis 
is that "freedom" and "voluntariness" presuppose a bedrock 
of agreement. Men cannot engage in costly activity cal- 
culated to maintain or raise their earnings and status 
and positron in the overall structure of decision-making, 
unless there is a widely distributed and internalized 
market code (a set of coherent economic principles) supported 
by a deeply entrenched value consensus. There is a ¶enerai 
connection bet,. ieen economic indicators such as interest 
rates, and the force of consensus. The genera-11y lower 
pattern of interest rates in industrial capitalist societies, 
as compared to pre-industrial societies, represents not only 
the greater abundance of credit but also a change in the 
pattern of risk aversion, as economic fite becomes more 
rationalized ä la Weber, and more consensualized a la 
Durkheim. 
The whole power/conflict tradition rests on an 
unsatisfactory metaphysic. Let us assume a continuwn of 
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societies stretching between the polar opposites of our_e 
agreement and pure coercion. While both extremes 
represent an impossible social reality, it is reasonable 
to maintain that social life in general tends to veer to 
one pole rather than the other, specifically to rest 
fundamentally on agreement rather than power. On this 
view power will flourish only in the social interstices 
where men's agreements have penetrated only weakly, or not 
at all. What we nevertheless argued in our chapter on 
pre-i iýriýictr' ?l society ; and will arafuP again in our chapter 
on socialism, is that many of the central social divisions % 
in such societies are not, apparently, easily internalized 
by o6 W11Ulll 1. 
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slaVG and serf, the 
disenfranchised citizen of contemporary Eastern Europe, 
the impoverished Third World peasant, the slum proletarian 
of early capitalism, may very well have internalized 
imperatives against robbing, raping and betraying his friends 
and neighbours. There are good, a priori grounds, however, 
for thinking that only weakly and partially does he accept 
the huge social distance between him and those more favoured. 
That, surely, is the explanation for the countless flare-ups 
in agrarian society down the ages, as late as the slave 
revolts in the nineteenth-century American South. Such 
surely is the explanation of the Russian tanks in Budapest 
in 1956, or in Prague in 1968. Such is the logic of 
Sharpeville and Soweto. Modern, liberal capitalist society 
been the first society since the Stone Age that has not en 
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forced, by the very nature of its structure of social control, 
to have frequent recourse to such massive violence for 
purposes of general order. The principles of the capitalist 
social consensus are deeply impressed on the individual 
consciousness. The individual does indeed feel the force 
of the consensus as if it were a thing. 
The structure of social control in advanced capitalist 
society, a structure which is intimately linked with a 
human capital order, does not preclude conflict. Competition, 
which dte 1aisi adlrlg thes of the p ogressive liiono- 
polization of the capital stock, the growing concentration 
of manufacturing power, 
(36) 
remains indispensable to a 
flexible allocation of economic resources, is itself a 
phenomenon of conflict.. But it operates within a consensus 
which defines its acceptable limits. 
What we find in modern capitalist society is in fact 
the fullest expression to date of what it means to be 
human. As Durkheim understood, to be an autonomous indivi- 
dual a man must internalize a whole battery of social mores 
and imperatives. 
(37) 
In some respects his central problem 
was the social explanation of the individualism which he 
saw as characteristic of the age. In this sense, the wide- 
spread individual economic activity represented by human 
capital formation can be conceived, in terms of its function 
in the creation of cohesion and solidarity, as occupying 
a gap in Durkheim's work, as much as in Weber's. The 
phenolerron of widespread human capital format: ion, whereby 
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and mobilization of productivities in men, as simultaneously 
calculating, competing and consenting individuals, is a 
tribute to the viability of our species, given the appro- 
priate circumstances, without crude direction, terror and 
coercion. 
Human capital theory, whatever the shortcomings Mark 
Blaug brings to our notice, 
(38) 
has brilliantly illumined 
the economics of this situation. Such an illumination has 
massive sociolocical implications. In particular, those 
calculative behaviours which we conceptualize as leading 
to human capital formation, involve a massive amplification 
of those areas of agreement without which society is 
impossible, or to put it in another way, a parallel reduction 
in those coercive activities which operate in the "consensual 
gaps" which all societies also have. Capitalism has led 
men to invest massively in themselves. Given risk 
aversion, men will not act in this way unless there is a 
high probability of social continuity. Consensus is a 
condition of such probability. 
I1, I iu" 
Iz 
Htun n capita]_ and Social Stratification 
The basic insight into a theory of social stratification 
given by human capital theory is clear. A dichotomous 
model of social class, in terms of who does or does not 
own property (physical capital), is no longer viable.. 
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in terms of a recognition of those elements in social strati- 
fication which pertain to human capital formation. Herein 
lies the hitherto missing theoretical basis of the pluralist 
case. Labour, in its human capital guise, has become a 
significant element in social control and stratification, 
precisely because it is not just raw, unimproved labour 
from some industrial -reserve army, but rather a scarce 
repository of skills, of capital choices, of incurred costs. 
In human capital theory we find an explanation of the bases 
of new or enlarged classes and strata -- the skilled 
proletariat, the professions, the technostructure. -The 
s, ci. ll. ed wor'-Tº-- n, the doctor; the highly-qual ifi. ed býa. reauc -a- 
may be taken as having deliberately invested in themselves, 
deliberately having balanced the money and psychic costs 
of their career decisions against previsioned money, status 
and decision-making returns. 
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of social stratification is in something of a mess. It is 
difficult to know whether the lack of agreement represents 
an exciting fecundity in the social sciences, pre- 
figuring major intellectual advance, or whether the 
uncertainty reflects ambiguities which will prove permanent 
in the social sciences, predicated as they are on a reality 
which, whatever regularities it manifests, involves 
perpetual motion. Is our choice of theories between an 
untidy correctness, as in the Registrar General's occuoation- 
al classification, and a more compact system of erroneous 
dichotomy, as in structural Marxism? 
The burden of this thesis-is that the concept of 
human capital formation rivals or even surpasses the claim 
of ohvsical capital to serve as the principal determinant 
of social processes and patterns. The notion of systematic 
human capital formation can furnish occupational measures 
of social class with a hitherto missing conceptual cutting- 
edge. Previous social formations have been polarized 
around discontinuous divisions between haves and have-nots. 
Under oriental despotism there were those who dominated 
the bureaucracy, and those who were dominated by it. Under 
feudalism the division was between those who controlled 
land, and those who worked it. Arguably, in the early 
conditions of industrialism, the separation was between those 
who owned physical capital and those who did not. 
We may in all this have recourse to Bernsteins notion 
of classification. A dichotomous social formation in most 
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eras has implied strong classification" or a principled 
kind between social strata. If we identify modern capitalist 
society as typified by relatively weak classification 
between social strata, we may indeed turn to human capital 
theory as our deus ex machina from previous dichotomies. 
For human capital formation is ubiquitous. Though there 
are those who possess it in. abundance, even the meanest 
citizen of modern capitalism is not totally without it. 
A widespread distribution of human capital signifies weak 
insulation between social strata. Why? Because of the 
relatively continuous character of that distribution. 
Agrarian, socialist and early capitalist formations all 
require a high incidence of coer. cion, since the central 
dichotomy in such societies is not easily internalized, 
that is to say, cannot easily be disseminated through con- 
census. Advanced capitalist society does not have this 
problem. There is quite simply no such dichotomy to be 
internalized. 
Human capital formation does not, however, constitute 
an easy nostrum for equality. Human capital is formed in, 
embedded in, various non-economic stocks of human aptitudes 
which are differentially distributed in the population and 
constitute, indeed, a greater secular obstacle to equalityp 
than physical wealth which can, after all, be nationalized. 
For a market economy identifies scarcities, productivities 
in the labour force, which are only partly the productivities 
of pure human capital formation. They are also the non- 
1C-- 
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the outcomes of relative imponderables such as luck, 
corruption, nepotism and so on. However much we aim to 
eliminate the injustices of human arrangements, a 
rational economy is likely to foster incremental producti- 
vities on the basis of biologically and socially determined 
aptitudes which admit of no easy egalitarian redistribution. 
In a sense the supreme virtue of a rational capitalist 
economy may also be a source of tension. While the socio- 
economic processes of capitalism can partly push aside the 
overlays of race, class, accent and mores -- that is they 
can dissolve many aspects of ascriptive barriers between 
people -- they also ruthlessly expose the raw socio-cultural 
potential on which human capital is based. As Psacharo- 
poulos and Wiles observe, how much schooling a child receives 
depends partly. on how suitable for schooling he appears 
at an early age. 
(39) 
The economic entity, the economic 
citizen, conflates in his productivity, non-economic elements 
of a genetic and socio-cultural kind, along with more purely 
economic components arising from his educational and medical 
biography. There is clearly a tendency for him who is 
rich in non-economic culture (Bourdieu's misnamed cultural 
capital) to become rich in human capital formation. Quite 
simply he is a more informed decision-maker. 
Nevertheless, as A. H. Halsey's Reith Lectures make 
clear, there has been a massive change in the occupational 
structure, involving the emergence of a huge middle class, 
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and of, a skilled and semi-skilled working class .`" 
The process is not to be termed "embourgeoisement". Such 
a term was always etymological nonsense, though many 
British and American writers have now fallen into the French 
trap of wrongly using "middle class" and "bourgeois" 
coterminously. But the idea of a human capital distribution 
running continuously from very high formations, to very low 
ones, has enormous appeal. It helps to explain the 
secular trends in the distribution of income. It helps 
to ex_plaiýý t. e3s 
toi i cf socia stratification and the 
structure of social control. 
What have traditionally been regarded as ascriptive 
social phenomena, the accidents of 'Zi -1i and. 
may be regarded as leading to strong classification between 
social strata. Meritocratic phenomena lead to a weakening 
ý41) 
of classification. If Psacharopoulos and Wiles are correct 
in arguing that the regression of income on education does 
indeed yield a significant correlation, if Psacharopoulos is 
right that one can make the distribution of income slightly 
more equal by longer schooling for the children of lowest 
income groups, 
(42) 
if indeed the labour market is conceived 
as sensitive to the end-product of schooling and other 
decision-making, rather than merely rewarding its initial 
genetic and cultural props, then it does indeed become 
reasonable to treat human capital formation as a dissolver 
of traditional strong classifications between strata. 
We shall certainly propose that human capital formation 
1ýU "' 
is a hinge of the occupational structure. For as the 
Jencks' report made clear, education and occupation are 
positively correlated. 
(43) 
Whilst Jencks and his team 
denied the education and income link 
(44) 
-- wrongly as 
Psacharopoulos and Wiles now insist 
(45) 
-- the education- 
occupation connection was one of their strongest findings. 
Economists have of late increasingly borrowed from 
sociologists the statistical technique of path analysis, 
in the study of the links between education, occupation 
om --, -1. r, nuc perm ... 
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the direct effects of one variable on another, say education 
on income, education on occupation or occupation on income, 
exampýC r in the form of a "direct path coef f icieiiL" r uz 
Psacharopoulos and Tinbergen find a direct path coefficient 
of . 174 between education and earnings. 
(46) 
This means 
that if the level of education is increased by one standard 
deviation, then mean earnings will increase by . 174 standard 
deviations. The authors also calculate the direct path 
coefficient between education and occupation (. 221) and 
the (very high) path coefficient between occupation and 
earnings (. 342). 
(47) 
However, the relationship between 
education and earnings is clearly mediated through occupation, 
and the direct path coefficient between education and 
earnings (. 31-74) is thus an understatement. The particular 
appeal of this path analysis is that it also permits an 
additive treatment of the variables involved in the 
determination of earnings. Psacharopoulos and Tinbergen 
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(that is the relationship between earnings and the combined 
influences of father's occupation, individual's ability, 
years of education and occupation) of . 279. 
(48) 
This is in 
line with the"coefficient of correlation of earnings 
regressed on education" of traditional analysis, only 
rarely denied as statistically significant. 
(49) 
One or two comments seem pertinent. First, occupation 
is a huge predictor of earnings according to Psacharopoulos 
and Tinbergen (direct path coefficient of . 342). Second, 
education powerfully correlates directly with occupation 
(direct path coefficient of . 221) and significantly with 
earnings (direct path coefficient of . 174). These relation- 
ships are consistent with a constantly reiterated theme of 
this thesis: namely, that the occupational structure is the 
prime determinant of the "anatomy of class" (to use Halsey's 
phrase) 
(50) 
and unambiguously so if we consider income 
significant in the class-structure. The occupational- 
structure is the principal embodiment of human capital 
formation, above all of educational human capital formation. 
Futhermore the intermediary role of education is crucial. 
According to Psacharopoulos and Tinbergen, the direct path 
coefficient between father's occupation and child's earnings 
is quite low (. 036). Thus the influence of father's occupa- 
tion (social class) has to be mediated through schooling and 
occupation. 
Finally, the model understates the influence of schooling. 
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who claim that it is in reality parents' education which 
is responsible for the effect of social background on 
earnings. These writers have shown that highly-educated 
mothers spend. more time with their children than less- 
educated mothers. 
(52) 
I have engaged in this brief statistical digression to 
stress my belief that the findings of some types of economic 
and social analysis point in the same direction. The findings 
of a human capital theorist like Psacharopoulos, both 
confirm empirically the contentions of Halsey (drawn from 
other data) on the trends in social stratification, and 
facilitate, through the idea of a "human capital order", 
some further conceptual purchase on the problem. A man's 
place in the occupational structure is partly determined 
by his human capital formation, by the costly choices he 
has made with regard to education, training, health-care, 
job-search, information retrieval, migration and so on 
, 
(his privately generated human capital) and also by the 
collective action in these regards which affects him 
involuntarily (social human capital). Human capital theory 
is also, as we shall see, in some degree the missing 
COriCeptucii l: C1LLCnt1 o Weber 's specific contribution to 
stratification theory, that is, his rounding off of "class" 
by the addition of a "status" variable and 
.a 
"party" 
variable. 
(53) 
What we must spell out above all is that under capitalism 
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the occupational structure comes, for the first time, 
to oust the warrior-prince, priestly bureaucrat or 
landowner, as the dominant element in social stratification. 
Hitherto, while occupations were always of course important, 
in that the rule of the elite, a generally coercive rule 
as we have argued, was always occupationally mediated, these 
mediators such as lawyers and other functionaries, always 
had a secondary postion. Now, when the occupational 
structure embodies, and expresses in good measure, the vast 
accumulated resources of the human cdpi Lal order, what was 
once secondary has become primary. The middle class has 
"arrived". The term "middle class" must be separated from 
the notion "bourgeois". Furthermore, "middle-classness" 
cannot be explained entirely with reference to the distribu- 
tion of income. There are actually quite large minorities 
of high-income citizens who are hard to locate socially, 
for example, pop singers and professional footballers. 
Middle-classness must also relate significantly to phenomena 
on the continuum between Bourdieu's (misnamed) cultural 
capital, and skill formations of a human capitalist kind. 
We can probably distinguish high-wage proletarian human 
capital from middle-class human capital, not in terms of 
a greater previsioned decree of market-sensitive costing for 
the latter, but in terms of the additional status and party 
elements in the middle-class calculus. 
(54) 
We have repeatedly stressed the dangers of reductionism. 
It seems very unlikely that the : uralt=lplex 
dimensions 
of 
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stratification in a capitalist society should boil down 
to some quintessential core. What I do feel sure of, is 
that human capital formation, expressed in the occupational 
structure, is the single most important element in social 
stratification in the advanced economies, and that it has 
brought the senior reaches of the occupational structure 
into an unprecedented pre-eminence. 
The term "middle class", however, is not very successful 
as a structural metaphor. It is true that we can rank a 
do... o Ci iurrY .. r ,. IyLcr w. äil ä 
bi 1ý. ý ay 2i , even when 1.110 
latter may earn more, because the latter is so much "lower" 
in the status hierarchy. However, we run into great 
difficulties when we try to extend the "structural layers" 
metaphor further upwards, and to place the middle-class 
human capitalist in relation to the bourgeoisie. For it is 
now clear that the giant corporation is a better risk taker 
than the individual wealthy man. For that reason, the actual 
management of physical capital is increasingly institutionally 
mediated -- controlled, that is to say, by professionals 
and bureaucrats who will typically be rich in human capital 
formation. In other words, the physical capital order and 
human capital order overlap. 
Thus there will be a small number of very high. -income 
people (not themselves necessarily large wealth-holders) 
whom it is difficult to call ''middle'' in relation to anything. 
They are quite simply at the top. Nothing could be further 
from my mind than the view that the 
class structure is a 
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trichotomous hierarchy, involving capitalists at the ton. 
middle classes in the "middle" and the working-class 
majority at the bottom. When I employ the term "middle 
class" in this thesis, it carries a definite sense of non- 
proletarian status, but says rather little about the 
complicated social mosaic of the huge non-working-class 
population. My thoughts on this enormously complicated 
subject remain inchoate. All I can at present venture 
is the proposition that middle-classness involves income, 
status, party and life-style in a complex fusion relating 
intimately to human capital formation embedded in the 
occupational structure. 
Those hostile to this thesis might of course accept 
this proposition of the primacy of the occupational structure, 
and yet draw from it far from comfortable conclusions, 
might see it as does Bernstein, 
of the division of labour''. 
(55) 
as "the grim obduracy 
Does not the occupational 
structure express perfectly the most insidious of all trends 
in an alienating division of labour, namely the crystallizing 
of social strata around the division between the mental and 
the manual? 
The answer is that perhaps the occupational structure 
does manif she unequal distribution of income between 
mental and manual labour. Not unambiguously though, for 
there are some manual jobs which carry much higher earnings 
than some mental ones. For example, for much of the post- 
war period teaching was associated with lower earnings in 
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can be dramatic changes in the intra-national distribution 
of earnings. 
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It would seem to be only the status outcomes of human 
capital formation which one can truly associate with the 
division between mental and manual occupations. There is 
discontinuous high status attached to medicine, law and 
other favoured occupations in the occupational hierarchy. 
The income division is much more gradual, much less 
discontinuous. 
Industrialization makes status a more significant and 
generalized phenomenon than it was in pre-industrial society. 
First; it reduces those ascriptive barriers which privatized 
status in the pre-industrial world, for example, the huge 
"status gap" between the aristocracy and serfs in a feudal 
society. Second, by increasing the lifespan of the average 
citizen and differentiating his socio-economic experiences, 
industrialization makes it possible for the citizen to 
relate to a larger number of reference groups than was 
possible in pre-industrial society. There is always a 
limitation forced by mortality on a society's ability 
to engender status. Status requires reference groups. The 
essence of one man's having status is that someone else does 
not. 
This means that, unlike wealth and income, to the 
generation of which there is no easily foreseeable end in 
the conditions of modern technology, the stock of status is 
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limited. It may increase as longevity increases, or as 
leisure, time increases, but in principle it is less amenable 
to multiplication than are wealth and income. 
We repeat that status is not divorced from economic 
phenomena. Though there are many status phenomena which 
are, strictly speaking, non-economic, for example those 
associated with physical appearance, if there is one 
abiding deficiency in the sociological analysis of status, 
it is that insufficient attention has been paid to its 
economic aspects. 
(57) 
True, Weber and Veblen were very 
sensitive to the economic aspects of status as secured ý"y 
spending, by Veblen's "conspicuous conslamption". We never- 
theless find one of our most persuasive social theorists, 
Anthony Giddens, entirely failing to apprehend the economic 
nature of many status-phenomena in capitalist society. 
(58) 
I do not deny that there are non-economic aspects in social 
stratification. It is simply that a non-economic view of 
status will not do. Modern social theorists have a 
penchant for ignoring or denying the economic character of 
phenomena which are economic, or employing economic termino- 
logy around phenomena which are not. 
(59) 
The implication of a fruitful coupling of economic 
and social insights in terms of human capital theory is that 
much of the stock of status is indeed economic, is in fact 
a "status capital". Prevision of the status outcomes of 
human investment decisions can be taken as profoundly 
modifying the purely monetary aspects of decisions to form 
1/U 
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human capital through training or migration. in 
other words, a considerable element in the status stock 
is a non-monetary but nevertheless economic return to 
the costs of human capital formation. People train as 
professionals, as skilled workers, partly because of 
the flow of non-monetary benefits which they anticipate 
will result from their capital formation. A reading of 
the purely monetary returns to human capital formation 
vastly understates its contribution to social hierarchy. 
More than this: while the purely monetary returns to 
human capital formation may constitute a dissolution in 
the strength of classification between social strata, the 
non-'monetary. status returns may he the basis of new 
strong classifications. This, we shall argue in a 
subsequent chapter, is a fortiori the case with profession- 
alism. 
Weber's approach to social class is a valuable 
attempt to break free from Marx's over-emphasis on owner- 
ship of property. What Weber necessarily leaves out 
is a developed treatment of the sociological significance 
of those economic resources actually-invested in the 
citizen. In Economy and Society he makes it clear that 
marketable skills are a source of class position. Indeed 
he sees the "middle classes" as in significant degree 
based on such skills, often "monopolizing" these. 
(60) 
This inchoate insight must be taken much further today. 
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Most citizens are simply not the instantly replaceable 
cyphers envisaged by Marx. The costly accumulation of 
skills in all developed economies, capitalist and 
socialist alike, is now vast. It has huge income 
implications, as we have seen, but also massive status 
implications, and massive general implications for 
social stratification. 
Industrialization generally weakens the classification 
between social strata. That is what an increase in 
achle . '°: et as oppose'. to ascription actually is. Ascription 
involves strong boundaries, strong insulation between strata. 
In Bernstein's work it is taken as characteristic of 
L Li Lý ' they PrA certain iorm6 of itiuü5L-ýiä., L occupation that 
they 
arme- 
strongly classified. 
(61) 
In general it may be doubted that 
this is typical. For one thing, there is high price 
elasticity of substitution between some kinds of wage 
labour, that is, their boundaries are weakly insulated. 
(62) 
There might well be stronger classification between strata 
if human capital differentiation were more precise. This 
might occur if, for example, the instructional system were 
itself more capitalistic, such that employers were able to 
demand more precise curricular biographies of their 
employees. 
(63). 
We shall discuss the fascinating outcomes 
of the removal of school (the main agency of skill-formation) 
from the private to the public sector, in our later chapters 
on education. The important point here is that such a 
removal reduces the general sensitivity of the labour market. a 
1VV 
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to variations in labour productivity. In some degree 
social stratification reflects this. But the labour market 
is not finely sensitive to scarcity. It is evident, for 
example, that the connection between education and employ- 
ment is not highly specific. There is a strong connection 
between education and the level of occupation; but a weak 
one between the contents of education and job. It is also 
the case that there are many other elements in social 
hierarchy than the differential distribution of labour 
productivity. Such hierarchy is a mixture of achievement 
and ascription. All previous societies were dichotomized 
around the latter. 
Industrial capitalism shatters this dichotomy. For in 
an advanced capitalist society, land ceases to be the main 
non-human input to production, at the same time as the 
human input becomes variegated. The sociological message, 
till now only latent, of Becker, Schultz, Blaug, Layard 
and Psacharopoulos, is that capital has become generalized 
in the market economy. The modern economy is one in which 
scarce economic resources are widely invested, devoted to 
the enlargement, maintenance and mobility of the labour 
input to production, as well as to the machine input. 
Labour is not a homogeneous entity, locked in perpetual 
class warfare with "capital". Labour itself involves 
capitalisticformations. 
None of this is to deny the kinds of conceptual and 
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empirical difficulty we are likely to find. Modern 
capitalist societies are a confluence of consensus and 
power, in an extraordinarily complex mosaic. Their 
stability, to which police enforcement seems mainly re- 
dundant, is evidence of their deeply consensual character, 
yet at the same time the disparities in wealth, income, 
knowledge and status, however much they reflect consensus, 
are also phenomena significant in terms of the conflict 
view of society in the tradition of Marx and Weber. Never- 
tlleless what wýc maust stress here is the gradual, continuous 
character of social hierarchy under modern capitalism. 
This gradual character of social hierarchy, this weakening 
of the ascriptiveiy secured classification bct:: ee^ soda? 
strata, is a reason for the binding force of consensus. 
Principles of social control. and social stratification of 
a gradualist kind are evidently less wounding to the psyche, 
less damaging to a man's need to regard himself as signifi- 
cant, than the principles of a society based on sharp 
demarcation between ins and outs, haves and have-nots. 
Weber, we have noted, had another concept besides 
status with which he wanted to round off the Marxist propo- 
sition that wealth is a source of class and power. This 
proposition is ancient, and is found in a systematized 
form in the seventeenth-century statement of James Harrington: 
"empire follows the balance of property. °(64) 
Weber's other variable was "party". Men's overall 
position in the system of social stratification, also depends 
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on their position in such organizations as political 
parties, trades unions and various pressure-groups and 
lobbies. Once again human capital theory suggests a strong 
economic component in "party". A stream of costly effort 
yields a flow of returns, perhaps mainly non-monetary, 
which nevertheless is economic in the sense that the cal- 
culation of costs and benefits involved took account of the 
desirability of a location high in some area of the general 
structure of decision-making. 
Thus:. to sum up, we may argue that the sociology of 
k 
human capital is an admirable source of insight into the 
social stratification of advanced capitalism, illuminating 
iti Web r' ha" 4-h t- end "party" must hP the YYCUCt lüia iiaj iyiaý a. aau .. v., r... _. 1 
added to property in the theory of stratification. However, 
human capital theory is also relevant to an analysis of 
the state in advanced capitalist society, as we shall see 
in the next section. 
Human Capital and the State 
We have argued that the market code is the dominant cultural 
category of advanced capitalist society. Such a code is 
associated structurally with a strong classification between 
society's administrative matrix and other areas of socio- 
economic life, and functionally with the dissolution of 
strong, coercive, external frames on socio-economic action, 
and their replacement by deep, internalized frames. 
1 83. 
The emergence of a human capital order, characterized by 
multiple hierarchies which conflate consensual and power 
influences, is associated with dramatic changes in the 
state. The different aspects of the administrative matrix, 
of which the formal state is the most significant, become 
highly specialized and differentiated. A strong classi- 
fication is established between the formal state and other 
agencies such as church and media. Above all there occurs 
a strong classification between the public and the private 
realms . 
Ralph Miliband's book 
(65) is a late-twentieth-century 
study in the light of Marx's famous dictum that the 
"capitalist" state is the executive arm or the bourgeo- 
sie. 
(66) 
This proposition in fact nestles somewhere between 
those ideas of Marx which are wrong now and were right when 
he wrote them, and those which were wrong, as Andreski says, 
in the light of information already available at the time 
when Marx enunciated them. 
(67) 
To begin with, let us note that the state, as broadly 
defined to include central and local government, the police, 
judiciary, legal system and compulsory schooling, what we 
have called the "administrative matrix", is in very general 
terms an arena of massive consensus in advanced industrial 
society. Most citizens in Great Britain and the U. S. A. 
(and in Soviet Russia too, for that matter) believe that the 
state should protect the life and limb of the individual 
citizen, as well as his property, that children should be 
`8u . 
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state were fundamentally bourgeois one might reasonably 
argue that it has other fundaments. It involves clear 
societal consensus, that is to say, expresses views and 
interests of a non-class kind. 
True, the state exhibits conflict as well as consensus. 
Vast, unrealizable and contradictory claims can be put 
on the state machinery, as attempts are made to appendage 
it to special interests. Sometimes these interests do 
turn on private human capital formation. as in the case 
of the professions, as we shall argue in the next chapter. 
But human capital formation and its employment are only 
two of the many aspects of the modern state in capitalist 
society, so our discussion, consistently, the reader may 
reflect, will inevitably be rather discursive. 
There is also a connection in modern capitalist society 
between the relatively weak classification between social 
strata, and the rather strong classification between the 
activities of the administrative matrix (broadly the state) 
and other socio-economic acitivity. Because the social 
structure is highly consensual and because the distribution 
of human capital is continuous, comprising gradual 
hierarchies of income, status and pdtLy, social strata are 
blurred at the edges, so that there is a gradual ascent 
from the least to the most favoured groups, whilst at the 
same time the most favoured groups have no need for an 
extensively privatized administrative system. 
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"authorities", has a deep hold on the populations of 
capitalism. The paradox is that as the concept of the state 
hardens, so its phenomenal character lessens. It quite 
literally controls and interferes with people less (though 
its scope in welfare administration may have swollen enorm- 
ously). Indeed we can reverse the Marxist-supposed flow of 
influence. So suffused is the state in advanced capitalist 
society by the consensual view of the majority, that it 
does indeed become possible to think of people dominating 
the state, rather than vice versa, and in fact the sea-change 
associated with the capitalist state in relation to the 
state in previous, agrarian society, or in contemporary 
socialist society, is this: the state in advanced capitalist 
society is the only state so far which has not been the 
administrative creature, more or less, of one pre-eminent 
class or stratum and one alone. The reality of the modern 
capitalist state is diametrically opposed to the picture 
Miliband paints of it. 
(68) 
Because the emergence of a 
human capital order has produced a non-dichotomized social 
structure, the state ceases to be a control agency for one 
set of dominating interests. 
Since capital, as we have broadly defined it, that is 
to say as including in its human version any deliberately 
achieved net present value of income, status and party, 
furnishes a plurality of capital bases, supplies, that is 
to say, a number of props for social stratification, it 
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follows that the state in capitalist society reflects 
more than one class or capital interest. In particular, 
if modern capitalist society is characterized by a 
"capitalism of occupations" we should expect to find this 
reflected in the character of the state. In the next 
chapter, a study of the professions, we shall examine the 
huge influence that the high professions exert over the 
state in advanced capitalist society. Here let us note 
that it is also simply absurd to deny the influence of 
organized labour in the modern capitalist state. In Great 
Britain, against the wishes of most citizens, organized 
labour has beeen successful in employing the state and 
i ga "' c" ncry the defence n-F the c osed shop. Most 
citizens dislike the closed shop, none more so than the 
bourgeoisie. Yet it has come into being -- massive prima 
facie evidence that the bourgeoisie simply do-not dominate 
government and law. The state and legal systems are mani- 
pulated by bourgeois interests. Patents and other barriers 
to industrial entry are a good example of this. The vast, 
lucrative contracts which organized big business wrings from 
the state, especially in heavy engineering and military 
production, are another. It would take a fool to deny the 
power and influence at many levels of the giant industrial 
corporations of modern capitalism. However, this influence 
is not the same as overwhelming pre-eminence a la Ralph 
Miliband. Only through perversity can the influence of 
the modern professions be denied. Neither can the signifi- 
`II Qi 
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cance of organized labour in the state machinery of 
societies such as ours be easily gainsaid. 
The manipulation of the state in the interests of 
organized labour in fact involves some labour which is 
very rich in human capital (such as the professions) and 
other labour which is relatively poor in human capital. 
Sometimes it is hard to say whether human capital is signi- 
ficant or not in a powerful section of the labour force. 
Groups of workers, such as the power-station workers, have 
key skills which cannot in the short run be dispensed with. 
It would take an empirical study to determine whether these 
skills are also in significant degree formed in a sensitive 
awareness of their costs and benefits. I suspect they are. 
However, we can be sure that they connect with immense 
discretion in the structure of decision-making. Groups 
such as the power workers join with the high professions; 
the miners and workers in key export industries, in effect- 
ively directing their wage claims, in defiance, often, of 
general consensus, not to their immediate managers, but to 
the very heart of the state machinery -- to the government 
itself. 
Marxian mythology seeks to represent all this in terms 
of the strug; le between labour and capital. This view 
ignores the fact that some of the most militant unions are 
within the public sector. In any case, even with regard to 
private sector unions, as writers like Brittan have shown, 
(69) 
the leap-frogging wage inflation of the last few years 
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represents struggle within the occupaziolidý 
than a conflict with the bourgeoisie. What these reflections 
all add up to is this: the pattern of conflict over the 
distribution of the national income, does not reduce to 
a dichotomous struggle between bourgeois capital and 
proletarian labour. It is a multi-faceted pattern of 
contention, as groups variously possessing 
_property, 
human 
capital and relatively non-capitalized labour skills, 
compete for larger, or at least constant, relative real 
shares. Just as the social relations of physical capital 
are only one element in social class, only one element 
in social control, so they are also only one element in the 
control Of the state and legal system. We shall argue in om. 
the remaining pages of this section that the state is in 
fact intimately connected to the pluralistic human capital 
order. 
In fact, even together, physical and human capital 
do not exhaust the capital aspects of the state and related 
agencies in the administrative matrix. There is also the 
question of "cultural capital" in Harry Johnson's properly 
economic sense of the term, 
(70) 
rather than in Pierre 
Bourdieu's non-economic sense. 
(71) 
In those advanced 
capitalist societies which subsidize the arts, there is a 
transfer of resources and utility from that majority who are 
not interested in the arts, to that minority who are. Much 
of the cultural capital of our kind of society is formed 
in the public sector, or at least the partially demarketized 
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Similar reflections hold with human capital order 
itself. That much human capital is formed in institutions 
withdrawn from the market and directly provided to the 
public, facilitates the shifting of the costs of much 
human capital formation from its prime to its lesser bene- 
ficiaries. There are grounds for arguing that the proto- 
socialism of the public or semi-public sectors of society, 
including its educational, medical and "high" cultural 
activities, are highly regressive, and indicative of the 
emergence of a middle-class ascendancy in place of the 
bourgeois dominance of the nineteenth century. Many 
intrusions by the state do indeed constitute a creeping 
socialism which allows factions to dominate or distort 
socio-economic life in a way that they could not in a more 
purely capitalistic ambience. The late Tibor Szamuely 
long ago asserted that comprehensive state education, so 
far from facilitating the identification of working-class 
talent, would crystallize the pre-eminence of the middle 
(72) 
classes. There seems little doubt that a similar middle- 
class pre-eminence is visible in public medicine. 
The inexorable growth of the public sector, the 
extension of the "social wage" , is an important clement 
in 
this. Moreover, successive governments have sought to 
remedy observed ills by the extension of more such ills. 
The wage policies of the last Labour government in Great 
Britain exemplify this. The wage demands they sought to 
190. 
contain were themselves a response to the slow increase 
in economic development and low real earnings which a pre- 
emptively large public sector, high marginal taxation, 
'conservative union leadership -- in a word an inefficient 
price system -- had led to. Incomes policies both cause 
excessive wage demands by institutionalizing "norms" which 
are taken as starting rights, and they -Flatten the spread 
of earnings in an economically inefficient way, ironing 
out in particular those earnings differentials which, 
through prevision, are a major element in the decision to i)' 
engage in human capital formation. 
It is also arguable that the relative failure of the 
modern British economy is in some measure a failure to 
generate an appropriate human capital stock. Is this not seen 
in the coexistence of skill-shortage and heavy unemployment? 
Frances Cairncross points out that the huge increase in 
contemporary unemployment in Great Britain seems to have 
done almost nothing to reduce the number of unfilled job 
vacancies. 
(73) 
In 1965-6 unemployment was around 1.4%. 
In 1965 unfilled vacancies averaged-384,000 a month. In 
1973-4 unemployment averaged 2.6%, whilst in 1973 unfilled 
vacancies averaged 398,000 a month. In June 1979, with 
unemployment more than double the 1973 level, vacancies 
totalled 315,000. 
Thus, a dramatic, secular rise in unemployment has 
been associated with a relatively stable level of unfilled 
vacancies. Cairncross admits that the data collection 
procedures changed in the mid-1Y70 's, but she insists that 
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extraordinary figures. She also stresses that the time 
required to fill a vacancy appears to have risen. Cairn- 
cross confesses that no one seems to have the "faintest 
idea" what is happening. 
I would suggest that the thesis of a lack of appropr- 
iate skill-formation has some appeal. Cairncross points 
out that in several skilled engineering jobs (for example, 
tool makers and fitters) there are now more vacancies than 
in 1973. It may reasonably be argued that the general 
instructional system (including formal schooling) has 
failed to turn out the right kinds of human capital. 
At the gloomiest level, the fears of Hayek(74 and 
Friedman 
(7 5) 
are that interventionism implies a growing 
state management of the economy which will claim a pre- 
emptive proportion of the available resources. This will 
induce inflationary tendencies and by increasingly crowding- 
out private initiative will stifle economic inventiveness 
and innovation, seen as among the essential features of 
the free society. 
Such fears cannot be simply pushed aside. In a direct 
sense we must ask questions about the role of the state in 
the economy with particular urgency in the case of Great 
Britain, in that the continuing intellectual pre-eminence 
of the British has not been accompanied by a comparably 
shining economic performance. 
(76) Our low wage-economy, 
sluggish growth rate, inefficient capital-output ratio, 
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an economy whose relatively weak modern performance suggests 
a rather enfeebled price system. The problems of advanced 
Britain are not those of capitalism but of a rather 
degenerate socialist-capitalist hybrid. 
The essence of our remarks in the last half-dozen pages 
can be easily expressed. The phenomenon of widespread 
human capital formation is a sine qua non of the retreat 
of the administrative matrix in advanced capitalist society, 
as compared with its corporatist predecessors. At the same 
time there are countervailing pressures to weaken the 
classification between the state and other areas of socio- 
economic life. One of these, paradoxically, is the interests 
and semi-autonomous power positions created by various skill- 
formations. As we have remarked elsewhere in this thesis, 
the phenomena of progress are often Janus-faced. 
The Corporate State 
I 
The "corporate state" is seen by Marxists as the last ditch 
entrenchment of the moribund capitalist order. No specific 
date is given for the final implosion of the system under 
the weight of its multiplying contradictions, but the 
picture is presumably one of "diminishing marginal incorpora- 
bility". Eventually the contradictions will overload the 
structure. Alienated false consciousness will be torn apart, 
193. 
as the proletariat's subjective view of the world comes, 
in a cataclysmic revelation, to coincide with its objective 
condition. 
This model involves the endless administrative 
ad hocery of a desperate bourgeoisie, striving uselessly 
to postpone the final revolutionary synthesis. A much more 
terrifying proposition is that the corporate state may 
indeed be a convincing picture of our future, but not as 
a temporary phase in humanity's march to emancipation. 
It may instead prove to be the resumption of a long- 
lasting corporatism in human affairs, a resumption of 
corporatist pre-eminence in economic as in other decision-, 
making 
Neither does it seem remotely likely to be a bourgeois 
phenomenon. It is much more likely to represent a 
paralysis in the system emerging from the incompatible 
demands placed upon economic production, income distribution 
and social agreement by interest factions of the sort so 
well analyzed by Brittan. 
(77) 
Above all else it will involve 
the disintegration of the value consensus of liberal capital- 
ism. What we must face up to is the possibility that the 
Orwellian glimpse into the future is not a "crude fable" 
as Macrae would have us believe, 
(78) but a terrifying 
prescience, with Great Britain as a strong candidate for 
the status of first victim of such a retrogression, by way 
of a dialectical nemesis. Having been the first economy 
to emerge into the capitalist daylight, will not this a, 
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extraordinary society pay the price of such hubris, and 
also be the first to sink back, in her industrial senescence, 
into the corporatist darkness? Perhaps liberal capitalism 
is only a fantastically unlikely and unsustainable accident. 
Baechler has stressed its extreme improbability. 
(79) 
Is 
it only a brilliant, fleeting day of creative agreement, 
a glittering interlude in the long history of coercion? 
Perhaps we have scotched but not killed the corporatist 
serpent. The corporatist habit, acquired during the six 
millenä. a of agrarian society may reassert itself, and dim 
the infant morn of capitalism to aged night. 
One must, I think, sound some notes of caution. 
Our ea-y on Hayek's Road to Serfdom. 
However, it may equally well not be. Samuelson certainly 
seems to think it is not. 
(80) 
To begin with, nostalgia 
for the past will not help. Friedman's picture of mid- 
nineteenth-century Britain does not fully convince. 
(81) 
For all its dynamism, such society was surely less desirable 
than our own in many respects. Real wages were much lower, 
and a huge minority of people lived in desperate poverty. 
It is impossible to gainsay the progress we have made since 
then. 
Secondly, it is possible that the developmental 
sequence, if there is one, is the other way round. On this 
view, espoused in my later chapter on socialism, it is 
indeed capitalism, not socialism, which is the historical 
newcomer, and capitalism which expresses the underlying I 
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logic of emancipated (that is, rationalized economic 
action. On this view, even if the whole world "went 
communist" there would be a standing temptation for indi- 
vidual societies to break ranks, for the sake of stealing 
a march through the adoption of superior (capitalist) 
techniques. 
In any case it will be argued in the chapter on 
socialism that by one of the supreme ironies of intellectual 
(and general) history, it is socialist society which best 
fits the Marxist model of a society so transfused with 
contradictions that eventually the structure will not hold. 
The socialist economy of forced industrialization has 
gelled taa self a womb of non-socialist logic, a -- with iV. it lV 
living and undeniable ''deep code'of industrial development, 
in particular a proto-capitalistic organization of occupat- 
ions, which may eventually shatter the socialist carapace. 
It has also resulted in an unofficial "capitalist" 
economy, in the interstices of socialist planning. 
In this sense the future may hold for the communist 
world, not a further extension of the state, but a massive 
contraction. In the advanced Western economies, however, 
is Ronald Dore correct in envisaging permanent management 
of income distribution by the state machinery? 
(E`) More 
than that, is the interventionism which Popper believes 
has been so necessary since the nineteenth century, 
(83) 
an interventionism so feared and dreaded by the Friedmanites, 
likely to multiply? Perhaps, but I doubt it. The state, , 
1JV. p 
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formation. A great deal of human investment decision- 
making takes place within the public sector, or partly 
public sectors of education, medicine and transport. 
But the existence of a state sector in the economy which 
facilitates decisions about private human capital formation 
does not imply a substitution of state decisions for 
private decisions as to the deployment of labour. It 
does not mean state decisions as to where citizens shall 
work and at what, as to where they shall live, and so on. 
The Friedmanite case leaves out the crucial question 
as to the differences between the state in liberal capitalist 
society and the socialist state. It is not that one would 
deny the general unpopularity of the social wage. Doubtless, 
as Lord Vaizey says, people would prefer to spend their 
own high disposable income rather than have someone else 
spend their income for them. 
(84) 
Neither is it difficult 
to agree that there is some limit to the extent to which a 
free society can endure the progressive removal of its 
economic life from market principles. It is nevertheless 
reasonable to argue that the capitalist state remains 
suffused with a consensus whose economic core is a market 
code deriving from and shaping the capitalist economy. 
This is not to say that the state sector is run on 
market principles -- for the most part it clearlyis not. 
It is nevertheless the case that in advanced capitalist 
society the consensus dominates the state machinery, such 
1 9. 
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"back-reflection" an alternative "administrative code" 
in the market areas of the economy, in place of the market 
code which obtains in these. In any case, as Peter Wiles 
points out, the development of what he calls "state 
capitalism" in the advanced societies has actually accompan- 
ied a massive liberalization of social life. 
(85) 
The state 
in advanced liberal society in general neither intrudes 
nor claims the right to intrude on citizens, in ways 
comparable to the stifling pervasiveness of the modern 
Marxist-socialist state. It is possible to assert, quite 
baldly, that the state in advanced capitalist society is 
simply unlike the state in communist countries. 
The crucial distinction between the state in capitalist 
society and the Marxist state is that in the former, state 
and wider economy are strongly, in the latter weakly, 
classified. In socialist society there is an institutional- 
ized, specific ideology, leading to an intended predicta- 
bility between system-parts. True, as many sovietologists 
have pointed out, there is a massive, unofficial, capitalist 
economy in socialist societies. 
(86) 
We shall attempt to 
derive some of the fascinating sociological outcomes of 
this and related issues in our later chapter on human 
capital and socialism. The point is that, suffused as they 
are with consensual ideas about competence and responsibility, 
liberal capitalist societies result in a high degree of 
functional autonomy accorded to their educational, medical 
1OQ 
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are simply not left to their own devices in this way. 
For example, socialist education systems are expected to 
play a massive role in the dissemination of official 
Marxist ideology. 
(87) 
Finally, an interesting aspect of the sociological 
derivationsof human capital theory is this: so long as a 
highly developed, private human capital order persists, 
so long as men continue to make relatively free, rational 
choices to incur costs in order to augment their income, 
status or party position, so long will the powerful 
consensus of liberal capitalism survive, and that odious 
concentration of coercive state power, which would be so 
unseemly a retrogression for our civilization, be rendered 
unlikely. Nevertheless, there are corporatist elements in 
liberal capitalist society, and it is to one of these we 
now turn: the strange case of the professions. 
/ 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
HIDDEN CAPITAL: THE SOCIO-ECONOMY OF THE PROFESSIONS 
L V. tw=, 
two 
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flies the highe pitch, 
Between two dogs, which hath the deeper mouth, 
Between two blades, which bears the better temper, 
Between two horses, which doth bear him best, 
Between two girls, which hath the merriest'eye, 
I have perhaps some shallow spirit of judgement; 
But in these nice sharp quiliets of the law, 
Good faith I am no wiser than a daw. 
/ 
Shakespeare: Henry VI, Part One 
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INTRODUCTION 
So far in this thesis we have sought to establish that 
sociological interpretations of human capital theory are 
rich in their potential for explaining the structure of 
social control in advanced capitalist society. We have 
argued that such society involves all uiq). tel: edenLe l lv 
cohesive consensus both permitting and depending on 
human capital formation. We have claimed that modern 
capitalism is a relatively open society based on a 
decentralized structure of economic decision-making. 
We have also claimed that human capital formation, 
expressed in a complex occupational structure, is the main 
frar work -imf ±: I12 structure of hi__- saT_chy i il capitalist society. 
The differential accumulation of human capital in this 
occupational structure is associated with a complex, 
gradualist class-structure, quite distinct from the dis- 
continuous social divisions of corporatist social formations 
such as slavery or feudalism. 
The "human capital order" is the essence of the socio- 
economic pluralism of modern capitalism. Though human 
capital formation is not associated with a new ruling 
class -- we have not for a second suggested that it is -- 
"1 n G! Uo 
t. , -. ,.. L... l --I l -. 4 ,.. 4-1- -4- -P - -. ., v, + 4- 4 yV uý, /cü 1LCiltJ :.. f11. /1A 111 ý. 11{yL V LL \Ayll1... aa Vk Vi Vaa . a. aa ýaay y yv `wem ` 
of decision-making under modern capitalism which makes 
the model of a capitalist ruling-class untenable. 
We have not denied that there are "power" elements 
in the capitalist dispensation. However, we have suggested 
that power is an overworked concept in sociological 
analysis generally, and that it is especially inappropriate 
as a central concept for the analysis of modern capitalism. 
Such society is a genuinely liberal society characterized 
by an effective socialization of the population through 
the internalization of a complex market code both deriving 
from and regulating the structure of economic action. 
Nevertheless, it is also the case that human capital 
formation -- so important in the structure of economic 
decision-making -- though mainly a phenomenon requiring 
and generating openness in social arrangements, is not 
uniformly a phenomenon of a liberating kind. Like so many 
aspects of human progress and emancipation, human capital 
is Janus-faced. One face points to the daylight of the free 
society. The other points back into the corporatist darkness, 
to obscurantism in human affairs, to unperceived alienation 
in human relations, to that disguised ideological coercion 
(covert power) which the Marxist tradition, wrongly in our 
view, associates with modern capitalist society generally. 
Having previously outlined the socio-economic anatomy of 
human capital formation in its contribution to the free 
society, we turn now, therefore, to an examination of the 
-. ,, c_so 
conditions of its closure, the mechanics of its pLi aýizat1o,,, 
We turn, that is to say, to the mysterious socio-economy 
of the professions. 
I 
Analysis of the professions has occupied the attention of 
sociologists for many years. No consensus has yet emerged 
and indeed it may reasonably be claimed that clarity and 
commonsense in this matter have too CftAn yielded to 
ideology or special pleading. The claims made about the 
professions are in fact frequently intemperate. "Profession- 
alism" is seen on the one hand as mere bourgeois rhetoric, 
and on the other as an almost ubiquitous trend in the 
division of labour. 
(l) 
Such a dichotomy is of course no greater than others 
in the social sciences. Indeed, it is perhaps only symptom- 
atic of a general dichotomy in the modern perception of 
the social world. Yet it may be argued that whether one's 
viewpoint is critical of, or favourable to, the notion of 
professionalism, one is confronted with an unsatisfactory 
debate. 
The great lacuna in the literature on the professions is 
that economists have devoted so little of their energies 
to such. study. 
(2) 
This has meant that our sociology of the 
professions has generally lacked an economic dimension. 
This is all the more surprising in that professionalism 
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of labour. Professions, as Lees points out, create and 
control human capital. 
(3) 
Moreover they attempt to derive 
, 
benefit from the privatization of specialized human capital, 
in the form of income, wealth, status and influence -- 
virtually every conceivable indicator of class is involved. 
Professions also frequently seek and obtain state 
validation for their organizational forms, for their 
exclusiveness, indeed for their ideology. That is to say 
that they employ the administrative apparatus of the state 
in defence of their "property" in a way that is precisely 
akin to that envisaged by Marx in his discussion of the 
bourgeois state: "the executive arm of the bourgeoisie. , 
(4) 
So also do trades unions in some capitalist economies. 
I would claim that this constitutes further damage to the 
Marxist case, but that is another story. 
Even the most sophisticated sociological analysis, 
such as Johnson's fails to recognize that professional 
expertize is a property, a capital. In Lees' excellent 
economic monograph, on the contrary, we find an admirable 
willingness to puncture the inflated self-image of the 
professions and their disingenuous rhetoric, 
(5) 
with an 
unproblematic view of what professioýýaýisn actually is. He 
takes at their word the claims of any group that they 
constitute a profession. Such acceptance i2 not helpful to 
occupational analysis. 
On the other hand, if one is to study the professions, 
i LL ýJ 
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strongest. This does not mean that we will engage in a 
cross-sectional trait analysis. Merely to identify the 
characteristics of assumed professions, and then to try to 
boil these down to some essential core is, as Johnson rightly 
points out, ahistorical. 
(6) 
Nevertheless, we may take it 
that doctors or lawyers do have some distinctive characteris- 
tics,. that however problematically, they are "professional" 
in some central sense in which "professional" footballers 
or layabouts arD not. 
To uncover their occupational strategy, the student 
of the professions must penetrate their ideological facade, 
must try to reveal inconsistencies between proclamation 
and reality. I submit that the unifying theme of the 
development of the professions has been a defence of covert 
property rights, of hidden capital. The backdrop to the 
entrenched position of the medical and legal professions 
in advanced economies is economic growth -- higher living 
standards and expectations, and a huge growth in the number 
of economic transactions and in the size of the capital 
stocks of the economy, both physical and human. The 
historical genesis of the professions has involved occupational 
groups corctiricg -co control both the production of services 
relating to this economic development and also their 
consumption. The growth of professional ideology has 
been the widening mask of self-interest. Professionalism 
is a manifest ethics but a latent economics. 
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always been the force and insistence of the ideology they 
generate. Thus arises the extraordinary polarity in the 
picture of the professions that sociologists variously 
present. On the one hand professions are seen as defending 
the individual against the encroachments of the state or 
big business. 
(7) On the other hand, professions are identi- 
fied as bourgeois interest groups of a conspiratorial kind. 
(8) 
In my view most of the literature on the professions 
is indeed crude and, as Johnson says, sacking in dynamism 
and historicity. Much of this shortcoming could have been 
avoided had professional economic history been properly 
put together. However, even to the eye of the casual 
historian, the professions reveal themselves as unique and 
fascinating, encapsulating the newest and most traditional 
aspects of our social life in an ambiguous, uneasy and even 
potentially explosive synthesis. It is arguable that it is 
in the professions and not in the big business corporation 
that the contradictions of our age have become incarnate. 
Every epoch has it anomalies; the professions are ours. 
The professions are older than industrialism. They 
nevertheless have grown to unprecedented pre-eminence in 
industrial society. The enormous growth in the economic 
resources the professions now manage, the influence which 
such resources imply, and the ubiquitous ideology of legiti- 
mation involved, in a sense typify modern society. Professions 
reflect both changes in the composition of factor inputs to 
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Professions are part of the growing specialization of modern 
economies, of the complex consumption, maintenance and 
investment activities that this specialization both 
represents and entails. Perhaps, above all, professions 
indicate the increasing pre-eminence of knowledge and 
expertize in the determination of a wide range of social 
processes, though the strange consideration here is that 
professions have a curiously "un-modern" organizational 
structure. As we shall see, professions secure much more 
effective deep-rooted and obfuscating interference with the 
competitive workings of the markets in which they operate, 
than is the case with the genuine bourgeoisie. Thus, as 
well as typifying modern economic development in some respects, 
professions also contradict its central cultural category -- 
the "market code" of capitalism. 
One notable aspect of medicine, law and psychotherapy, 
is that as well as discharging new functions and enlarged 
traditional ones, they have also appropriated functions 
previously accorded to other groups. Thus the medical, 
psychiatric and legal professions, in addition to displacing 
(largely) the clergy, have also, to a considerable extent, 
taken over the functions which in earlier times were the 
province of the elderly as a social group. 
(9) 
Of law and medicine in particular, it can be said that 
their star has been waxing in the advanced world for at least 
two centuries. Industrialism has been their watershed and 
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the nineteenth century witnessed particularly rapid gains. '-"' 
These have been consolidated and expanded in the twentieth 
century, and as far as societies like Great Britain and 
the United States are concerned, I regard Terence Johnson's 
opinion that professions are in decline as grotesquely 
premature. 
(11) 
It would be much more pertinent to stress, 
as Johnson does not sufficiently, that professional 
production, swollen through the expansion of capitalist 
production, is nevertheless akin to the restrictive, corpora- 
tist guild economy of pr. e-capitalist society, of the medieval 1L 
era. The professions in fact are an historical hybrid, 
curious but immensely formidable, with one foot un-nostalgic- 
Ages the oý. iair i.. 
ambiguously planted in high technology. 
Professionalism is high-status tertiary production. 
It is a key element in the middle-class ascendancy. 
Admittedly professionalism is only one element in the rise 
of the middle classes. With the development of what has 
been called the technostructure, 
(12) 
managerial and scientific 
labour have made increasing challenges to bourgeois pre- 
eminence which parallel those of the professions. There has 
also occurred in the twentieth century, the astonishing 
spread of bureaucracy, in the wake of the increasing 
(13) 
complexity of economic production and social administration. 
A very complex inter-twined collection of middle-class 
forces has developed. To some extent this reflects partici- 
pation with bourgeois interests in the organization of the 
Li. 
nh"ici. ra1 car, itaI of the economc'. Tl'o r, orrr"N cý e% 47 .. _4=14-4- i_L. rv.. 1 rv. 7 .rVVlV/sL111VA.. 
as opposed to consensus in this matter, between the 
traditional capitalist and the bureaucrat or technocrat 
is a large and unresolved issue. 
(14) 
Much less in doubt 
is the overwhelming pre-eminence of these middle-class 
forces in the question of the human capital order. 
(15) 
Medicine, law and education, for example, today involve 
societal sub-systems comparable in size to major industries. 
This is true both in terms of their resources and in terms 
of the employment they generate. 
(16) 
Professions create human capital formation in two ways. 
First they accumulate it for themselves. Secondly they 
create it, or maintain it, in their fellow citizens. A 
doctor, for example, both embodies human capital formation 
in his own training and activity, and creates or maintains 
it in his clients. Lawyers possess this latter characteristic 
less obviously than doctors, though they greatly influence 
a wide range of economic activities, including the operation 
and maintenance of the physical and human capital stocks. 
To take just one example, lawyers are often involved in 
actions concerning industrial and other accidents, where 
loss of earnings occurs, that is, where human capital has 
been damaged. (17) Naturally, only that proportion of a man's 
earnings which results from his education and training, 
from the medical treatment he has undergone, from the job- 
search he has undertaken and so on, represents human capital 
formation, and it may be difficult, or impossible, to identify 
n, n 
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all this. Nevertheless, in principle it seems clear that 
much of the law relating to employment involves the 
protection and maintenance of human capital. 
Clearly middle-class domination is also shown in 
pre-eminence in intellectual and cultural production 
generally, and in their reproduction. 
(18) 
In the develop- 
ment of pressure groups, in the accumulation of general 
know-how with regard to law, government and school, the 
middle classes have done disproportionately well in overall 
terms. It can be plausibly argued, in particular, that 
professionalism . as been a central force in the "human 
capital order" which has made of the middle class an 
identifiable- social group, arguably a real, if rather 
inchoate class, and certainly one which it is impossible 
to represent convincingly as at the coat-tails of a bourgeois 
dispensation. 
It is by no means clear that the interests of the 
various professions are always in accord. 
(19) 
Neither, 
however, are those of bourgeois groups. Nor do professional 
interests necessarily match those of other middle-class 
social groups such as bureaucrats and scientists. At one 
level, indeed, it may be argued that the professional 
has by definition an interest in the clientizing of everyone 
else -- other professions, bureaucrats, big business and 
working class alike. These intra and inter-class relations 
are fascinating but belong properly to another work. 
My present purpose is to assert that it is not possible 
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modern societies, without a serious consideration of the 
professions. 
An important point is that in a sense the professions 
are an unproblematic case of human capital formation. 
Their long training programmes represent heavy costs, 
and their high mean earnings,. extended salary structures 
and high psychic gratification (status) place them among 
the most remunerative of occupations. 
(20) 
It is true that 
they call only segmentally on expertise -- doctors and 
lawyers perform many tasks in the course of their work 
which require little or no specialized knowledge.. Examples 
include form-filling and telephoning. Yet there is a core 
of skill. which is occupationally specific. 
(21) Few people 
have mastery of the Law of Contract or the techniques of 
heart surgery. Professions thus at least partly escape the 
the strictures of critics like Peter Wiles, who attacks the 
notion of human capital in view of the notoriously bad fit 
between the content of most higher education and the nature 
of the occupations in which most graduates engage. 
(22) 
The key to understanding the professions, however, lies 
not in recognition that they possess human capital, but that 
they privatize it. It is important to stress this word 
"privatize", for it could hardly be denied that medical and 
legal activity must rest, au fond, on a substantial bedrock 
of consensus. Furthermore, however open the social organi- 
zation of medicine and law may become, these occupations 
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formation. Thus it is on the mechanisms of privatization, 
which distort the workings of the market, that we must 
concentrate. It is privatization which makes professionalism 
so striking an example of socio-economic power. "Power" 
here means the ability to constrain the behaviour of 
others. What is implied, in fact, is a Marxist version of 
"power" as disguised coercion, the manipulative outcome 
of pseudo-consensus, where the dis-benefitted systematically 
misconceive the nature of the social activities in which 
they are engaged. The established processions possess 
the ability to influence or control certain aspects of 
the behaviour of the entire citizenry. This is achieved 
both by the rnanipilation of individuals and by the mani- 
pulation of institutions. The ideology propagated dis- 
seminates the idea that the professions are indispensable 
and the notion that their knowledge is arcane and mysterious. 
In this way, income and status of a higher order than would 
be afforded by a more competitive organization of these 
occupations are generated and sustained. Membership of a 
profession thus constitutes a privatized property yielding 
a multi. -faceted benefit stream. It is time to consider 
the nature and organization of this property in more detail. 
zz I .. 
II 
The core of the professional power, I shall submit, is 
a marked, simultaneous discretion over the conditions of 
demand and supply of the service in question. How this 
is done, the exact techniques employed and the implications 
which arise, I shall discuss later. At present, however, 
I would like to advance my thesis encapsulated in the two 
educational notions . borrowed from the work of Basil 
Bernstein which I have employed throughout this thesis-- 
namely "classification" and "framing". 
We have already suggested that professionalism is a 
manifest ethics and a latent economics. In the terms 
borrowed from Bernstein we may say that the essence of 
professionalism as a form of knowledge-property management, 
is that the expertise is strongly classified, and the client 
strongly framed. The socio-economic functions of 
professional ideology are thus the securing of boundaries 
for professional expertise, both with regard to its 
definition (classification) and its dispensation (framing). 
Professionalism, then, is simultaneously a legiti- 
mating and manipulative ideology. However, as with most 
ideologies, the protagonists are believers as much as the 
clientele. This is what makes neo-Marxist writing like 
O'Toole's so inferior to that of the master. 
(23) O'Toole 
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sees professions as bourgeois interest groups of a 
conspiratorial kind. This is wrong on two counts. 
First, professions are not bourgeois but middle class. 
The conflation of these terms is common, particularly in 
the sociology of education. 
(24) 
But it is a dangerous 
short-hand and quite inadmissible in any specific writings 
on the theory of social class. Professions are, in fact, 
in some respects the paradigm case of the middle classes. 
Secondly, professions are not conspiratorial. They 
do roc LeudLÜ their ore-L aDitalist, medieval notions of 
control and regulation as inhibitive of economic efficiency 
or utility maximization. 
(25) 
They believe in their own 
ideology. Behind the service ethic of law and medicine, 
we repeat, lies a multi-functional latent economics. 
The ideology persuades its practitioners both that they are 
not as other men and that they are selflessly devoted to 
the welfare of their fellow. It also persuades non-profess- 
ionals that this is so. The ideology of professionalism 
does not only disunite and fragment the clientele; it also 
surrounds the practitioners in a 
cocoon, entrapping them as much 
in a false consciousness. Thus 
the nature and functions of the 
the closure techniques by which 
buttressed, that we realize how 
professional claims are. 
soothing and obfuscating 
as the unfortunate consumer 
it is only when we examine 
ideological proclamations, 
professional activity is 
shaky and ill-founded 
First of all, it is noteworthy that the high status 
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of professional output. Indeed, it is part of my purpose 
to argue that professionalism is a strikingly inefficient 
form of economic activity. In fact it is public evaluation 
of the importance of their activity, not the efficiency 
with which it is discharged, which secures the high status 
of the established professions. Medicine and law are 
universally regarded as high professions; their outputs, 
however, are problematic in the extreme, hard to identify, 
and even harder to measure. 
(26) 
Many, perhaps most, low 
status activities, have more readily measurable production 
functions. For example, a road sweeper can clean a pavement 
more efficiently than a general practitioner can treat a 
common cold, and in almost every case the former's activities 
are econometrically more tractable than the latter's. 
Similarly the "output" of legal activity. is highly 
problematic. A barrister's output is a blurred dialectic 
between his intellect, skill, experience and judgment on 
the one hand, and the 'facts" on the other. The facts are 
clearly not variables; neither, however, are they entirely 
givens. They are "semi-givens", partly dependent on the 
lawyer's mediation. Of what, precisely, are guilt or 
innocence, in the case of criminal law, a function? 
Considerations of this kind, incidentally, throw grave doubt 
on the commonly found view that teaching is usually a low 
status activity because of the diffuseness and vagueness of 
its outpu. t. 
(27) 
In many respects medical and legal production 
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are equally vague. 
Professional ideologies have the function of hiding, 
from practitioners as much as from clients, the very 
existence of these awkward considerations. In the case of 
medicine, we find similar production function problems 
to those outlined above, when we turn from individual 
ministration to the most aggregated and secular context. 
The enormous improvements in average health in the advanced 
economies in the last two centuries, are arguably not in the 
main the result of medical intervention.. as narrowly, i. e. 
professionally defined. Such advances have as much, or more, 
to do with dietary and sanitary improvements, although the 
medical profeSsioi1 is their outstanding beneficiary. 
(28) 
The doctor would be of no significance in a society which 
had conquered death; he is however the recipient of an 
extremely insistent demand in a society which 'increasingly 
keeps death at bay. Even now, however, it is by no means 
clear that the doctor looms larger than the dustman or the 
sewage worker in the constant war against infection. 
Thus, it may be claimed, there is an element of 
unintentional misrepresentation in the vociferous classific- 
cation of their knowledge-base on which doctors insist, 
through the dissemination of their ideology. And there are 
other, and more dramatic, examples of the way in which their 
ideological classification masks the parasitism of medical 
practice. For in reality medicine is partly parasitic 
on non-professionalized contributory research in neurology, L 
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bio-chemistry, micro-biology and medical physics. On 
inspection, law, too, is heavily dependent on non- 
professional contributions. There is nothing essentially 
legal about fingerprints and blood group classification 
on which legal practice now heavily depends. The dependance 
on extra-professional contributions is perhaps less in law 
than in medicine. Yet it still obtains. 
What is perhaps startlingly true of professionalism 
is that it is a form of production at a considerable remove 
from the innovations of knowledge and practice which 
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motor of socio-economic change and development in an 
industrial economy. 
(29) 
Those branches of reasearch on 
which development is dependent, are non-professionalized. 
What Galbraith calls the"technostructure" consists over- 
whelmingly of non-professionalized production: 
(30) 
Indeed, 
it may be postulated that were intellectual activity at the 
frontier of research and innovation, restricted in the way 
that professional activity is restricted, then the rate of 
knowledge advancement would be reduced. Professionalism, 
with its deep-rooted myths and pre-emptive protocols, would 
be a fetter on free intellectual inquiry, a cybernetic 
disaster. 
It may be argued that professionalism is in many ways 
akin to an institutionalized Marxism. Clearly, the two 
phenomena exist at very different levels of aggregation, 
and the analogy may seem at first blush far-fetched. In 
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find, within their delineated areas, a preposterous claim 
to near omni-competence. There is the same parasitism on 
other sources of research and information, the same 
propaganda-control problems, the same need to socialize, 
fragment and weaken the discretion and initiative of the 
clientele/citizenry, and the same orientation to what are 
essentially pre-capitalist modes of social organization and 
economic production. 
(31) 
It is precisely for this reason 
that professionals are able to survive, even to flourish, 
in socialist societies. Though not much commented on, this 
is not surprising. Like medieval thought, Marxist thought 
is largely concentrated on man as producer. Man as consumer 
is scarcely considered. 
Let us return to Bernstein's most fertile conceptuali- 
zation of cultural transmission. This can be put to 
excellent use in the context of analysis of the professions. 
For Bernstein, the combined strengths of classification and 
frame will be expressed in "evaluation", the forms of assess- 
ment, grading and certification which obtain in the education 
system. 
(32) 
Evaluation is therefore an overarching matrix 
for the organization of school-knowledge. Under professional- 
ism, the unifying matrix is an evaluative consensus 
encapsulating the degrees of expertize-classification and 
client-framing achieved. Classification is control over supply; 
frame is the control over demand. The evaluative consensus 
reveals the degree of control enjoyed by the occupational 
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consumption jointly. Let us now consider professional supply 
and demand factors separately. 
III 
Professionalism as the Management of Supply 
In a sense professionalism is only a specialized form of 
trades unionism, albeit a particularly ancient and powerful 
one. 
(33) All trades unionism is an attempt to regulate 
the conditions of employment. This is to say that trades 
unions attemot to regulate the supply side of production. 
The two strategies for such regulation involve either 
control over the flow: of output, or control over one of the 
inputs , namely labour. Many trades unions use both approaches. 
Production can b-- halted by strikes- labour inflow to the 
activity in question can be controlled by power over 
recruitment policies, rules regarding qualifications, etc. 
Some activities, for example restrictive practices, can 
affect supply in both these ways simultaneously. 
In this kind of supply-management, professions have the 
appearance of particularly strong and active trades unions, 
and ones, moreover, whose situation is often secured by law. 
The bestowal of closed shop status on the-professions, 
ratis, is one of the most striking dysfunctionalities of 
the nineteenth-and twentieth-century legal and state 
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apparatuses in industrial society. 
(34) 
Not for doctors 
and lawyers, the tortuous and embittered two steps forward 
'for 
one back, of more mundane trades union emancipation 
in the nineteenth century. Not for them Peterloos and 
Osborne judgments, Haymarket massacres, and the imbalances 
of a law of contract whose violation was a criminal offence 
on the side of labour, but a mere tort vis-a-vis employers. 
(35) 
Professionalism is clearly akin in many ways to deliberate 
imperfections in physical production. The iron control over 
entry qualifications and training which the professions secure 
and their power over definition of bona fide production, are 
massively similar to patents and other barriers to entry 
in the production of conventional goods. The crucial differ- 
ence, however, is in breadth of exclusiveness. Though no 
production can be totally monopolized, in the case of profess- 
ionalism production is amazingly privatized. A soft drink 
may have a patented formula; but in the case of professional- 
ism we find, as it were, one firm with sole production-rights 
over all soft drinks. 
Many of the "traits" identified as characterizing 
professional. production are only the logical conditions or 
outcomes of successful suppýy management. Professions are 
few in number, have long training procedures controlled 
and validated by the occupational group itself and are able 
to control recruitment. 
(36) 
None of this, we repeat, is 
very distinctive, save perhaps that in popular imagination 
it is not a source of recrimination for professionals as for 
some other groups. 
(3? Let us discuss why this should be so. 
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professions: their extraordinary control over the 
conditions of demand. 
IV 
Professionalism as the Management of Demand 
Professionalism is a global strategy. It attempts to secure 
control over the conditions of demand a-- well as of supply. 
The de facto or de jure "monopoly" position conferred on 
the high professions in advanced industrial society permits 
exclusiveness and barriers to entry such as to facilitate 
demand as well as supply manipulation. The demand element 
is the less usual; it logically subsumes control over 
supply conditions. No group can control demand without 
controlling supply, though supply control is only a necessary 
and not a sufficient condition of demand control. Naturally 
"control" is misleading; it cannot be total and that it is 
not claimed. Nevertheless between professions and what are 
called semi-professions, the great distinction is the 
relative weakness of the latter in the case of demand 
influence. 
Control over the conditions of demand does reflect back 
on the supply side of production. The successful "freezing" 
of patterns of demand reinforces occupational hegemony in 
the shaping of supply. To sum up: strong classification 
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is a logical condition of strong framing; at the same time 
strong framing of the clientele by the occupational group 
reinforces the privatized process whereby output is 
classified. 
The essence of the demand strategy is to heterogenize 
the overall demand for professional output, to disunite 
and fragment the non-professional public. There must be 
minimal non-professional participation in defining what 
counts as production. An elaborate and constantly renewed 
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Such client socialization (alternatively conceived as 
the dissemination of professional ideology) has the economic 
function of retaining and expanding the demand for professional 
output. Demand is rendered income elastic, such that the 
professions are able to secure a revenue which is not a 
falling function of national income. 
(38) 
Simultaneously, 
demand is rendered price inelastic, such that the public 
will not switch to alternative goods in the presence of 
rising real or relative professional prices. 
(39) 
Total demand 
s thus greater and more "loyal" than would be the case in 
the absence of massive client socialization. 
Socialization is not confined tD the clientele. The 
professions themselves are also subjected to it. It has to 
be repeated that no conspiracy is involved, and that 
practitioners, although they are the beneficiaries of their 
ideology, are as much trapped in it as their clients. 
Socialization secures public deference, and through 
231. 
deference i created tht- nrnfPq. ci ona l Pniii ýýa l_Ani- of 
brand'loyalty. Examples are legion. In the case of 
medicine there are the hierarchical devices which constantly 
reinforce the practitioner's position and maintain social 
distance between him and the clients. The separation of 
the litigant from the barrister by the solicitor in legal 
process in Great Britain is a good example. More generally, 
there is the role-enhancing of the professional by the 
organization of secretarial and para-professional staff. 
The most striking case of this is nursing, which enormously 
enhances the role of the doctor. The Anglo-Saxon habit 
of calling medical clients "patients" testifies to a long 
history of client manipulation. In Great Britain at 
present, social deference to doctors is revivified by such 
devices as insisting that clients and doctors use different 
entrances. 
(40) 
Obviously the elements of professional strategy will 
vary both internationally, and inter and intra-occupationally. 
Nevertheless, it may be claimed that the notion of a 
profession is an ideal type, useful for analysing certain 
occupational groups characterized by very strong powers of 
frame vis-a-vis the demand for their output. Such groups 
are active Ja all advanced societies, though it is beyond 
the scope of this chapter to pursue far the interesting 
question whether they are stronger in "socialist" countries 
or in those where significant private business survives. 
What can be postulated of the professions, however, is that 
e-1L. 
in capitalist society their position is strengthened 
(41) they operate in public sectoral contexts. 
41) 
A number of reasons can be adduced for this, First, 
public sectoral work enhances the ideology of professional 
non-selling, the view that in some sense professionals 
do not "sell" their output- 
(42) 
Secondly, it reduces the 
visibility of the client as-consumer. In so far as the 
client is a consumer faced with a bill, he is, to some 
extent, able to drive a wedge into the frame in which the 
professional seeks to fasten him. A third, related point, 
is that public sectoral production partially disguises 
costs, reducing the likelihood of a switch to other goods 
this : 7iew, `t C. 7J I1 IN seen th t the 
paradigm professional is the British doctor working in the 
national health service. 
As in the case of supply, many of the traits held to 
charaterize professionalism, the enunciation of which is 
derided as ahistorical by critics, are no more than the 
logical conditions in principle, and in the fact the devices, 
of successful professional demand management. Such devices 
constitute, collectively, the strong framing of the clientele/ 
citizenry by professionals. Power over the social definition 
of output and occupation is maintained by the securing of 
the conditions of demand. 
The insistence on professional ethics is one such 
device. This secures occupational unity and largely defines 
out any client discretion in the professional/client 
2 33 . 
relationship. Such ideology also interprets for the 
layman the view he holds of professional production, and 
therefore to some extent his demand for it. 
The celebrated resistance to bureaucracy is another 
example. 
(43) This represents no more than the prevention 
of demand concentration in sources which require a say, 
even a definitive say, in what counts as production. As 
Johnson rightly points out, it is the indispensability of 
"rational" accounting and actuarial procedures to modern 
capitalistic enterprise which exnlaines the semi-bureau- 
cratization (i. e. de-professionalization) of those activities, 
despite their relatively recondite knowledge-base. 
(44) 
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another example. Drama, after all, can be heightened by 
interpretation. Certainly, people care about feeling well, 
about their marriages, about the roofs over their heads, 
about their mental health. What is not generally recognized 
is the professional role in interpreting and shaping the 
public response to these concerns. It is this manipulative 
discretion, which endows professions with a status higher 
than could be generated by the genuine consensus on which 
medical and legal activities must inevitably rest, which 
renders the concept "power" more relevant for analysing the 
professions than for analyzing the situation of the bourgeoisie. 
Like the general structure of social control, various 
occupations are a confluence of consensus and power. Some 
trades unions, for example, possess coercive power. What I 
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by a strong element of manipulative power. 
Face-to-face encounters have been said to characterize 
professional production. Even this may be less indis- 
pensable than realized to genuine legal or medical 
imperatives. Much legal and medical activity is already 
codified and standardized (that is, bureaucratized). 
Perhaps much more could be (and, rationally, in terms of 
efficiency, should be ). The insistence on face-to-face 
encounters may be more vital to professional power than to 
client welfare in some cases. Codification threatens, after 
all, a possible fall in the demand for professional services. 
V 
The Evaluative Consensus: Professionalism as Market Control 
The professions have achieved, in the advanced economies, 
an unrivalled pre-eminence in what may be called the "social 
relations of the market", a concept subsuming the relations 
both of production and consumption. 
(45) 
The consumption 
element is especially important. Sprung in large measure 
from the spending of economies which increasingly easily 
minister to basic social demands, the professions have 
achieved a powerful position with regard to shaping, 
defining and regulating that spending. 
Professionalism, as a form of production, both requires 
ý2 
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and engenders a favourable evaluative public consensus. 
It is a consensus in two layers. Its bedrock is the 
high measure of agreement that any society seems likely 
to display as to the significance of medicine and law. 
This is the genuine consensus which a hypothetical free 
market would create. It is the engineered, manipulated, 
professional accretion which concerns us here. Thus we 
identify both genuine agreement and disguised conflict and 
coercion in the evaluative consensus. This consensus 
expresses occupational hegemony in the classification of 
supply and in the framing of demand. It precisely expresses 
the power of the occupational group. 
The consensus al cn permits the secular reproduction 
of the professional form of production. Through such a 
consensus the professions are able to ward off non- 
professional intrusion into questions of production generally. 
Each professional contact may reinforce the consensus, and 
in macro-social terms the professional claims are constantly 
reinforced by representation in the mass media and in public 
institutions. In many countries lawyers and doctors are 
particularly prominent politically. 
The consensus involves a definitely anti-capitalist 
ideology to the effect that professions do not "sell" 
their output, that they are free from vulgar competitive 
jostle, that they are somehow remote from sordid consider- 
ations of resources and efficiency, above the inter-twined 
imperatives'of scarcity and choice. 
(46) To the sceptical 
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historian or economist, such an Olympian stance. si3-h 
mystification, is a source of amusement or irritation. 
Practically, however, it implies a reactionary organizational 
structure of Rosicrucian remoteness from the layman. 
Certainly it is hard to imagine any aspect of modern social 
life more powerfully exemplifying the Durkheimian notion 
of the sacred and the profane, 
(47) 
than professionalism. 
Two striking paradoxes are involved. First, there is 
the oddity that though nothing better typifies modern 
societies than the huge growth in the production of medical 
and legal services that has occurred, the occupational 
groups involved have preserved a pre-industrial occupational 
structure and ideology. The professions have adapted many 
of the techniques of modern science to their own advantage, 
yet at the same time have resisted the central thrust of 
liberal, bureaucratic rationalism. Though they have not 
managed totally to control the demand for substitutes, 
the professions have shown great powers of flexibility and 
absorption. For example, the resistance to osteopathy by 
the medical profession in Great Britain, may be only a 
prelude to incorporation. In some countries (e. g. Scotland) 
the functions discharged by estate agents in England have 
been privatized by lawyers. 
The second paradox is that professional ideology itself 
is so non-economic in tone, whereas the underlying structure 
of professional organization is so overwhelmingly economic 
in signficance. Consider for example the general ban on 
2. f 
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The general ban on advertising is to be regarded as a 
quintessential element in demand management. In the case 
of manufactures and non-professional goods, the function 
of advertising is to develop brand loyalty in order to 
establish different patterns. of demand from those which would 
obtain in the absence of intervention. 
In the case of professionalism, the engendering of an 
evaluative consensus favourable to the professions, renders 
advertising de trop, even counter-productive. The nature 
of the strong framing of the client by the professional is 
that the former is inhibited from making a rational appraisal 
of the relative real costs and risks, as opposed to the 
benefits, of alternative courses of action. 
Professional ideology stresses the certainty and 
standardization secured by professional policy. By dis- 
couraging clients from resorting to non-professional 
alternatives, professionals promote greater reliability. 
By prohibiting intra-professional competition, they secure 
greater certainty of output. 
Denis Lees would concede that certainty may indeed 
be enhanced in this manner. But certainty and standardi- 
( 
zation themselves have risks and disbenefits. 
49) A 
classical English and Welsh case would seem to be the 
conveyancing of houses. This activity is confined de facto 
to solicitors. There is no actual prohibition of the 
individual citizen from conveying his own house though, 
soaked in professional ideology, few citizens do. Attempts 
11 
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to set up non-professional conveyancing organizations, 
however, have been very smartly (professionally) nipped 
in the bud. 
(50) 
There is merit, from the point of view of consumer 
utility, in allowing citizens to trade the greater reliabil- 
ity of professional conveyancing against the lower price 
of alternatives. There is merit in allowing consumers 
choice between competing professionals, where the lower 
charge of one may involve an element of carelessness or 
corner-cutting. The demand manipulation of the public by 
profession-als, reduces the likelihood of these eventualities. 
Within the logic of classical economic liberalism, profession- 
alism is, therefore, a source of dis-utility. In general 
it may be presumed that professionally unconstrained 
consumers will prefer to standardization, the right to 
weigh the greater certainty of entrusting certain activities 
to a professional, against the higher price of so entrusting 
him rather than a non-professional. The existence of 
professional production, however, makes it impossible to 
find out. 
On this view professionalism is an irrational use of 
resources, an unwarranted petrification of occupational 
structures, an unjustifiable restriction in the circulation 
of relevant knowledge, an unmerited and unconstitutional 
accumulation of power and an enforced retardation in the 
general process of socio-economic change. 
In the author's view, the standard indictment of 
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advertising in capitalist economies has been misleadingly 
cast in terms of abuses which are in fact incidental 
rather than inherent (sexual prejudice, philistinism, 
competitive consumerism, etc. ). Such a stance is blind 
to the underlying utility of advertising, a utility which 
directs discretion back from the centre to the individual, 
a utility which has a wholesomely destabilizing effect 
on human organization. By ministering to individual 
preference, advertising augments economic rationality. 
Professional client socialization, by contrast, seems 
to involve precisely all the disbenefits of advertising, 
-, without 
its advantages. It is as manipulative as any 
competitive advertising, without the genuine informative 
character of the latter. Advertising is part of the dynamic 
process which Schumpeter had in mind when he spoke of a 
"perennial gale of creative destruction". 
(51) 
Indeed 
advertising may be thought of as a destroyer, as well as 
a creator, of particular patterns of consumption. 
Is it not arguable that an overt, profit-geared 
advertising might loosen beonds which under professionalism 
are kept tight? May it not be the case that client 
socialization, a covert, surrogate advertising, secures 
fetters more inhibitive of f exibie and sensitive economic 
resource use than overt advertising ever could? Straight 
advertising, by asking previously unbroached questions, 
might disseminate new knowledge and ideas in such a way 
that a wholesale revision of the conditions of demand occurred. 
2"It 0. 
Doctors do not want a situation in which the relative 
values of a trip to the chemist or a trip to the surgery 
are rationally pondered. Solicitors in this country do 
not want large numbers of citizens conveying their own 
houses. 
If advertising were to serve an heuristic function 
in areas presently professionalized, consumer utility 
would be enhanced. A more rational and nearer optimal 
pattern of resource use would be possible. Conceivpble 
outcomes might include the rapid advance of osteopathy 
to a position as bona fide therapy, the collapse into each 
other of illegitimately separated professional functions 
(in Great Britain solicitors and barristers? ), the 
fragmentation of medicine into its constituent specialisms, 
a more general recognition of the contributions to human 
welfare of non-professionalized activities, and above all, 
enlargement of the sphere of individual competence and 
initiative. 
Here, to hark back to a point made earlier, the author 
would suggest that the anti-advertising stance which 
socialist regimes and professional production share in 
common is, in fact, the central strand in their affinity. 
At present. the stance (however unco. c^ious) of professional 
occupational groups is: why use overt, destabilizing 
advertising when ideology is such a successful covert 
advertising? My view, by contrast, is that whatever 
imperfections and rigidities may be secured by conventional 
advertising, they are small beer indeed compared to the 
formidable structure of obfuscating prejudice within which 
the professions carry out their functions. 
The professions are epitomized by the long-run 
retardation of resource-pattern change which they secure. 
In the short run, their supply and demand manipulation 
constitute a situation similar to the effects of barriers 
to entry in manufacturing. Where a firm sits on a patent 
super-normal profits can be earned. But as Schumpeter 
pointed out, short-run obstacles may be a source of long- 
run technological innvati on j 
File "creative ale of 
perennial destruction". 
(52) 
Professionalism, often 
protected de jure as well as de facto (through the evaluative 
consensus), is different. My proposition is that profess- 
ionalism is also a source of long-run retardation. No 
manufacturing firm could ever enjoy a patent so multi- 
faceted as the pre-eminence enjoyed by the high professions. 
The rationalist imperative has not fully penetrated the 
inner sanctum of some of the most extended and significant 
aspects of modern society: its medical and legal sub- 
systems. 
The outcomes of the professional evaluative consensus 
can be enumerated and formally represented in simple neo- 
classical terms: 
1. The number of practitioners is restricted below 
(53) 
what a "free" market would engender. 
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greater than would occur in a free market. 
3. The degree of price elasticity of demand for 
professional activity is lower than under compe- 
tition, and the degree of income elasticity of 
demand higher. 
4. The price of hypothetical units of professional 
production is higher than would occur in a free 
market. 
These four conditions generate gross professional incomes 
higher than competition would produce, incorporating 
considerable monopoly rents. 
5. The flow of economically relevant information 
is curtailed. 
6. The mechanism of resource a'-location is irrationally 
distorted. 
7. The occupational structure is more rigid than a 
free market would occasion. 
In sum, these seven outcomes coalesce in: 
8. The consumer utility from a given level of resources is 
reduced as compared with competitive conditions. 
In order to explain diagrammatically how professional 
pricing occurs one must first demonstrate what a Perfectly 
competitive production of the same activity would lead to. 
This is seen in Figure 1 (page ). Here, demand for and 
ý-ý 3 
supply of a unit of production are seen as totally un- 
professionalized. This implies that there are no barriers 
o-- 
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to entry, no client manipulation and perieeL c: ocisül«ar 
knowledge. Obviously the figure represents an ideal- 
typical situation, and is purely heuristic in character. 
Pricing is shown at the overall market level, rather than 
that of the individual firm. 
Figure 1 
The pricing of a hypo- 
thetical unit of medicine 
or legal output in the 
total absence of profess- 
ionalization. 
In Figure 1 the price of a hypothetical unit of 
production is shown by the interaction of totally non- 
professionalized demand and supply schedules. 
Figure 2 
The pricing of a 
hypothetical unit of 
medical or legal 
output when supply is 
"professionalized". 
ol 
Diagram redacted due to third party and copyright issues
Diagram redacted due to third party and copyright issues
Ana 
In Firnire ? (na p 36) it is demonstrated that supply 
closure techniques can create a monopoly rent on the price 
of our hypothetical unit of production. Here the supply 
curve is pushed to the left and upwards, and a monopoly 
rent of ppl is created. 
Figure 3 
The pricing of a 
hypothetical uni_t 
of production 
under professional- 
ized conditions. 
In Figure 3 we see the results of full professionali- 
zation as demand management is added to the supply constraints 
shown in Figure 2. 
Here the market price p is raised by supply closure 
, 
effects to pl and by simultaneous demand manipulation to p2. 
The monopoly rent on each unit sold is pp2. 
s 
Diagram redacted due to third party and copyright issues
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Iý addition to this demonstration of the price and 
income implications of the professional form of production, 
it is necessary to consider the implications of professional- 
ism for the non-monetary economic benefits of practitioners. 
Much of the statistical and conceptual attack on human 
capital theory has tended to ignore these. Bowles and 
Gintis have virtually nothing to say about status. Neither 
have the Jencks team, though their statistical findings 
were at variance with the theory of human capital. and 
al f; ngs of its indeed with the eia-P-L -L ý ter. 
diý. I proponents. 
(54) 
However, as Weber long ago recognized, status is a 
key variable in societies with a complex division of labour. 
(55) 
Since education and occupation are hiyhiy correlated, 
(56) 
especially in the professions, we have good grounds for 
thinking that the income effects shown in our figures are 
matched by comparable status effects, perhaps of an even 
more significant kind. 
It is possible to say "perhaps even more significant" 
in that status is in logically limited supply. While there 
is no demonstrable limit to some kinds of capital formation, 
for example physical capital or human capital in its 
earnings aspect, status, as we have argued in an earlier 
chapter, is by definition something which one man can have 
only in relation to someone else's not having it. Status 
is distributed in terms of reference groups, in terms of 
those who have and those who have not. Status has many 
forms, but of each form it may be confidently stated that 
ý46. 
some people must not possess it. Its limited divisibility 
is its essence, and this is as true of the economic forms 
of status, what we earlier called "status-capital", as of 
other versions of status. 
VI 
Conclusion 
Modern capitalist societies involve a complex structure 
of consensus and power. Professional production exemplifies 
this mix. The two classic professions -- law and medicine -- 
involve activities that one can presume will be accorded 
spontaneous importance anywhere this side of Utopia, Tn 
this sense, professionalism is a phenomenon of genuine 
consensus. 
The same is true of other occupational groups such as 
architecture and accountancy, which for one reason or 
another are less close to the ideal-typical model of 
professional production which I have tried to depict. 
People want decent medical services, the rule of a law held 
to be just and so on. 
Nevertheless the professions are sources of conflict, 
of unintentionally misinformed elements in consensus, and 
of the exploitation of consumers and tax-payers, in that 
their organization latches on to real demands, and engineers 
interpretations of these, consonant not with the maximization 
2n?. 
of consumer welfare and the optimal rational use of 
resources, but with the interests of professions as 
A 
Professions are not properly to be interpreted either 
as the unproblematic executors of functional specialisms 
indispensable to general societal welfare, or as the 
Sübordina e support mcCiicaiisms Gi tiic bourgeois ord . 
That both approaches are so commonly encountered is a 
disturbing indictment of the crudity of much social theory. 
privileged groups. In my view, the bourgeoisie proper 
is a much less appropriate locus for "power" analysis, 
since bourgeois activity is highly dependent on advertising 
and typically subject to competition. 
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other voices in the overall structure of decision-making -- 
with the still formidable, if attentuated forces of 
bourgeois interest, with the ubiquitous influence of the 
bureaucratic form of social organization, with the 
increasingly insistent claims of organized labour. What 
professionalism illustrates is the significance of the 
occupational structure in industrial society. This is 
characteristic of such society, especially in its mature 
form as we have argued in earlier chapters. In pre- 
industrial society great power was often possessed by men 
who were essentially inactive in relation to the source of 
that power. They held property, especially land, which was 
managed by functionaries. 
Of course the professions are not part of a ruling 
(52) 
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T,? wye rý were sianficant in the management of this land, 
but in a secondary and supportive way. In early modern 
England, for example, the law was often an occupation 
for younger sons who inherited no land. 
(58) 
Neither was 
the level of demand for their services always sufficient 
to employ the supply of labour available. 
(59) 
Medicine was even more secondary. Most people did 
not receive the ministrations of doctors who, as a group, 
were dependent on the patronage of the rich. 
(60) 
Similar 
considerations apply in the case of architecture. In a 
central way then, the history of professionalism in 
industrial society involves a massive widening and deepening 
of professional activities societally. Today everyone 
enters the legal and medical orbits. 
In modern society those high in the structure of 
decision-making are active in relation to that structure. 
The rentier yields to the active capitalist or even to the 
manager. Political positions cease to be sinecures. 
. 
Above all, the senior reaches of the occupational structure 
become influential in their own right. In particular they 
tend to gain considerable control of the state apparatus. 
This fortifies them. Johnson rather misses this important 
consideration. While he stresses t : at occupational eminence 
is not enough in itself to confer what he rather crudely 
terms "dominant power", he does not notice sufficiently 
that state interventions work typically for rather than 
a ainst professional practitioners. k°-LI Johnson's claim 
LY9 
that professionals are upper iuiddit-_ uia55 iaCý aase Lhey 
come from upper middle-class families, is inherently 
implausible. 
(62) 
Logically, the connection is the other 
way round. It is largely in virtue of their occupation 
that professionals occupy their class position. Johnson's 
position is merely the opposite error to the Registrar 
General's. The latter wishes to list social classes in 
terms 'of purely descriptive occupational strata. Johnson 
wishes, more usefully, to employ class as an analytic 
concept relating to what Marxists call the "power- 
structure", but we have preferred to call the "structure 
of decision-making"; recognizing that power is not the only, 
or even the main element in such decision-making, under the 
conditions of advanced capitalism. However, it is surely 
as barren to minimize the occupational dimension of social 
hierarchy as to assert that it has only an occupational 
dimension. I would draw the reader's attention to the 
argument of an earlier chapter where I recognized the 
cogency of Talcott Parsons' notion of power as a non-zero 
sum game, that is to say as a question of autonomous 
decision-making in which one man's behaviour does not 
interfere with the discretionary behaviour of others. 
(63) 
I recognized the cogency of this conceptualization in the 
belief that much of the behaviour of people in advanced 
capitalist society is of this kind; but I nevertheless 
rejected the use of "power" in this sense, on the purely 
terminological ground of its likely confusion with "power" 
G 
understood in its two Marxist senses, that is as force or 
manipulation. The central argument of this chapter has 
been, however, that this second Marxist sense of power 
(manipulation) is precisely applicable to professionalism 
which, founded on consensus, proceeds to place on this 
consensus a mystificatory accretion. 
It is not possible to predict the future of the 
professions with any degree of confidence. Perhaps they 
will not be able indefinitely to survive the extension 
of the bureaucratic Leviathan, whether that eventuality 
implies that the state will come to insist on a greater 
role in the social definition of production, or alternatively 
that members of the public may finally tire of mystification, 
or both. 
Till now, the professions have been able to avoid the 
kind of hostility which organized labour still directs 
against the bourgeoisie, or which the general public often 
feels for organized labour. This, however, may prove a 
temporary respite. First, new generations of professional 
workers may incline to a more open administration of their 
activities. Secondly, it is possible that we are already 
witnessing in advanced capitalist society a growing dis- 
enchantment- the "social wage" and an upsurge in the 
preference for private economic decision-making. Nevertheless 
at present the professions, an ancient and adaptable occupa- 
tional type, appear to have assumed a most enduring position 
in the control of scarce resources, and an assured locus 
in the structure of social hierarchy. 
(64) 
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PARTTW0 
HELL-SMOKE AND IDEOLOGY: HUMAN CAPITAL AND 
THE MARXIST CHALLENGE TO THE LIBERAL URGER 
Come, thick night, 
And pall thee in the dunnest smoke of hell, 
That my keen knife see not the wound it makes, 
Nor heaven peep through the blanket of the dark 
To cry, 'Hold, hold. ' 
Shakespeare, Macbeth 
I 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
MARXISM AND HUMAN CAPITAL 
e 
Great Wits are sure to Madness near allind 
And thin Partitions do their Bounds divide; 
Dryden: Absalom and Achitophel 
/ 
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In the earlier chapters of this thesis, I have offered an 
interpretation of modern capitalist society which has been 
strongly, but only implicitly, hostile to Marxism. It is 
time now to make explicit the basis of such intellectual 
hostility. ºti'hat follows is in fact deeply critical of 
Marais 
. 
`'. pproü: hcs . 
%-/ -L s. ly it doeb not seek to offer rr 
a comprehensive survey or detailed exegesis. This has been 
done by such outstanding scholars as Aron, Plamenatz, 
T'N 
copper, Kolakowski (i) and many others. Rather, this 
chapter will seek to offer a critique of Marxism mainly 
from one viewpoint: that of the sociology of human capital. 
We have sought to establish the view that modern 
capitalism is rendered more comprehensible sociologically 
through the insights of human capital theory. We have also 
repeatedly stressed that modern capitalism tends to be 
associated with that open society which Sir Karl Popper and 
(2) 
many other writers have so passionately defended, a 
society whose open character depends on free and rational 
discussion of socio-economic, political and scientific 
issues. However, it is also the case, one might argue, 
that capitalism may fall victim to that very spirit of 
continous critical evaluation which is its lifeblood. 
This is not to say that the system cannot equall be- marrcdL 
by coro. placency. Wiles observes that a rely Lively 
Unsophisticated self-satisfaction was for long the bane 
of American society. 
31 Nevertheless, in principle we 
may argue that without endless probing, self-doubt and 
criticism, men cannot achieve a more rational society, 
cannot free themselves from obscurantism and prejudice, 
cannot overcome the scarcities of nature or the folly of 
human arrangements. On the economic level, a continuous 
reappraisal of resource use is clearly a condition of a 
rational allocation of resrnnrces, 
The danger is that partial views of our deficiencies 
and shortcomings can be unhelpfully generalized. The evils 
vi "%j -, , +y 
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meant criticism. Modern capitalism has shattered hitherto 
obdurately dichotomous patterns of social stratification, 
and has partly overcome the intractable scarcity of which 
human endeavour has always hitherto .o easily 
fallen foul. 
Now, at the very moment when we have rolled back the margin 
of scarcity, and achieved levels of productive power and 
inventiveness our ancestors never dreamed of, the voices 
of self-doubt and critical self-awareness have multiplied. 
Surely our affluence and security cannot be put down 
to our own efforts and imagination! There must be a 
villain of the piece. Either the bourgeoisie are exploiting 
the proletariat, or the rich world is exploiting the poor. 
Obviously there are many 11Marxisms", and any critique 
Stands in danger of erecting a styli zed caricature. What is 
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and militant trades unionists for whom our institutions 
are moribund, our economy predatory, our society corrupt, 
, and our civilization 
doomed. It is among such men and 
women that Marxism has its hold. 
Central to the intellectual disposition of Marxist 
intellectuals is the notion of "exploitation". I shall not 
be addressing in detail the massive attempt by Marx to 
give this concept a scientific basis. The task of criticising 
this effort has been completed by some very eminent writers. 
I need say no more here than that Marxist notions of 
exploitation involve the proposition that there is only 
one capital, and that is its confrontation, under class 
ownership, with social actors _possessing 
only their labour 
power for sale, that leads to exploitation, by depriving 
the working class of control over their surplus value creation. 
We repeat that there are many capitals, and that the 
ability to make capital choices and decisions is widespread 
where men have been socialized into the market code. It 
seems impossible to give exploitation a scientific status. 
Most of the world's poor are not so much exploited as 
insufficiently involved in economic activity. Exploitation 
seems appropriate as a term only for deliberate attempts 
to deprive people of the fruits of their labour, e. g. in 
South Africa today. 
The spirit of criticism, vital to a capitalist economy, 
can become distorted, and appendaged to false and murderous 
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ideologies. The only revolutionary movement ever to succeed 
in a highly industrialized society, German National Socialism, 
is a monument to the dangers which attend a false diagnosis 
of present ills. 
According to Raymond Aron, Marxist theory is now almost 
bankrupt in terms of its explanatory power. 
(4) 
Nevertheless 
it remains immensely attractive in the Western world, 
especially among sociologists. Let us outline, in summary 
form, the kind of rebuke which human capital theory can 
offer Marxism. At this point we need do no more than recap 
on earlier chapters. 
Human capital theory is a multi-pronged weapon in the 
critique of Marxism., It rebukes the Marxist approach to 
social class, for it helps to explain the non-revolutionary 
character of the proletariat. 
(5) 
It offers a model of 
consensual economic inter-action vastly more persuasive 
than the intractable conflicts of Marxism. It gainsays the 
centripetal perspective of neo-Marxism, which views the 
capitalist economy as fundamentally centralising economic 
power, positing against it a decentralized model of social 
control and economic decision-making. It puts in the place 
of the grotesque puppets of Marxian mythology, helplessly 
swinging on the strings of private ownership, real men who 
perceive their own interests. Human capital formation, 
whether social or private, is inevitably centrifugal with 
regard to economic resources, since it is invested inalienably 
in individaal men. 'Outside a slave economy one man cannot a 
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Perhaps human capital theory may eventually be eclipsed 
by, or absorbed in, wider theories of human decision-making, 
as Blaug suggests. 
(6) 
Nevertheless we hope that all the 
points made against Marxism above have emerged from earlier 
chapters, or will be reinforced in this one. In many cases, 
we believe that human capital theory has much to offer 
which is highly illuminating. 
However, before we attempt to bring the insights of 
human capital theory to- bear on the inadequacies of Marxism, 
it is only fair to recall that modern neo-Marxists have also 
been hostile to human capital theory. We must therefore 
address those things which they have had to say. 
There is by now a well-established tradition of 
employing Marxist arguments in the critique of human capital 
theory. Such theory is held to be both abstracted and 
reified, that is to say it is thought to be a-social and 
a-historical. 
(7) 
Indeed, the very concept "human capital" 
has been challenged. The term involves, say some critics, 
a false analogy. Investment in men does not lead to their 
gaining "power" over their fellows. Specifically, it does 
not create employment. The human capitalist is not an 
employer. 
(8) 
Human capital theory, as a development of 
neo-classical economics, is also held to fall victim to 
(certain 
theoretical shortcomings in the latter. 
9ý It 
has also been charged, though not only by Marxists, with 
resting on incorrect statistical data. This was the view of 
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Jencks and his co-authors (including the leading American 
Marxist, Herbert Gintis) in their massive Inequalj_t . 
(10) 
Finally, and here the critique involves a shameless 
arguentum ad hominem, human capital theory is indicted as 
an example of bourgeois ideology. 
(11) 
None of these charges seems sustainable. Any economist 
worth his salt knows that human capital theory is in some 
degree a socio-historical construct. It makes no sense 
outside an exchange economy, and indeed not much sense unless 
th t exchange economy "las a 
Jeve I Qped abc Ur market. In 
other words both the theory and the phenomena it seeks to 
explain are in the main products of industrialization. 
That we do not keep saying this does not mean we do not know 
it. Neither do we require Marxists to keep repeating this 
of their own perspectives, though it is equally true of 
theirs. Marxism is a theory predicated on the evils of the 
division of labour and the "commodity fetishism" of the money 
economy. It presupposes the existence of the evils it aims 
to abolish. It is a theory of socialism, born of capitalism 
itself. 
It is the case that the genesis of human capital theory 
lies in many decades of neo-classical economics. Some 
branches of economics, such as neo-classicism, are rather 
abstracted and socially narrow. To criticize them for this 
is misplaced. The central body of economic theory is a 
specialized form of social science which does not pretend 
to be able to gr. asp all the social aspects of economic 
LV aJ 
phenomena. However, as we argued in earlier chapters, 
the sociological derivations of human capital theory are 
in fact rich and various. Interpreted in a sociological 
fiway, human capital theory is an admirable source of insight 
into social stratification, and the structure of social 
control. Furthermore, though the concept "human capital" 
is no more definitive than earlier notions of capital in 
explaining the etiology of industrialization, since it 
cannot explain why increased levels of capital formation 
were evoked in the first place, any account of the British 
Industrial Revolution which ignored the role of human capital 
formation as an historically original form of skill formation, 
would surely seem somewhat lacking. 
Furthermore human capital theory does not fall down in 
terms of the non-employment yielding character of human 
capital formation, nor in terms of the non-discretion over 
the deployment of human capital by its beneficiaries as 
compared with orthodox capital. I would answer such 
charges quite simply. First, it is simply not true that 
human capital formation is not a source of employment. The 
creation, maintenance, protection and mobilization of human 
capital, constitute a vast source of employment, involving 
labour at every level of modern social hierarchy. The 
instructional system is analogous to a vast producer goods 
system, the medical system to a vast service and maintenance 
industry. In the instructional system skill formation is 
a prime function; the maintenance of skill is at least an 
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of skill formation is a latent function of transport systems 
and a manifest -F unc Lion of employment agencies and labour 
jexchanges. All these functions generate employment. 
Moreover there are clearly many occupational groups 
. who seek 
to combine for purposes of enhancing their earnings 
and status, in ways which involve attempts to protect and 
even privatize human capital formation. We have seen that 
this is a fortiori the case with the professions. Clearly 
there is a difference between employment generated by the 
creation, maintenance and mobilization of human capital on 
the one hand, and on the other hand, employment created by 
a man or group of men actually putting human capital to 
work. However, many occupational groups, who are rich in 
human capital formation, 
(12) 
for example the professions, 
do themselves generate employment. A doctor employing a 
secretary, or a receptionist, is precisely comparable to 
a factory owner employing labour. In both cases it is the 
existence of a capital which creates employment, and the 
examples of such employment generated by human capital are 
legion. 
None of this of course makes any difference if the 
skill formations involved are not rationalized, that is, 
deliberately organized in terms of outlay and return. This 
is perhaps the central problem with human capital theory, 
and we shall address it later. 
(13) 
lt is not, however, 
the question which we are addressing. The charge is, 
-7 i L/1" 
au fond, that human 'ý capital'-'- is xiu i. Ca La , 
because ýt 
does not create discretionary powers of resource use and 
employment in its beneficiaries.. We repeat that this is 
`simply not true. 
The charge that human capital theory is a-social it 
is the whole burden of this thesis to refute. It is true 
only in the sense that is also true of monetarism or 
Keynesian theory. By this I mean that in themselves 
Keynesianism, monetarism and human capital theory, are 
economic theories, not sociological theories. Chiding 
such theories for not being sociological is like rebuking 
water for not being wine. In any case their original economic 
character does not mean we cannot attempt to derive sociolog- 
ical implications from them. The huge advantage enjoyed by 
Marxism over its nineteenth-century rivals is precisely 
that is is an economic sociology. Marxism is. fundamentally 
an economics, an economics, however, with the sociological 
derivations spelt out. Marxism is the socio-economy of 
private physical capital. Human capital theory, already more 
successful than Marxism in its economic treatment of labour, 
promises to eclipse Marxism by its wider sociological 
perspective. In my view the integration of certain forms 
of modern economic and social theory is not merely possible: 
it is also desirable and perhaps inevitable. The mutual 
frigidity of the two subjects is not desirable, and probably 
not sustainable in the long run. Human capital theory, 
identified by George Psacharopoulos as the outstanding 6 
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intellectual innovation of recent decades in economics, ---, 
is a promising area for socio-economic synthesis. 
I am not a specialist in economic theory. When I meet 
i 
the view that neo-classical economics is flawed or passe, 
I react nevertheless with a certain exasperation. It is 
noteworthy that the Robinson and Eatwell attack on the 
concept of price determination through supply and demand, 
(15) 
surfaced at the very moment when the Arabs were furnishing 
the world with an incomparable empirical demonstration of 
the validity of the supply and demand model. Hahn has 
(16) stressed the logical robustness of neo-classical theory. 
Wiles points out that perfect computation -- were such 
Possible -- in a nor -market economy, wo; l lnozr; ±ahl y 
involve a simulation of a perfectly competitive market, 
where marginal social cost equals marginal social utility. 
If it did not, the computation would simply be wrong. 
(17) 
In one of Adam Westoby's attacks on human capital theory, 
we meet the central charge that human capital theory, as a 
paradigm version of neo-classicism, suffers from the 
perpetual sin of neo-classicism -- the omission of class 
as an explanatory variable. 
(18) 
The omission is real enough; 
but I doubt if it is a deficiency. One might as well chide 
Marxism for its "failure" to cast light on the oedipus 
complex. Such failure is not in fact failure at all. What 
Westoby objects to in neo-classical theory, is its applying 
Supply and demand analysis to the distribution as well as to 
the production of the social product. One might retort 6 
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that this is precisely its strength, a strength fortified 
by the predictive power of neo-classical approaches. The 
proposition that earnings will be increased by education, 
is deducible, a priori, from neo-classical principles, 
and empirically demonstrable. Marxism, by contrast, has 
no such successful predictions to its credit. 
There is little doubt, in fact, that Marx was not much 
interested in the distribution of national income. Even in 
the case of wealth, it was not its distribution that 
concerned him, but its for fa of tenure (private property) 
and its mode of accumulation (surplus value extraction). 
The idea that this latter notion is a refutation of 
competitive labour pricing, contuses macro and micro 
perspectives. It is true that the population of an economy 
must produce more than they consume, at least in the long- 
run. There must be a surplus for depreciation and net 
investment and so on. One does not actually need Marx's 
theory of value to recognize the cogency of the concept 
"surplus" which in any case does nothing to disturb the 
micro identification of earnings with marginal productivityý19) 
In any case, what "class" factors does Westoby want us to 
intrude into our analysis? The answer is: the pre-emptive, 
question-begging Marxian categories, where class boils down 
to systematic relationships (of ownership or non-ownership) 
to private physical capital. 
(20) 
This, however, is to 
conceive the problem the wrong way round. The theory of 
social class is rambling and inchoate. Is it not far better 
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to bring to it a highly developed body of economic theory 
(e. g. human capital theory) than to keep running around 
in nineteenth-century circles, combining crude notions 
pof property with metaphysical vagaries such as surplus 
value extraction? Indeed, as we argued in earlier chapters 
on social theory and on the professions, the way forward for 
a theory of social class is to jettison the crude dichotomies 
of nineteenth-century economics and incorporate in their 
place the insights of modern economics. The resources 
which go into skill formation in modern economies are vast. 
Is it really obscurantism to argue that millions of men 
and women actually weigh up the net benefits of educatonal, 
coarcYl an other ac±i ZTl ti es? 
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Is it naif to assert that skill formation is significant 
in social stratification? I have personally observed, in 
the West of Ireland, that peasants make competent cost- 
benefit calculations in the organisation of their working 
lives. (21) The oddity of Marxism is that it wants to 
restrict quite ordinary powers of calculation of cost and 
return to the bourgeoisie. This is the basis of Althusser's 
repressive and ideological 
(22ý 
There is in apparatuses. 
Althusser's notion of repressive state apparatuses, the 
implicit, arrogant view that the masses cannot objectively 
approve of institutions such as the police, being incapable 
of genuine reflection on the subject. In the case of 
"ideological state apparatuses" like education, they are 
similarly held to be passive and duped. The masses are not 
L%5. 
to be credited with any intelligence. This-is why Westoby 
is so contemptuous of human capital theory and its model 
of "bourgeois", individual action. 
(23) 
Underlying most 
) Marxism is a contemptuous dismissal of ordinary people as 
supine, witless fools. 
(24) 
Empirically it is worth noting that Freeman's book, 
The Over-Educated American, relates the earnings of different 
groups mainly to the elemental forces of supply and demand, 
in a way wholly consistent with neo-classical theory. 
(25) 
Neither is the average citizen unaware of these phenomena. 
It is true that Freeman's work pointed to an over-supply 
of educated labour, and could thus be construed as inimical 
to I1MMIa.. 
VQl. i apit.,, 
thiý. 
vi , 
eory. but as has been argued by Bowen. VV 1Ull1Q11 vui va -v by 
falling money rates of return do not vitiate the human 
capital paradigm, for the non-monetary returns to certain 
occupational choices may remain particularly important and 
attractive. 
(26) 
Insofar as occupational status may derive 
from human capital decisions, this point is as significant 
for sociology as for economics, as we argued in an earlier 
chapter. Gordon and Williams have shown that there is a 
widely disseminated educational investment calculus amongst 
older school-children. 
(27) 
1 would here add that it might 
be more comprehensively embracing were it not for the 
relatively high degree of insulation of public education 
systems from the capitalist labour market. Basil Bernstein 
has suggested to me that education systems are crude (that 
is, not sensitive or responsive) allocators of labour to the 
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occupational structure. 
(28) 
This, it seems to me, is 
intimately connected with their generally non-capitalist 
character, that is to say their direct provision to the 
j 
public out of taxation. All in all, however, I would 
argue, neo-classicism has little to be ashamed about, either 
theoretically or empirically. 
The statistical charge against human capital theory 
is that earnings regressed on education do not yield a 
correlation particularly more significant than the regression 
of income on many other independent variables. Let us simply 
note that George Psacharopoulos (of the human capital 
persuasion) and Peter Wiles (a non-believer) jointly insist 
that the correlation holds, and that the Jencks rejection of 
it turns on faulty methodology. 
(29' 
Elsewhere Psacharopoulos 
and Layard have argued that the question is not whether 
education increases earnings, but why it does. 
(30) 
Also in 
his evidence to the Diamond Commission, Layard holds 
unambiguously that greater school exposure of the individual 
does enhance his earnings very considerably. 
(31) 
However, it is the charge of intellectual prostitution 
which is the most forceful one levelled at human capital 
theory. Let us address it separately. 
Human Capital as Ideology. 
The concept "ideology" is understood in this work in its 
central Marxist sense of a body of ideas which serve the 
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interests of a social class. As Plamenatz - points out, 
these ideas may either uphold or challenge the existing 
order. 
(32) In one sense the charge that human capital 
theory is the ideology of a corrupt bourgeois class should 
not surprise us. Frightened orthodoxies are notable for their 
shrill notes and a frightened orthodoxy is what, fundamentally, 
modern neo-Marxism actually is. It is a sociology with its 
roots in crude nineteenth-century economics, where labour 
and capital are held to be such distinct categories that, 
like East and West, the twain shall never meet. From earlier 
hints that this dichotomy is not viable, 
(33) 
we have now been 
given coherent intellectual works indicating that calculi of 
cost and return surround the deployment of labour itself. 
(34) 
Individual citizens make capital decisions- about their own 
productivities. No wonder that Marxists react with such 
hostility. This philosophy of man as active, negotiating, 
calculating, in some degree manager of his own socio-economic 
world, is so much at variance with the Marxist view, where 
save for true believers, men are ignorant, helpless pawns 
in a system of exploitation. 
Marxism gets itself into a paradoxical bind over labour 
prices. On the one hand Marxists want to assert that only 
labour is productive; while on the other hand they must 
needs reject the most promising tool yet devized for analyzing 
variations in labour productivity. Human capital theory 
must be rejected, because it breaches the central 
Marxist assertion as to the structural discreteness of 
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labour and capital. 
The Marxist position is inherently contradictory. 
While it insists as relentlessly as neo-classical economics 
that the maximization of profits is the motive force of 
private business, it nevertheless posits an insensitivity 
on the part of capitalist enterprise to significant varia- 
tions in productivity and efficiency. If it is agreed 
that the drive is for profit, it may fairly be asked for 
what reasons different combinations of factor-input obtain 
in proüuctioýl. For it cannot be claimed that all combinations 
are associated with similar profitability. If some labour is 
more productive than other labour, how can a theory purport- 
ing to explain at least part of such variation be 
dismissed 
as mere ideology? 
In neo-Marxist writings on ideology there is the 
deepest confusion. At one level this consists`in a failure 
to recognize the speculative, and indeed one might say 
entirely hypothetical, nature of the neo-Marxist ideology 
itself. The real enemy of neo-Marxism is hierarchy. 
This is true of such variously Marxist writers as Bowles 
and Gintis, M. F. D. Young, and Nell Keddie-. 
(35) Indeed, 
relatively thinly Marxist writings like those of Young are 
perhaps especially hostile to hierarchy. There is running 
through Young's work an unspoken counterfactual to the effect 
that hierarchy is unjustifiable and dispensable. 
(36) In 
the essay by Henderson we meet the absurd sociologism that 
what courts as "intelligence" is merely a middle-class 6 
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structure of the nineteenth century. 
(3) 
This particular 
paper seems to me an especially strident case of anti- 
hierarchical ideology. Now human capital theory is an 
attempt to explain, however incompletely, the hierarchy 
of the distribution of income. It was therefore bound to 
attract the label "ideology" from an anti-hierarchical 
thesis., postulating that all hierarchies among men are 
undesirable and unnecessary, a kind of redundant vileness, 
like starvation or oppression. 
The objection to hierarchy is nevertheless itself an 
ideology. If ideology consists in ideas which serve the 
interest of some group or class, then surely the notion of 
a non-hierarchical society is also ideological. If a 
majority of citizens desire hierarchy of one kind or another, 
then a quest for. the abolition of hierarchy is part of the 
ideology of a minority who reject the majority view, and 
would seek to impose their own non-hierarchical society on 
the rest of us. In this case we may say that their ideas 
on hierarchy and equality minister to their personal 
psychic interest. 
Marxist writings on ideology are various. Some would 
attribute a ýýon-ideological character to the doctrines of 
revolutionary socialism. These approximate to "knowledge" 
(that is, ideas drained of their ideological content) as 
they cut through the surface of present arrangements and 
uncover the true interests of society, that is to say that 
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pattern of social affýiis to which all men would accede if 
they understood the world. 
(38) 
The Platonic and 
Rousseauesque character of this conception is obvious 
enough, as is its dangerous Olympian arrogance. Other 
Marxist influenced writing, for example that of Bourdieu, 
seems to admit of no such possibility. 
(39) 
Althusser, on 
the other hand, regards ideology as a permanent feature of 
social life -- a position with which the present writer is 
inclined to agree. 
(40) 
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brought against this or that branch of social science, come 
from quarters whose own ideological position is not recognized. 
It is a case of Freudian projection, that is, attributing 
to others faults one possesses oneself. Andin the case of 
the neo-Marxist dismissal as ideology, of human capital 
theory, I would claim that however "ideological" the latter 
may be, it has greater predictive force than Marxism. As 
I have remarked elsewhere, the long book on American education 
by Bowles and Gintis does not develop a specifically 
ý41) 
Marxist predictive theory of the distribution of income. 
Their outline of the hierarchy of income distribution in the 
United States is descriptive and could effortlessly have been 
written by a non-Marxist. Indeed Marxism is in general not 
very powerful predictively. This is a characteristic it 
shares with most branches of sociology, and which distinguishes 
it from many branches of economic theory, including supply 
and demand analysis. Nor is it only the long-range 
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predictions of Marxism that have gone *astrayý. One such 
prediction concerned the increasing polarization of society 
j 
between bourgeoisie and proletariat. We have argued that 
human capital theory is a cogent tool for showing up the 
wrongness of this prediction. 
(42) 
However it is also the 
case that Marxism is not very fertile in "cross-sectional 
prediction": for example, it cannot explain the pattern 
of incomes, either collective or individual. 
The gravest demerit of the Marxist assault on human 
capital theory (as ideology) is the assumption that the 
substantive contents of an ideology must be false or not 
worth examining, simply because it is an ideology. Adam 
k Westoby's first insulting and iri Leiiiperýat_ C attack- on L'1CL1 
r 
ý. 
Blaug, for example, has little to say on the explanatory 
value of human capital theory. It is almost pure argumentum 
ad hominem. 
(43 ) 
Now let us accept with Blaug, 
(44) 
as Psacharopoulos 
and Wiles assert, 
(45) 
pace Jencks, 
(46) 
that we still must, 
that in all societies for which we, have data, on average, 
income correlates positively with education. Human capital 
theory is an attempt to explain this phenomenon. 
The point that seems to get missed is that it is 
perfectly possible for a theory to be simultaneously both a 
good explanation of a certain reality and an ideological 
justification of that reality. It is perfectly possible 
for a man's higher than average earnings to reflect his 
scarcity, at the same time as he believes this to be the case, 
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and believes that this should be the case. There is no 
inevitable tension between "knowledge" and "ideology". 
, The proposition 
that education enhances earnings may pertain 
to both worlds. An educated man does have an interest in 
preventing the accession of a government which seeks to 
alter the distribution of income along lines in which scarcity 
does not much figure. As the late john Plamenatz pointed 
out: "it is not clear why class ideology..... need have 
anything of illusion or false consciousness about it.... 
Masters and slaves might have some beliefs about slavery in 
common, and others peculiar to their class, and yet all the 
beliefs be true. , 
(47) 
In similar vein Martin Seliger observes: 
"not all that is placed within an ideological context is 
false, non-factual, slanted or mendacious. "( 
48 
In fact in ne. o-Marxist writings on labour-prices we 
find two positions which are not easily reconciled. There is 
is first the view that a capitalist economy in fact "works" 
pretty much along the lines of text-book economic theory, 
and that this is not a desirable state of affairs. This is 
the view one finds in Herbert Gintisspiece on Ivan Illich. 
(49) 
According to this view, which accepts the primacy of market 
factors in t11G determination of prices, the higher earnings 
of the better educated citizen may well reflect his 
scarcity. Gintis does not actually address the issue in 
terms of human capital theory, but his model of the workings 
of a capitalist economy is pure neo-classicism in some 
respects. 
28 Q' ý. 
The other posi ti_on, also embraced by some non-Marxists, 
is that the distribution of earnings is not governed 
Dy market forces, but by "power relations". 
(50) 
According 
tp such a view, human capital theory must indeed be the 
ideology of those standing high in the power and income 
hierarchies. This is the implicit noticn behind Schooling 
in Capitalist America. 
(51) 
Though Bowles and Gintis do 
not address the question of human capital theory at length 
in this particular book, their thesis that the process of 
certification is both the linking device between the hier- 
archies of schooling and capitalism, and the source of 
ideological justification for the status quo, is evidently 
in similar vein to Westoby's charge that human capital theory 
is ideological. We may thus turn to the core of the debate, 
to one side of which human capital theory merely adds a 
gloss of explanation (or ideological justification): what 
are the essential determinants of the hierarchy of income 
under capitalism? 
The debate would be enlivened if the ideal-typical 
character of the two models implicitly involved in it were 
more clearly spelled out. We may conveniently label these 
two models the "Rational Economy Model" and the "Power 
Relations Modell'. 
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The Rational Economy Model 
Here the economy is seen as a "rational" price system, 
ýighly sensitive to variations in scarcity. The price of 
any good or factor of production is determined by the 
intersection of the supply schedule of that good or factor 
with the demand schedule for. that good or factor. 
The model involves profit maximising man, utility 
maximising man, a perfect distribution of knowledge, and a 
perfectly flexible system of resource allocation. Now, if 
these assumptions are seen as corresponding to a real world, 
we are clearly faced with an unacceptable hypostasis. No 
economy is, or has ever been, like this model, though it 
is worth noting that Blaug 
(52) 
and Brittan 
(53) 
have 
suggested that in principle a socialist economy could approach 
it closer than any other, since the state could attenuate 
the rigidities caused by concentrations of market power and 
by other imperfections, whether in the case of goods or 
factors of production. This qualification, however, 
convincing or not, involves the inclusion of a sociological 
element in the model, since it invokes the concept "state 
power", which is more a sociological than an economic notion. 
In the real capitalist world we find monopolies, 
restrictive practices, huge public sectors, government 
interference, incomes policies, sluggish mechanisms of 
resource allocation, professionalism, racial, sexual and 
age prejudice, and many other factors which prevent wages 
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often, ' as Blaug regretfully points out, returns to factors 
of production are simply not equalized at the margin. 
(54) 
Must we therefore let out the conceptual baby with 
the empirical bathwater? I would argue, to the contrary, 
that we should accede, by way of a pis aller, to the 
Friedmanite view that it is not the assumptions of a 
theory which count, but the validity of its predictions. 
In Freeman's book, The Over-Educated American, we find a 
strong corroboration of the view that th3 pattern of earnings 
of many occupational groups is indeed powerfully influenced 
by supply and demand, though Freeman does not address the 
philosophical issue as to the implications of this, either 
for neo-classical economics in general, or for human capital 
theory in particular. 
(55) 
A majority of economists are persuaded of the validity 
of human capital theory in the partial explanation of income. 
Schooling is one element, probably the biggest, though not 
at all a massive element, in the generation of personal 
income. Naturally the theorist of human capital should 
attempt to speak from strength. Psacharopoulos and Layard 
claim that human capital, defined. for their purpose as that 
formed by schooling and on-the--job training, explains about 
a third of earnings inequality in Great Britain -- almost 
exactly the same as in the United States. This is actually 
highly significant, and a strong. prima facie justification 
of the human capital paradigm. 
(56) 
Other forms of human 
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capital, formation also have their part to play, such as 
health treatments, migration, job* search, information 
retrieval and so on. In turn, all human capital formation 
constitutes only a part of the determination of labour 
prices through supply and demand, the supply of labour 
also involving non-economic, that is, cultural and genetic 
elements which also shape its employable character. Finally, 
few economists would deny the influence in the pattern of 
labour prices, of the conventions and rigidities which 
pi v cn +i. w iC*. i liä. "V called 
4ir idea 
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economy" being a faithful representation of economic 
reality. However so far the largest single element which 
econometricians have succeeded in identifying as an independ- 
ent variable in the generation of income, is years of 
schooling. This suggests that a prime function of education 
is indeed skill formation, though clearly i am aware that 
there is a considerable literature arguing that the connection 
between school and income concerns affective socialization 
or screening rather than knowledge or skill accumulation. 
What further inclines me to the notion that skill formation, 
not affective processing, is the true raison d'etre is my 
relative disbelief in the power of schooling to produce 
Particular personality types. This is a position I shall 
return to in my discussion of education. 
One difficulty in our way, we repeat, is that in 
advanced economies, primary and secondary education and to 
Some extent tertiary education are not capitalistically 
7. 
organized. This has a number of outcomes relevanL 
to our discussion here: 
(a) It affects the distribution of educational 
j costs. For example, upper secondary and 
tertiary curricular biographies may be 
different from what they would be had 
students to finance their own education. 
(b) It weakens the ability of employers to demand 
particular curricula in schools. The direct 
provision of schooling out of public taxation 
enhances the curricular discretion of teachers 
and students. 
(c) As a consequence of (a) and (b) we encounter 
the notoriously bad "fit" between the contents 
of curricular biographies on the one hand and 
the contents of occupations on the other. 
In the light of these considerations it may be argued 
that in fact it is remark-able not how little the market 
asserts itself in the generation of income, but how much. 
Despite the relatively strong insulation (in Bernstein's 
term "strong classification") between the education system 
and the wider labour market and economy, the incorrigible 
forces of supply and demand nevertheless assert themselves. 
s 
2e8. 
The Power Relations Model 
This model of the determination of prices is, much less 
developed than. the ideal type of the rational economy. 
It is also not closely articulated with any formal economic 
theory, for though it is found mainly in neo-Mar: st writings, 
it seems to me to bear no indispensable connection with 
Marxist economic theory. For example, it does not derive 
from the theory of surplus value extraction. In fact, the 
model is a sociological rather than an economic one. 
According to this model the industrial economy is 
essentially a power structure. In capitalist society this 
power structure is based upon the ownership/ control of 
private capital. 
(57) 
Under socialism it is alleged a similar 
hierarchy results from elite control of state capital. 
(58) 
(Hence such society is often termed "state capitalist". 
(" 
According to this model the higher earnings of some 
citizens reflect not their scarcity/productivity, but their 
situation in the power hierachy. The longest, though still. 
only implicit, example of the model, is in Bowles' and 
Gintis' Schooling in Capitalist America. Here the authors 
effectively break the theoretical link between productivity 
and earnings by offering a model of the co, ^-^ection between 
schooling and hierarchy almost exlusively in terms of 
affective socialization; in other words, in terms of the 
differential attachment of the school population, not to a 
hierarchy of scarcity but to one of power. Power, not 
7AQ 
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On ýllC'h a \Tl P. W 
human capital theory can only be an ideology of legiti- 
mation. Bowles and Gintis deny the standard association 
between earnings and scarcity in arguing that one function 
of the "capitalist" education system is to ensure that 
labour is "productive but not scarce". 
(61) 
Theoretically the power relations. model is thin. It 
has little predictive power. Furthermore its theoretical 
roots are also shallow. It can be squared with the Marxian 
conception of surplus value extraction; but it cannot, be 
derived from it. Moreover, a world which perfectly embodied 
the power relations model would, in order to maximise profits, 
be subject to the same neo-classical constraints which 
Peter Wiles claims are logically entailed by perfect compu- 
tation in a planned economy. 
(62) 
If prices do not accord 
with neo-classical theory, profits will not be maximized. 
The Bowles and Gintis book is actually remarkably 
unsophisticated in terms of an ,.:,. lysis of labour prices . 
Nevertheless we may reasonably assume that such accomplished 
scholars would respond to the above charges to the effect that 
no actual economy must be confused with the ideal type used 
to conceptualize or typologize it. The maximization of 
prosit is a ue dentia-,, , 
not an ubiquitous aspect of 
the sys e 
To this we must retort that insofar as there is 
ten? ential orientation to profit maximization, so also there 
must be a behaviour of prices approaching the neo-classical 
paradigm. The further prices are away from the paradigm, 
the less will profits be maximized and vice versa. 
, 
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In reality all industrial economies, capitalist or 
socialist, will come somewhere between market rationality 
and power relations. The question concerns the relative 
importance of these. We have argued in earlier chapters 
that highly developed capitalist economies tend to a high 
degree of rationalization, and are characterized by powerful 
integrative consensus. In a subsequent chapter we shall try 
to develop the proposition that . modern socialism is relatively 
coercive, and does indeed in considerable degree approximate 
a power relatinns model. In the final part of this chapter 
an attempt will be made to weave a critique of Marxism 
based on human capital"theory, into a more general critique. 
that for ll' +- - 4-" ,, the Marx; sm i- My fic en. t My view is tha1. Vl C1J. _l its uvl mg výýs, 
within its own terns. The added insights of human capital 
theory, however, bring to the traditional critique some 
further powerful cutting edge. However, before we proceed to 
our final section, it behoves us first to hold a discussion 
of a Marxist thesis which has been very popular among socio- 
logists-in recent years: Harry Braverman's contention that 
advanced capitalism is characterized by the radical de- 
skilling of the working population. 
(63) 
Braverman and the "De-Skilling Thesis" 
Braverman's work does not directly impinge on the debate 
about human capital theory. Where he does discuss education 
directly, for example, he relies heavily on Ivan Berg's now 
toi S. u J. " 
a- (64) largely duciiiuored victvu. 
book which need not detain us. 
Th Ü ýý ý"; oak part of hi 
The general disposition of the book, however, implies 
ja strong antipathy towards the explanatory ambience of 
human capital theory. First it is orthodox Marxism, and 
contains in fact several jejune chapters on Marx's analysis 
of capitalism. 
(65) 
Secondly, its specific message is that 
under advanced capitalism, the worker is increasingly 
alienated, deprived of his skills, and divided from his 
fellows. Such pessimism is a polar opposite to the general 
optimism of human capital theory. Thus while Braverman 
does not address human capital theory intellectually, and 
indeed there is no formal exclusivity between the de-skilling 
thesis and human capital theory, they clearly belong to very 
different universes of general discourse. This remains true 
despite the fact that, as we shall see, Braverman's thesis 
can be expressed in neo-classical terms. 
Braverman's thesis is ingeniously stated. The vast 
productive powers of industrialism imply a huge increase in 
knowledge. This increase in knowledge, however outr4 the 
proposition may seem at first blush, has been accompanied 
by a fall in skill levels as workers' discretionary functions 
N 
have been increasingly incorporated into machine functions. 
66, 
The illusion of higher skill levels has two main 
sources. 
(67) 
The first is the rise in qualifications. 
This, however, says nothing about job contents. The second 
is the set of categories used in the statistical analysis of 
2q92. 
the labour force. Fundamentally, the name of a job tells 
one nothing of its skills. 
In the 1930's Alba Edwards changed the classification 
i 
of workers in the U. S. A. The previous classification had 
been between craftsmen and labourers. Edwards restricted 
the latter term to non-farm workers who were not craftsmen 
or machine operatives. Edwards, whose work is the basis 
of subsequent classification, now backprocessed previous 
data in the light of his categories. Thus when we find the 
term "operati"ve" in pre-1930 Is data, this is because of 
Edwards. 
(68) 
His work has led to the familiar trio: skilled, 
(ýql 
semi-skilled, unskilled. -, The middle terra is Edwards' 
operative. This is obviously an expanding category in an 
industrialising economy. Association with machinery is 
misleadingly associated with a massive impression of a fall 
in the number of unskilled, and a rise in the numbers of 
semi-skilled. These untenable assumptions have powerfully 
influenced subsequent work and attitudes. 
Braverman devotes many thousands of words to his thesis 
that both the industrial and clerical work-forces are in 
fact finding their skills and autonomy progressively reduced. 
While the text is brilliant, and full of interesting things, 
I would argue that this central theme is fundamentally flawed. 
There is first of all its intuitive unlikeliness. Such 
an objection hardly merits theoretical weight, but it is 
not without force. A form of society, rather lightly " 
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policed, not very centralized as a structure of decision- 
making, characterized by unprecedented living standards, 
fabulous powers of engineering and environmental mastery, 
is held by Braverman to be characterized by the concentra- 
tion of expertise in fewer and fewer hands or alternatively 
incorporated into machinery itself. I find the proposition 
intuitively jarring. 
Second, while Braverman -fastens on processes which are 
real enough, he overlooks their partial character. Job- 
fragmentation has been a feature of the organization of 
labour in many occupations under the conditions of advanced 
industrialism. The mötor-car industry is an obvious case. 
However, under aýr Cyr{J t a" n cond1ýi., ýý., _ _o, , 
conditions of technology and factor Gll ý/V111. t 
endowment, such extreme fragmentation may be the purest 
rationalization. If greater efficiency could be secured 
by less fragmentation we could expect some capitalists to 
break ranks. If this has not widely occurred, we may take 
it that real productive efficiency is involved, unless one 
takes it also that there is a central "political" conspiracy 
(70) 
at work, of the kind most Marxists would reject. Some 
capitalists indeed have broken ranks here, e. g. Volvo. To 
the extent that they have not, we may argue that the problem 
is general for industrial society and not distinctly related 
to private ownership. 
The incorporation of skill to machine processes is also 
real enough. It looms larger now indeed than when Braverman 
published his book. 
(71) 
Once again, it seems likely that 6 
the trend is not specific to capitalism. More than this, 
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to expand on a point we hinted at earlier. both PI PmP-n+,, _ 
in Braverman's version of advanced capitalism -- the 
incorporation of skill to machinery itself, and a bourgeois 
preference for employing unskilled labour, can be encapsul- 
ated in the standard neo-classical explanation of the 
search for profit maximization -- namely the substitution, 
at the margin, of the cheaper for the dearer factor-input. 
We repeat that Braverman's charges are partial. 
Specialization of function does not necessarily imply falling 
skill levels. Doctors, teachers, lawyers and countless 
other spe vial iz e'd groups have simply not been "de-skilled" . 
In the case of medicine and nursing, technological innovation 
may be regarded as an enhancing complement to the practit- 
ioner's art, rather-than an "incorporation" of it. 
In the course of our ordinary lives we are all the 
beneficiaries of specialized, skilled workers. Doctors, 
nurses, teachers, hairdressers, electricians, plumbers, 
plasterers, dentists, bricklayers, carpenters -- but we 
could go on tediously here. One group we could-add to the 
list, is those who drive for their livelihood. They should be 
separately addressed. 
For drivers relate to the third fault of which Braverman 
can be accused, namely that his partiality combines romantic 
nostalgia and a determination to find what he wants to see. 
He bemoans the historical slighting of farming and farm 
labouring as skilled activities. 
(72) 
He also compares 
horses and cars in terms of the skill compared for their 
295. 
mannepment. 
(73) 
Knowledge of the former was in earlier 
days not so much a skill as a near universal cultural 
heritage. Today this is how driving should be regarded. 
This is extreme disingenuousness. Driving a car to work 
or on holiday may perhaps be regarded as a non-significant 
skill. Urban taxi-driving and the management of heavy 
vehicles such as trucks and buses, are in no way comparable. 
Nor are ambulance drivers, police drivers or fire-engine 
drivers remotely comparable to the ordinary commuting or 
shopping motorist. What Braverman has done here is to write 
off the massive skills of a 'Large minority of the citizens 
of advanced industrial society. For example, only a small 
proportion of the labour force knows how to manoeuvre 
heavy articulated lorries. Similarly, Braverman chooses to 
ignore the massive skills embodied in that group of workers 
who service and repair our motor-cars. 
When Braverman rightly points out how minimal much 
"training" actually is, and how basic the "skills" attributed 
to semi-skilled workers actually are, he fails to consider 
that in earlier periods, craft training may also have been 
far more extended at times than the complexity of the craft 
actually warranted. 
(74) 
The fourth major defect I find jr Rraverman's thesis 
concerns his sceptical treatment of the actual business of 
job analysis. While it is true that the economic historian 
must treat occupational data very cautiously, and an fortiori, 
true that Edwards' categories are very suspect, it is also 
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ýýue that Biýuveiwaii dues not offer us any very sensitive 
indices by which we could measure the skill complexity of 
jobs across the total occupational structure. He 
)perversely ignores the considerable sophistication that has 
occurred since Alba Edwards' day. 
(75) 
Doubtless the science 
of job analysis is in its infancy, and will require, for 
its progress, the integration of the most sophisticated 
economic, psychological and statistical techniques. That 
grounds are there for thinking Braverman's work to have 
achieved the astounding feat of having put job analysis on 
a secure basis? All he has really done is to highlight 
the deadly, alienating aspects of much work in the advanced 
economies, a stultifying industrial parallel surely, to 
the backbreaking and minimally rewarded toil that was, and 
is, the normal experience of the pre-industrial serf or 
peasant. 
There is a difference, however, and one which turns on 
the fifth error I identify in Braverman's work: its 
traditional Marxist fixation on work, its failure to deal 
with leisure, with consumption, with social relations which 
do not pertain to production. We repeat, once again, that 
modern capitalism is a spending as much as a producing 
economy. Modern capitalism has at least vouchsafed many of 
its citizens whose working lot is alienating and unimagina- 
tive production, their partial release through greater 
longevity, greater leisure, more consumption choices, and 
so on. Human capital theory is a theory of voluntarism. 
297. 
Here it stands, four-square, in the mainstream of such 
traditions as neo-classical economics and Weberian 
sociology. What I am saying is that the processes of 
economic decision-making engaged in by the citizenry 
of modern capitalism, involve a complex of choices as to 
consuming, saving and investing in skill formation. We 
conclude this section with the view that for many individuals 
boring and monotonous work is rewarded by disposable income. 
In fact, an alienating work situation no more necessarily 
destroys- the insights of human capital theory than enjoyable 
employment necessarily vindicates them. Braverman has not 
shown work to be typically de-skilled in our kind of 
society. However, even those whose work is an alienating 
experience, may be construed as weighing up the costs and 
benefits of different choices. 
I 
My conclusion, from this brief discussion of the 
de-skilling thesis, is that Braverman's work must be judged 
"not proven" and cannot be taken as constituting a strong 
case for the opposition to human capital theory. 
i 
III 
With Marx it is true to say simply that there is much in 
the central vision which is valid. Wealth is a source of 
class and power; the mode of production does massively 
influence society's ideational life; and, perhaps above 
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all, much of that ideational life is ideology, that is to 
say it serves the interests of particular groups and classes. 
Hugh Trevor-Roper stresses that such propositions were not 
Aoriginal to Marx. His contribution lay in the "ferocious 
systematization" within which he expressed these ideas. 
(76) 
I prefer Leszek Kolakowski's view that if these ideas are 
truisms, it is because Marx made them so, and that they 
would have lodged themselves less securely in our outlooks 
if Marx had not advanced them in an unacceptably over-stated 
form. 
(77) 
It is also fair comment that Marx's intellectual 
achievement is nothing less than astonishing. A wide range 
of economic, historical, sociological and philosophical 
reflection and analvsi sis welded by him into an aes 
t1e 
uically 
beautiful synthesis. 
All the most notable critiques of Marx admit his genius 
and originality. Popper, Aron, Berlin, Schumpeter, Plamenatz, 
Blaug, Kolakowski -- all identify Marx as an intellectual 
giant 
(78) 
Thus while I believe that Marx was mainly wrong when 
he wrote, and that subsequent Marxism has proved even more 
erroneous, and while I also believe that no man's ideas have 
ever had such direful effects on his fellow men, I can 
personally have no truck with the view that he is a petit 
maitre or charlatan. 
In fact Marx is generally worse served by his friends 
than his enemies. This is perhaps not surprising. Epigoni 
are often withered and inferior compared to their maestro. 
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At any -rate, to read the idolatrous drivel of Althusser( 
"y) 
or EweeZeY 
(BO) 
is to realize that Marxism in its contemporary 
form is not a scientific phenomenon but a substitute 
religion. Naturally, this is not to say that some contemp- 
orary Marxist work is not of the very highest standard. 
The two-volume work by Cutler, Hindess, Hirst and Hussain, 
for example, is in many ways a piece of exemplary 
scholarship, 
(81) 
It refuses mechanical tributes to past 
genius. Indeed the authors scale down Marxism drastically. 
Dl ., nk jr a I, t edifice 1_b 'S'ized G Cn and T "" wanting 
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For example the theory of value, so central to Marx's 
attempt to give a scientific basis to the concept 
"exploitation", is overturned, `"`' and the conceptual 
centre-piece of MarxTs motor of history, the "mode of 
production" and its attendant base/superstructure metaphor, 
(83 
are refuted. f In an unacknowledged Weberian spirit, the 
authors attribute to the political and legal realms a 
character which is virtually su generis. 
(84) 
It is not that one would disagree with all this. It 
is simply that one is left with the compelling question: 
what distinctively "Marxist's residuum can be salvaged from 
such radical demolition? 
Some of the criticisms that a sociology of human capital 
must address to Marxism have been made apparent already. 
Marxism is a theory of power. All class societies, that 
is societies subsequent to primitive communism and prior to 
industrial communism, have been based on power and coercion.. 6 
-00 i 
though social order is actually in some degree secured 
through false consensus (false consciousness) which is 
disguised coercion. True consensus can be secured only 
when the division of labour has been abolished, and when 
exploitation has been eliminated, that is to say when men 
gain discretion over the disposition of the surplus value 
which they create. 
We have attempted to show in earlier chapters the falsity 
of such a view. All societies involve a combination of 
agreement and force. Marx's view attributes too much sig- 
nificance to coercion in the societies known to him, and too 
much to consensus in the hypothetical future society. In 
t his lice-tiiiie the t eory of ma can ; tai was not available 
to him, nor were the phenomena on which that theory is based 
as highly developed as they have since become. Suffice it 
to recall to the reader our argument that individual 
economic. action both 
consensus, and that 
decisions which lead 
millions of citizens 
In other words human 
in the unprecedently 
society. 
depends on and generates societal 
this a fortiori is true of those economic 
to human capital formation, and give to 
a stake in the capitalist system. 
capital formation is highly significant 
consensual character of liberal capitalist 
Indeed one is tempted to wonder whether contemporary 
neo-Marxists might not be advised to shed their reliance on 
a schema where capital and labour are radically discrete 
phenomena. If labour is seen as the origin of capital 
Ju'1. 
(cr`y s allize laäour-power j why not accept ~ the explanatory 
force of the concept human capital, and seek to uncover 
its part in the creation of hierarchy and privilege? 
Bourdieu has not done this, but it would presumably be 
possible to thread such an insight into his general explana- 
tory fabric. Is there not something odd about arguing on 
the one hand that labour is. the source of capital, and on 
the other that they have no conceptual affinity? True 
there is a question as to how far so radically altered a 
schema should properly be called "Marxist". We might 
reasonably point out, however, that other branches of neo- 
Marxism have radically-altered the classical schema. For 
example, neo-Marxist work on deg. elopmcnt argues taU 
e 
advanced capitalism prevents industrialization in the less 
developed world, 
(85) 
a view opposite to the classical Marxist 
view, which is clearly a diffusionist line, e. 'g. Marx's 
claim that the advanced economy shows the less advanced what 
its future aspect will be. 
(86) 
Marxism also attributes an unwarrantable primacy to 
production as an economic activity, failing to see that 
consumption is at least as important. Paul Samuelson asserts 
that the consumer is king. 
(87) 
The Marxist position is that 
the producer is. The contrast is between the mainstream of 
economic theory which argues that, given the appropriate 
institutional context, men are free, and the general 
disposition of structural sociology, e. g. functionalism and 
Marxism, to argue that men are not free. 
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However, it is not merely in the over-emphasis on 
production that Marxism is at fault. It is also the case 
that Marxists do not specify production correctly. 
)Production is conceived of too narrowly in the Marxist 
tradition, an error underlying the famous metaphor of base 
and superstructure. Blaug points out that if labour is 
more productive with than without capital, then capital 
must be productive also. 
(88) 
This is also true of law, 
k 
government and so on. Some of the resources of the economy 
go into these activities and if a greater flow of goods and 
services is obtainable from the economy in the presence of 
these activities than in their absence, it must follow that 
I, G, / are 1.110111 iJ ClV 
CO p 
Cll t, Vl Vli\. C. VViiv111y " 11 
At the centre of Marxist approaches to production, 
sits what Wiles identifies as a source of policy error in 
Soviet society, namely an over-emphasis on accumulation of 
physical capital in the developmental process. 
(89) 
This 
over-emphasis in Marxist economics is accompanied by a 
similar over-emphasis in Marxist sociology. Most Marxist 
writings on the distribution of knowledge, income, status 
and so on, take the background to all -these to be the private 
ownership of physical capital, which is the source of power 
in capitalist society. Althusser, Bowles and Gintis, Miliband 
and a host of other writers all share this view. 
(90) It is 
a remarkably crude view, and a reverse crudity is also 
apparent in opposition to Marxism. For Marxists, private 
i 
property is a source of reaction. For many anti-Marxists, 
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private property is a source of freedom. The truth is 
that the treatment of private property by many writers is 
grotesquely inadequate. Peter Wiles is quite scathing 
j about "Victorian and Marxist" notions of property. 
(91) 
Before we precis his already brilliantly terse arguments, 
let us suggest that data on private wealth have remarkably 
little to tell us about socio-economic action, about the 
structure of social control and the balance within it of 
consensus and coercion. The attempt to relate the objective 
conditions of society, that is those conditions which are 
hidden behind the view of reality which most men subjectively 
hold, to the distinction between property holders and non- 
holders, is simply to ignore the vast resources which do 
not go into private capital formation but into publicly 
owned capital and, more importantly for our thesis, into 
human capital formation. 
Wiles argues that ownership is not "an unambiguous, 
all-embracing, absolute power to dispose of something......, 
-ownership is a bundle of particular rights. "(92) Only when 
sufficient of these rights are united in one person or 
organization, do we call him/it the owner. No one in 
society can "do what he likes with his own". For example, 
he may not commit a crime with it. The ownership bundle 
includes at least these rights: 
(i) to found, extend, contract or close. the business, 
or in the case of a consumer good, to acquire, 
consume or destroy it; 
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(ii) to take the residual profit of the business 
(no one has total control over profits for they 
are taxed) or enjoy the residual use of the thing; 
to sell the business, or the right to make profits 
from it, in whole or in part; 
(iv) to appoint managers or tenants; 
(v) to do what is not specified as the prerogative of 
someone else, i. e. to possess the residual power; 
(vi) do deal with major crises; 
(vii) to sue and be sued on behalf Of tl e uslnes)3; 
%_ (viii) to be liable for the business debts in case of 
bankrupty. 
What Wiles is implicitly driving at is the proposition 
that concepts like "ownership" and "private capital" cannot 
be mechanistically associated with -"power" as in the Marxist 
tradition, not, by implication, with "freedom" as in the 
liberal tradition. 
Current decisions on pricing, output and employment are 
(93) 
often divorced from ownership. Matters of new investment, 
technique and location are more often reserved, and Wiles 
argues that if there is a key distinction between private 
and public ownership it will be : found in point (v) in his 
list: who has the residual power? He might have added 
that there is a huge and non-definitive literature in the 
Galbraith, Burnham, Nichols ascendancy here. 
(94) 1 would 
argue that there is a sleight-of-hand tradition in Marxist 
writings, of advancing as incontestable ta't: ths, propositions 
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which are actually highly problematic half-truths. I am 
thinking, for example, of the "wealth is power" arguments 
of Miliband or Bowles and Gintis. 
(96) 
Nowhere in 
these celebrated books is there any convincing demonstration, 
either that power is the fundamental element in social 
control under advanced capitalism, or that such power is 
logically derivative from private wealth. 
My own view is that we can wed such ostensibly odd 
bedfellows as Galbraith and Gary Becker. The "techno-- 
. 
1; L; - 
Uü -e -L a rye ei ernerft in i71'oduc e_ l1V.. ýy decision-making, 
vastly outstripping any capitalist "class", active or rentier; 
and at the same time human capital formation is highly 
significant since the technostructure is the embodiment of 
fa 
specialized human capital Formation. k'7) The personnel of 
the technostructure do not control all economic activity. 
They have only the partial grip which advertising permits 
o Cons, `Lciptio-: -I, 
tý ) 
and 'chr, y do not c. ýýýtrc L all production. 
The small firms of modern capitalism are often outside their 
reach. Neither do they control technology in a centralized 
or co-ordinated sense. Nevertheless the technostructure is 
the dominant element in productive decision-making in the 
corporate sectors of advar. ý_ ed c_. 1 itai :t economies, and as 
such is immensely significant in the structure of general 
decision--malei rlg . It is precisely decisions on pricing, 
out--put, employment, investment, technique and location that 
are involved., though Wiles may be right that private 
capitalists tend to reserve greater discretion over the it-er s 
3 qu0- 6. 
ILL i, he second half of this list (investment, technique 
and location) than over those in the first. 
Of all the central tenets of Marxism, ancient and 
modern, none is more entrenched than the notion that wealth 
is power. 
(99) 
That, in a nutshell, is the central argument 
of Das Kapital, and of most work in the Marxist tradition. 
This position is wrong about wealth and wrong about power, 
indeed wrong about power because it is wrong -about wealth. 
The terms of the error are wrong here whichever way we have 
the sequence. Thus we could also way that the tradition 
is wrong about wealth because it is wrong about power. 
True, the rich are often powerful, and the powerful often 
rich. the world over, But "wealth -iss power" 
is not a 
socio-economic law. There are rich people who are not 
especially powerful, that is to say they have little coercive 
or manipulative discretion vis-a-vis social control. There 
are also powerful people (having coercive or manipulative 
discretion over others) who are not rich. Millionaire pop 
singers come into the first category, the leading members 
of the Chinese communist party into the latter. 
A proposition which is sometimes-true and sometimes 
false is not theoretical. The fundamental problem in the 
Marxist tradition is that wealth, property and capital on 
the one hand, and power, agreement and control on the other, 
are inadequately conceptualized. 
The Marxian error involves two basic faults: 
it analyses an inadequate conception of capital; 
first 
secondly 
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were only one kind of capital. Having set up an inadequate 
version of capital, it then proceeds. with an analysis which 
, is unconvincing even within 
its own terms. That is equally 
noteworthy is that much of the traditional critique of 
Marxism suffers from the same fault. Work in the Friedman 
tradition operates within the same assumptions, merely 
connecting the variables of wealth and power differently. 
(100) 
Milton Friedman's conception of freedom, for example, 
seems to me to involve "fragmented power". This is inadequate 
as I shall try to show. 
, 
Any theory resting-on "power" as a crucial concept is 
in my view highly suspect. Generally the concept "power" 
involves the idea of coercion, overt or covert, and in the 
Marxist tradition, such coercion is seen as the outcome 
of an objective structure of social relationships such that 
power-wielders systematically disadvantage those whom they 
constrain. 
Perhaps the clearest formulation of this position is 
given by Althusser, where he distinguishes what are overt 
and covert institutions of coercion. 
(101) 
However, we have 
sought throughout to establish the view that much, perhaps 
most, social life in all eras and in all societies, is 
consensually based. In pre-capitalist formations it is 
true, there was a central dichotomy between. ownership/ control 
of land and non-ownership/control. Under modern socialism 
a similar gulf exists between party members and the rest. 
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These L, ýttVýe who 
are disadvantaged. This is what explains, at least in part, 
the heavy reliance on coercion in such societies. 
This, however, does not mean that consensus is absent 
from such societies, nor even that it is not the principal 
element in social control. When we turn our gaze to modern 
liberal capitalism we find that consensus becomes even more 
important. 
There is in fact little disagreement that there is 
massive consen_su. s in advanced capitalist society. The 
question is not whether there is such consensus, but rather 
what the nature of such consensus consists in. The general 
Marxist answer is that consensus is "false consciousness", 
(102) 
with specific varia- D=gis such as 'imisrecognition" (Bourdieu) 
and "repressive tolerance" (Marcuse). 
(103) 
Now Stephen Lukesis clearly right that what looks like 
consensus may be a disguised coercion, a manipulation, a 
control over the agenda of significant decision-making. 
(104) 
Herbert Marcuse could be correct in seeing men as more or 
less indefinitely malleable in their spending and other 
decision. (105) Such views, however, depend on the propo- 
Bition that it is possible to discern beneath the surface 
of the soci. i world, some objective structure which militates 
against the interest of the majority. 
In fact an examination of the economic. structure of 
modern capitalism reveals no such objective pattern of 
Minority advantage, majority disadvantage. We repeat with 
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Wiles that private capital cannot be translated mechanisti- 
cally into power. 
(106) 
For alongside private property 
goes human capital formation. Furthermore the sum of all 
J capitals yields only part of the picture of the economic 
structure. Let us reaffirm that modern capitalism is a 
spending economy. Thus the structure of consumption is as 
indispensable an element in the general economic structure 
of modern capitalism, as capital formation. 
To argue that ownership of private property leads to 
power for owners and to exclusion from power for non-owners 
is both theoretically and conceptually crude. The theoret- 
ical crudity is the assertion of a mechanistic connection 
between ow er$lýi n and nnv, wer. The conceptual crudity 
concerns the vagueness and lack of precision in the concepts 
"ownership" and "power" themselves. 
Nevertheless the Marxist tradition generally, as in the 
famous Miliband book, does seek to affirm precisely this 
connection. 
0 07) Modern capitalist society has a ruling 
bourgeois class whose power (sic) rests on private ownership 
of the capital stock. We may rightly ask, however, when 
did such a picture ever convincingly capture socio-economic 
reality? 
The answer is that perhaps it is historically defensible 
for the first half of the nineteenth century in Great 
Britain. There, bourgeoisie and proletariat did confront 
each other in conditions of stark contrast. The lightly 
taxed bourgeois, with few legal restrictions on his 
yin 
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enjoys little by way of social security, is subject to 
highly regressive indirect taxation, is allowed no rights 
of unionization, and whose general behaviour is regulated 
by a savagely coercive legal system. Ostensibly then, the 
bourgeois (power) proletarian (powerlessness) distinction, 
has something to commend it for the early nineteenth 
century and, as we argued at length in an earlier chapter, 
for the generally autocratic early capitalist societies of 
the Third World today. 
Only something, however. For the model says nothing, 
for example, about consumption as an economic activity. 
It is possible in principle, however difficult evidentially, 
to conceive of capitalist industrialization as fundamentally 
connected with changes in consumption patterns.. In this 
case, an increase in capital formation is a response to, 
rather than an initiator of, general economic change. 
Furthermore it is not possible to argue that patterns of 
consumption are controlled by the bourgeoisie under early 
capitalism. Advertising is simply too rudimentary to allow 
for such a contention. 
(108) 
-" 
Modern capitalist society is characterized by extra- 
ordinary rapid changes in the composition of output. 
Behind these, among other influences, lies the consumer. 
This abstraction is not one favoured by Marxists, since it 
suggests discretion and self-command far beyond their view 
of the general citizenry. For the study of the twentieth- 
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century consumer. Marxists have been able to speak of 
consumers as manipulable by advertising and so on. We 
shall argue below that such positions are not convincing. 
i 
For the first half of the nineteenth century the issue 
does not even arise. Thus a whole dimension of economic 
life lay outside the "power" of the bourgeoisie. That, 
however, was not the only limitation on bourgeois hegemony. 
The nineteenth century is also the period of increasing 
complexity in the occupational structure, involving the 
emergence of the professions and other middle-class groups, 
as well as a host of supervisory proletarian jobs. 
Bourgeois man is not the only one capable of juggling 
costs and returns. There is a tendency for such calculation 
to become increasingly generalized, as we have argued in 
earlier chapters. 
Furthermore, there is the question of the emergence of 
the modern state. Here again it is interesting to note how 
Marxists and Friedmanites coincide, the latter merely 
inverting the arguments of the former. The Marxist tradition 
is that the state is the agency of the capital, as in the 
work of Miliband. The Friedman view is that capital, 
for Friedman, the essence of freedom, can become the 
prisoner of the state. 
(109) 
I do rot believe that this 
is the norm of capitälism, though it is certainly true of 
the bastard capitalist-socialist formation of fascism. 
In liberal capitalist society, the state has served 
as an agency of social consensus, generally as an adjustor 
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classes seeking arbitrarily to control the pattern of 
decision-making. The state has legitimated the negotiating 
frights of labour and sought to contain and define those of 
(110) 
capital too. 
Neither is the Miliband argument that trades union 
rights, welfare legislation, the extension of the franchise 
and rising living standards, can be represented as 
concessions by the ruling class, even remotely convincing. 
') 
For even if the Marxist power analysis were convincing, the 
view that the ruling group is forced to make massive 
concessions, would presuppose that some of such power has 
passed to the beneficiaries of such concessions. 
We repeat that modern capitalism is testimony to the 
ability of millions of men and women to make up their own 
minds. This proposition is justifiable by casual observation. 
Some of the most outstanding socio-economic phenomena of 
modern capitalism eloquently attest to it. Huge sums are 
spent on advertising motor-cars (e. g. the Ford Edsel) and 
the public refuse to büy. Strenuous publicity campaigns to 
Popularize T. V. programmes, pop stars and film stars frequently 
fail to come to fruition. The most outstanding modern 
British popular entertainers, the Beatles, were not in the 
first massive instance, a manufactured phenomenon. No 
pressures or intiatives by the "corporate state" ushered in 
the popularity of modern radical sociology. The vast 
propaganda exercises of U. S. administration did not suffice 
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to attach the American people to the cause of the war in 
Vietnam, and so on. 
These examples could be multiplied by the legion. 
It is simply not the case that the composition of demand 
and the pattern of opinion are entirely plastic. They are 
only partly so. Technological change, and change in tastes, 
are only in part predictable or controllable. The model of 
the passive , proletarian, alienated and manipulated, the 
ignorant helpless pawn of capitalist discretion, is the 
most insulting, condescending, grotesque myth in the whole 
'_. armoury of radical analysis. No Wonder Marxists reject 
human capital theory. For this theory celebrates the 
free social actor, free because he has so deeply internalized 
the principles of the market code, and is thus well able to 
make decisions about the costs and benefits of his skill 
formation in the face of uncertainty and imperfect knowledge. 
Human capital theory has no need for cloudy, counter-factual 
assumptions about hic l. en structures of objective interest 
that the deluded everyman cannot see. It rather builds on 
what men do, and celebrates their knowing discretion in 
doing. it. The talk of power and of hidden, objective 
structures of interest in Marxist writings is actually vague. 
When Nicos Poulantzas claims that economic property, or 
real appropriation, is the only genuine economic power, 
we are not left much the wiser. 
(112) 
Is the ability of a 
modern trades union to close a factory or railway or hospital 
against the wishes of most other people, not a fors of 
314. 
'«eooiicsmiu" Puwer it is something other than power, 
must we not conclude that there are forms of coercive 
discretion other than bourgeois power? Would not such a 
ý conclusion suggest that a "bourgeois power" analysis of 
capitalism is inherently inadequate? 
My view is that it would be hard to conceive of any 
economic structure more "objectively" favourable to citizens 
than one which expresses the sum of their economic 
preferences as consumers, savers, investors. Though market 
economies are profoundly modified by state interventions, 
advertising and so on, it is at least plausible to argue 
that their citizenry generally approve their composition of 
output, and that the citizens of mode socialist socie Lies 
e 
are given to envious westward glances. 
The apparent subjective acceptability of the capitalist 
order to most citizens, explains the popularity among critics 
of capitalism, of the concept "false consciousness". This 
Olympian notion attributes a prescience to the elite that 
the masses do not have. And what does the objective 
structure of exploitation consist in? It cannot consist 
in the creation of surplus value. As Kolakowski points out, 
all societies must consume less than they produce, and for 
Marx it is private property which is the basis of exploita- 
tion, since it enables one group of men to determine the 
disposition of surplus value. 
(113) 
It is the phenomenon 
of the private ownership of the capital stock which constitutes 
the "objective" conditions of capitalist society and its 
r 
polarization between those who do ; a_ncý_ +hncA , ýý, o , a rot 
control surplus value. 
Here, as in many other ways, many contemporary neo- 
Marxists have not remained true to the classical canons'. 
Bowles and Gintis admit that for them it is the control, 
not the ownership, 
(114) 
of the capital stock which counts, 
a position taken a fortiori by those who, like Djilas 
(115) 
( 
or Cliff, 
116 ) 
would bring a soi-disant Marxist analysis 
to present-day socialist society. At the very least this 
qualification as to the basis of "power" must raise questions 
as to the emancipatory effects of the socialization of the 
%. capital stock (i. e. the significance of "private property" 
in the first place). 
Marxist scholars are in fact reluctant to debate the 
implications of modern public ownership either in Marxist or 
capitalist societies. No one has ennunciated the glaring 
truth more clearly than Raymond Aron: "Between collective 
ownership of the means of production and a planned economy, 
on the one hand, and the liberation of man, on the other 
' (117) hand, there is no connexion, either causal or logical. " 
Aron also points out that Max Weber was long ago fully 
aware of this, a point for which, says on, Herbert Marcuse 
found it difficul t to forgive him.. 
( h 18 ) In Kolakowski' s 
book we find a fascinating account of Bakunin's astonishing 
prescience as the despotic outcomes likely to arise from a 
Marxist take-over of society. 
(119) 
However, we have also said that in some respects the 
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Friedmanite. defence of liberal capitalism is not persuasive 
either. Let us give it now some attention., Its gravest 
demerit is that like Marxism, it takes power to be the 
fundamental problem in the sociology of modern capitalism. 
We have said that in the case of writings like those 
of Miliband or Bowles and Gintis, no attempt is made to 
show the logically necessary basis for "power" in private, 
ownership. The same is true of Aaronovitch. 
(120 ) 
Aaronovitch 
actually 'advances arguments purporting to show that owner- 
ship implL ti r. vvC , vwih_Lch make 
it clear that it is control 
which matters. 
(121) 
Miliband, as we said earlier, trots 
out arguments about concessions the ruling class have had 
to make, without apparently seeing that the notion of 
dominance is reduced by the need to make concessions. 
( 122) 
Nichols attempts to show that owners have not relinquished 
power to managers, 
(123) 
but his sample is narrow and he 
does not address the issue in its crucial context: the 
(124) huge business corporations of modern capitalism. 
In the Friedman tradition, by contrast, though the 
same variables are identified (property and power) a different 
connexion is seen between them. 
(125) 
On. both sides property- 
ownership and property-control are ccnfused and. --n the 
assumption that power is the hinge of social control, 
mechanistic connections are drawn between property and power. 
For the Marxists, property concentrates power; for the 
liberal/conservative it diffuses it. Neither side takes 
account of the importance of the occupational structure 
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in social control. 
Milton Friedman is a most distinguished economist. 
JHis embryonic sociology, however, is crude. Like Marxism, 
it is a power sociology, accepting a determinate relation- 
ship between property and the social order. 
There is obviously a clear empirical sense in which 
Friedman is persuasive. No non-capitalist society has 
ever allowed its citizens the intellectual, political 
and other freedoms associated with modern liberal capitalism. 
Sociologically, we repeat, the condition of such freedom is 
an effective socialization of the masses. This sociali- 
nation can be represented as the alienation of social 
consciousness, only through a series of tenuous arguments 
about the objective structure of economic interests, and a 
determined refusal to study the effects of the large-scale 
abolition of private property in the socialist world. 
The drawback in Friedman's argument is that he takes as 
a consequence of capitalism, what is in truth a cause. 
Historically, thelines of influence run from ideas to 
economy, rather than the other way round. Obviously, as 
Weber stresses, the relations are reciprocal. 
(126 ) 
But 
as Rostow argues, the etiology of capitalism is fundamentally 
conceptual. 
(127) 
Private property does not entail freedom. 
Nazi Germany was not a free society. Private property is a 
necessary, but not a sufficient condition of freedom, and 
in general it is more convincing to argue that the West 
Ji8" 
is capitalist because it is free, than that it is free 
because it is capitalist. Such freedom is vastly indebted 
, 
to writers such as Locke and Hume and Smith, writers who 
shaped modern intellectual individualism, before the advent 
of capitalist society. 
What is absolutely crucial from our standpoint is the 
indispensable nature of human capital formation for a free 
society. If we assume that the money economy will survive, 
and with it the labour market, we may take it that freedom 
to invest in one's own labour will remain an essential 
freedom. That, at any rate, is the argument of this chapter. 
We may indeed find it hard to construct a truly satisfactory 
theory of the demand for education. Nevertheless I would 
affirm, in general, the rational autonomy of the modern 
citizenry. If they. do not polarize between bourgeois and 
proletarian, this is in part because they possess differen- 
tial human capital, capital destined not to be drained off 
them to the benefit of the bourgeoisie, living labour 
transformed to dead labour; but capital vested inalienably 
in their persons: human, livin capital. 
Both Marxist and Friedmanite sociology predicate their 
analysis cf" u-italist society on the existence of private 
property. Friedman's view of capital is akin to Durkheim's 
notion of corporatiorP -- intermediate phenomena which 
block 
the otherwise remorseless centralizing power of the state. 
From the standpoint of our thesis, however, private property 
and the free labour market are not causes but consequences 
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purposes is the structure of social control, the inter- 
connections between a society's administrative matrix, its 
pattern of hierarchy (social stratification) and its value 
consensus. Modern liberal capitalism is characterized by 
deeply entrenched notions of freedom in the general 
consensus. This is reflected in the administrative 
matrix, in that the governmental and private realms are 
strongly classified. The attendant forces of economic 
freedom are reflected in the pattern of social stratification, 
which is determined both by differences of property and 
of human capital formation. 
Under fascism and communism on the other hand, explicit 
ideological exclusion of individual freedoms is associated 
.. with a weak classification 
between the government and the 
governed. To put it in control terms: the external, 
coercive frames on the citizens are very strong. Such 
societies are characterized by relatively weak consensus. 
. Their patterns of hierarchy are different from those in 
capitalist society. The importance of private property 
depends on the nature of ideology. Marxism is hostile to 
private property, fascism much less so. There is thus a 
weak bourgeoisie under fascism (a bourgeoisie mainly sub- 
ordinated to the dominant personnel of the administrative 
matrix) whilst under communism there is no. real bourgeoisie. 
This question of private property, however, is a secondary 
issue. To repeat the words of Bowles and Gintis intended 
32C 
for a very O. ý ffer° ± context, , "ownership is an amorphous 
(128) 
legality". 
The case of human capital formation is different. 
, It is 
important under totalitarianism. However, the human 
capital order of totalitarian society is a distinctive one. 
We shall address this important issue in the next chapter. 
We shall attempt both to develop further the view that the 
Marxian analysis of capitalism is a false one, and also 
to show that an examination of the control structure of 
socialism indicates the viability of the theory of human 
capital. It is to a consideration of these issues that 
we now turn. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
HUMAN CAPITAL AND SOCIALIST SOCIETY 
We will drink wine under the trees of 
Babylon. But the slaves must ice it properly. 
Eugene O'Neill, The Iceman Cometh 
/ 
Chassez le naturel, il revient au galop 
Destouches 
937. 
i 
In this chapter I shall try to see what light a socio- 
logical approach to human capital theory can throw on the 
nature of socialist societies. I have three main, tentative 
propositions. The first is that modern socialist society 
does have a "hum=n capital order" , but of a distinctive 
kind. The second is that "development", however conceived, 
must imply an increasing significance for that human 
capital order. The third proposition, which spans the 
other two, is that development threatens the control 
structure of socialist society. 
I do not share the view, often found in neo-Marxist 
writings, that modern capitalist societies and modern 
socialist societies are very similar. I am not persuaded 
of the cogency of the term "state, capitalism" as a 
description of the latter. In particular one must avoid 
exaggerating the "reproductive" similarity of the education 
systems of these two kinds of society. 
What Ishall argue, however, is that just as the concept 
"human capital" seems to me indispensable to a sound 
conceptualization of mature capitalist society, so also in 
socialist society the labour market and occupational structure 
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and the educational system which articulates with them, can 
be regarded as collectively furnishing a huge arena for 
decisions to engage in human capital formation. It may also 
be claimed that the labour market, occupational structure 
and educational system, constitute the most significant 
proto-capitalist phenomena of socialist society. 
I must first issue a caveat. I am not a Sovietologist. 
Accordingly I must ask the reader's indulgence as to the 
a prioristic and highly speculative character of this 
chapter. Having outlined my conceptual schema, i sha 11, 
however, try to justify it with reference to published 
work. 
Since this chapter is iüiidameilLaliy about socialism, 
I must state what I understand by this elusive concept. 
Sir Karl Popper repudiates questions of the "what is? " 
sort. 
(1) 
It seems to me, however, that such questions 
are inevitable if we are to make sense of the social world. 
By modern socialism, I understand a system aimed at a 
specifically corporatist or collectivist form of industrial 
society. Modern socialist states may not be industrial, 
but they aim to be, with perhaps the exception of contempo- 
rary Tanzania. More or less significant, is the issue of 
state or collective ownership of the material means of 
production. This, however, is not the only fundamental 
principle of the "explicit code" of socialist society. 
Nazi Germany claimed the title "socialism". So also have 
the Scandinavian societies at times. So also have many 
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Third Worl ýnýýPtlPS. 
ThP_ mint, / it SP_Pms _. tn me, /i. s that 
while it is reasonable to count public ownership as a 
tendency of socialist society, this is not so definitive 
pa point 
as might appear at f irst blush. For example, if 
it were the case (and it might well be) that Great Britain 
in the 1960's and the 1970's had a larger public sector 
than Nazi Germany, could we claim that the former was 
more "socialist" than the latter? Assuredly not! The 
difficulty is that "socialism" is an intellectual construct 
rather than an empirical reality. This means that for 
typological purposes we have to look not only at the relative 
incidence of public ownership, but also at the intentions 
and core principles embedded in. the administrative matrices 
of different societies. On such a view the explicit code 
of socialism involves the denial of the individual as the 
real focus of socio-economic action and administration, 
the celebration of collectivist over individual imperatives, 
the denial of interest conflicts. The explicit code of 
socialism involves a weak, in principle indeed, a non- 
existent classification between government and governed. 
Paralleling this classificatory structure there are 
massive- regulatory frames on human action. 
It will he seen that within this schema, fascism is in 
some ways a form of socialism. 
(2) 
It will also appear that 
while "left" and "right" are epithets which may maintain 
some explanatory force at a purely conversational level, 
they are useless analytically. 
(3) 
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It is true that discussions of a definitional kind 
are bedevilled by the crossing of normative and positive 
wires in the case of concepts like socialism. Many people 
use "socialism" as a term of approbation, summoning up a 
desirable state of human emancipation and freedom. When 
some writers have asserted that the Soviet Union is not a 
socialist society, as did Arthur Koestler many years ago, 
all that is implied is that they find such societies morally 
repugnant. 
(4) 
The panegyric to socialism offered by Paul 
Johnson during his -recent menopausal reorientation, was in 
a similar vein. He was merely saying how he would like the 
world to be. 
(5) 
In contrast, when Eric Hobsbawm writes of 
the Soviet Union as 'a socialist society, his position is both 
positive and normative. He intends both description and 
approval. 
(6) 
I shall employ a generally neutral use of the term 
"socialism" to refer to a particular form of socio-economic 
organization, with no inevitable normative implications. 
I find "socialism" a quite reasonable name for modern Marxist 
societies, though I would not wish to restrict it only to 
them. 
I would not classify Scandinavian society as socialist. 
It is quite simply too "liberal" for such an appellation. 
By contrast, I repeat, I do believe that fascist society 
was in considerable degree socialist. It involved a weak 
classification between the state and the individual, and 
strong coercive frames on individual and group action, 
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for example, the partial destruction of the capitalist 
labour market, and the suppression of trades unions. It 
is true that under fascism there was widespread private 
ownership, but to borrow a phrase used in quite a different 
context by Bowles and Gintis, 
(7) 
1 would argue that the 
presence of private ownership in Nazi Germany and its virtual 
absence in Soviet Russia, is only "an amorphous legality" 
in terms of the sociology of government. i do not believe 
there is a capitalist ruling class in the advanced liberal 
societies. StilI -less was there one in fascist society, 
where macro decisions were made by the politicos, 
(8) 
and 
the capitalist classes tended to occupy the decision-making 
positions filled by -senior bureaucrats and administrators 
in Marxist society. Both under fascism and communism 
the leading ideological cadres called the tune. Indeed it is 
a commonplace that Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia shared 
much more in common than either had with a liberal society. 
By the same token the use of the term "fascist" to 
describe brutal and autocratic "early" capitalist states 
like Brazil, Singapore and so on, is simply unhelpful. 
They lack the specific, institutionalized, pondered ideology 
of fascist society. The concept "fascism" has been debased 
by its misuse as a synonym for "nastiness". It is not that 
fascism is not nasty; merely that what is nasty is not 
inevitably fascist. "Nasty" regimes like Brazil have, it 
may be claimed, a burgeoning capitalistic occupational 
structure which may unfold as part of a process of 
I 
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rationalization which will attenuate their "nastiness". 
"Human capitalism" --the phenomenon of the individual 
sufficiently emancipated that he can make decisions of a 
I 
costly sort, designed in relation to previsioned circum- 
stances, to enhance his earnings, his status, his "party", 
may augur a liberal society. There is nothing inevitable 
about such a liberalization. However, the Western precedent 
makes it a distinct possibility. 
(9) 
There is a huge Western literature on socialist 
economies. Some of it is very impressive, for example 
Peter Wiles' extraordinary erudition. 
(10) The consensus 
among Western economists is -- crudely -- that such economies 
are less dynamically efficient than economies which maintain 
a still predominantly market system. 
(11) 
The sociological literature is much more diffuse. I 
have found it in general far less hostile to Marxist socialism 
than is the economic literature. David Lane's long and, 
in many ways, excellent book on Soviet Russia, is a case in 
point. 
(12) 
It passes very lightly over the appalling 
history of modern Russia, and while there is nothing in his 
book to indicate that Lane is a Marxist, one suspects 
that what is involved is not a Weberian-style attempt at 
neutrality, but an example of the general sociological 
disposition to pull punches in relation to socialism, a 
disposition which, happily in my view, most economists do 
not share. Economists, it seems to me, do not generally 
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share in that boredom with established truths which Bernard 
Crick sees as so threatening to civilization. 
(13) 
Frank Parkin's comparative work is very interesting, (14) 
'and in some ways Milovan Djilas' work has stood the time- 
(15) 
Inevitably there is little which could be test well. 
called "socio-economy" or "economic sociology", but 
Raymond Aron's preliminary socio-economic sketches are very 
useful. 
'(16 ) 
Wiles rightly draws our attention to the huge variations 
within the Communist block. 
(17) 
For example; Communist 
societies have widely differing proto-capitalist elements 
in their societies. I am no master of the field. Even 
Were 1T1.1 
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venture. So I propose to pitch my remarks here at a very 
abstract level -- specifically around the conception of a 
"corunand economy" and ask the following questions: 
1. Why are all socialist societies non-political in 
Crick's liberal-classical understanding of "politics"? 
2. What are the implications for human capital theory 
of that a-political or anti-political character? 
3. In what sense is rising human capital formation -- 
a question urged on me in private correspondence 
by Sam Brittan'18 -- likely to affect the overall 
pattern of social organization under socialism? 
4. Perhaps above all, can human capital theory say 
anything about developmental sequences? 
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take it for granted that the term "state capitalist" 
has little to recommend it in the context of socialist 
(19) 
society. It seems to me to join with the "corporate 
i 
state" description of capitalism -- that is to say, it 
is a soft-centred, self-indulgence, engaged in by those 
whose stomach for accepting the wrongness of the central 
tenets of Marxism is weak. Those tenets are that capitalism 
will be battered down by the upwelling of revolutionary 
consciousness, and that the socialization of the means of 
production is a necessary prelude to human emancipation. 
It is time to reassert -- and if I have not previously 
asserted it then my thesis is not what I intended -- that 
whatever may once have commended these tenets in grand 
abstraction, they are empirically quite untenable. In any 
case, I hope I have established in earlier chapters the 
embryo, at least, of a socio-economy of their theoretical 
wrongness. 
The reason many Marxists favour "state capitalism" 
as an appropriate term for actual Marxist societies, is that 
they are sensitive and humane, and therefore strongly 
disapprove of societies like the Soviet Union. There is 
a rather pathetic romanticism which attaches some of them 
to such despotisms as Cuba and China; others reject all 
"Marxist" societies as merely soi-disant. But most 
Marxists are humane individuals. Their emotional capital, 
however, is bound up with the correctness of Marxism as an 
explanatory system. Thus when a Marxist regime is revealed 
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as odious, the last thing Marxist scholars wish to address 
is the possibility that such odiousness could possibly 
relate to the wrongness of Marxism as a body of explanation. 
The direst reflections on the liberal capitalist 
order may come from those who love it deeply, as we have 
said. The gloomiest scenario has it as a one-off improba- 
bility between corporatisms. On such a view the future 
holds in store the ineluctable advance of autocratic 
socialism, and since Marxism is the most influential 
contemporary ; deol ogyI '- of Marxist socialism to boot. T contemporary - 71 
think that this is highly unlikely, and that the probable 
truth is much more comforting -- namely that the Orwellian 
nightmare, trenchant indictment of the moral bankruptcy 
of much of the twentieth century that it is, is actually 
unconvincing. For questions of sheer technological 
efficiency, we may guess that if Oceania does not break 
ranks with corporatism, then Eurasia will. Rationality, 
the ethos of calculative rationality, is the spectre at 
the corporatist feast, capitalist Banquo to socialist Macbeth. 
In the twentieth century, one of the principal guises of 
rationality is human capital formation. Such will be the 
argument of this chapter. 
We can establish a kind of rough ideal-type of the 
modern Marxist society, an ideal type with the following 
principal features: 
1" The administrative matrix will be weakly and 
comprehensively classified vis-a-vis general 
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socio-economic life. There will be no sphere of 
that life where the state does not claim a right of 
intrusion in principle. 
i 
2. There will be a massively entrenched, explicit, 
official ideology. This ideology can be thought of 
as a "base" setting limits to what can happen in the 
rest of society, a remainder which, by a grim irony, 
may be regarded as superstructural. 
3. There will be a strong classification in a dichotomized 
co trol-si. r sture, between party members and the rest. 
On the other hand, the classification of social strata 
on economic lines may be different from that of a 
capitalist economy. For, as we argued in an earlier 
chapter, the skill order (human capital order) of 
Western society, is associated with a continuous 
pattern of income and status hierarchy, reflecting, 
grrosso modo, a gradual hierarchy of scarcity and skill. 
We admitted that the meritocracy involved remains 
powerfully influenced by ascriptive forces. However, 
there is little or no attempt by the authorities to 
shape or manipulate the reward structure. To this 
extent the market is given its head. Under socialism, 
by contrast, at some periods either highly skilled 
labour will be officially downgraded vis-a-vis 
proletarian occupations, or required to engage in the 
activities of the latter. This is to say that manual 
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work will be celebrated. However, statements of 
this sort are plagued by the bewildering speed with 
which official policies can change in societies which 
have such highly centralized structures of decision- 
making. 
i 
4. A point which catches aspects of the preceding three 
points is that there will be a high emphasis on what 
is actually social human capital formation, that is, 
collectively planned skill formation. 
5. There will be strong external frames on group and 
individual socio-economic action. There will be 
strong regul Minn on werk ý 
domi ci le, lei sure activity; 
travel, belief, opinion and so on. For this reason 
socialist societies will inevitably have a much more 
skeletal "human capital order" than is the case under 
advanced capitalism. In particular, "migratory" 
human capital formation will be less available to the 
citizenry. / 
It is worth saying immediately, in the context of this 
ideal typus, that it is itself a long way adrift from Marxian 
eschatoloty. That we can abstract such a set of structural 
features at all, is witness to the theoretical wrongness of 
Marxism. Marxist society is despotic because Marxism is 
intellectually wrong, a point we shall hope to elaborate 
later. 
Second, it is clear that no actual socialist society 
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corresponds at all fully to the ideal type we have outlined. 
Peter Wiles points out that there are huge variations within 
the Marxist world. 
(20) 
Hungary is not a soviet-type 
economy. 
(21) Neither was China, 
(22) 
at least until recently. 
Yugoslavia permits relatively free exit and return to its 
workers, Poland and Hungary permit relatively free travel 
rights to some citizens; Poland has considerable internal 
intellectual and religious freedom, and so on. Perhaps above 
all we must stress the presence of capitalist and proto- 
capitalist elements in all Marxist societies. Poland with 
it small businesses and non-collectivized agriculture, 
Russia with its intensively worked. small-holdings, China 
with its adjacent "capitalist" mediator, Hong Kong; all 
exemplify departure from any total conception of socialism. 
What we shall do in this chapter is to try and uncover 
the sociological relevance of human capital theory to the 
analysis of the Marxist state. How appropriate is this 
theory for "totalitarian" society? 
There is, in fact, a real sense in which the concept 
"totalitarianism" is a misnomer. Its only full justification 
would reside in its being used to describe regimes which 
intend to regulate every detail of socio-economic life. 
It seems likely, however, that no regime has sought fully 
to do this, and also that the intention to move in that 
direction will always fall short in reality. 
We repeat that the very concept of society is consensual. 
Whatever the ambitions of a Stalin, a Hitler, a Mao Tse 'l'ung, 
3'4' 9. 
it is, not mainly the fear of the secret police which prevents I 
anti-social behaviour. People internalize and conform to 
behavioural norms as the condition of social life. Thus 
i 
while there are differential ambitions by regimes to control 
the lives of their citizenry -- China more than Singapore, 
Singapore more than the U. S. A. -- it is fair comment that 
the theorists of totalitarianism have not sufficiently 
recognized the ideal-typical character of their analytical 
device. 
We propose to employ Bernstein's concept of classifi- 
cation here. A totalitarian society, ideal-typically, is 
a society where there is no classification between government 
and the governed, either in intention or fact. No society 
will actually correspond to such an ideal type, but 
societies may be ranged on a spectrum between weak classifi- 
cation and strong classification. Soviet Russia, Nazi 
Germany, Communist China, occupy positions (though these 
are historically variable) at the weak end of the spectrum. 
At the strong end of the spectrum are those societies where 
there is sharp classification between the state and private 
social life, as in the U. S. A. and Western Europe. A host 
of other societies, e. g. the autocratic regimes of early 
capitalism, occupy an intermediate position. 
The important theoretical proposition for our thesis is: 
the emergence of a highly developed human capital order is 
a main influence in creating a strong classification between 
government and governed. Conversely, a weakening of the 
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human capital order, involves a weakening of classification, 
as the state machinery becomes less separate from men's lives. 
What is the nature of human capital formation in socialist 
i 
society? This central question cannot be tackled without 
an examination of the role of ideology in Marxist society. 
The Human Capital Order of Socialism 
It is not the case that there is no human capital formation 
under modern socialism. There is both human capital 
formation and what we -have earlier called a 
"human capital 
order", that is, a pattern of social stratification and 
other systematic socio-economic relationships, relating 
. 
to human capital formation. 
What is noteworthy, however, is that under socialism 
the human capital order assumes a different guise from that 
associated with capitalist society. In principle, a 
"capitalism of occupations" could be more significant in the 
determination of income and social stratification under 
socialism, than is the case under industrial capitalism, 
since the private property sources of income, status and 
class, are mainly absent. That such a primacy of the occupa- 
tional structure does not fully obtain, reflects the 
constraining influence, over a wide range of socio-economic 
phenomena, of institutionalized Marxism. Socialist societies 
often deliberately alter the pattern of income distribution 
away from that which would be generated by the market 
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registration of scarcity. 
In socialist societies there are rapid shifts of policy 
pn the subject of income differentials and efficiency etc. 
The fundamental constraint on a fully-fledged commitment 
to economic efficiency is the centralized control of the 
party bureacracy. Just as a rural bourgeoisie and a 
capitalist industrial class are inconsistent with the ideology 
and the likely continued pre-eminence of the communist party, 
so an untrammelled capitalism of occupations, which would 
effectively usher in a strong middle class, is not consistent 
with the present structure of social control. 
Of the various models offered for the analysis of 
modern socialism, I find a mixture of elite theory and 
totalitarianism the most convincing. 
(23) 
There is an elite 
in socialist society, but it may not be as self-perpetuating 
as the elites of capitalism, though it is enormously stronger 
in the structure of decision-making. At the same time, I 
incline to Raymond Aron's view that socialism is relatively 
classless. 
(24) 
It lacks a bourgeois class, its "middle 
class" is weaker than that under capitalism, and its workers 
are relatively powerless and fragmented. 
For these reasons two propositions are worth repeating: 
1" Socialism has a distinctive human capital order. Raw 
income differentials may or may not be-attenuated, as 
compared with a capitalist economy, but there is a 
massive incidence of the non-monetary aspects of human 
capital formation, an incidence rendered greater by 
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the lesser presence of monetarily quantifiable 
hierarchy as compared with capitalist society. 
i 
2. The emergence of a more "Western" version of human 
capital formation will threaten the pre-eminence of 
the party. 
Both these propositions relate to an issue we have raised 
in an earlier chapter, and which we must develop more fully 
below -- namely that by one of history's supreme ironies, 
ideology, which is seen in the Marxist analysis of capitalism 
as a super-structural manifestation of the economic base, has 
itself become, in Marxist society, the constraining "base" of 
social life. A similar point is made by Alexander Gershenkron 
in his essay, "The Stability of Dictatorships", when he says 
that dictators try to maintain power as the independent 
variable, such that their economic policies become the 
dependent variables. 
(25) 
I have throughout this work raised questions against the 
over-use of the concept "power". However, when an explicit 
ideology is institutionalized, the resultant control-structure 
is more coercive than that of liberal capitalism. To that 
extent a power analysis does gain an increased cogency. In 
any case, Geishenkron's implicit insight is the valuable one 
that the base/superstructure metaphor (in his version the 
independent/dependent variable relationship) has a relevance 
to the analysis of socialist society which it lacks in 
relation to Western capitalism. 
(26) 
Tom Bottomore is 
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thinking in somewhat similar vein when he points out that 
the unified elite of Soviet countries is nearer an ideal 
type of ruling stratum than are the divided elites of 
(27) 
capitalism. 
Marxist ideology has not fully prevented the emergence 
of what Weber terms "rationalization". 
(28) but has never- 
theless profoundly modified its processes. The human capital 
order of Marxist societies has two fundamental elements: 
the occupational structure and the communist party. Economic 
success in +ýýv 
h cases involves calculated decisions ýo incur 
present costs for the sake of future benefits. These two 
elements are partly overlapping, and in part distinct. 
They are also partly at war with each other, for the latter 
is the repository of official Marxist ideology, and the 
former is the principal proto-capitalist element in socialist 
society. For example, David Lane quotes a writer called 
Bergson to the effect that "the principles of relative wages 
in the Soviety Union are also capitalist principles". 
(29) 
We repeat, however, that a calculus of cost and benefit is 
also involved in upward social mobility via the party. 
That this is so, constitutes a check to the occupational 
structure. If the occupational structure were ever to 
achieve, under socialism, the kind of socio-economic pre- 
eminence it has assumed under capitalism, the survival of 
the Marxist regime itself would be put into question. 
The two structures (of occupation and party) have, 
therefore, some similarity. In both, education is crucial to 
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continued membership of, or successful ascent to, the 
upper reaches. In the case of higher positions in the 
occupational structure, this is achieved via a successful 
career at school and higher education. In the case of the 
senior party positions in Soviet Russia, ascent has often 
been through the party schools. In both cases it seems 
inevitable that a private calculus of costs and benefits, is 
at work. Indeed it seems, a priori, extremely likely that 
such a calculus is more intensively employed in communist 
societies than in capitalist societies; given the absence 
of other sources of upward mobility, such as private business. 
It is worth noting, and we will later pursue the matter 
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tions seem likely to take greater account of non-monetary 
returns to educational outlays, such as status differentials, 
access to special shops, foreign travel, and so on. This 
is true both of occupational and party advance, but especially 
of the latter. Neither does it seem fanciful to expect an 
inverse relationship between equality in the distribution 
of money incomes and the importance of these intangibles. 
(30) 
The two structures (of occupation and party) are, 
however, also notable for their differences. The occupational 
elite is not by any means fully seif-perpetuating, but in 
Soviet Russia, for example, as Alec Nove points out, it is 
recruited overwhelmingly from the groups known in that 
country as the intellectuals. 
(31) 
This being the case, the 
Possibilities for an analysis a la Bourclieu are obvious. 
355. 
The communist party by contrast is relatively classless. 
Though what would be called "working-class" membership by 
Western sociologists is not an actual majority, it is 
i nevertheless very large. For example, according to Lane, 
42% of party members in the U. S. S. R. were of lower class 
origins. in 1977, 
(32) 
and the recent leadership has been 
almost entirely of lower-class origin. 
(33) 
If this lower- 
class pre-eminence is in time reduced, this may also reflect 
a conscious attempt by the party to prevent the emergence of 
the occupational elite as an independent force. The 
relatively classless nature of the party composition -- 
cutting across, as it dDes, all other possible hierarchies -- 
is both a reflection of official ideo og, j 1' Of 
the structure of social control. 
As we shall see later, Soviet policy is to expand 
lower-class representation in the party. If socialist 
societies wish to prevent the emergence of a strong middle 
class, without abandoning the benefits of a specialized 
division of labour, they may either seek to exclude highly 
qualified labour from the party, or contain it within the 
party. 
What we find in the history of Marxist societies is an 
unsettled tension between economic rationality and ideology. 
Sometimes monetary skill differentials are encouraged; at 
other times they are suppressed. Stalin made sharp earnings 
differentials a fundamental part of his strategy for 
industrialization from the 1930's, thus reversing earlier 
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policies of equalization. 
" The post-Second World War 
Marxist states have passed through a similar reversal, as 
Parkin has pointed out. 
(35) 
Contemporary China is also 
) presently stressing the need for differentials and incentives, 
as against its earlier extreme literal egalitarianism. 
Some Western writers are fixated on relatively crude 
indicators of equality, such as the distribution of income, 
the ratio of highest to lowest incomes, and so on. Such 
fixation is especially apparent among radical sociologists. 
36) 
I would submit, however, that a distribution of incomes 
where individuals have earnings of increasingly similar 
magnitude, where differentials are narrowed, does not 
indicate a generalized equaliLy in society. As Kolakowski 
points out, one needs also to uncover the degree to which 
individual citizens have access to decision-making in 
general. 
(37) 
My view is that corporatism actually dis- 
enfranchises the individual citizen. It could hardly be 
otherwise, for corporatism denies that he is the fundamental 
focus of government and economic activity. In terms of the 
leverage which the individual citizen has on the overall 
structure of decision-making, the citizens of advanced 
capitalist society, are not only freer than the citizens 
of modern socialism, but also enjoy greater equality of 
consideration. By the same token, the development of wider 
income differentials in a socialist society may indicate a 
greater, rather than a lesser, equality in general decision- 
making. Rationalization of this kind may be what the 
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citizenry actually want. 
(38) 
Extreme literal egalitarianism 
in the distribution of incomes seems likely always to be 
the work of irresistible and fanatical elites, and its 
price is a general intensification of the overall inequality 
in the structure of decision-making. 
Human capital formation has implications for politics, 
in the sense in which we earlier understood it. For 
politics implies a recognition that conflicts exist in 
society. - Human capital formation generates social strati- 
f? cation . it is thus a phenomenon relati ?ý to actual or 
1.. potential conflict, as well as to consensus. Socialist 
regimes, having nationalized the physical capital stock, 
deny that either social stratification or social conflict 
can occur. They have an underlying desire for classlessness. 
They therefore try to suppress market relations and 
politics. 
What we are insistently drawn to address in all this 
is the role of official ideology in the Marxist state. Such 
ideology has profound implications"for the structure of 
social control under socialism, and for the very special 
character of human capital formation in socialist society. 
We must therefore address it formally. 
Marxist Ideology and the Socialist State 
In earlier chapters we have repeatedly suggested that there 
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is strong affinity between the control structures of modern 
socialism and those of traditional corporatisms such as 
feudalism, slavery and oriental despotism. We have also 
suggested that modern capitalism is the distinctive 
historical formation in terms of its modality of social 
control, resting as it does on unprecedented consensus. 
The notion of continuity between ancient and modern 
corporatisms, however, whatever its felicity for some 
purposes, is also misleading. For in all pre-industrial 
societies, -Iie process of socialization may be seen, retro- 
spectively, as reflecting the relative lack of a deep pattern 
of economic socialization. Where the money economy is weak 
or absent, where people are not involved in complex economic 
decision-making, we may take it that their socialization 
is generally non-economic in character. Thus social control 
attains its essential core in terms of a mechanical solidarity 
of social action. To this extent Durkheim is correct. 
(39) 
The absence of pluralistic or alternative value systems 
reflects a society where there is little division of labour 
and no deep market code, the internalization of which is a 
powerful influence in social life. We repeat, however, that 
the fundamental cleavage in pre-industrial society, between 
the elite and the masses, was probably not internalized by 
the majority. This, rather than Durkheim's "conscience 
collective", may explain the ferocity of some aspects of 
the system of social control in agrarian society. 
Under modern socialism we may argue, the generally 
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capitalistic principles of the occupational structure may 
well be internalized by the masses. It is the dichotomy 
between party and non-party which proves unacceptable to 
Jthe excluded majority. Under modern capitalism, by contrast, 
economic socialization sits at the centre of general 
socialization. This is associated with relatively flexible 
codes of non-economic conduct, e. g. sexual and religious 
conduct, and so on. The highly pluralistic intellectual 
and moral life of advanced capitalist society depends on 
the uaiquitcue incidence of economic sociaiization. Such 
economic socialization, we repeat, is intimately connected 
with human capital formation. 
The control problem of modern socialism thus becomes 
clear. It seeks, through institutionalized Marxism, to 
generate a homogeneous value system which will attach the 
general citizenry to the status quo, 
(40) 
at the same time 
as it must necessarily seek to attenuate or inhibit the 
occurrence of a market socialization of the citizenry, of 
the kind implicit in its developmental ambitions. One way 
of interpreting Marx is to see his work as an eloquent recoil 
from the "market code", which he regarded as destructive of 
our humanity. The central phenomena of capitalism, namely 
the ubiquitous division of labour, and the ubiquitous market 
economy, are the very features Marx saw as at war with our 
species essence, the very features which advocates of 
capitalism would identify as vital to our increased powers 
of product--ion and of control over the material world. 
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However incompletely, Marxist societies have remained 
faithful to these inclinations, generating a control struc- 
ture which is the opposite of that of capitalism, in that 
it is loose (or embryonic) where capitalism is tight -- 
in the matter of economic socialization -- and tight where 
capitalism is relatively loose -- in the case of intellec- 
tual and moral attitudes and behaviour. The Marxist state permits 
its citizens much less economic freedom than is enjoyed by the 
citizens of advanced capitalism. To this extent, it deprives 
ri iý. oý i^w 
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social control. It also seeks to mould the intellectual 
and moral outlooks of the citizenry, in the attempt to 
create socialist man. The contradictory outcome of a 
society whose leaders have adopted a Marxist perspective, 
to the effect that ideational life is a derivative of 
economic life, is a fracturing of those reciprocal relations 
between ideational phenomena and economic phenomena which 
Weber observed in society. 
(41) 
The result is that ideology 
comes to constrain the social whole. By a savage irony, 
Marxist society is extraordinarily idealist. 
This does not mean, we repeat, that capitalist principles 
are foreign to the citizens of modern socialism. it is 
merely that they are not officially allowed for. There 
are the huge unofficial capitalistic markets of modern 
socialism, (42) ranging from those which are relatively 
tolerated, to those where major, proven activity carries the 
death penalty. There is the emulation effect caused by 
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knowledge of Western capitalismn. Above all, cýýere is ýi 
inherently capital istic character of a specialized and 
hierarchical occupational structure. Such phenomena seem 
likely to become more, rather than less significant, with 
the passage of time, certainly if socialist governments 
aim at establishing living standards and technological 
innovation comparable to those of advanced capitalism. 
It is in fact fascinating to speculate how far these 
phenomena are associated with a deep code of market 
principles in modern socialist society. To what extent is 
it these principles which form the consciousness of the 
citizens of modern socialism? Wiles remarks that personal 
contact with Russians and Poles does not suggest the 
emergence of socialist man. 
(43) 
Perhaps the institutionali- 
zation of Marxism is capable of generating a surface code 
only, the principles of which many citizens do not believe, 
though they are constrained to live with many of its 
consequences, such as the impossibility of building large- 
scale capitalist enterprises and so on. Certainly I am not 
persuaded of the view that we shall lack an adequate test 
of Marxian socialism until we see it transform an industrial 
society. It seems to me that the further the process of 
modernization progresses in socialist society, the more 
dysfunctional will socialism as a set of organizing principles 
become. What we shall argue later is that in socialist 
societies, the education system is shot through with a 
capitalistic "hidden curriculum". 
JUL. 
There is an intractable conflict between a Marxist- 
inspired structure of social control, and the developmental 
)amlItionswhich Marxism also promotes. Marxist regimes 
are based on the propositions that private ownership is 
the basis of the ills of capitalism, and that the sociali- 
zation of the capital stock will eliminate social conflict 
and generate a new consciousness among the citizenry. 
A central feature of Marxist regimes is that the ideology 
of which these propositions are the core, is institutionalized 
but not generally internalized, hence the coercive control 
structure of Marxist socialism. 
There are obvious variations. Some socialist societies 
are much freer (less coercive) than others. Nevertheless 
we may doubt how far such freedoms can develop. in the 
case of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, there 
seems to have been a genuine and widespread desire for 
greater economic and political freedoms. In the latter 
case, as Parkin 
(44) 
points out, there was a desire for the 
recognition of skills and expertise, through greater pay 
differentials, which we may retrospectively interpret as 
a desire to engage in private human capital formation. 
This would suggest, in particular, a r. jecticn by -many 
citizens of the extreme, literal, egalitarian aspects of 
Marxist ideology. Socialist regimes have oscillated rather 
violently between lesser and greater equality in the distri- 
bution of income, and it may be that the encouragement of 
decision-making by their citizens, as to the deployment of 
6 
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their labour, permits such regimes to relax somewhat the 
coercive elements in their social control. We may doubt, 
i 
however, how far the process can go, without threatening 
the ideological base. 
Is a socialist economy consistent with an open society? '45) 
It is certainly possible, as Wiles points out is the case in 
contemporary Hungary, for an economy with a nationalized 
capital stock, to go very far in the direction of market- 
based production. 
(46) 
One is mindful of the point made by 
ýýt %/ /YON 
writers such as biäily and Lr tsar., ` "' Lrat in principle 
a socialist economy could more nearly approach perfect 
competition than a capitalist society. 
This, however, is not a possibility I find likely. 
Free men have, it seems to me, a tendency to want property 
as well as income, and if Marxist socialism is nothing else, 
it is the relative absence of large-scale private property. 
On this view Hungary may be interpreted as following a very 
precarious course, one which conflates the capitalist 
(or at least market) logic of development, and the ideological 
primacy of institutionalized Marxism. In the event the 
Russian tanks are never far away, and can be deployed with 
lightning rriäity against any fundamental challenge to the 
control of the party. 
Thus I would argue that analytically, strategically, 
the Russians were right in 1956 and 1968. A free society is 
one where you can say that Plato, Christ, Marx or anyone else 
was in fundamental error. The man who either believes that 
4 
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Marx was wrong about property and capitalism or, the more 
likely case, has not the slightest interest in what Marx had 
to say, may well decide that he would like to be a capitalist. 
The alacrity with which many Poles seem to have taken to 
the small-scale entrepreneurial activity now allowed to 
them, is surely a case in point. 
The point from which we shall never stray far in this 
section of the thesis is that socialist society involves 
a conflict between what Bauman calls "officialdom and class"(49) 
Officialdom is the administrative matrix within which 
Marxist ideology is institutionalized. It promotes the 
pre-eminence of the communist party, and is a source of the 
elements of classlessness which writers like Aron detect 
in socialist society. 
(50) 
It leads to a social stratifi- 
cation of a non-class kind, between party members and the 
rest, preventing in some degree the crystallization of 
strata based on market relations. "Class" is precisely 
the outcome of market relations, an inexorable outcome 
of the logic of the developmental process. 
We argued in earlier chapters that the widespread 
socialization of the population of Western economies in 
terms of the market code, is associated with a complex, 
pluralistic class-structure, based on human capital 
formation as well as private property. The former gives 
to capitalist society its continuous, rather than dichotomous, 
system of stratification. For this reason we deny Ernest 
Mandel's view that the development of market relations will 
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entrench the rule of the socialist elite. 
(51) 
I would 
argue, to the contrary, that it will undermine it. That 
Is precisely the dilemma of socialist society. This 
dilemma is writ large in socialist educational practice, 
- and it is to a discussion of socialist education systems 
that we now turn. 
Education and the Socialist Human Capital Order 
I have already repudiated the view that advanced capitalism 
and contemporary socialism are very similar social formations. 
This repudiation holds also for their respective systems of 
education. Socialist education systems do have similarities 
with those of the West. The published literature, however, 
makes it clear that there are vital differences. 
Mark Blaug begins the main text of one of his best 
known works with the statement that in all societies of 
which we have knowledge, educated people tend to earn more 
than less educated people. 
(52) 
Socialist societies conform 
to this rule, though there may be grave problems associated 
with interpret; na the education/earnings connection in the 
context of socialist society, as we shall see later. According 
to Parkin, there is a tremendous importance attached to 
qualifications in Eastern Europe: "the most obvious break 
in the reward hierarchy occurs along the line separating the 
qualified professional, managerial and technical positions 
from the rest of the occupational order. " 
(53) 
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Speaking specifically of the Soviet Union, Nove 
asserts that higher education has now become almost a 
necessary though not a sufficient) condition of getting 
i 
into the nomenklatura (roughly, the "establishment") and 
into senior positions generally. 
(54) 
Again with specific reference to Russia, Lane opines: 
"In the absence of family property, the educational process 
is the major determinant of the life chances of the Soviet 
 (55) citizen. 
As Parkin points out, for Eastern Europe generally, 
lower clerical workers do not often get promoted to managerial 
positions. Neither do blue-collar workers get managerial 
promotion. Such positions are mostly filled by direct 
university recruitment. 
(56) 
This suggests a strong prima 
facie case for regarding socialist society as constituting 
"an educational meritocracy". This, however, does not hold 
throughout the entire occupational structure, as we shall see 
below. These considerations do not imply that there is 
greater inequality of incomes under socialism than under 
capitalism: on the contrary, there is less. Neither do 
they imply that there is less upward social mobility under 
socialism than under capitalism: on the contrary, there is 
more. 
(57) 
What is implied is that there is a different 
structure of social control under socialism from that of 
the West, and an attendant, different rewards structure. 
In this reward structure, the educational system plays a 
more vital and central part týýan is the case in the West. 
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Parkin notes that in a command economy the rewards system 
is much more responsive to manipulation by the central 
jauthority than it is in a market-based economy. The 
market, he says, is not "the governing mechanism of reward 
allocation. " 
(58) 
The first proposition seems to me incontestable. The 
second-needs much qualification. It is true that in what 
would be the lower-middle reaches of the occupational 
structure in a Western economy, embracing skilled workers 
and lower clerical staff, the ideological posture of 
socialist regimes, namely to exalt manual labour, has been 
associated with a reversal of the normal pattern of the 
relative earnings of such workers under capitalism. Under 
socialism, skilled manual workers earn more than lower 
clerical workers despite their fewer years of-schooling. 
When such a development occurs in a capitalist economy, 
we may take it that the forces of supply and demand are at 
work. Or perhaps an imperfect market prevents the true regis- 
tration of relative scarcities in the pattern of labour prices. 
Under socialism, by contrast, the higher pay of skilled 
workers than of lower clerical works has often reflected 
ideological preoccupations. 
It may be that in socialist society both groups. are 
relatively weak in the structure of decision-making. We 
repeat that recruitment to senior, managerial positions, is 
not made from either group, such recruits requiring direct 
university background. It may be in fact that "officialdom" 
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is able, seriously to subvert the exigencies of scarcity 
(a manipulation which will certainly involve some efficiency 
loss) only in the case of relatively weak occupational 
ft 
groups, such as lower clerical workers. In the higher 
ranges of the occupational structure, the relationship 
between education and earnings is an especially robust one 
under socialism. It may be that here the rationality of 
human capital formation has asserted itself with irresistible 
urgency. I am impressed, I repeat, by Bauman's view: 
"in the socialist Societies of East ern "uro.. rý each ind ,. ý_. ýupe ., 
ual's situation is shaped by two relatively autonomous and 
to an extent, antagonistic, power structures, neither of 
which is entirely reducible to the other. I am inclined to 
consider this as a permanent and structurally determined 
feature of the societies in question. The two power 
structures are: officialdom and class. " 
(59) "Officialdom" 
is the equivalent of what we called in earlier chapters the 
"administrative matrix". We have already seen that its 
main institution, the Communist Party, is an arena of human 
capital formation, where costly decisions can bring very 
considerable rewards in terms of privilege and so on. 
In this sense, Bauman's antithesis is a little too sharp. 
However, officialdom is suffused with the egalitarianism 
of Marxist theory and remains therefore in principle hostile 
to capitalism and all its works. 
"Class" refers to stratification according to the 
principles of market scarcity. Socialist societies äo 
. Jo * 
more commonly subvert these than is the case in western 
society. For example, we repeat, as compared with the 
West, in Eastern Europe, as Parkin makes clear, there was 
, 
in the raid-1960's a clear tendency for highly skilled 
manual workers to enjoy, on ideological principle, 
higher material rewards and status than lower white-collar 
employees, as is shown in these figures: 
Income Differentials of Occupational Categories in 
Eastern Europe, 1964 
Source: U. N. Economic Survey of Europe in 1965, Part IT, 
Table 8.18. 
(60) 
According to Alec Nove, it remainýA true in the 1970's 
that the broad stratum known in Soviet Russia as the "intelli- 
gentsia", from whose ranks, via higher education, upwardly 
mobile ci. ti. zPns may enter the nomenklatura, was not generally 
materially privileged. The majority of its members earned less 
than skilled workers. 
(61) 
There seems to be involved here, 
contrary to the received wisdom about unified elites under 
socialism, a deliberate attempt to prize apart, to some 
Table redacted due to third party and copyright issues
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extent, the hierarchies of earnings, status and decision- 
making. One is on difficult ground here. I have found no 
direct literature on the subject, though Parkin points out that 
J in Poland and Yugoslavia, parents often prefer highly-paid 
manual labour to more lowly-paid clerical employment for 
their children. 
(62) 
Parkin does not seem to take cognizance of "class" 
as understood by Bauman. 
(63) 
Yet it may be argued first, 
that the deliberate suppression, for ideological reasons, 
of incomes differentials generated by scarcity, is probably 
a major source of efficiency loss in socialist economies, 
and second, that any attempt to right this, in pursuit of 
cr, r_i ety _ nämely the 
developmental ambitions- of socialist L1"-. L 
the eventual surpassing of capitalism in terms of living 
standards, is Likely to intensify market relations. In 
generating a class-structure more similar to that of 
capitalist society than is the case at present, market 
relations will increasingly subvert the control structure. 
Thus the incorporation of almost all highly paid 
occupations to the party structure represents, as we have 
said, an attempt by "officialdom" to contain "class". 
(64) 
Nevertheless there are self-perpetuating class tendencies 
in the occupational structure of East European socialism. 
While Nove says that if one means by elite, the apex of 
the state and party bureaucracy, say the top 20,000, one can 
confidently assert that they are not hereditary in soviet 
Russia, (65) Parkin points out that for Eastern Europe 
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generally, very few children of the white-collar intelli- 
gentsia are downwardly socially mobile, and it seems likely 
that the same holds for children of the apparatchiki. 
(66) 
Parkin also asserts that the occupational elite use 
education for their children as the equivalent, under 
socialism, of capitalist property. 
(67) 
The published work on incomes in East European society 
makes it clear that a positive correlation between education 
and earnings does occur under socialism. I shall not 
attempt to calculate the coefficient o-JE correlation involved. 
The data might, in any case, not prove sufficiently 
sensitive to permit a general study of the relationship 
between education and income distribution. 
Wiles and Markowski point out, in the context of a 
comparative income analysis showing Poland to be more 
egalitarian in its distribution than the United Kingdom, but 
less so than the Soviet Union, that in the case of Soviet 
Russia, they were obliged to work on earnings data, since 
(68) 
Russians are very secretive about incomes. 
68) However, 
I will suggest the difficulties econometricians would be 
likely to face in working in this area. First, the ideolo- 
gical polici.. Ps of what Bauman calls "officialdom" have the 
effect of massively subverting the relationship between pay 
and scarcity, over some ranges of income, as we have seen. 
When income redistribution occurs in Western economies, it 
is generally via the market mechanism. Its incidence under 
socialism, we repeat, has a profound ideological inspiration. 
J7Z, 
jCý, V-- _n y- LIlýte is a hidden pattern of ecorriomic advantage 
behind the quantifiable distribution of income. This 
involves economic intangibles such as status, access to 
Adecision-making, foreign travel and so on. Considerations 
of the incidence of these intangibles may be taken as 
profoundly modifying the calculations around human capital 
formation undertaken by the citizenry under socialism. 
It is not that the calculation of intangibles is absent 
under Western capitalism. Indeed recognition that it occurs 
is perhaps vital to the viability of human capital theory. 
(69) 
It is simply that under socialism, given the relative absence 
of private property, and given the relatively narrow range 
of income distribution, the calculation of intängibles 
becomes, a fortiori, important in the process of maintaining 
a position high in the system of social stratification for 
the children of the elite, and important also in the process 
of upward social mobility either via the occupational 
structure or via the party, for children from the lower orders. 
As Lane says in his chapter on social stratification 
in Soviet Russia, there are clear divisions of pay and 
education between unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled 
workers, (70) and as we have stated already, elite positions 
require higher education. To this extent, the education 
system may be the locus of especially intense decisions as 
to human capital formation by the citizens of socialism. 
However, the education system of modern socialism is also the 
intended agency of socialist ideological dissemination and 
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social control. By an inherent contradiction, it embodies 
the principles both of officialdom and class. Insofar 
as the occupational structure is the main capitalist 
element in socialist society, and insofar as education 
is the principal "narrow pathway" to success in the "grim 
obduracy of the division of labour", 
(71) 
then the socialist 
education system has inexorably capitalistic functions. 
At the same time, the education systems of socialist 
society have the explicit, manifest function of disseminating 
Marxist ideology. ' h. ey are intended to link up with other 
' media as agencies of socialist social control. How success- 
ful they are in this is open to doubt, as we shall see below. 
Lane points out' that in Soviet Russia the boundaries 
between school and other institutions are not clearly 
defined. (72) Elsewhere he notes: One of the characteristics 
of the Soviet system is a diffuse boundary between the 
political and other social institutions over which the party 
and state claim the right to use sanctions. " 
(73 
We may express these ideas in the Bernsteinian termino- 
logy we have employed throughout. In Soviet Russia (and in 
socialist society generally) there is weak classification 
between the rc, _ s of the public and t'ie private, between the 
activities of the state and other socio-economic activity. 
There is also weak classification between different. agencies 
within the state. This does not imply a more coherent 
structure of values than occurs in advanced capitalist society. 
On the contrary, I believe socialism is even more confused 
3-74. 
and contradictory than capitalism. Indeed, the ambiguities 
We have identified, the contradictions between officialdom 
and class, go right to the heart of the educational control 
t 
structure, itself a key element in a general apparatus of 
control and decision-making, centralized and interventionist 
beyond the imaginings of most citizens of Western society. 
The education system of socialist society is highly 
centralized, in a way which relates directly to centralized 
manpower planning. 
(74) 
There has never been much ambiguity 
about the frank role education is intended to play in skill 
formation and occupational placement, though, for example 
in the Russian case, there seem to be constant doubts 
about education's allocative functions, and particular 
concern about the productive adequacy of curriculum. 
(75) 
The unashamed vocational emphasis of the system, 
(76) 
results 
in a curriculum of an investment character. To employ a 
phrase I have used elsewhere, "curricular consumption" is 
X77, 
not encouraged. This means, I suggest, that though the 
principles of the occupational structure (capitalist principles 
of scarcity and reward, of sacrifice and return) are present 
in schooling, one of the outstanding characteristics of 
advanced capitalist societies, namely their tendency to use 
scarce resources for educational consumption, is largely 
missing from the socialist world. 
The system is clearly intended to secure a high degree 
Of conf ormism, 
(78) 
and there is a strong emphasis on 
patriotism. (79) In Soviet schools, furthermore, students 
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in final year are taught about the inevitable collapse 
of capitalism and the great achievements of the Communist 
Party - 
(80) 
These propositions, blatant and crude compared even 
with the worst American flag salutation, 
(81) 
are accompanied 
by ceaseless exhortations about selflessness, brotherhood, 
proletarian solidarity and so on. 
(82) 
Lane cites 
Bronfenbrenner's research which concludes that the Soviet 
educational system is an effective agency of socialization. 
Even peer groups, unlike their Western counterparts, evidently 
promote conformism and discourage deviance and misconduct. 
(83) 
Here Lane's text glides over what is surely a 
monumentally naif and confused study. One might, of course, 
simply glance a few hundred miles further west, where there 
are surely massive a priori grounds for believing that the 
citizenry reject most of what comes to them through approved 
channels. Nearly thirty years of Marxist education in 
Poland have passed, and the Catholic churches are bursting 
at the seams. The vast army presence in Eastern Europe 
inevitably suggests a precarious control structure, resting 
heavily on coercion. Many people in Eastern Europe clearly 
regard socialism as a monstrous and alien imposition. 
In Russia, however, things might be different. So 
what is wrong with Bronfenbrenner's case? Put at its simplest, 
it is that the most elaborate data on surface conformism 
(low truancy rates and so on) tell one rather little unless 
they are interpreted in the light of the general structure 
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of social control. Socialist societies are highly coercive. 
The Soviet Union uses capital punishment, for example, 
on a scale unknown in the West. In the case of a much 
i 
less developed socialist economy, China, much beloved by 
Western radicals, there appear to have been quite frank 
and open declarations of sundry executions in recent years. 
(84) 
All societies are in part coercive. The difficulty 
for Bronfenbrenner's thesis is that when coercion is a 
very important element in the social control-structure, it 
is especial ?y difficult to take conto iris:,, as an index of 
internalization. This is not to. deny that socialization 
occurs within socialist education, nor to deny Bronfen- 
brenner's suggestion that exposure to a narrower range of 
ideas tends to render peer groups relatively conformist 
in socialist societies. 
(85) 
1 am merely suggesting that 
conformism does not adequately measure socialization. 
Socialist education systems are doubtless characterized by 
greater conformism than is the case in the West. This does 
not imply a successful ideological socialization. 
According to Mickiewicz, in 1964 in Soviet Russia, some 
thirty-six million adults were involved in a system of 
"political socialization" i. nvci vi n? cr. ols. official circles 
and seminars. 
(86) 
One response to this is to assume that 
ideological discussion and analysis are very popular in the i 
Soviet Union. Another interpretation is to see it as a 
process of solidarity for the Communist Party. My immediate 
response would be to argue that it typifies the weak consensus 
37.7. 
of socialist society, and is indicative of a social control 
structure which so far from being able to implant the 
jofficial 
ideology successfully in the masses, does not 
even find it easy to convince the elite of its cogency. 
Abercrombie and Turner have argued, in the context 
k 
of capitalist society, that contrary to the received wisdom 
of the Marxist tradition, dominant ideologies have usually 
had the function of integrating the dominant classes rather 
than controlling the masses. 
(87) 
In the case of Soviet 
Russia, the scale of adult political socialization, whose 
costs must be a major element in the educational budget, 
suggests first, that it is difficult to achieve and, second, 
that it is deemed very important. This, no doubt, in 'part 
reflects the desire by the regime to prevent the now 
dramatic over-representation of highly educated and upper 
occupational groups in the party, from coalescing into 
an independent force. 
(88 
High truancy rates, unruly schoolchildren and so on, 
may well reflect disaffection where they occur. The massive 
and scandalously under-researched truancy of many urban 
children in Great Britain and the United States is indeed 
evidence of'uuucatjorýal estrangement. These, however, are 
liberal societies, where social order does not greatly 
depend on massive bureaucratic surveillance and harsh 
punishment. Thus when A. H. Halsey said of the Bowles and 
Gint. is thesis that it seemed very like functionalism, and 
more appropriate to Eastern Europe than to Western capitalism, 
378. 
I 
I was able to agree with the first charge, but not with 
89ý ( 
the second. Schooling in Capitalist America is indeed 
like a crude functionalism, combined with an even cruder 
conspiratorial ism. 
(90) 
The second. charge, however, 
confuses intentions with actual outcomes. Basil Bernstein 
rightly doubts if Western education systems do easily 
produce personality types appropriate to capitalist social 
relations. 
(91) 
He is quite correct. What reason, however, 
is there for thinking such a reproductive schema to enjoy 
a rescued relevance under communism? 
The answer is: very little, unless one thinks that 
dovetailed agencies of indoctrination are very successful 
in producing pre-specified personality types. Scholarship 
in this area has now achieved astonishing levels of naivete, 
with Marxist scholars asserting the efficacy of education 
as an agency of social control under capitalism (a veritable 
industry, this) 
(92) 
and liberals like Halsey taking communist 
ambition at its face value. I take both positions to be 
sociologistic. In my chapters on the sociö-economy of 
education, I shall argue that the education systems of 
capitalism are generally not well integrated with the wider 
economic systems of which they are a part. 
In the case of modern socialist societies, by contrast, 
the manifest proclamations of the school world, its intended 
function of introducing children to a new and emancipated 
value system, have little part to play in internalized 
social control. Social control occurs partly because of 
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the concerted, dovetailed action of agencies of coercive 
regulation, of which school 
is one, but also, by a 
pupremely ironic contradiction, because of education's 
massive role in the process of economic decision-making. 
This is to say that it is the proto-capitalistic elements 
of the socialist education system, massively linked to the 
main proto-capitalist elements of socialism -- its labour 
market and occupational structure -- which create its 
effectiveness as an agency of social control. School's 
manifest function under socialism, the production of 
t - socialist man, runs counter to its role in the developmental 
strategy of socialism. This latter role is an unperceived, 
latent subversion of' education's proclaimed role. 
(93 
We may perhaps assume that some of the items in Marxian 
eschatology have been consigned to oblivion. Though money 
relations are less than under capitalis. m (a high social 
wage), there seems no intention to push towards real de- 
monetization. As to the abolition of the division of labour, 
can it seriously be considered as still on the programme? 
For these reasons the contradiction between education's 
role as a disseminator of socialism and its promotion of 
seems likely to the "ethos c lculet; ve rationality', 
(94) 
intensify with the passage of time. Decentralized market 
socialism of the Hungarian kind, 
(95) 
also seems likely to 
increase this tension, if independent managers become ever 
more sensitive to variations in labour productivity. 
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The education systems of socialism afford their 
student through-put huge opportunities for human capital 
formation. As in Western societies, the post-compulsory 
educand must bear the cost of foregone earnings. Every 
other material cost -- though not, of course, psychic 
cost -- is borne by the state. The much wider range of 
capital decision-making available to Western citizens, 
anxious either to perpetuate their place in the social 
hierarchy, or rise in it, are under socialism intensively 
channelled into one medium: school, either conventional 
i or party. In this respect human capital formation may 
be more, rather than less, significant in socialist society. 
The brilliant young man may not be able to make himself a 
millionaire, but he can become a top manager or party boss. 
Even where the spread of earnings is narrower than 
under capitalism, 
(96) 
this centrality of school success as 
the indispensable pivot of social success, remains intact. 
Indeed, such a relative narrowing may not disturb, may 
even enhance the centrality. The fierce competition, via 
education, for scarce places in the sunr is a commonplace 
(97) 
contemporary analysis of Third world countries. 
97) 
In any case, under socialism, there ar the massive 
intangibles. We, for whom reserved shops are an incompre- 
hensibly offensive notion, and for whom access to foreign 
travel is commonplace, may find it hard to grasp the massive 
attraction of these intangibles in socialist society. 
We thus attribute the efficacy of educational. and social 
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control under socialism to two main influences. First, 
11 
there is the massive coercion which seems indispensable 
to socialist society. The sterile and tyrannical police 
) states so brilliantly explained by Kolakowski, 
(98) 
are 
an outcome of the imposition on society of a scientistic 
ideology. The old adage about socialism -- that it is 
"all right in theory but all wrong in practice" -- is 
actually nonsense. The tyranny of the practice vitiates 
the theory. It is a wrong theory. 
Secondly apart from some smäll_scale pr sate 
capitalism, 
(99) 
and the clandestine capitalism of the 
unofficial sector, 
(100) 
education is the main "capitalistic 
pathway" to 5ocio-economic success. The outcome is clear. 
A conformist educational biography, docile and supine beyond 
the bitterest indictments of Western education advanced by 
Aithusser, (101)or Bowles and Gintis, 
(102) is'the sine qua 
non of socialist educational success. Capitalist activity, 
banished from much social life by ideological fiat, re- 
asserts itself in another guise. Chassez le naturel, 
il revient au galop. 
The education system is, therefore, an effective agency 
of socialization, but the principles into which it socializes 
the young citizenry are not those of classless officialdom, 
but rather the class values of the occupational structure. 
However, as we argued in an earlier chapter, class is a 
derivative phenomenon. It is a product of the market. 
Wiles points out that there is a labour market in socialist 
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societies. In this sense it would seem that Bauman's 
antithesis "Officialdom and Class" might be better expressed 
as "Socialism and the Market". I personally incline to 
A the view that the education systems of modern capitalism 
are not numbered among its most capitalistic phenomena, 
being removed as they are from market principles. 
(104) 
Under socialism, by contrast, which possesses only proto- 
capitalist phenomena, the education system is among the 
most notable of such phenomena. 
The logic of rationalization is no dispensable in 
industrial society. Max Weber has proved an incomparably 
(105) 
better guide to industrial society than has Karl Marx. 
SüüialisL society has succeeeded, in considerable degree, 
in suppressing the capitalist ethos in the deployment of 
physical capital, and in the distribution of goods. At the 
same time, socialism has engendered a "human capital order" 
which may be even more vital than is the case under capitalism. 
We are, of course, speaking of educational human 
capital formation. The sources of human capital formation 
through migration and job-search, for example, may well be 
far less significant under socialism than under capitalism. 
Whatever the range of human capital decision-making currently 
allowed to the citizens of socialism, we may doubt how far 
the system is capable of spontaneous stability. The citizen 
who is allowed to accumulate capital in his personal product- 
ivity might well, were the coercive control structure 
relaxed, seek to accumulate private physical capital Loo 
The general dilemma is not a new one in socialist society, 
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and it is to a brief discussion of the abiding contra- 
dictions of the oldest socialist society that we now turn. 
Western writers, Marxist or otherwise, vary considerably 
A in their views as to the relationship between Soviet reality 
and Marxist theory. Such variety takes a number of forms. 
Kolakowski believes that Marxism is dead in Eastern Europe, 
a matter of mere cynical lip service. 
(106) 
The late Carew 
Hunt held that communist governments genuinely believe 
in Marxism. 
(107) 
Polaczi Horvath holds that schizophrenia 
obtains in commiin i st society; whereby belief is genuine, but 
the communist leadership systematically employs Marxism 
as an ideological smokescreen for its activities. 
f108) 
Baran and Sweezy take mode-cri Mai xi6L 5LaLes, ev denLiy, 
to constitute genuine socialism. 
(109) 
Bowles and Gintis 
deny that communist societies constitute a genuine appli- 
cation of Marxism, 
(110) 
as does Harry Braverman. 
(111) 
Kolakowski regards modern communism as, in part, an out- 
growth of Marxism as the "greatest fantasy of our century" 
112) 
David Thompson held that the nemesis of the one-party state 
is self-destruction, and the price of absolute power, 
absolute corruption. 
(113) 
There are very real problems involved here. In one 
sense late Tsarist Russia was too primitive to, constitute a primitive 
test for Marxist theory. In another sense it was-too 
advanced for subsequent development to constitute a test 
for socialist practice. In general though, I would argue 
that Soviet Russia must furnish some kind of emnirics for 
,. 
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Marxism and socialism. It has a predominantly nationalized 
capital stock, private enterprise on the Western scale is 
absent, and above all, Soviet Russia has been there for 
two-thirds of a century. One understands the difficulties 
which face humane and sensitive Marxists, of course. 
There is a vast evidence for the view that Soviet Russia 
has been the most murderous regime that has ever existed 
! 114) 
Personally, I would not flinch from an argumentum 
ad hominem here. This is to say that I detect a connection 
between the i tolerance of Marx's er ible genius , and 
the institutionalization of intolerance which institutional- 
ized Marxism also implies. 
(115) 
This view seems less absurd 
than the psychologism that the corruption can be explained 
with reference to Stalin's malignant personality. This 
latter explanation is truly absurd, ignoring as it does 
the impeccable personal testimony of Bertrand Russell, that 
Lenin himself was a sadistic murderer. 
(116) 
It also ignores 
the sociological question: what sort of social system is 
it which can engender a rule like Stalin's? 
Another frequently encountered argument is that 
Russian communism is historically continuous with previous 
Russian policy. One could cite, for example, Marx's remark 
that the perpetual lode star of Russian policy is world 
domination, or Hannah Arendt's view that modern communism 
is incomprehensible outside the tradition of Pan-Slavism. 
(117) 
Our attention is drawn to Russia's consistent drive to the 
ocean margins, her consistently cautious policy of grabbing 
385. 
the weak; of rstý, _ , lcr taan engaging 
in frontal confrontation with the strong. Perhaps above 
all there is the continuous cynicism and remoteness of 
Russian government, possibly a legacy of Mongol hegemony. (118) 
Much of this historical argument is convincing. 
History is the record, however problematic our interpret- 
ations, of what happened. Indeed, conventional historio- 
graphy may be celebrated as against Marxism, this latter 
being in some respects the study of what, in a fit of 
dialectical absentmindedness, forgot to happen. But is 
there not, behind all this, a lurking counter-factual which 
requires answering? We know that Russia has become an 
industrial super-power under a proclaimed Marxist aegis, 
We also see, as Wiles points out, that in terms of growth, 
full employment, inflation control, the system "works" 
comparatively well. 
(119) 
It does not work well in terms of 
comparative living-standards, individual freedoms, a deep 
structure of internalized control. The counter-factual 
question is this: would not Russia have become an 
4120) industrial super-power under any conceivable dispensation. 
Turning to the question of human capital formation, 
I also ask: if human capital formation has been-. indis- 
pensable in soviet industrialization, what light might human 
capital formation as a phenomenon, shed on the fascinating - 
question of developmental sequences in history? 
I incline to the Weberfan view that the future is open, 
and that accordingly the past has no logical necessity. 
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Thus Rostow's position is unsustainable. kl2l) The Soviets 
have continued the process of Russian industrialization, 
and given it the contingent, dispensable, and probably 
r 
ultimately unviable form, of messianic despotism. They 
have assiduously perpetuated the continuity of that 
autocracy which seemed in process of dissolution in the 
last Tsarist years, an autocracy which might have been 
radically attenuated had industrialization taken a capitalist 
form. 
As Kemp has said, the d4lemma facing the late Tearýct 
autocracy was that the processes of industrialization that 
the regime must needs initiate and secure if Russia were not 
to be eclipsed by the modern powers, were the very processes 
which threatened the basis of the autocracy. 
(122) 
The 
liberalizing tendencies of late Tsarism might have constituted 
an answer, but they were not given time to consolidate. 
For they were crushed in their infancy by a new corporatism, 
based on false science and unrealizabie messianic ambitions, 
whose drive to the millenium has inevitably been backwards 
in terms of the structure of social control. The unlooked- 
for answer to the compulsive paradox of Tsarist Russia 
has been the twentieth-century Marxist state. Is it. 
conceivable that the vast imperial ambitions of Russia 
could have been maintained under a liberal order, -for 
example? (123) Only a further extension of an administrative 
system already weakly classified in relation to society and 
economy generally; and a further strengthening of frames on 
387. 
the citizenry already unimaginably strong by the standards 
of Western society, could secure the essential policy 
objectives. Using a borrowed technology and sweating a 
J 
surplus out of the masses for investment purposes, analogous 
to the consumable surplus the aristocracy had previously 
extractedfrom the peasantry, the new Tsars, Lenin, Stalin 
and their heirs, have sought to prevent the appearance of 
those harbingers of liberalism, the industrial bourgeoisie 
and the independent middle classes, social groups which 
i r'cvit c 
bly c ^bra e vhaI. w 
ti' 1' we l 1isd the 11ma.. -. rjk l_eý. 1. code". y,, ý "ý ., -c ...,.. ý. a aL. iüve ß: äi. 
The communist leadership has achieved a disenfranchisement 
of the masses without parallel in any advanced capitalist 
society. The system is an unholy blend of neo-serfdom and 
imitative technology, functioning, to the disbenefit 
of its economic and administrative efficiency, as Wiles 
points out, like a crude application of Weber's path-breaking 
but excessively formalized model of bureaucracy. 
(124) 
The further development of the Russian economy requires 
precisely a withdrawal and sharper classification of 
"officialdom", the dismantling of coercive, external frames 
on the selection, organization, timing and pacing of socio- 
econoimic activity by the citizenry. A free mobilization of 
capital, physical and human, will be required if Russia is 
ever to rival or surpass the West in technical innovation 
or affluence. What late Tsardom embraced only hesitantly, 
the Marxist regime was able to postpone through the erection 
of a Leviathan state surpassing c-. -en that of the Incas in 
388. 
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its ubiquity. It was able initially to suppress the 
emergence of a human capital order, because the early stages 
of industrialism are not particularly skill-intensive. But 
the requirements of mature industrialism are precisely those 
perceived by Max Weber -- the complex of processes he called 
"rationalization". 
Thus there is a self-generating time-bomb in the works 
of the socialist machine, a self-augmenting dysfunctionality, 
fuelled by the contradiction between officialdom and class. 
he murderous dream of a Society Without hierarchy is at 
war with an ambition for affluence. Were socialist societies 
satisfied with what they can do, namely manage high growth 
rates, with a form of full employment, at relatively low 
levels of inflation, such that the worst excesses of primary 
poverty can be transcended, there would be no problem. 
The socialist dream, however, also involves super-abundance 
and freedom. All the evidence, as Wiles says, is that the 
latter cannot be squared with socialism. 
(125) Cannot a good 
case be made that affluence, too, is not easily within the 
socialist grasp? Affluence is fundamentally the outcome of 
capitalism. 
An indis2ensable concession to Lhc logic of development 
in Russia has been the emergence of a human capital order. 
We may propose that such an emergence carries within it 
the seeds of a more generalized capitalism. Does Marx's 
developmental triad have its antithesis and its synthesis 
the wrong way round? The classic sequence: agrarianism, 
389. 
capitalism, socialism, should perhaps be restated: 
agrarianism, socialism, capitalism. The spectre haunting 
, socialism 
is the spectre of capitalism. Have the architects 
of the Gulag Archipelago deprived long-suffering Russia of 
her birth right? Is the emergence of irrepressible human 
capital formation in Soviet Russia, a hopeful augury that 
this great nation will one day assume her rightful place 
among the free peoples? Perhaps the greatest irony of the 
twentieth century will be that socialism, imposed by 
dedicated ideologues in circumstances which violated all 
the central canons of Marxism, will prove a mere episode 
in the transition between agrarian and industrial society. 
Human capital formation may serve as the grave-digger 
of the socialist order. 
/ 
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HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE SOCIO-ECONOMY OF EDUCATION 
The distribution of education is a 
part of the distribution of wealth. 
P. J. D. Wiles, 
Economic Institutions Compared 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
. HUMAN CAPITAL AND THE EDUCATION SYSTEM: 
THE CASE OF THE MISSING ECONOMICS 
Errors, like straws upon the surface flow; 
He who would search for pearls must dive below. 
Dryden, All for Love 
409. 
So far in this thesis, we have sought to derive the 
sociological implications of human capital theory, in relation 
to such issues as the structure of social control, and the 
class and occupational structure. We have tried to see 
what human capital theory might entail both for an evaluation 
of the Marxist critique of capitalism and for an analysis 
of modern socialist society. It is time now to consider 
a sociology of human capital in terms of what has been its 
most significant theoretical and empirical field of economic 
enquiry -- namely the educational system in its articulation 
with the wider economy in advanced liberal society. We now 
attempt, therefore, in our last two chapters, the beginnings 
of a socio-economy of education. 
However, before we pass to this interesting task, we 
must first attempt to relate the main substance of these 
chapters to the thesis as a whole. We now repeat, in summary 
form, the intellectual schema which is the main framework 
of argument in this thesis. I shall try to make this inherently 
tedious process as terse as possible. 
Earlier in this thesis we identified the structure of 
social control in terms of a tri-partite model involving: 
1. An administrative matrix, that is, a set 
of governmental, legal and other institutions 
which regulate and police the citizenry. 
ý_, ý. _. 
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2. A structure of hierarchy. 
ýýý y 
3. A social value consensus. 
We argued that characteristic of modern liberal 
capitalism is the unprecendented influence of the third 
1 
element in the securing of social control. So powerful is 
the consensus, that it permeates both the other elements. 
Both the state machinery and the structure of hierarchy 
come to be dominated by consensus, rather than, as in most 
societies, constituting in themselves a power-structure which 
dominates a largely excluded majority. 
We employed Bernstein's terms "classification" and 
"frame", ' arguing that in advanced capitalist society, the 
administrative matrix is strongly classified vis-a-vis 
other areas of socio-economic life, that is, sharply limited 
in relation to these. At the same time, we suggested that 
the principal social hierarchy under modern capitalism, 
namely its class-structure, involves weak classification, 
that is, involves strata which relate to each other in terms 
of gradual distinctions, rather than the discontinuous 
divisions which characterize corporatist society, for example 
between noble and serf under feudalism, or party-member and 
non-member under socialism. 
We further argued that modern capitalism is character- 
ized by such powerful mechanisms of socialization, that it 
has largely dispensed with strong external frames on socio- 
economic action, permitting a wide range of individual 
discretion to citizens, on the condition of their having 
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strong internalized frames, that is, rules regulating 
socio-economic behaviour, rules which are constitutive of 
'personality. 
(2) 
Weak classification of the administrative matrix 
" and strong external frames on the citizenry, indicate a 
highly coercive society, with a limited consensus. Strong 
classification of the administrative matrix and weak, external 
frames on the citizens indicate a highly consensual society, 
where recourse to coercion. is attenuated. All forms of 
corporatist society, such as slavery, feudalism, oriental 
despotism, f-ascism, and communism, can, to a greater or lesser 
ricaroo loo nnnnorýfrµul 1 ri 
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between the administrative matrix and the rest of socio- 
economic life, in terms of strong classification between 
social strata, and in terms of strong external frames on 
general social activity. Only advanced liberal capitalist 
society can be characterized in terms of a strong classifi- 
cation of the administrative matrix, of weak classification 
of social strata, and of weak external frames on the citizenry. 
Thus it appears that modern capitalism is a highly 
distinctive structure of social control. We have argued 
at length that the evolution of human capital formation as 
the marketized version of skill-formation, is indispensable 
to this modality of social control. We also argued that 
modern Marxist-socialist societies are threatened by human 
capital formation, which generates dysfuncý. ionalities, 
vis-a-vis the manifest ideology of socialist society. 
I! 
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Human capital formation generates economic stratification 
which is at variance with the generally non-economic 
, hierarchy 
between party members and the rest. 
The issue we now must raise is: how does the 
educational sub-system of advanced capitalist society 
relate to this schema? Variations in skill-formation are 
useful in analysing variations in the general structure of 
social control. So these chapters must ask two main 
related questions: 
1. That is the relationship between the education system 
of advanced capitalist society, and, respectively 
its administrative matrix, its structure of hierarchy, 
and its value consensus? 
2. What is the significance of human capital formation 
in this crucial relationship between education and 
the structure of social control? 
It may be assumed that skill-formation is an indispensable 
function of the education systems of advanced. capitalist 
society. This is not denied, for example, by Marxists such 
as Althusser(3) or Bowles and Gintis. 
(4) 
Indeed, Bowles 
and Gintis argue that the education systems of capitalist 
society ensure that labour is "Productive" but not "scarce". 
ý5ý 
It is not the creation of skill which they deny; but the 
relevance of the concept "scarcity", the connection between 
skill and earnings. 
(6) 
Indeed, the non-Marxist critic, 
Wiles, is much more critical of the notion of skill-formation 
as a function of education. 
(7) 
His explanation of the 
I 
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education-earnings nexus turns on the exiguous thesis 
that screening for talent via certification is the basis 
. of the connection. However, as Layard and Psacharopoulos 
point out, the screening case is badly damaged by the 
fact that university drop-outs earn, on average, more than 
those who did not go to college. 
(8) 
While the relationship between skill/knowledge and 
earnings remains problematic, the proposition that skill/ 
knowledge figures in earnings, has an intuitive obviousness. 
In any case, however the trick is done, education and earnings 
are indisputably correlated. 
(9)- 
As we saw in our chapter 
on human capital and social theory, modern path analysis 
provides huge statistical support for the view that 
education massively influences occupation and, more weakly 
but still decisively, influences earnings. 
(10) 
Where we shall quarrel with Marxists, is that they 
considerably underplay the skill-formation aspect of schooling 
(denying as we saw in an earlier chapter that human capital 
theory provides a satisfactory account of skill-formation), 
and that they over-emphasize, grotesquely, the powers of 
schooling with regard to the affective processing of its 
through-put. 
Just as Layard and Psacharopoulos have argued that the 
issue is not whether education increases earnings but why 
it does, so I shall not be asking whether education 
leads to human capital formation but rather accepting that 
it does and seeking to derive the implications of such an 
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acceptance for the sociology of education itself. 
We must first recognize a paradox here. Human capital 
; theory emerged as a conceptualization of the interactions 
of workers and firms in the matter of industrial training, 
that is to say that the theory involved an analysis of 
aspects of the capitalist labour-market. 
(12) 
The main, 
subsequent development of this theory, however, had as its 
principal concern, one of the outputs of the education system 
itself, that is the output of a predominantly non-market 
area of the economy. 
The importance of the non-market character of most 
education (certainly most primary and secondary education 
and a good deal of tertiary education too) in the advanced 
capitalist societies, cannot be over-stressed. Economists 
have partly recognized it, hence the interest in voucher 
schemes and other proposals for increasing individual 
discretion. ýý3) Sociologists, however, have paid it 
scant attention. 
I would maintain that the publicly financed nature of 
most education in the capitalist world. is an issue of 
cardinal importance for the sociology of education. One 
reason it is hard to evaluate various claims-as to the key 
"functions" of education, is that, as Bernstein has it, 
education is "strongly classified" from other areas of socio- 
economic life. (14) An attempt will be made in these two 
chapters to establish the implications of this strong classifi- 
the general economic life of education systems. 
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The point to be made directly is that the strong classifi- 
cation of education reduces the visibility of its economic 
functions. A powerful element in this strong classification 
is precisely the fact that. education is not bought and sold 
on market principles but provided direct from taxation. 
(15) 
This profoundly affects the ways in which education 
constitutes general economic production, as we shall see 
later, and in particular massively, affects its role as the 
principal generator of human capital formation. As Dougherty 
and Psacharopou I os put it: "the output of t educa tol 
sector, human capital...... is only indirectly subject to % 
the competitive forces normally responsible for the efficient 
allocation of resources. " kI 
The authors maintain that, in general, education systems 
are not efficient users of scarce resources, and this is a 
theme that we shall return to. We shall emphasize that the 
socio-economic principles which regulate the education system 
are not the same as those which regulate private business. 
(17) 
If we can level one general charge against the sociology 
of education, it is the same one of which we earlier accused 
the sociological study of the professions: lack of an 
economic dimension in the analysis. In the case of the 
sociology of education, it is notable that the most widely 
known "economic" phrase is the pseudo-economic terminology 
employed by Bourdieu -- his famous ''cultural capital 11, 
(18) 
I would maintain that the intrusion of economic 
perspectives in the sociology of education is long overdue. 
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1. 
Much of the literature conveys the unfortunate impression 
that education is distinct from the economy, distinct 
. from production. This is not the case. Education does 
have an output (is production) and is part of the economy 
itself. Education absorbs vast resources, and shows a 
secular tendency to absorb proportionately more, and it 
yields a flow of output. The difficulty is to identify this 
output -- this is what causes controversy among economists 
and sociologists alike. 
The number of children and young adults passing through 
the system is not the output. The correct economic term 
here is "through-put". A through-put tells one nothing 
about the"people-processing" aspects of education. The 
output is what happens to the through-put. This the 
"educational production function". 
Direct attempts at measuring output are extremely 
crude and limited. In this country we are forced to use 
measures of certification such as the General Certificate 
of Education, 
(19) 
since the state does not (yet) collect 
the data necessary for literacy, numeracy and other profiles. 
This, however, could be done, and may happen. 
(20) 
However, though identification of output is difficult, 
there are overwhelming grounds for regarding education as a 
form of Production: 
ý" There are literacy and school enrolment constraints 
on development. 
(21) 
In this general sense, education 
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is clearly a form of investment. 
2. There is world-wide evidence that educated people 
earn more than less educated. 
(22) 
This must indicate, 
unless labour markets are totally irrational, that 
educated people are more productive, though in what 
precisely that productivity consists, is highly 
problematic. Nevertheless it is clear both that 
education is investment, and that a certain level 
of - education is a necessary, though not a sufficient, 
condition of development. 
3. Education is clearly demanded as a consumption good. 
As societies get richer, they demand more education 
for its own sake. 
These central propositions have sustained an immense 
literature in economics. We are proposing that it is 
high time sociologists took account of them. Cross- 
fertilization between two disciplines, however, can flow 
both ways, and it is also arguable that economists could 
offer economic interpretations of"`hitherto sociological 
explanations of educations. 
Let us consider, for example, the various interpret- 
ations of the functions of education presented in Earl 
Hopper's interesting reader. 
(23) 
Hopper maintains that 
occupational placement is the key function of modern 
education systems, such that a revealing educational 
typology can be constructed around international variations 
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(for example in the age at which educational specialization 
begins) in ministering to this functional imperative. 
, Hopper's proposition receives strong statistical confirmation, 
let us repeat, from the path analysis of writers like 
Psacharopoulos and Tinbergen. 
(24) 
Ioan Davies, however, 
wishes to accord occupational placement only a latent role 
in educational activity, the manifest function of school 
being the "management of knowledge". 
(25) 
In fact, the proposition that the dominant function of 
education is occupational placement and the view that the 
prime function is the management of knowledge, are not, 
strictly speaking, comparable statements. However far- 
fetchedly, occupational placement could be conceived as 
articulating not at all with the education system. The view 
that education involves the management of knowledge, however, 
is tautologous. The concept "education" actually subsumes 
the "management of knowledge". That is what education is. 
(26) 
The view that education is about occupational placement is 
theoretical, that is to say it posits a determinate 1. 
relationship between two variables. The notion that education 
is the management of knowledge, by contrast, is old-fashioned 
conceptual aiaiysis, and has nothing directly theoretical 
about it. Be that as it may, Dennis Smith believes that 
the views of Hopper and Davies are not antagonistic but 
complementary and can be reconciled in a sociological analysis 
of selective processes. 
(27) 
It may be pointed out that 
ti 
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Bernstein's recent work, also permits a marriage between the 
sociologies of knowledge and of the division of labour. 
(28) 
What is missing in these articles, as in much of the 
sociology of education, is a sense of the economic nature 
of the activities identified. All societies must allocate 
labour, organize the production and dissemination of 
knowledge, and generate systems of evaluation to these ends. 
In a complex modern society, with an elaborate division of 
n rc mo11s1y costly. 
T ey labour, 
, 
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They 
constitute vast and in some cases unrecognized aspects of 
educational production. 
Similar considerations apply to the standard view of 
the Durkheim-Parsons ascendancy, that schooling is fundament- 
ally an agency of socialization, of societal integration. 
Socialization, as mediated by schooling, is itself an 
economic function. It both absorbs costs and constitutes 
production. 
We suggested in an earlier chapter, that one of the 
4 
characteristics of modern society is its increasingly 
"economic" nature. Characteristic of a society with a complex 
division of labour, is that both the principal aspects of 
cultural transmission, that is to say its affective- 
behavioural aspects and its skill-formation and cognitive- 
developmental aspects, become increasingly entrusted to a 
costly and specialized sub-system of- society -- its education 
system. Bernstein has distinguished between the "instrumental" 
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and the "expressive" orders of socialization. 
(29) 
Another 
way of dichotomizing socialization is between "general" 
and "economic", the latter seen as a sub-set of the 
principles and behaviours of the former. The latter must 
not be identified solely with the instrumental order, for 
it does not consist merely in the acquisition of marketable 
skills and knowledge, but also in the internalizing of 
economic principles, above all, in capitalist society, of 
the core economic principles of its "dominant cultural 
category", v t. hie market code. vv. ý. i. -ý v 
Comparable to the development of a specialized 
educational sub-system, is the emergence of specialized 
medical institutions. In both these cases a general 
proposition holds: costless inter-generational transmission 
of skills and values, mainly via the family, and costless 
medical activity (either in the family unit or by elderly 
members of the community) are largely replaced by the 
activities of costly, specialized institutions. 
The transition is neither total nor uniform. The 
family retains a good part of its costless functions in 
affective socialization, rather less of its functions in 
skill-formation or medicine. 
(30) 
What we must insist on, 
from our view-point, is the proposition that to the extent 
that school is important in socialization, such socialization 
constitutes part of the output of the "educational economy". 
To recognize the economic character of affective 
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socialization. 'f occupational-placement, knowledge- 
management, and the system of evaluation and certification 
, which effects 
them, is not, however, to suggest that they 
are necessarily efficiently achieved. With regard to 
school's affective and cognitive functions, we shall strive 
to show that in many respects school is not a very efficient 
agency. We shall try to show that for many children, school 
has weak powers of general socialization, precisely because 
it is not efficient as an agency of economic socialization, 
and does not permit them, for example, successfully to 
engage in private human capital formation. Wiles has argued 
that in many cases, a much cheaper system of intelligence- 
testing could replace educational certification as a device 
for occupational placement, 
(31 ) 
and Dougherty and Psacharo- 
poulos, as we have said, regard education systems as highly 
inefficient in meeting the requirements of the labour 
market. 
(32) 
The argument of these last two chapters is that 
education, whatever the degree of its economic efficiency, 
constitutes multi-faceted economic production. It is an 
arena for private and social investment and for consumption. 
It socializes children, manages knowledge and. secures 
occupational placement, through its extended processes of 
evaluation and certification. Education also generates 
massive employment in its own right, and as Weisbrod points 
(33 ) 
out, also permits a huge increase in the female work-force. 
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Most of these general functions overlap with the 
question of human capital formation. For example, one of 
the manifestations of education as a source of employment, 
is that it reabsorbs much of its own output of human 
capital. The notion "occupational placement" is virtually 
a sociological counterpart to the economic idea of human 
capital formation. It is in virtue of variations in that 
problematic set of characteristics which employers find 
C 
productively worthwhile, 
34ý that individuals are, variously, 
occupationally "placed". The socio-economic processes of 
knowledge-management, certification and affective sociali- 
zation, 'are among the conditions of human capital formation, 
although they are also wider phenomena than the latter. 
Knowledge must be managed and children affectively socialized, 
whether or not skill-formation is enhanced in the process. 
One of the key ideas in these last two chapters, however, is 
that the successful accumulation of skill and knowledge 
massively enhances, for those who experience it, the 
effectiveness of education as an agency of socialization. 
It is perhaps surprising that a relatively narrow conception 
of educational production has obtained among the economists 
of education , In the case of sociologists we 
find an almost 
total failure to grasp the essentially economic nature of 
many educational processes. Whatever might explain these 
short-comings, they are certainly the reason that despite 
the huge growth of the sociology and economics oT education, 
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a distinctive socio-economy of the subject has not yet 
emerged. Psacharopoulos argues that there has already 
peen "a happy marriage" between the economics and the 
sociology of education. 
(35) 
This statement is premature. 
The interest sociologists now have in income as a dependent 
variable requiring statistical explanation, and the borrowing 
by economists, from sociologists, of the statistical tech- 
nique of path analysis, for the incorporation of social 
class factors in the explanation of income, are indeed 
welcome. lt seems to me, however, that "marr age it requires 
more than this. Such a metaphor suggests a real mingling 
of social with economic theory. This is what has not 
happened. 
What such a mingling might permit is the addressing 
of the vital question: what is the character of the education 
systems of advanced capitalist society in relation to the 
character of the overall socio-economic system, specifically, 
how like the wider economy and society of which they are a 
part, are such educational systems? 
In an earlier chapter on socialism, we argued that in 
socialist society, the education system is one of its most 
notable proto-capitalist phenomena, linked very strongly 
with the labour-market and occupational-structure. In 
capitalist society, by contrast, the education system is 
not numbered amongst the most capitalist aspects of the 
economy. While economists have long been aware of this, 
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their, relatively narrow fixation on certain limited aspects 
of educational production, has prevented their taking full 
cognizance of the largely non-capitalist nature of education 
systems in advanced capitalist society. Economists have 
both neglected certain vital areas of educational production, 
and failed to stress sufficiently, for the benefit of 
non-economists, the very distinctive nature of educational 
production generally. Certainly in much of the Marxist 
sociology of education we find education systems treated 
as if they were very typical, in their organizational 
principles, of the wider capitalist economy. 
(36ý They 
are not, and had this been more widely realized, it may be 
doubted whether Marxist interpretations of education could 
have achieved their astonishing popularity. 
Clearly there are massive connections between the 
education system and the general capitalist economy. 
Education is linked to one of the indispensable conditions 
of an advanced capitalist society, namely its organization 
of skill-formation as human capital. I believe that 
Dougherty and Psacharopoulos are quite correct that the main 
output of education is human capital. 
(37) 
However, if this 
indispensable function has not been fully recognized, and 
in some quarters has even been denied, this reflects a 
general failure by scholars, both to grasp fully the 
distinctive character of educational production and to 
recognize the essentially economic nature of many of the 
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sociological functions attributed to education, a failure, 
we have argued, which in some cases applies to economists 
, as much as 
to sociologists. 
Economists naturally fix their attention on prices. 
It is this which has perhaps led them partly to ignore the 
economic nature of non-quantifiable aspects of educational 
production. The Marxists might have spotted that sociali- 
zation is a key economic function of modern education 
systems. It is not ubiquitously a successful function, as 
we shall argue. Insofar as it is achieved, however, it is 
an economic function, that is, one which absorbs scarce 
resources having alternate uses. Writers like Bowles and 
Gintis want to link earnings with differential class 
socialization rather than cognitive development or skill- 
formation; (38) but in fact their thesis involves the 
relegation of the education system to a superstructural 
role at the behest of the corporate capitalist economy, 
that is to say does not see it as an actual part of the 
economy, and thus, paradoxically, in that Bowles and Gintis 
are economists, is blind to the manifold economic character 
of schooling. 
What we encounter among the sociologists, is a widespread, 
man-in-the-street, prejudice, to the effect that production 
is about making machinery or motor-cars or mood, such that the 
people who teach our children are not engaged in production. 
No contemporary economist would articulate such an argument, 
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but it is nevertheless arguable that a fixation on that 
which is measurable and quantifiable, still only partly 
attentuated by a recognition of intangibles, has led 
economists also to overlook some vital aspects of 
educational production. 
At the same time we must stress again the very 
distinctive character of the educational economy. In 
particular, as we shall argue, the removal of education 
from the market economy in advanced capitalist society, 
results in its relatively weak penetration by the "market 
code". We have identified this code as the set of principles 
regulating the market economy and constituting also the 
economic core of the general societal value consensus. We 
have also insistently linked the market code with the wide- 
spread phenomenon of human capital formation. The strong 
classification between the educational economy and the market 
economy, however, under the conditions of modern capitalism, 
leads, I suggest, to the obscuring of the generally economic 
nature of schooling, and has the notable effect of shrouding 
education's indispensable function of skill-formation, in 
a blanket of discursive consumerism. This is a point we 
shall develop later. 
Most sociologists of education have failed to take account 
of the degree of insulation between education and other 
socio-economic activity. This is what makes Bernstein's 
notion of classification so useful. They have also failed 
in their analyses the fundamentally economic 
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character of the functions of education. A compendious 
statement of these errors, is to the effect that they have 
'involved both illegitimate bracketing and unjustifiable 
separation. The world of school has been treated as very 
like the world of work, which in many ways it is not, and 
at the same time the school system has been treated as if 
it were not itself an integral part of the economy, which, 
as we have argued above, it is. The Bowles and Gintis 
book, for example, commits both these sins at once, and 
we shall later offer a brief critique of the reproduction 
thesis of which these writers are among the best known 
nrnnnnPn+c 
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In three articles which emerged from the preparatory 
(39) 
stages of this thesis, when I began to write what, for 
organizational purposes, I have decided to make the last 
chapters of the work, I was at pains to develop the socio- 
economic implications of what I see as the relative autonomy 
of educational systems in the advanced capitalist societies. 
Along with this insistence on the relative autonomy of 11 
education, I tried to erect an associated critique of the 
Marxist thesis, so influential in the last decade, that 
education has the fundamental function of preserving and 
reproducing the capitalist order. 
As we argued in earlier chapters, human capital theory 
is a voluntarist theory, maintaining that individual men 
and women make independent (non-coerced) choices about the 
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costs-and benefits of various activities pertaining to 
their productivities, for example, decisions about schooling, 
trainin, medical treatments, migration and job search. - C> 
Such at least, is the picture of man implied by the notion 
of individual human capital formation. 
The paradox, of course, is that the largest single 
element econometricians have identified in the determination 
of income, is years of schooling. 
(40) 
This makes 
"educational human capital" the most important version of 
human capi jai. ` et the world o education is compulsory 
%, - for the bulk of its papulation. For some children the 
school world is more coercive than the wider society. We 
shall pursue these issues later. For present purposes, we 
need only say that we accept the voluntarist model of man 
which human capital theory implies. 
It is a picture wholly at variance with Marxism, which 
views the capitalist economy as a centralized structure of 
decision-making, where the bourgeoisie make the real 
"capital" decisions, and the masses are passive, either 
through coercion or indoctrination. 
Ostensibly, the notion "social human capital formation" 
might be reconciled with Marxist theory, especially since 
Marxists do not generally deny the importance of skill- 
formation, though, as we noted earlier, they drastically 
underplay it. 
(41) 
Social human capital is the result of 
collective decisions to incur costs and benefits to enhance 
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labour productivity, that is to say it is effectively a 
question of state activity. If the Marxist thesis that 
the state is the instrument of bourgeois capital were 
convincing, then social human capital could be claimed as 
a notion consistent with Marxism, in a way in which 
individual human capital is not. 
(42ý 
The simple drawback 
of this unlikely reconciliation is the extreme vulnerability 
of the view that the state is the agency of bourgeois 
capital. - We argued, in an earlier chapter, that the state 
in capitalist society is the only state in history which 
is not the creature of one predominant interest and one 
alone. In these two chapters, we shall argue that this 
view can be fortified by an examination of educational 
processes. 
I believe that in the case of education, as elsewhere, 
a sociology of human capital can throw light on the central 
questions of the class-structure and its relationship to the 
state. It is alleged by many that the education system is 
the agency of the bourgeoisie, a state apparatus, part of 
the octopus-like growth of the corporate state. There now 
-1 
exists a vast, and in my view for the most part, inferior 
literature to this effect. 
(43) 
One eminent writer, by 
contrast, views the world of school in Great Britain as 
fundamentally an agency of continued gentry hegemony. 
(44) 
I shall argue, not only that the thesis of bourgeois 
educational control is false (the thesis of gentry hegemony 
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is even more tenuous) but that a socio-economy of education 
supplies further support for the view that there is no 
ruling-class in advanced capitalist society, no one social 
group with incontestable control over the state. 
One of the reasons so many writers on education have 
espoused extreme one-sided views, is that their arguments 
have been predicated on reductionist perspectives. I have 
stressed the dangers of reductionism throughout this thesis. 
However, in preparing this chapter, I have benefited 
considerably iron reading an unpublished paper by David 
Hamilton. 
(45) 
Though his text is terse and provisional, 
it nevertheless seems to me to mark the opening of a most 
fruitful direction for the socio-economic analysis of 
education systems. It will not be tedious, therefore, to 
note some of Hamilton's main points. None of his positions 
seems to me hostile to the thesis I am arguing here. 
Nevertheless, I restrict myself to noting only those especially 
germane to my case. 
He is first of all, hostile to any form of reductionism, 
which, however, he equates mainly with biological reduction- 
ism. (46) For example, Bowles and Gintis, he says, build 
heavily ", upon the presumption of a correspondence (or 
symbiotic) relationship between 'school-structure and job 
structure. "1 (47) 
In fact, I would argue, biological reductionism is only 
one version of a general error. The most common reductionism 
in sociology. is sociologism. against whose dangers Rria. n 
Davies warns us. 
(483) 
Similarly, the base-superstructure 
metaphor, so common in the Marxist sociology of education, 
is a version of economic reductionism. The metaphor itself 
derives from engineering or architecture, the analogy 
involving the economy seen as a sub-structure or foundation 
to which the "non-economy" is superstructural. Thus a 
critique of Bowles and Gintis' work, as reductionist, needs 
no biological accretion. Their book is actually a vast 
attempt to give empirical substance to the base-superstructure 
metaphor, and ii s thus doomed to theoretical illegitimacy on 
the grounds of economic reductionism. This is true. despite 
the fact that their general mode of argument is sociological 
rather than economic. 
(49) 
Hamilton rightly complains of Bowles and GintisI attempt 
to explain classrooms in terms of factories. Their argument, 
he says, derives "from the use of a circular rationale 
vwhich, in turn, is confirmed through the initial selection 
of conforming instances". 
(so) 
I have myself made a similar 
point, when I noted that Bowles and Gintis omit to deal 
with the widespread phenomenon of truancy, since this is 
so uncongenial to their argument. 
(51) 
Mott _--J- 
--ant 
lr of all, Hamilton argues that i, is 
essential that the socio-economic analysis of education should 
examine "not only f; 'lc^, correspondences but also the inconsist- J 
encies, contradictions and non-correspondence relationships 
Of education. It 
(52) (53) 
This is a point I have made. 
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Hamilton makes it within a more elaborately worked-out 
case. 
A Hamilton stresses the need to distinguish "aspects 
from entities". 
(54) 
For example, "hidden curriculum" is 
not a separate entity from "visible curriculum" but an 
as ect of curriculum, just as curriculum is an aspect of 
some other phenomenon. 
(5J) 
Here Hamilton starts to lurch 
into a Hegelianism of a kind I feel disinclined to follow. 
I mean by this, that he starts to construct a sort of 
dialectical "chain of relations" ä la Hegel and Marx. 
The initial point, however, is well-taken, especially his 
view that "factories and schools- can be analysed as centres 
of production", 
(56) 
and in his claim that to locate the 
mainsprings of educational change outside the education 
system, as do Bowles and Gintis, is "to deny that education 
has any economic significance". 
(57) 
Much educational 
analysis, Hamilton says, involves "false polarities" such as 
"education" and "economy". 
(58) 
I repeat that while education 
is part of the general economy, it is a distinctively different 
part, whose distinctiveness can be illumined by the concept 
"autonomy". 
The proposition that there are significant degrees of 
autonomy in the education systems of advanced capitalist 
society, is not new. However, it has been rather pushed 
aside of late, either effectively ignored, as by Bowles and 
Gintis, whose version of the base/superstructure metaphor 
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assigns to education a passively mechanistic role, 
(59) 
or dropped in a logical no-man's-land as by Althusser, 
(60) 
or reassigned a meaning quite opposite to its normal use, 
as by Bourdieu. 
(61) 
1 maintain that an examination of 
educational systems such as our own, reveals, not only the 
continuing relevance, but the theoretically indispensable 
character, of some such terms as "autonomy" or "independence". 
It is to a defence of this proposition that we now turn. 
In the next chapter, I shall argue that human capital 
formation is indeed the very essence o the nexus between 
education and the wider society, though in a way rendered 
extremely complex and problematic, by the very autonomy 
of education that we are proposing. 
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A 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONSUMERS AND CAREERISTS HUiýAN 'CAPITAL 
AND THE MIDDLE-CLASS EDUCATIONAL ASCENDANCY 
Full many a gem of purest ray serene, 
The dark unfathomed caves of ocean bear. 
Gray's Elegy 
/ 
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The pluralistic approach to the analysis of social 
11 
stratification in advanced capitalist society, while it 
has long enjoyed a general Weberian-style appeal, has always 
lacked a sharp economic underpinning. This thesis has sought 
to argue that human capital theory is the missing economic 
cement of such various intellectual edifices as Weberian 
and functionalist sociology. H. i therto , wnatever the apparent 
deficiencies of Marxist approaches, they have tended to rest 
on a more definite economic basis than their rivals. They 
have been able to draw on the Marxist schema where capital 
and labour are conceptually discrete entities. Marxist 
sociology, with its predication on private property as the key 
independent variable in socio-economic analysis, has been able 
to generate theoretical relationships (relationships where 
variables are connected in determinate form) as to capital 
and social class, capital and schooling, capital and ideology, 
and so on. 
These determinate relationships, however over-simplified 
and meritricious, have a graspable character which lends them 
appeal. This explains the popularity of relatively simplistic 
works like Miliband's The State in Capitalist Society. 
(1) 
The popularity of Miliband's thesis that the state is a 
creature of bourgeois interests, finds a massive expression 
in the Marxist sociology of education, itself taking education 
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systems as a key element in the securing of bourgeois 
hegemony. 
I believe that the Marxist explanation of education 
a 
in advanced liberal society is a false one, as. I shall try 
to show. Nevertheless, it has to be admitted immediately 
that there is a problem, very far from resolution, as to the 
connections between education and social structure, or, to put 
it in the language of this thesis, between education and the 
administrative matrix of society, the structure of hierarchy 
and the societal value consensus. 
1, Thus nothing is further from my mind than the view that 
contemporary Marxist approaches to education are addressing 
a non-problem. I think, for example, that we are still 
relatively in the dark over such fundamental issues as the 
nature and extent of social mobility in advanced capitalist 
society, and of the relationship between that mobility and the 
educational process. Neither are we well-informed on such 
basic questions as the degree of alienation from school felt 
11 
by children. We do not even possess, for example, basic 
information on the level of truancy or absenteeism in schools. 
The extent to which education mediates a relatively unchanging 
system of social stratification, as opposed to mediating a 
changing one, or alternatively itself is autonomously generative 
of change, is a question which cannot be satisfactorily 
addressed in the absence of such basic information and under- 
standing. 
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Obviously, we are by no means entirely ignorant. A. H. 
Halsey argues that there has been considerable social mobility 
in Great Britain. 
(2) 
Frank Musgrove believes that most 
working-class children are not estranged from school. 
(3) 
In fact, the first claim is much more securely based than the 
second. I am far from accepting Musgrove's assertion. It 
certainly does not square with my experience of London 
secondary schools, for example. I would require much more 
detailed evidence of the degree of estrangement/attachment of 
children vis-a-vis the world of school before I abandoned my 
own anecdotal impressions. However, whatever the relative 
empirical state-of-play of these two issues, it seems clear 
that an economic sociology of education will depend, in the 
long run, on a detailed mapping of the terrain in question. 
I would suggest, however, that a sociology of human capital 
can shed an informative light on the na ture of the educational 
process. It could hardly be otherwise, given that I have 
already acceded to the view that human capital formation is 
the dominant function of education systems in advanced 
capitalist society. 
(4) 
1 would also propose, again consistently 
with the repeated argument of this thesis, that Bernstein's 
conception ofa societal complex of classifications and frames 
can massively illumine the issues we are addressing. 
(5) 
That I have recognized the appeal of the Marxist case 
does not imply that I find it convincing. At one level, the 
" thesis of universal bourgeois control seems merely ludicrous. 
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In contemporary Great Britain, for example, the trades union 
leadership has powerfully employed the state and legal 
machinery in pursuit of its interests, for example in securing 
the closed shop. Peter Wiles is just one among many eminent 
writers to express trepidation in the face of the formidable, 
even frightening posture of modern organized labour. 
(6) 
We are involved in examining, however, a part of the adminis- 
trative matrix where the trades union bosses are not very 
influential -- namely the education system. Neither, we shall 
argue. are the bourgeoisie very prominent in the . Vor! -1 of 
school, pace the huge Marxist literature to the contrary. 
The world of school is a middle-class world. Its relative 
autonomy enhances its domination by the middle classes. If 
it fitted more flushly with the wider capitalist economy, then 
the influence of capitalists would be more apparent. 
I am not arguing that were education bought and sold on 
market principles, its dominance by the middle classes would 
be entirely eliminated. I have earlier argued that the huge 
expansion of the middle classes in modern capitalist society, 
is predicated on human capital formation. Since I have also 
accepted the proposition that human capital is the main output 
of the education system, 
(7) 
i am driven to the conclusion 
that in an advanced capitalist economy, the education system, 
with its insistent occupational orientation, 
(8) 
will always 
tend to be dominated by those most successful in human capital 
formation. What I am arguing is that the relative autonomy 
Of the education systeýmý, its strong classification in relation 
aa 
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both to other elements in the administrative matrix and to 
bourgeois production, enhances its middle-class character. 
The Marxist literature portrays the working classes as 
'helplessly soaked in bourgeois ideology when they are at 
school. I argue, to the contrary, that the education systems 
of advanced capitalist society, deliver working-class children 
to the mercy of the middle classes. Education is suffused 
with middle-class ideology. While much of the sociology of 
education has also argued the educational dominance of the 
middle classes ;; t has generally offered no explanation of tho 
provenance of such domination. The sociology of human capital, 
by contrast, has a relatively strong explanation of the 
dominance 
of the middle classes, namely the emergence of a 
human capital order. 
One route into an elaboration of the view that education 
is a middle-class world is via a critique of the proposition 
that it is mainly a bourgeois one. We now turn, therefore, 
to a discussion of the thesis of bourgeois reproduction 
through education. / 
Malice in Wonderland: The Marxist Reproduction Thesis 
The Marxist literature on education is extremely various. 
In some cases, the emphasis is on a detailed examination of 
the curricular life of schools, treating that life as problematic, 
that is, as requiring explanation. The work of M. F. D. Young, 
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for example, is of this type. While this work may properly 
be credited with having helped both to revive and extend 
the sociology of knowledge, it has always had a number of 
striking weaknesses, apart from its very obvious lack of 
a theor of social class. 
(9) 
First, Marxian phenomenology has never managed to lower 
any very substantial empirical anchors. Writings like those 
of Young, Keddiec1O) Postman 
(11) 
and Bartholomew, 
(12) 
often 
reveal an anxious sifting of educational phenomena, seeking 
the grounds such phenomena might supply for 
of hierarchy. Social hierarchy is taken as 
despicable or undesirable state of affairs. 
who believe that intellectual and other soc 
the indictment 
in itself a 
Perhaps only those 
ial hierarchies 
among men are not dispensable through praxical enthusiasm, 
and who have taught the sociology of education during the last 
decade, will appreciate the role played, in this kind of 
analysis, by the destructive vices of guilt and envy. 
(13) 
The more strident propositions of this literature -- 
(14) 
that working-class culture is as worthwhile as any other, 
that working-class language is richer and more real than 
middle-class language; 
(15) 
that "intelligence" is an 
ideological construct rather than a differentially distributed 
17 
aspect of humanity; 
(16) 
that all knowledge is ideology 
ý-- 
are all both doubtful and propagandist. The first two are part 
of a contemporary quietism which would, if it came to inform 
policy, condemn millions of able working-class people to 
Permanent inferior status, and prevent our tapping the vast 
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reservoir of proletarian talent. 
(18) 
in my view, the first 
society to devise a truly scientific pedagogy, enabling us 
to crack the mysterious nut of educability, will take off 
for the socio-economic stratosphere, by harnessing the 
hitherto relatively dormant creativity of the working class, 
by enormously expanding their capacity to engage in human 
capital formation. 
The third proposition, that the concept "intelligence" 
is pure ideology, strikes not only at the roots of common- 
sense, but runs counter to a vast evidence. 7) The elusive 
nature of the idea of "intelligence", should not blind us 
to the overwhelming likelihood that, whatever the difficulties 
of identification involved, men vary cognitively, intellect- 
ually, as much as they manifestly vary in physical attributes. 
Does anyone seriously doubt the vast intellectual disparity 
between Marx and most of his followers and critics? 
The fourth view, that all knowledge is ideology, is 
self-defeating. It is literally a meaningless statement 
since it can only imply that there is no such thing as 
knowledge. If all knowledge is ideology, what grounds are 
there for taking "all knowledge is ideology" as a true 
statement? If it is a true statement, however, it implies 
the possibility of other true (non-ideological) statements. 
The proposition is thus self-defeating. I have, incidentally, 
nowhere found any evidence that Marx himself held such extreme 
views, which would render the whole business of intellectual 
activity merely redundant. In fact, a presumption of all 
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science ( and not only science) must be that there is 
knowledge, and we argued in an earlier chapter that it is 
, 
perfectly possible for a set of propositions to constitute 
both knowledge and ideology. 
In any case, the problem with these propositions is 
that it is hard to see what would count as satisfactory tests 
for them. The trouble with this (crudely speaking) phenomen- 
QQgical animadversion, is that it combines two weaknesses: 
it has weak empirical purchase on the reality it purports to 
describe, but. also little explanatory power. 
This second weakness is apparent in much micro-sociology. 
If social phenomena are swirling and indeterminate, if 
holistic representations of phenomena are always objectionable 
reifications, then the social scientist is condemned to a 
permanent impressionism, where one man's impressions are as 
good as anotherIs. However, explanation is part of the 
sociological endeavour. This is why such threads of explanation 
as do emerge from Marxian phenomenology, do so predominantly 
in terms of its abandoning the phenomenological inspiration 
and veering towards the semi-theoretical pole of Marxism. 
Marxism lacks one of the essential ingredients of a science: 
Specification of the grounds of refutation. 
(20) However, 
it retains, in part, one vital characteristic of science: 
explanatory power. When I agreed, in an earlier chapter, with 
Aron's view that Marxism has lost most of its explanatory 
(21) force, I did so in the sense that I regard other 
LL i 
socio-economic ways of explaining society as more co ent. 
I would not deny that Marxism has more appeal than an 
indeterminate introspectionism. It retains, at least, the 
ability to offer theoretical (that is determinate) 
relationships of the form, if A then B. 
(22) 
It. is not in 
the least surprising that, having convinced themselves (and 
many of their students) that there was no such thing as 
structure, so many sociologists are now uncovering, with equal 
fervour, the workings of the corporate state. Intuiting, as 
they are inclined, the moral wrongness o± the world as yr c^. sc tl 
constituted, they had nowhere else to go. From the ashes of 
their de-reifying fires, there has arisen a formidably 
unfair) sý uctural 
hoenix. (23) To Parody a lgrosslY J r 
witticism about the United States, some sociologists have 
jumped from barbarism to decadence, without an intervening 
period of theoretical civilization. 
What can we say of those who have rediscovered structure, 
or of Marxists who never inhabited the phenomenological 
wilderness in the first place? Their work has the merit, we 
1. repeat, of wanting to assert and uncover determinate relation- 
ships between variables. There now exists a vast international 
literature of this kind. This literature is an apologetics. 
The central prediction of the master°s magisterial vision having 
been falsified, no revolutionary proletariat having yet availed 
itself of its historical privilege of constituting the last 
and definitive social class, Marxist scholars have sought in 
many fields to uncover the sources of revolutionary 
V; 4 
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postponement, In the field of education the most famous 
article is by Althusser. 
(24) 
The best known book is by 
Bowles and Gintis. 
(25) 
We now turn to the briefest of 
summaries of the latter work. 
(26) 
The education system of the United States is an agency 
of the corporate state, functioning to contain and neutralize 
the revolutionary threat of the exploited masses. The 
contradiction between the potential emancipation afforded. by 
the progressive forces of production (enormous under the 
technological conditions of advanced capitalism) and the 
reactionary social relations of capitalist production, is 
suppressed, in large measure, through the processing of 
children in the school system. School "corresponds" to work. 
The teacher is the analogue of the boss. The successful pupils 
are the counterparts to the successful managers and bosses they 
will become. Working-class failure in school, prefigures the 
lowly status and lack of autonomy in work experienced by the 
proletariat. 
The principal mechanism in the 'alienation of social 
consciousness, is the system of certification which legitimates 
and reproduces the class structure. Docility and conformism, 
essential to -the continued profitability of capitalist 
enterprise and to the continued political domination of the 
masses by big-business interests, are also, correspondingly, 
the key to educational success. 
There are two main distinctions between this kind of 
453. 
work and Marxian phenomenology. First, unlike the latter, 
it shows little interest in a detailed analysis of the 
components and dynamics of cultural transmission. It is 
simply uninterested in the sociology of knowledge. In this 
sense it is actually much less interesting than the phenomeno- 
logical version. 
Secondly, whether rightly or wrongly, this kind of 
Marxism offers a much more precise model of class relationships 
than does Marxian phenomenology. The latter really marks no 
change from the standard middle-class/working-class dichotomy 
of conventional sociology, though it insists that the social % 
organization of schooling massively advantages the middle 
classes, and massively disbenefits the working class. In this, 
' let it be said, it is absolutely correct. 
Work of the Bowles and Gintis type, by contrast, offers 
a full-frontal anatomy of class a la nineteenth century. 
There is a bourgeoisie and a proletariat, and the interests 
of the former are massively mediated through schooling. 
More than this, Bowles and Gintis' explanation of the 
11 expansion of the tertiary sector in the U. S. A. in the twentieth 
century, turns on the view that the professions and other 
middle-class groups have been proletarianized, that is, 
drawn into the wage-labour system. 
(27) 
In this sense they 
are trying to uphold the Marxist prediction as to the 
increasing polarization of the class structure -- a hopeless 
task if our earlier chapter on the professions and our 
general socio--economy of stratification possess any cogency. 
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There are other Marxist versions. Sharp and Green 
combine interactionism with structural Marxism in an attempt 
to show, at the level of classroom analysis, how the overall 
structure reproduces itself through school even when 
"progressive" educational ideas have been espoused. 
(28) 
Paul Willis, on the other hand, offers a much more voluntarist 
version of Marxism, arguing that it is working-class children 
who themselves adjust the school world to their knowledge of 
their occupational destinations, rendering it comparably 
chaotic, resin tin and rejecting educational officialdom 
and its purposes, just as they will later resist the bosses 
( 
and theirs. 
29 ) 
Whatever these variations, Marxist approaches all assert 
the generally crucial role of education in the reproduction 
of social hierarchy. Education is said to reflect, correspond 
to, reproduce, capitalism. These notions have been increasingly 
asserted, given the tendency, noted earlier, for the 
phenomenonological version of Marxism to lose ground to the 
structural. 
N 
I have addressed repeatedly, in this work, the deficiencies 
of the Bowles and Gintis thesis. Similar criticism could be 
levelled at most of the work in this genre. The astonishing 0 
crudity of much of the argument, its mechanistic , functional- 
ism', its lack of historical empathy, its frequent degeneration 
into conspiratorial ism, ought to have earned it a well-merited 
back seat. 
(30) 
1 have nowhere in the huge Marxist sociology 
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of education, gor example, encountered a sophisticated 
discussion of the concept "power", and its putative 
nelationship to private property and schooling. 
Neither is the Marxist-We'berian-Durkheimian synthesis 
of Bourdieu, in my view, ultimately convincing. Beneath the 
elaborate, pseudo-geometrical layout lurk some very banal 
(observations. 3ý) Some of his central vocabulary is 
hopelessly inadequate. His "cultural capital" is not a 
capital, 
(32) his "autonomy" is not an autonomy, 
(33) 
his 
"bourgeoisie" is not a bourgeoisie but an unhelpful conflation 
of the bourgeoisie and the middle class. 
(34) 
Neither is his 
view that there is no such thing as "naked" power convincing. 
He claims that there is always a symbolic imposition accompany- 
ing overt coercion. 
(35) 
In the remainder of this chapter, the relative "autonomy" 
of the education systems of advanced capitalist society will 
be accorded its standard dictionary meaning of "independence". 
It will be argued that the examination of the interior life 
of education systems in our kind of society, reveals them 
as not remotely the creatures of bourgeois interest, but as 
suffused by middle-class values, interests and ideology. The 
autonomy of such education systems has two main sources. 
First, they enjoy the Western tradition of institutional 
competence. This means that they are strongly classified 
vis-ä-vis other elements in the administrative matrix. There 
are, of course, clear variations, French governments possessing 
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far greater central control over education than occurs in 
the U. S. A. or Great Britain. However, we do not find in any 
advanced capitalist society, the frankly blurred boundary 
between education and the state which, as we saw in our 
chapter on socialism, characterizes East European societies. 
Secondly, education systems in advanced capitalist 
society are in the main removed from the market economy. 
This leads to their being dominated, we shall argue, by an 
internal "administrative intelligentsia". The education 
systems of advanced capitalist society are above all the 
locus of the dominant activities of the middle classes: 
specialized human capital formation, and discursive intellectual 
consumerism. It is with the middle-class dominated occupational- 
structure, that education most obviously articulates. It is 
by a middle-class intellectual elite, not by a bourgeoisie, 
not by a gentry, that the world of school is shaped and 
directed. 
/ 
The Middle-Class Ascendancy in School 
When I-claim that education is a "middle-class world", 1 am 
not suggesting that it is dominated by teachers as a profession. 
I argued, in an earlier chapter, that medicine and law are 
dominated by their respective occupational groups, professional 
in the sense that they largely control the demand for, as well 
as the supply of, medical and legal production. Teachers are 
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noZ professionals. '1'ney nave only weak control either 
over the conditions of supply of educational production, 
or over its conditions of demand. The middle-class 
ascendancy in education is much looser than professional 
pre-eminence in the medical and legal sub-systems. The 
education system is "middle class" in the sense that the 
world of middle-class values and interests and the formal 
structure of cultural transmission are weakly framed. 
(36) 
This is to say that the preoccupations of the middle class -- 
high-status occupational specialization and discursive 
intellectual consumerism -- can and do enter the pedagogical 
1` 
relationship. Indeed they largely constitute it. By contrast, 
the bourgeois world, predicated, on profit-maximisation and 
the efficient use of resources, and the proletarian world, 
predicated itself on a strong frame between work and leisure, 
that is on a markedly instrumental, even painful view of 
learning, are both kept at a remarkable arm's length from 
schooling. 
Bourgeois pre-eminence in education would require a 
capitalistic mode of educational production. In a world where 
entrepreneurs produced education as a purchasable investment 
or consumer good, a capitalistic industry would emerge. 
It would be an entrepreneurial class which produced the 
good in question, and we may presume that the non-educational 
bourgeoisie would obtain greater discretion. in the definition 
Of output. The educational capitalists would be responsive 
to the demands of other capitalists for particular kinds of 
I IL Q 
knowledge and skill-formation. The education industry 
would be linked to other industry by market forces. There 
are, in fact, areas of skill-formation which can be 
characterized in this way, for example, schools of hair- 
dressing. In general, however, the educational economy is 
not of this kind. Hence the often-noted tendency of individual 
educational biographies to fit far from flushly with the 
occupational-structure. 
In fact, employers have had relatively little influence 
over the curricular life of schools, and have been forced 
-0 accp: iescE J-n a SyS Eßt : ": teere iývEý :; i ýý: t. "; ýLý. ': i'ýýý CEr't1- 
fication has been used as a proxy. for productivity. Peter 
Wiles has expressed discontent at what he takes to be the 
37) 
wanton extravagance of this situation. 
It was suggested in earlier chapters that in industrial 
capitalist society the occupational structure is the 
principal element in the general system of stratification. 
It was further argued that this involves an enormous 
sociological significance for human capital formation. 
Here it must be asserted that the divorce between education 
and the capitalist principles of market production not only 
secures the general pre-eminence of the middle classes in 
education, but also enhances their control of the occupational 
structure. Here i am taking "middle class" to mean both 
Bernstein's "old"middle class of professionals and senior 
bureaucrats and his "new" middle class of journalists, 
academics and so on. 
(38) 
Much of the liberal ideology of 
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education, especially the expansionist, optimistic 
attitude to education which has been so influential until 
recently, 
(39) 
has come from this latter segment of the 
middle classes. So also, has the modish Marxism which a 
minority of intellectuals have recently espoused. This is 
even more true of France than of Great Britain. In the 
United States a milder liberalism (understood here as 
implying a belief in the efficacy of state intervention) 
(40) 
has been the dominant mode of thinking of this middle-class 
segment. 
Both segments of the middle class have been influential 
in relation to the curriculum. It would be a rewarding 
empirical exercise, for example, to trace the influence of 
the high professions on the curricular life of higher 
secondary education. Both segments have been influential 
in determining the occupational orientation of schooling. 
The old middle class has brought the interests of the 
occupational structure to bear on school. 
(41) 
The new 
middle class has done this too, but has also brought the 
internal preoccupations of education to bear on the 
occupational structure. 
Much of the curricular life of modern education systems 
substantiates this view. In Great Britain, for example, the 
huge expansion of the study of literature, history, economics 
and sociology, exemplifies the intellectual world of the 
new middle classes. 
(42) 
Bourgeois hegemony might have 
been expected to have secured an overwhelming pre-eminence 
i 
for, at one level-, a curriculum likely to enhance 
productive capacity and innovation (for example, science 
and engineering) and, at a lo ,, wer level, for a curriculum 
predicated on basic literacy and numeracy skills. Neither 
of these developments has occurred. While employers 
fulminate about low levels of literacy and numeracy, 
middle-class graduates in literature and the social sciences 
have been able, through the production of certificates as 
claims to employment, to convert their intellectual 
consumerism into a subsequent investment. 
43) In this 
sense; the removal of the educational economy from market 11JV 1Vv J 
principles has vastly increased the general discretion of 
the middle classes. 
I am not arguing that one could create a one-to--one 
correspondence between curricular routes and subsequent 
occupations. As Psacharopoulos points out a "whole vector 
of educational qualifications corresponds to a single 
oc , aýoa clonal 
/+4) title". We pointed out in an earlier 
chapter that many "professional" functions have little to 
do with occupational training. A similar point is made by 
Psacharopoulos, who observes that many of the doctor's functions 
could be performed by paramedical personnel. 
(45) 
What I 
am arguing is that a bourgeois pre-eminence in education 
might at least have been expected to have tightened, to 
some extent, the connections between curriculum and work. 
There is no distinctive economics of the curriculum, though 
it can scarcely be doubted that different curricular and 
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and pedagogic philosophies are associated with different 
"production functions". 
(46) 
Considerations such as these 
converge in the proposition that the bourgeois business 
'preoccupation with cost-reduction and maximal efficiency 
have simply been absent, typically, from the world of 
school. It is significant that after two decades of the 
economics of education, for example, Psacharopoulos still 
has to assert that: "we must know more about the returns 
to education for particular fields within higher education. , 
(47) 
I would only add that the same is true for lower levels, too. 
We have mentioned the article by Musgrove in which he 
attempts to show that in Great Britain a gentry hegemony 
has bee miti to i r'e irc rte Ecu or ma -} erºe "48) His argument L1 LAL A/VVli LUCA 111 VC. A1 Liu 111 VtAl Výi.. ti L. lVVV L. " +b-i 
fails substantively, in that the only specifically gentry- 
inspired curriculum he refers to, is the scouting movement, 
which in any case lies outside the formal curriculum. 
(49) 
Musgrove claims rightly that bourgeois imperatives have not 
been secured. 
(50) 
He also argues, wrongly I maintain, that 
the middle classes, too, have been unable to generate an 
occupationally oriented curriculum. 
(51) In one sense this 
is merely incorrect. The curricular routes to medicine in 
Great Britain, for example, lie very evidently in relatively 
early curricular choices. 
(52) 
In another sense, Musgrove's 
argument is misconceived. Many middle-class groups do not 
want an occupationally specific curriculum. Their inclination 
is for discursive consumerism, a fascination for literature, 
history, the social sciences and art -- subjects which 
have 
1U "t 
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What has sustained this consumerism is the fact 
that the certification process renders it simultaneously 
an investment. 
(54) 
Very significant in the learning 
difficulties of many working-class children is the fact 
that they and their families do not share the discursive 
values of the middle classes. Were the market discipline 
more evident in school, we may take it that the middle 
classes would purchase less of the "consumption" subjects 
they find so enjoyable. In the working-class case, many 
unfortunate children are forced to endure a curriculum which 
their families would not purchase at all, had they the 
option. 
(55) 
This is an important element in truancy. It 
is perhaps the manifest irrelevance to many working-class 
. children of social studies, literature, French, and so on, 
which lies behind the reluctance of many secondary children 
to be at school. 
(56) 
Once again, it seems likely that 
bourgeois educational hegemony would have resulted in a 
different, more instrumental curriculum. 
In the British case, the popularity of sociology 
involves another consideration which runs counter to the 
thesis of bourgeois domination. In its Marxist version, 
sociology has generated attitudes generally hostile to 
capitalism. 
(57) 
it has always been mysterious to me that 
a capitalist "ruling class" should tolerate such activity. 
One might save the "bourgeois hegemony" thesis, in this case, 
by arguing that to contain radical thought in harmless 
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institutions such as universities, 
neutralize and "incorporate" it. 
is effectively to 
I prefer to observe the 
practices of dominant groups in Third World and socialist 
'societies, which is simply to squash, where they can, such 
hostile activity. That it is not squashed in advanced 
capitalist society suggests to me that there is no ruling 
class. It is true that a huge Marxist persuasion, both 
among the academic intelligentsia and among sections of 
organized labour, does not seem to be inconsistent with a 
successful capitalist economy. The French experience makes 
this clear. Such a persuasion either does not threaten the 
ruling class, or alternatively, encounters no such class to 
y, r. T. +-., fn, + +T sewn fnrmiiIai-i nn_ The reason most k, 
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societies, historically or actually, have not tolerated 
bodies of opinion hostile to the dominant class or stratum, 
is that most societies have possessed such a dominant group. 
The reason advanced liberal capitalist society is intellect- 
ually pluralistic, reflects not its "repressive tolerance" 
which contains and incorporates threats to the ruling class, 
but the fact that in such society there is no ruling class. 
In such society there remain vast distinctions of wealth, 
income, status and access to decisionmaking; but these 
involve multiple hierarchies which do not coalesce into one 
group possessing incontestable dominance over all others. 
Insofar as my thesis is Weberian, it has insisted on the 
co-existence of hierarchies (for example those of the 
"physi. cal capital order" and those of the "human capital order"). 
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Itlsuiaý" as the thesis is oz functionalist tendency, it has 
asserted the efficacy of consensus in the control structure 
of modern capitalism. The thesis has emphasized, in 
particular, the part played by human capital formation 
in the consensus itself. 
The middle classes, characterized by their enormous 
accumulation of human capital, sit, it will be admitted, 
at the very heart of the structure of decision-making. 
In the case of the professions they have achieved a massive 
pre-eminence. In the case of what Galbraith calls the 
"technostructure", they interconnect with other formidable 
groups. 
(58ý 
Here, highly qualified scientific and bureau- 
cratic personnel overlap with traditional ca_p. talists and 
with the representatives of organized labour. The latter, 
in particular, often involves, also, very considerable human 
capital formation. I am not, therefore, suggesting that 
human capital formation has ushered in a new ruling class. 
The hierarchy of human capital is a gradualist one, ranging 
from workers possessing relatively little human capital, 
say unskilled labourers, to those possessing a great deal, 
for example the professions, senior bureaucrats and the 
technostructure. What has happened is that groups rich in 
human capital formation have, through their pre-eminence 
in the occupational structure, both made that structure 
the main fulcrum of stratification, and prevented the 
bourgeoisie from constituting a ruling class. What is so 
striking about some areas of the modern capitalist economy 
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is the degree to which the middle classes have made them 
their own. We argued at length in our chapter on the 
professions that this is so of medicine and law. 
(59) 
'We have suggested earlier that, in a different way, this 
is also true of the educational sub-system. Indeed what 
needs to be articulated is the view that while writers 
like Giddens are wrong, even perverse, in claiming to find 
a ruling class in modern capitalist society, 
(60) 
nevertheless 
within the education system itself the middle classes have 
achieved an astonishing pre-Aminence off a kind? that f1_n s 
no analogue in the market economy. Let us now try to 
develop this latter view rather more formally. 
The strong classification between education and the 
wider economy of which it is a part, reflects, we have said, 
its general withdrawal from private finance, and its 
inclusion within public finance. Not the bourgeoisie but 
some of the senior decision-makers of the occupational 
structure have come to define for the world of school what 
its curriculum should be. What must be stressed is that the 
higher occupants of the occupational structure are the 
main element in the general structure of decision-making, 
and that significant elements of both lie within the education 
system itself. By this i mean that there are very 
influential jobs, giving their encumbents significant access 
to decision-making, within the education system itself. 
Now here we encounter a difficulty which precisely 
fortifies Bernstein' s notion of an "old` and a "new" 
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middle : class. 
(61 For insofar as a "technostructure" 
has replaced mere capitalists as the dominant decision- 
makers in the corporate sector of the economy, we might 
have expected the members of such a technostructure to 
favour a strictly instrumental curriculum as much or more 
than the bourgeoisie proper might. That such a curriculum 
has not emerged does indeed suggest some kind of fragment- 
ation in the middle classes. Bernstein seems to me neither 
to have shown precisely where the division lies, nor to 
have explained its genesis. However, his view that, there 
is such a division seems incontestable. 
What we may suggest is that there is a segment of the 
higher occupational structure which is very weakly framed 
vis-a-vis the education system. This segment is the "new" 
middle class. The "old" middle class, for example the 
professions and some elements in the technostructure, have 
fed directly instrumental influences into the curriculum. 
Mathematics, chemistry, physics, biology, botany are some 
of the obvious examples. These groups, however, are not 
such as to exemplify fully the autonomy of education. The 
group which do express most fully such an autonomy are the 
"new" middle class. Their curricular vehicles have been 
literature, history, the arts and the social sciences. 
Their contribution to the autonomy of education has been 
their ability to have the curricular tail wag the occupational 
;, dog. For this group, as well as massively dominating the 
occupational structure insofar as it lies within the 
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education system, have succeeded in defining their 
discursive educational interests and achievements as 
relevant also to areas of the occupational structure which 
I lies outside the education system. The principle in terms 
of which they have weakened the boundary between education 
and work is the principle of study for study's sake. This 
segment of the middle-class works hard at play and plays 
hard at work. 
In control terms, the new middle class have been very 
successful in, eakening the boundary (frame) between what 
may and may not enter the pedagogical relationship. The 
preoccupations of their non-educational world enter freely 
the world of school. So drastic, indeed, is the weakening of 
structural and control differentiation between the world of 
this middle-class segment and the structure of cultural 
transmission, that we may indeed propose that their worlds are 
one. For this middle-class segment, school, work and leisure 
are all weakly classified and weakly framed. The socio- 
economic anatomy of this segment is given by weak frames 
and weak classifications on the basis of discursive intellect- 
ual consumerism, organized as human capital formation. 
From this segment is derived the educational sub- 
government. From this segment is derived a fluid interplay 
between the education system and the occupational structure. 
We have said that its capital base is discursive consumerism 
Potentially or actually translated into human capital. 
Bernstein offers a different base for this "fraction" of 
the 
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middle class. In one essay he 
become "psychologized". 
(62) 
i 
suggests that property has 
In another, he argues that 
this class is constituted (unlike the "ruling class") in 
terms of its direct relation to control over the means of 
cultural reproduction. 
(63) 
It is not clear whether these two propositions are 
versions of the same proposition. What is clear is how much 
weaker are such versions of the basis of middle-classness 
than are the sociological derivations of human capital theory. 
In our chapter on social theory we argued that a great merit 
of drawing human capital theory into the analysis of social 
stratification is precisely that such theory seeks to explain 
the pattern of incomes. By any reckoning, income is a key 
socio-economic variable. The widening of the concept 
capital to include decisions about skill-formation, is a 
more cogent explanation of the position of the middle class 
than Bernstein's psychologized property or direct relationship 
to the means of cultural reproduction. Neither of these 
ideas translates into a manageable theory of differentially 
distributed incomes. While a sociology of "control" could 
be invoked to explain the various incomes of this fraction 
of the middle classes, 
(64) 
it is not clear how this could be 
incorporated into a predictive theory of incomes without the 
invocation of supply and demand mechanisms which in the 
event could explain these incomes independently, that is, 
would gain nothing from their being attached to the initial 
notions (of psychologized property or symbolic/ reproductive 
, ntrol) . 
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Bernstein is right that this new middle class is 
ambiguously located in the social structure and, intellect- 
ually, ambivalently oriented. 
(65) 
The economic principles 
of its intellectual life as this is constituted in the 
world of school, are consumption and career, the crucial 
significance of the latter often obscured by the ideological 
smokescreen which surrounds the former. The mainly middle- 
class consumers of educational experiences which others, 
non-beneficiaries, have financed, 
(66) 
justify their 
"regressive" curriculum, with appeals to the intrinsic ,,; crth 
of knowledge, the concept of the "educated man" and so on. 
I do not question the legitimacy of this philosophy as such. 
T do insist -It that here iti, is Bing put . I. o ideological purpose. 
In particular there is the massive insensitivity of education 
systems to general questions of scarcity, an insensitivity 
compounded by the ideological pall itself. 
(67) The 
educational economy is characterized by a profound attenuation 
of the deep code of the capitalist market-place. In particular, 
we repeat, the central notion "scarcity" is largely missing. 
Many of one's literary and sociological colleagues, for 
example, are resolutely hostile to any' application of cost 
benefit or cost-effectiveness analysis to the world of 
school. These techniques, which are founded on the recognition 
Of scarcity, are essential if non-market production such as 
that of the education system is to be conducted efficiently. 
(68) 
If efficiency is not secured the system remains parasitic 
', On those areas of production which are efficient. I am not 
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arguing that there has been no concern foriefficiency 
in the education systems of advanced capitalist society. 
(69) 
Nor am I denying that many economic impulses and imperatives 
from other parts of the economy constantly feed into 
(70) 
education. I am merely stressing that the educational 
economy and the market economy are generally strongly 
classified. What we must do in the remaining pages of this 
chapter is to pull together the strands of this argument 
and attempt to draw out some further implications. 
Now let ý reg -1-er. -A. to some points we have made repeatedly 
before. The structure of social control (or synonymously, 
the structure of decision-making) is misconceived when it is 
terfaed a "power-structure Much social control in advanced 
capitalist society is consensual, and social action comprises 
many voluntarist (non-coerced) decisions, which can be 
termed "power" only in a Parsonian sense, where "power" is 
not a zero-sum game. 
(71) 
If society were purely a coercive 
or manipulative power-structure (no society ever is) then 
education would not be "autonomous". On the contrary, it 
would be thoroughly "dependent" . 
Secondly, writers like Althusser are wrong to speak of 
the "capitalist" education system. 
(72) I contend that an 
adequate socio-economy of education systems in advanced 
capitalist society cannot even begin until we recognize, 
precisely, that they are not capitalist. One way of presenting 
the difference between the educational economy and the market 
economy is to say that the former is socialist or 
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nnproto-socialist". How can we characterize the education 
systems of our sort of society? I will suggest here that 
we need do much more than merely examine the form of tenure. 
'We need to examine also the organizing principles. 
In an earlier chapter, we argued that while it is not 
possible to offer a finally satisfactory definition of 
"socialism", that we may nevertheless reasonably describe 
a society where the bulk of the physical capital is owned 
by the state, as socialist. This raises the extremely 
interesting question: - ow shall we characterize the public 
sectors of predominantly capitalist economies? Education 
systems, for example, are mainly in the public sector. 
now useful is the appellation 'sociaiist" for state education? 
In an article published in 1977,1 did indeed suggest 
that the state education systems of advanced capitalist 
society may be thought of as socialist. 
(73) 
I would now wish 
to make a partial retraction, and offer the term "proto- 
socialist" as a description of such education systems. The 
issue relates to our earlier discussion of the capitalist 
state, where we suggested that, however understandable the 
fears of Hayek or Friedman, 
(74) 
the state in capitalist 
society is basically unlike the socialist state. The 
capitalist state is strongly classified in relation to other 
socio-economic activity, whereas the socialist state is weakly 
classified vis-a-vis the rest of society. 
Education systems in capitalist society are in some ways 
similar to a general socialism, in other ways different. 
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Similarities : 
i 
The governing principles of the educational economy 
are administrative rather than market, principles. The 
market is not the governing principle of resource 
allocation. The "market code" does penetrate the 
system, but in a weakened form. The outstanding 
version is the economic calculus as to career choices 
which Gordon and Williams have shown to be common in 
secondary schools. 
(75) 
2. The education systems of capitalism, like socialist 
society in general, are not a sensitive vehicle for 
the expression of economic preferences, 
Tike the ý`i' c ^1 
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wage, of which they are a notable part, they compulsorily 
confine their populations, many of the pupils involved 
having little curricular or other initiative. 
(76) 
3. For many of their children, education systems under 
capitalism are coercive. The children involved would 
other-wise not be there. 
(77) 
This is similar to the 
huge reliance on coercion characteristic of socialism. 
Shortly we shall attempt to establish the connection 
between this coercion and the problem of human capital 
formation. 
Differences 
1" The education systems of advanced capitalist society, 
though part of the administrative matrix, are strongly 
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classified in relation to the state. To'put it more 
precisely, we may say that the education system of 
capitalist society, though it is a part of the 
1 administrative matrix, is strongly classified in 
relation to other parts. This reflects the tradition 
of competence and autonomy in relation to individuals 
and institutions which we earlier argued are an 
essential part of the general consensus in such societies. 
The education systems of capitalist society are strongly 
classified vis-a-vis the general economy. This 
distinguishes them from socialist education systems, 
which despite their proto-capitalist character are 
nevertheless more continuous with the general societies 
of which they are a part. 
Thus the education systems of liberal capitalismi are both 
imilar to, and different from a generally socialist society. 
t is difficult to know, for example, whether the education 
ystems of capitalist society are more or less deeply 
onsensual than those of socialist society. As we saw in our 
hapter on socialism, when a structure of social control is 
. ighly coercive, it is difficult to find an index of internal- 
zed approval. However, it may reasonably be assumed of 
, 0th kinds of education system that they express in considerable 
. egree the values of the general consensus. Children should 
le polite, well-behaved, respectful to grown-ups and so on. 
Neither would it be sensible to argue that the exposure 
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of children for 15,000 hours or more is not associated 
with considerable internalization of the values of this 
general consensus. 
(78) 
What I will suggest, however, is 
that Bernstein is absolutely right that the discipline in 
many of our schools is highly precarious. 
(79) 
I have argued 
that education is presided over by an administrative 
intelligentsia; that the principles of the capitalist 
economy obtain in education only in reduced form; that the 
system is for many children more coercive than the wider 
society and economy; and that the education system is a 
middle-class world highly insulated from bourgeois production 
and the world of the working class. I have also suggested 
that the problems of educability and human capital formation 
are intimately connected. What I now add are the related 
charges that the education systems of advanced capitalism 
are a source both of working-class educational failure and 
of the massive, systematic exploitation of the working class, 
not because such systems are capitalist, but precisely 
because they are not. The working class are exploited in 
advanced capitalist society. This is not, however, via 
the wage-mechanism. The notion that this is how exploitation 
occurs depends on the now long-exploded Marxist theory of 
value. Exploitation in fact depends on fiscal mechanisms, 
on the shifting of resources from the private to the public 
sector in favour of minority interests. I speak as a 
beneficiary of this massive inequity. I like literature, 
history, sociology, the theatre. I recognize, however, that 
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those who do like them are massively subs? dized by those 
who do not. It is not in the relationships of production 
that exploitation exists; but in the relations of 
expenditure. Working-class incomes are taxed to create 
what is for many working-class children an incomprehensible, 
dysfunctional and coercive experience. While many middle- 
class children have engaged in a veritable orgy of 
educational consumption (for example, the massive expansion 
of the study of sociology) the working classes are subjected 
to compulsory detention in an institution cover which they 
have almost no control with regard to its curriculum or its 
pedagogic methods. 
tie Bri is case we may illustrate all this by a 
consideration of the 1972 ROSLA (Raising of the School 
Leaving-Age). Like its predecessor of 1947, this massive 
administrative change, involving huge direct and indirect 
costs, seems in no sense to have been the outcome of a 
bourgeois initiative. 
(80 ) 
Neither does it seem to have been 
subjected to a cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness analysis. 
This perfectly exemplifies the contention that the efficiency 
principles of capitalism are largely absent from school. 
Indeed the education system has been suffused in the last 
twenty years with a kind of pseudo-economic logic, pushed 
out by its administrative intelligentsia. The central ideas 
of this pseudo-logic have been bigger schools and smaller 
classes. Though I shall not pursue the matter I would argue 
that the opposite slogan is more appropriate: smaller schools 
"ý 
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and bigger classes. 
The 1972 ROSLA demonstrates perfectly the semi-coercive 
world of school, dominated by a small administrative elite, 
'able to impose such ideologically inspired changes in face 
of indifference by many sections of the community and strong 
hostility by some. 
(81) 
The public sectoral nature of education in the mixed 
economies is a main source of the "consumption ideology" 
of knowledge as I would term it. Behind the philosophical 
justification (intrinsi. c value) is a massive consumerism. 
The secular trend towards educational consumption is 
fortified by its principal beneficiaries' being able to 
off-load much of the costs, onto other people. 
The way in which the finance of education benefits the 
middle classes is clearly shown by Psacharopoulos. 
(82) 
He points out that subsidization of education' always leads 
to higher private returns to education than is the case 
for social returns (a result about which he declares himself 
"very confident"). He gives the following figures which 
in the case of higher education show a massive discrepancy 
in favour of the private figure: 
Furthermore the effect is inter-generational. For Psacharo- 
Poulos quotes Hill and Stafford as showing that where social 
background appears to be a determinant of the occupational 
Table redacted due to third party and copyright issues
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and educational achievement of individuals, and hence 
their earnings, it is actually the education of their parents 
which is at work. 
(83) 
Education begets education in a 
'repetitive middle-class chain. 
Blaug has noted that many people in Great Britain who 
could finance their children's education do not do so. 
(84) 
The reality is a transfer of resources from those who do 
not go to college in favour of those who do. Psacharopoulos, 
also, argues that poorer families effectively finance the 
education of richer 1i 
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who send their children to college. 
(85) 
All this is justified 
in Great Britain by that quintessential Fabian and public 
sectoral ideological concept: the "-social wage nn . 
Behind much of the social wage lies a model of man as 
incompetent. This is not contradictory. While liberal 
capitalism has involved a widespread assumption about competence 
in some areas, it is also the case that the individual 
(especially some working-class individuals) is regarded as 
in some respects incompetent. The division between areas 
of life where people are regarded as competent or incompetent 
is largely arbitrary. The individual is trusted to buy his 
own food and clothes and consumer durables; not trusted to 
attend to his own children's schooling, nor in some countries, 
e. g. Great Britain, to attend to his or his children's health 
care. There is no basis for these distinctions in economic 
logic. School is not economically distinguishable from food. 
Indeed neither is an economic good: both are economic 
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categori(86) es. Qua category, food is the more important. 
What one buys or has administered to one, however, are goods 
not "food" or "school" but chocolate or a mathematics lesson. 
For reasons which I believe are historically obscure our 
societies have come generally to administer educational 
goods but to allow people their head in the purchase of 
foodstuffs. In the one case incompetence is assumed, in 
the other competence. 
There is some overlap, of course, e. g. heavily subsidized 
schon I lunches in many capitalist societies. The rationale 
behind this subsidization is perhaps the recognition of a 
malnutrition of composition in the home lives of some 
children, that is, people eating not insufficient food, 
but the wrong food. And indeed it takes no more than a 
trip to a supermarket to observe that some people buy very 
ill-advisedly. 
For those who fear that the hypertrophy of the state is 
a mortal danger to liberty, all this needs careful thought. 
What counts as needy or incompetent and what is the incidence 
of these conditions? While welfare analysis can effortlessly 
demonstrate a case for some subsidy, since the individual 
cannot collect from society all the benefit he creates by 
being educated, it is also clear that a subsidized system 
transfers resources from some individuals to others. In 
the case of education, for example, the transfer of resources 
is from those who do not have children to those who do, and 
more importantly for this thesis, from those who do not do 
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well at school and leave early, to those who succeed in 
school and leave late. 
The imperatives both of freedom and economic rationality 
suggest, I submit, that these issues should be carefully 
researched. I would not dissent from Peter Wiles' view 
that the extension of what he calls "state capitalism" has 
also been accompanied by the extension of some liberties. 
(87) 
But there are clearly huge dangers in the progressive removal 
of economic life from market regulation, especially in 
conjunction with the presence of ideologies hostile to 
freedom. 
The question is: what if the proportion of the population 
capable of managing their lives in a market economy is 
greater than we have assumed, perhaps the overwhelming majority 
of the citizens? The consensus is overwhelming that school 
should be compulsory. It does not in any way follow that 
it should also be proto-socialist. The law requires that we 
insure our motor-cars. This, however, is done through the 
capitalist insurance market. 
What is quite clear is that the marketization of education 
would produce a different structure of (school-based) cultural 
transmission. People prefer capitalism to socialism (cars 
to buses and trains) in the matter of transport. They might 
also do so in the case of school. More importantly, this 
question has massive implications for the central problem 
of educability. This question is intimately linked to the 
problem of human capital formation. I would propose that in 
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a free society (the outcomes in an unfree society are quite 
different) that nationalization of education simultaneously 
and relatedly, impairs the efficiency of its prime-function 
of human capital formation and diminishes the educability 
of large numbers of boys and girls. 
(88) 
Now let it be quite clear that I am not denying that 
there are gains from proto-socialism. London may without 
exaggeration be termed a "proto-socialist" city. Such is 
the basis of its status as the cultural capital of the world. 
, 'hat must also be admitted, however, is that Londons 
marvellous theatres, concert halls, art galleries and museums, 
also represent a massive transfer of resources from the 
majority who have little interest in them to the minority 
(and however large it is a minority) who do have an interest. 
In the case of proto-socialist education similar 
considerations apply. The composition of intellectual 
inquiry is different from what a capitalist education system 
would generate. So is the composition of intellectual 
production. We have more pure science and less applied than 
a capitalist educational economy would secure, more discursive 
intellectual activity and less instrumental activity than 
capitalist education would generate. Our proto-socialist 
education advances our understanding of our history, our 
neuroses and the social construction of our knowledge. It 
perhaps impedes those technological innovations which might 
help the economy to break through to higher levels of 
;, 
productivity and efficiency. There are also good grounds 
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for thinking that a more capitalist ambience for education 
would be more egalitarian than our present arrangements, 
both in terms of requiring people to pay for what they 
choose to study, and in making available to many working- 
class children a much more obviously useful and instrumental 
curriculum . 
(89) 
Most citizens, and this must include the , 
working-class majority, manage life in the general capitalist 
economy quite well. They handle money and bank accounts, 
buy houses and cars, do not get into debt. This is good 
prima facie evidence that they successfully inter alize the 
principles of the market code. 
In school, however, the possession of the market code 
is not enough. Contrary to the received wisdom about 
middle-class "deferred gratification" it may be claimed that 
it is the immediacy of the emphasis on intellectual discursive- 
ness as what counts which deters the potentially ambitious 
working-class child. Like the bourgeois or the old middle 
class, the proletarian, especially the skilled proletarian, 
has a wide time-horizon. The future for him is not strongly 
framed from the present. Its preoccupations may enter, do 
enter, the present process of decision-making. 
In the case of the new middle classes their cultural 
ideology is present oriented on the surface. Future and 
present are apparently strongly framed. The sordid notions 
of a future oriented calculus must not be allowed to profane 
the unfettered examination of the life-world. Behind, of 
course, lie a weakly framed present and future. This, 
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however, is not readily apparent to the working-class 
child. He does not possess the cultural pre-disposition 
which would both help him manage in a discursive intellect- 
ual ambience and facilitate his apprehension of the invest- 
ment orientation which lies behind the intellectual 
consumerism. As Bynner has shown, the parents of working- 
class children are, initially, typically ambitious for them. 
(90) 
This ambition is progressively eroded in school as working- 
class children find their educability, and thus their 
potential for engaging in educational human capital formation, 
increasingly impaired. For a decade or more, sociologists 
have been inclined to explain working-class failure at school 
in terms of the capitalist-like nature of education systems. 
It seems to me much more probable that it is the non-capitalist 
nature of the educational economy which is the root of the 
problem. 
We may summarize and conclude our extremely tentative 
remarks here by applying to the educational economy itself, 
the tri-partite model of social control which we have 
employed throughout. Compared to the market economy the 
educational economy has a relatively weak consensus. This 
is because it involves its detainees in a much less thorough 
and ubiquitous pattern of economic decision-making than does 
the market economy, whose denizens are, in any case, much 
less properly to be termed detainees. Many working-class 
children, since they do not understand the principles of 
the educational economy, do not internalize them, and are 
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on the conduct of their lives in school. By contrast, the 
accordingly subjected to highly coercive external frames 
pattern of their economic decision-making outside school 
' is much more voluntarist. They conduct their trips to 
football matches, pop concerts and sweet shops just as they 
manage their paper-rounds and part-time jobs, in the spirit 
of the deeply internalized rule-system of the capitalist 
economy, the market-code. In these cases, their actions 
are regulated by internalized frames. The seething 
unhappiness and alienation, the indisciiýline and truancy o 
many urban secondary schools are a function, not of the 
likeness of capitalist school to the market economy but of 
the strident distinctiveness of the proto-socialist school 
world. 
The difference between the two economies is just as 
striking in terms of their structures of hierarchy. The 
cultural differentiation of the general population, which, 
however, is only one dimension of social stratification in 
the market economy, is the main principle of stratification 
in the world of school. What Bernstein calls the message- 
and evaluation(y91) systems of school -- its curriculum, pedagogy 
are embedded in a discursive intellectual consumerism -- 
a view of knowledge quite alien to the generally instrumental 
notions of work which the working classes internalize from 
their situation in the market economy. 
Finally, the administrative matrix of education is a 
remote and unresponsive body which merges, as we argued is 
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also the case in all corporatist societies, with the 
structure of hierarchy, into` a power-grouping which excludes 
and coerces the working-class majority. The well-intentioned 
attempts (and I would not for an instant represent them 
as insidious) of the middle-class educational elite to 
enlighten the masses are doomed to failure, for they involve 
a view of knowledge, learning and work which are simply 
alien to the working-class mind. 
I 
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tension between, and complementarity of, the different 
parts, have great secular explanatory potential. Where 
the el n...,. is the l vaaa x.. 11 Vor! 
in hmix 
are uneven, to intellectual 
dalliance is soon exhausted. This, I believe, has been 
the fate of Marxian phenomenology. 
24. Aithusser, L. ('Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" 
in Cosin, B. (ed. ) Education, Structure and Society, 
Penguin 1972, pp. 242-280. 
25. Bowles, S. and Gintis, H. Schooling in Capitalist America, 
Routeldge and Kegan Paul 1976. 
26. For a more detailed summary see O'Keeffe, D. J. "Profit 
and Control: the Bowles and Gintis Thesis" in Journal 
of Curriculum Studies, 1978, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 251-61. 
27. Bowles and Gintis, op. cit. pp. 201-223. 
28. Sharp, R. and Green, A. Education and Social Control, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul 1975. 
29. Willis, P. Learning to Labour, Saxon House 1977. 
30. The Bowles and Gintis book is guilty of all these faults. 
That such work is so prominent is a sad commentary of the 
current state of the subject. See v^'Keeffe, "Profit and 
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31. 
32. 
Control". See also Clarence Karier's hysterical essay, 
"Testing for Order and Control in the Liberal Corporate 
State" in Dale, Esland and Macdonald, Schooling and 
Capitalism, pp. 128-141. Here Karier attempts to 
represent early twentieth-century American educational 
administration as a proto-Nazism in its psychometric 
procedures. At a public lecture during an Open University 
conference in 1976, I heard Karier deliver himself of 
the view that the United States is a "fascist" society. 
As a historian he should know that totalitarian regimes 
do not allow citizens hostile to the system to hold 
prestigious appointments, nor to travel freely, nor to 
attack the regime at home or abroad. There is-only one 
word for such posturing: contemptible. 
Bourdieu, P. and Passeron, J. C. Reproduction in Education 
Society and Culture, Sage 1977. For example, we learn 
on p. 58: -"The education system tends to equip the agents 
appointed to inculcate with a standard training and 
standardising instruments. " This particular book is 
laid out in the form of pseudo-geometric propositions, 
and is written in a ferociously impenetrable jargon. 
The extract above, it will be seen, is nothing other 
than a heavy and clumsy way of saying that teacher- 
training tends to be standardized. 
Ibid. p. 30. "Cultural capital" means "cultural goods". 
iThis, however, is merely to replace one economic term 
(capital) by another (goods) without specifying why the 
495. 
economic terminology is being used. 
33. Ibid. p. 4. It is incoherent to say that one phenomenon 
depends on another but is autonomous in adding to. 
that other. Insofar as X is independent of Y it does 
not depend on Y. 
34. This is merely standard French practice. Such looseness 
of language makes sociology very uncertain. 
35. Bourdieu and Passeron, op. cit. pp. 9-10. These writers 
address social control exclusively in terms of the 
exercise of overt and covert power. This has two grave 
demerits. First, it ignores the role which consensus 
must always have in social control. Secondly, it 
exaggerates the role of symbolic imposition in societies 
which do rely very heavily on coercion. In many societies, 
I would argue, though the power has been imposed, the 
principles of the symbolic accompaniment have often 
not been acceded to by those disbenefited. It is the 
Red Army, not the principles of institutionalized Marxism, 
which secures the power-structures of Eastern Europe. 
It was force majeur, not symbolic imposition, which 
subjected the medieval peasantry to droit de seigneur. 
It is also, quite evidently, main force which keeps 
intact the structure of apartheid in South Africa. 
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36. 
A 
. 
Strictly speaking one could also write here of the 
degree of classification between the education system 
and different elements in the system of social 
stratification. We could say that the structural 
differentiation between the educational system and 
both the bourgeoisie and the working class are strong, 
whereas education and the middle-class life-world are 
weakly differentiated. This is the sort of usage 
Bernstein employs when he speaks of the strong classi- 
fication between "education" and "production". 
Though in the form in which Bernstein presents this 
dichotomy. op. cit. chapter 8, the distinction is 
invalid, implying as it does that education is not 
production, it could be rescued by the addition of the 
epithet "capitalist" to the latter term. The fact that 
one can speak here ofv+eak classification between middle- 
class school and the middle class as such, or of weak 
framing between the two, suggests a certain ambiguity 
at some levels of analysis between the concepts 
classification and frame. Indeed I believe that the 
Durkheimian (control) elements in Bernstein's analysis 
are much more convincingly managed than his Marxian 
(structural-power) elements. There is no convincing 
explanation in Bernstein's work of what he means 
by "power" and I incline to the view that it is 
advisable to regard "structure" as the derivative, or 
crystallization of the principles of "control". Such 
4 
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is implied in my concept "the structure of social 
control". 
37. Wiles, P. "The Correlation between Education and 
Earnings: The External-Test-Not-Content Hypotheses 
(ETNC)" in Higher Education, vol. 3, no. 1,1974, 
pp. 43-57. 
38. Bernstein, op. cit. chapters 6 and 8. 
39. O'Keeffe, D. J. "Capitalism and Correspondence: A 
dritique of Marxist analyses of education" in Higher 
Educatio fl-y4-w- vol. 12, no. 1, Autumn 9 9, pp. 
40-54. 
40. Friedman, M. Capitalism and Freedom, University of 
Chicago Press'i 1962 , pp. 5-6. Friedman here resents, 
and justifiably it seems to me, the appropriation in 
the United States, of the term "liberal" by those 
who seek, not the attenuation of the state, its dedi- 
cation to certain clearly specified minima of govern- 
ment, but its indefinite expansion in the interest of 
this or that virtuous cause., Though I have earlier 
suggested that the sociological accompaniment to 
Friedman's brilliant economic theorizing is somewhat 
crude and misconceptualized, I thoroughly endorse his 
view that the hypertrophy of the state is the enemy of 
free men. 
41. O'Keeffe, "Capitalism and Correspondence", p. 46. 
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A 
42. O'Keeffe, D. J. "Towards a Socio-Economy of the 
Curr"iculum" in Journal of Curriculum Studies, 1977, 
vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 97-109. 
1 43. Ibid. pp. 103-4. 
44. Psacharopoulos, Education and Work, p. 58. 
45. Ibid, p. 58. 
46. O'Keeffe, "Towards a Socio-Economy of the Curriculum", 
P. 101. 
47. Psacharopoulos, Education and Work, p. 58. 
48. M usgrc rc , ººOurriculuru Culture and Ideology" , pp . ßa9_ i1l. 
49. Ibid. P-107. 
50. Ibid. p. 104. Musgrove here claims that the movement 
Known as ýýnamismýi attempted but failed to create a 
bourgeois curriculum in late sixteenth-century 
England. What makes one reluctant to investigate 
this obscure historical claim, is Musgrove's view that 
this failure took place "at the very point of capitalism's 
economic and social take-off". The man who believes 
Tudor England had arrived at, any such juncture will 
believe anything as far as I am concerned. The 
emergence of a "bourgeois" curriculum requires, one may 
reasonably assume, the existence of a bourgeoisie. 
Sixteenth-century England did not have one. The author, 
however, goes on to maintain that the nineteenth- 
century Taunton and Clarendon Commissions were of 
gentry-aristocratic cultural provenance, and in this 
regard consistent with the twentieth-century reports of 
499. 
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51 
52. 
53. 
Hadow, Norwood and Spens. 
i 
Unfortunately Professor 
Musgrove does not here afford us the kind of textual 
reference which would allow us to sort out the 
argumentum ad hominem ("The point about Clarendon and 
Taunton is that they were aristocrats") from real 
evidence that the tradition of educational reports 
and commissions in this country constitutes an 
aristocratic-gentry ambience for educational decision- 
making. 
Ibid. U. 105. 
In such cases one might conclude that middle-class 
elements are very much at work in the determination 
of the curriculum. To become a doctor, engineer or 
scientist, in this country, ordinarily involves rather 
early choices of curricular combinations, e. g. sciences 
from the age of thirteen. One should be wary of 
drawing mechnistic assumptions, however, for in the 
United States such curricular choices are much delayed. 
This variation fortifies the view that there is a 
partial indeterminacy between the system-parts of an 
advanced capitalist economy. 
Thus I simply disagree with Musgrove that the middle 
class "have always wanted a vocational curriculum". 
Ibid. p. 105. I think it is precisely the middle class 
who are interested in Shakespeare and Racine, 
Beethoven and Picasso, and who want their children 
to study them. Since when did the gentry have much 
interest in such a culture? 
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54. O'Keeffe, Towards a Socio-Economy of the Curriculum", 
pp. 103-4. O'Keeffe, "Capitalism and Correspondence", 
pp. 47-50. 
55. O'Keeffe, "Capitalism and Correspondence", pp. 50-52. 
Obviously we should be careful here. The high rate 
of upward social mobility in modern capitalist 
societies implies that many working-class children 
do succeed in school. School is one of the avenues 
of such upward mobility. It is also a commonplace 
that the children of skilled working-class parents 
do better than those of unskilled. There is thus an 
inter-generational effect of human capital formation 
on educability in the case of skilled working-class 
families as well as middle-class families. What may 
be tentatively suggested is that the working class in 
general have a highly instrumental approach to schooling 
and that the discursive attitude to education, viewed 
as a world to be explored for the intrinsic satisfactions 
it affords, an attitude typical especially of the new 
middle classes, is a considerable obstacle to many 
working-class children. 
56. O'Kee±fe, "Capitalism and Correspondence", pp. 50-51. 
57. Ibid. p. 47. 
58. Galbraith, J. K. The New Industrial State, Deutsch 1972, 
P-71. 
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What we should not lose sight of, especially in the 
case of Great Britain, is the astonishing size of the 
public sector. Even if there were a ruling class, 
based on the private ownership of capital, its rule 
could be only indirect in relation to this huge 
public sector. Most of this public sector is strongly 
classified from the market economy, and is dominated 
by bureaucratic and managerial elites, dominated that 
is-to say, by the middle classes. 
60. Gidders, ice. "An anatomy of the British ruling class" in 
New Society, 4 October 1979, pp. 8-10. 
61. Bernstein, op. cit. chapters 6 and 8, especially pp. 125-9. 
62. Ibid. P-97 and p. 126. 
63. Ibid. p. 127. 
64.1 mean by this the kind of "power relations" explanation 
of income which we discussed in the chapter on Marxism. 
65. Bernstein, op. cit. p. 126. This new middle class, says 
Bernstein, "are caught in a contradiction. _A deep- 
rooted ambivalence is the ambience of this group. On 
the one hand they stand for variety against inflexi- 
bility, expression against repression, the inter- 
personal against the inter-positional; on the other 
hand, there is the grim obduracy of the division of 
labour and of the narrow pathways to its positions 
of power and prestige. " 
66. Psacharopoulos, Education and Work, p. 43. 
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67. Characteristic of the finance of much public sectoral 
activity is a wild oscillation between prodigality 
and retrenchment purely in terms of directives from 
A the exchequer. The continuous monitoring for 
efficiency characteristic of private business is simply 
missing. See O'Keeffe, "Capitalism and Correspondence", 
p. 45. 
68. There is, we may note, nothing salutary about waste 
in. itself. For the case for using these techniques 
in the economic analysis of education, see Blaug, 
An Introduction to the Economics of Education, pp. 
pp. 120-136. 
69. Davies, B. Social Control and Education, Methuen 1976, 
pp. 68-76. 
70. There is clearly a widely understood calculus of the 
costs and benefits of curricular' decisions among 
older secondary schoolchildren, for example. See 
Gordon, A. and Williams, G. Attitudes of Fifth and 
Sixth Formers to School, Work and Higher Education, 
Institute for Research and Development in Post- 
Compulsory Education, pp. 96-112. 
71. Parsons, T. "On the Concept of Political Power" in 
Bendix, R. and Lipset, S. M. (eds. ) Class, Status and 
Power, Routledge and Kegan Paul 1970, pp. 240-265. 
72. Aithusser in Cosin, op. cit. Education, Structure and 
Society, p. 245. 
Z; 03 
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t: 11G, iowal ds a Socio-Economy of the Curriculum'! 
, 
'p. 108. Here I argued that the education system of 
advanced capitalist society is "socialist". I now 
prefer "proto-socialist" for reasons I hope will emerge. 
74. Hayek von, F. The Road to Serfdom, The University of 
Chicago Press 1944. ' Friedman, M. Capitalism and 
Freedom, The University of Chicago Press 1962, 
especially chapter 2, "The Role of Government in a 
Free Society". 
75. Gordon and Williams, op. cit. 
76. O'Keeffe, "Capitalism and Correspondence", pp. 50-52. 
77. Ibid. pp. 50-52. 
78. Rutter, M. et al, fifteen Thousand unurs : Secondary 
Schools and their Effects on Children, Open Books 1979. 
79. Bernstein, op. cit. p. 188. 
80. In the case of the 1947 ROSL"A the attitude of the 
bourgeoisie varied between rather mild hostility and 
general indifference. See O'Keeffe, D. J. "Some 
Economic Aspects of Raising the School Leaving-Age 
in England and Wales in 1947" in The Economic History 
Review, Second Series, Vol. XXVIII, no. 3, August 
1975, PP"511-513. 
81.1 am speaking anecdotally. 
research was undertaken. 
So far as I know, no proper 
However I was teaching in a 
secondary school at the time, and very few of the 
people affected by ROSLA seemed to be in favour. 
,. 
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-ft 82. Psacharopoulos, Education and Work, p. 33. 
83. Ibid, p. 40. 
84. Blaug, An Introduction to the Economics of Education, 
p. 296. I 
85. Psacharopoulos, Education and Work, p. 43. The research 
referred to here was undertaken in California. 
86.1 note this only to underline the fact that the state 
intervenes in the less rather than the more fundamental 
case. The oddities we take for granted are truly 
strange. The historical reasons for this selectivity 
in intervention are immensely complex. It seems to 
me, however, that an adequate account would involve 
the following argument as a central thread: in the 
nineteenth century a "crude socialization" was an 
indispensable function of education, given a turbulent 
(because only recently formed) proletariat. Though 
the issue could not be addressed in the language of 
modern welfare economics, there was a problem of 
externalities. The market could not have generated 
either adequate supply of, or demand for, educational 
production. Thus the state intervened. In the 
succeeding period, however, skill-formation has ousted 
crude socialization as the prime function of education. 
The social organization of contemporary nationalized 
education systems, however, results in considerable 
learning difficulties for many working-class children. 
505. 
As we shall argue below, a more capitalist 
educational economy might well enhance working- 
class educability. 
87. Wiles, P. J. D. Economic Institutions Compared, Blackwell 
1977, p. 468. 
88. Thus I am suggesting that the phenomenological view of 
educability as a socio-historical construct does 
indeed possess great merit. I hasten to add that I 
do not believe that educability is entirely socially 
constructed. I have no patience with sociclogistic 
arguments or indeed any kind of reductionism. The 
originality (if such it is) of my version of the 
systematic attenuation os working-class educability 
through the social organization of school knowledge 
is that while Marxian phenomenology has insisted that 
it is the general correspondence between school and 
the wider economy and society which impairs working- 
class achievement, I am arguing that the problem lies 
in the discontinuity (the strong classification and 
framing) between the educational and market economies. 
I think that the working classes handle the market 
economy rather well. 
89. O'Keeffe, "Capitalism and Correspondence", pp. 50-51. 
90. Bynner, J. "Deprived Parents" in New Society, 
21 February 1974, pp. 448-9. 
91. Bernstein, op. cit. chapter 5. 
I 
i 
506. 
A. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
AARONOVITCHs S. The Ruling Class, Lawrence & Maishart 1961 
Abercrombie, N. and Turner, B. S. "The Dominant Ideology 
Acton, H, R, The Illusion oft hen Epoch: TRürvi _r ..:. ... v a1ý111 LL1 Jlll 
as a Philosophical Creed, Routledge and Kegan 
Paul 1955. 
Alth ssei , L,. 'Iüeulogy and Ideological State Apparatuses" 
in Cosin, B. (ed. ) Education, Structure and 
Society, Harmondsworth 1972. 
Althusser, L. For Marx, Allen Lane 1979. 
Anderson, P. Lineages of the Absolutist State, N. L. B. 1974. 
Andreski, S. Social Sciences as Sorcery, Andre Deutsch 1972. 
Arendt, H. The Origins of Totalitarianism, George Allen 
and L'nwin 1958. 
Aron, R. Main Currents in sociological Thought, Penguin 
1969,2 volumes. 
Aron, R. "Interpreting Pareto" in Encounter, November 
1976. 
Aron, R. Opium of the Intellectuals, Greenwood 1977. 
Aron, R. "My Defence of Our Decadent Europe" in Encounter, 
September and October, 1977. 
Is 
507. 
A -- B. 
Ashton, T. S. The Industrial Revolution, Oxford University 
Press 1962. 
Ashworth, W. An Economic History of England, 1870 - 19 
BAECHLER., J. The Origins of Capitalism, Blackwell 1975. 
Bantock, G. Culture, Industrialization and Education, 
Rou. tledge and Kegan Paul 1968. 
Baran, P. and Sweezey, P. Monopoly ca iLai, Pelican 19vv. 
Bauer, P. "The Irrelevance of Class" in Spectator, 
12th November 1977, pp. 11-13. 
Bauman, Z. "Officialdom and Class: Bases of Inequality 
in Socialist Society" in Parkin, F. (ed. ) 
The Social Analysis of Class Structure, Tavistcckk 
1974, pp. 129-148. 
Becker, G. S. Human Capital, National Bureau of Economic 
Research 1965. 
Becker, H. S. Sociological Work, Allen Lane 1971. 
Beresford, "The Common informer, the Penal Statutes and 
Economic Regulation" in The Economic History Review, 
cc, 
2 and 3 ýý, .. ý"1º 195 i-S, Second Series, Vol. 
r+ 
pp. 221-238. 
Berlin, I. Karl Marx, Oxford University Press, 1 ý9. 
Bernard, P. and Renaud, J. "'Contre-mobilite et e. 
ffets 
res: une reflexion sur la transmission 
des diffe11 A 
biens inclusifs et des biens exclusif_, " in 
Sociologie et Societes, Falz 1.976. 
508. 
a 
Bernstein, B. Class Codes and Control, Routledge and 
Kegan Paul 1977, vol. 3. 
B. 
Blaug, M. Economic Theory in Retrospect, Heinemann 1968. 
I 
Blaug, M. An Introduction to the Economics of Education, 
Allen Lane 1970. 
Blaug, M. "The Correlation between Education and Earnings: 
What does it Signify? " in Higher Education, 1972, 
vol. 1. 
Blaug, M. "The Economics of Education in English 
Classical Political Economy: A Re-examination" 
in Skinner, A. F. and Wilson, T. (eds. ) 
Essays on Adam Smith, Clarendon 1975. 
Blaug, M. "The Empirical Status of Human Capital Theory: 
A Slightly Jaundiced View" in Journal of Economic 
Literature, 1976. 
Bornstein, M. (ed. ) Plan and Market, Yale University Press 
1973. 
Bourdieu, P. and Passeron, J. C. Reproduction in 
Education, Society and Culture, Sage 1977. 
Bowen, H. R. Investment and Learning: The Individual and 
Social Value of American Higher Education, Jossey 
Bass 1987. 
Bowles, S. and Gintis, H. "The Problem with Human Capital 
Theory ...... A Marxian 
Critique" in American 
Economic Review, May 1975, pp. 74-82. 
Bowles, S. and Gintis, H. Schooling in Capitalist 
America, 
.1 
Routledge and Kegan Paul 1976. 
509. 
i 
Bowman, J. M. "The Human Investment Revolution in 
B-C. 
Economic Thought" in Blaug, M. (ed. ) Economics 
A of Education, Penguin 1968, vol. 1. 
Braverman, J. Labour and Monopoly Capital, Monthly 
Review Press 1974. 
Brittan, S. Capitalism and the Permissive Society, 
Macmillan 1976. 
Brittan, S. The Economic Consequences of Democracy, 
Tenir le Srai th 1977. 
Bronfenbrenner, U. Two Worlds of Childhood, Russell 
Sage 1970. 
Burnham, J. The Managerial Revolution, Greenwood 1972. 
Bynner, J. "Deprived Parents" in New Society, 
21st February 1974. 
CAIRNCROSS, F. "How can you have a staff shortage when 
1/ million people cannot find a job? " in The 
Guardian, 22nd September 1979, p'. 18. 
Carew Hunt, R. N. The Theory and Practice of Communism, 
Penguin 1968. 
Clark, R. W. The Life of Bertrand Russell, Jonathan Cape 
and Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1975. 
Cliff, T. Russia: A Marxist Analysis, Socialist Review 
Publication 1964. 
510. 
Cohn, N. The Pursuit of the Millenium, Secker and 
Warburg 1957. 
Conquest, R. The Great Terror, Macmillan 1968. 
i 
Cosin, B. (ed. ) Education, Structure and Society, 
Harmondsworth 1972. 
C-D. 
Crafts, N. F. R. "Industrial Revolution in England and 
France: Some Thoughts on the Question, 'Why was 
England First? '" in The Economic History Review, 
August 1977, Second Series, vol. XXX, nos. 1-4, 
pp. 429-441. 
Crick, B. In Defence of Politics, Penguin 1964. 
Cromwell, J. "Income Inequalities, Discrimination and 
Uneven Capitalist Development", unpublished Ph. D. 
thesis, Harvard 1974, quoted in Bowles, S. and 
Gintis, J. Schooling in Capitalist America, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul 1976. 
Curtis, M. H. "The Alienated Intellectuals of Early 
Stuart England" in Past and Present 1962. 
Cutler, A., Hindness, B., Hirst, P. and Hussain, A. 
Marx's Capital and Capitalism Today, Routledge and 
Kegan Paul 1977,2 volumes. 
DALE, R. "Phenomenological Perspectives and the 
Sociology of the School" in Flude, M. and Ahier, J. 
Educability, Schools and Ideology, Croom Helm 1974. 
511. 
D. 
i 
a 
Dahrendorf, R. Class and Class Conflict in an Industrial 
Society, Routledge and Kegan Paul 1969. 
Davies, B. Social Control and Education, Methuen 1976. 
Davies, B. "Phenomenological sociology and education: 
radical return or magic moment? " in Gleeson, D. 
(ed. ) Identity and Structure: Issues in the 
Sociology of Education, Nafferton 1977. 
Davies, - I. "The Management of Knowledge: a Critique 
Oý the Use of Typologies in the Sociology of 
Education" in Hopper, E. (ed. ) Readings in the 
Theory of Educational Systems, Hutchinson 1971. 
Davis, R. "The Rise of Protection in England" in 
The Economic History Review, August 1966, second 
series, vol. XIX, no. 2, pp. 306-317. 
Djilas, M. The New Class, Unwin 1966. 
Dore, R. The Diploma Disease, George Allen and Unwin 1976. 
Dore, R. False Prophets: The Cuernavaca Critique of School, 
I. D. S. Discussion Paper,. no. 12. 
Dougherty, C. and Psacharopoulos, G. "Measuring the 
Cost of Misallocation of Investment in Education" 
in The Journal of Human Resources, vol. XII, no. 4, 
Fall 1977. 
Dunstan, J. "Curriculum Change and the Soviet School" 
in Journal of Curriculum Studies, November 1977, ' 
vo1.9,. no. 2, pp. L11"-123. 
512. 
Durkheim, E. Professional Ethics and Civil Morals, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul 1957. 
D-E-F. 
Durkheim, E. On the Division of Labour in Society, 
The Free Press 1964. 
ECKSTEIN, H. "The Politics of the British Medical 
Association" in Rose, R. (ed. ) Studies in British 
PolitiLs, Macmillan 1976. 
Esland, G. "Teaching and Learning as the Organization 
of Knowledge" in Young, M. F. D. (ed. ) 
Knowledge and Control, - Collier Macmillan 1971. 
FANON, F. The Wretched of the Earth, Grove 1965, with 
an Introduction by Jean-Paul Sartre. 
Feldstein, M. S. "Health Sector Planning in Developing 
Countries" in Economica, May 1970. 
Feuer, L. S. (ed. ) Marx and Engels, Fontana 1969. 
Finley, M. I. The Ancient Economy, Chatto and Windus 1975. 
Fisher, Z. J. "London as an Engine of Economic Growth" 
in Bromley, J. S. and Kossman, E. H. (eds. ) Britain 
and the Netherlands, Nartinus Nijhoff 1977, vo1.4. 
Frank, A. G. On Capitalist Underdevelopment, oxford 
University Press 1976. 
513. 
a 
Freeman, R. B. The Over-Educated American, Academic 
A Press 1976. 
F-G. 
Freund, J. The Sociology of Max Weber, Allen Lane 1968. 
Friedman, M. Capitalism and Freedom, University of 
Chicago Press 1962. 
Friedman, M. "The line we dare not cross" in Encounter, 
November 1976, pp. 8-14. 
Friedman; M. "Has the tide turn- -, -q'. >" in The List-c-4-er, 
27th April 1978. 
GALBRAITH, J. K. The New Industrial State, Deutsch 1972. 
Gellner, E. A. "Explanations in History" in O'Neill, J. 
(ed. ) Modes of Individualism and Collectivism, 
Heinemann 1973, pp. 248-263. 
Gershenkron, A. "The Stability'of Dictatorships" in 
Continuity in History and Other Essays, Cambridge 
Mass., 1968, pp. 313-343. 
Gershenkron, A. "Criticism from Afar: Another Reply" 
in Soviet Studies, October 1977, vol. XXIX, no. 4, 
pp. 495-505. 
Giddens, A. The Class-Structure of the Advanced Societies, 
Hutchinson 1973. 
Giddens, A. "An Anatomy of the British Ruling Class" in 
New Society, 4th October 1979. 
514. G-H. 
Gintis, H. "Consumer behaviour and the concept of 
sovereignty" in American Economic Review, 1972, 
Papers and Proceedings, pp. 267-278. 
' Gintis, H. "Towards a plitical. economy of education: 
a radical critique of Ivan Illich's Deschooling 
Society" in Dale, R., Esland, G. and Macdonald, M. 
(eds. ) Schooling and Capitalism, Routledge and 
Kegan Paul 1976. 
Girth,, H. H. and Mills, C. W. From Max Weber, Routledge 
and Kegan Paul 1970. 
Goldberg, G. W. "The March of Statism" in Encounter, 
January 1978, pp. 88-90. 
Gorbutt, D. "The New Society of Education" in 
Education for Teaching, Autumn 1972. 
Gordon, A. and Williams, G. Attitudes of Fifth and Sixth 
Formers to School, Work and. Higher Education, 
Institute for Research and Development in Post- 
Compulsory Education, 1977. 
Gould, J. The Attack on Higher Education, I. S. C. 1977. 
HAHN, F. H. The Share of Wages in the National Income, 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1972. 
Hall, P. "It is a Moral Issue" in New Society, 17th 
December 1970. 
515. 
H. 
a 
Halsey, A. H. and Karabel, J. (eds. ) Power and 
Ideology in Education, Oxford University Press 
1977. 
' Halsey, A. H. The Reith Lectures 1978. Printed in 
The Listener. 
Hamilton, D. "Correspondence theories and the promis- 
cuous school: problems in the analysis of 
educational change. " University of Glasgow, 
Department of Education mimeo, 1978. 
Hamilton, P. Knowledge and Social Str cture, Routledge 
and Kegan Paul 1974. 
Harris, M. Cannibals and Kings, William Collins 1978. 
Hayek, F. von. The Road to Serfdom, Routledge and Kegan 
Paul 1944. 
Hayek, F. von. (ed. ) Capitalism and the Historians, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul 1954. 
Hayek, F. von. Law, Legislation and Liberty, Routedge 
and Kegan Paul 1976. 
Hecksher, E. "Swedish Population Trends before the 
Industrial Revolution" in Economic History Review, 
second series, vol. 2, no. 3,1950, pp. 266-277. 
Henderson, P. "Class Structure and the concept of 
Intelligence" in Dale, R., Esland, G. and McDonald, 
M. (eds. ) Schooling and Capitalism, Routledge and 
Kegan Paul 1976, pp. 142-151. 
.r 
516., 
Hill, C. R. and Stafford, F. P. 
i 
"Allocation of time 
to preschool children and educational 
opportunity" in Journal of Human Resources, 
Summer 1974, quoted in Psacharopoulos, G. 
H-I, 
Education and Work: An Evaluation and Inventory 
of Current Research, International Institute of 
Educational Planning, UNESCO 1978. 
Hobsbawm, E. Industry and Empire, Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson 1968. 
Hopper, E. "P. typology for the classification of 
educational systems" in Hopper, E. (ed. ) 
Readings in the Theory of Educational Systems, 
Hutchinson 1971. 
Hopper, E. (ed. ) Readings in the Theory of Educational 
Systems, Hutchinson 1971. 
IHLAO, O. "A Walk with Milovan Djilas" in Encounter, 
October 1976. 
Illich, I. Medical Nemesis, Calder 1975. 
Inglis, B. Poverty and the Industrial Revolution, 
Pan t-rler 19 72. 
517. 
i 
JENCKS, C. et al,. Inequality, Allen Lane 1973. 
Johnson, H. G. "Towards a generalized capital 
accumulation approach to economic development" 
in Blaug, M. (ed. ) Economics of Education, 
J-K. 
Penguin 1968, vol. 1, pp. 34 - 44. 
Johnson, P. The Offshore Islanders: From Roman 
Occupation to European Entry, Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson 1977. 
Johnsön, P. "A Brotherhood of National Misery" in 
New Statesman, 16th May 1975. 
Johnson, P. Enemies of Society, Weidenfeld and Nicolson 
1977. 
Johnson, T. Professions and Power, Macmillan 1972. 
KARCZ, J. F. "Agricultural Reform in Eastern Europe" 
in Bornstein, M. (ed. ) Plan and Market, Yale 
University Press 1973. 
Karier, C. "Testing for Order and Control in the Liberal 
Corporate State" in Dale, R., Esland, G. and 
Macdonald, M. (eds. ) Schooling and Capitalism, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul 1976. 
Katsenelinboigen, A. "Coloured Markets in the Soviet Union" 
in Soviet Studies, January 1977, vol. XXIX, no. 1, 
pp. 62-85. 
Katz, F. The Ancient American Civilizations, Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson 1968. 
518. 
Keddie, N. and Young, M. F. D. 
i 
"New Directions: Is 
there Anything Happening in Sociology? " in 
Hard Cheese, 1973, no. 2, pp. 29-36. 
' Keddie, N. Tinker, Tailor: the Myth of Cultural 
Deprivation, Penguin 1975. 
K-L. 
Kelley, J. "Wealth and family background in the occupa- 
tional career: theory and cross-cultural data" 
in British Journal of Sociology, vol. 29, no. 1, 
March 1978. 
Kelly,, G. A. A Theory of Personality, Norton 1955. 
Kemp, T. Industrialization in Nineteenth-Century Europe, 
Longman 1969. 
Koestler, A. The Yogi and the Commissar, Cape 1947. 
Koestler, A. The Sleepwalkers, Pelican 1968. 
Koestler, A. The Invisible Writing, Hutchinson 1969. 
Kolakowski, L. Main Currents of Marxism, Clarendon 1978, 
3 volumes. 
/ 
LABOV, W. "The Logic of Non-Standard English" in 
Keddie, N. (ed. ) Tinker, Tailor, Penguin 1975. 
Lane, D. Politics and Society in the U. S. S. R., Martin 
Robertson 1978. 
Landes, D. The Unbound Prometheus, Cambridge University 
Press 1969. 
519. 
Layard, R. and Psacharopoulos, G. "The Screening 
Hypothesis and the Returns to Education" in 
A 
L- Mc - M. 
Journal of Political Economy, September/October 1974. 
Layard, R. The Causes of Poverty, Background Paper No. 5 
to Report No. 6 of The Royal Commission on the 
Distribution of Income and wealth under the 
Chairmanship of Lord Diamond, H. M. S. O. 1978. 
Lees, D. S. Economic Consequences of the Professions, 
1" l" 
iivv. 
Leggatt, T. "Teaching as a Profession" in Jackson, J. A. 
Professions and Professionalization, Cambridge 
University Press 1970. 
Levitas, M. Marxist Perspectives in the Sociology of 
Education, Routledge and Kegan Paul 1974. 
Levy-Garbou-a, L. "Le Point de la Recherche 'en Socio- 
Economie de 1'Enseignement". Paper presented 
at Mons, Conference on the Economics of Education, 
April 1978. 
Lipsey, R. G. An Introduction to Positive Economics, 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1966. 
Lukes, S. Power: A Radical View, Macmillan 1974. 
MACHIAVELLI, N. The Prince, Penguin 1961. 
Mackenzie, N. and J. 
Nicolson 1977. 
The First Fabians, Weidenfeld and 
JL LI 
McLellan, D. Karl Marx: His Life and Thought, 
Macmillan 1973. 
Macrae, D. Ideology and Society, Heinemann 1961. 
Mc - M. 
A Maenchen-Helfen, 0. J. The World of the Huns, University 
of California Press 1973. 
Magee, B. Popper, Fontana 1975. 
Marcuse, H. One Dimensional Man, Routledge and Kegan Paul 
1964. 
Marcuse, H., Wolff, P. and Moore, B. Jr. A Critique 
of Pure molei1 ancz -ý Cape 19 ö9 . 
Marshall, D. "The Old Poor Law" in Carus-Wison,. E. (ed. ) 
Essays in Economic History, Edward Arnold 1963, 
vol. 1, pp. 295-305. 
Marx, K. Capital, Lawrence and Wishart 1961, vol, 1, 
1971, vols. 2&3. 
Marx, K. and Engels, F. The Communist Manifesto in 
Cohen, C. (ed. ) Communism, Fascism and Democracy, 
Random House 1972. 
Mickiewicz, E. P. Soviet Political Schools, Yale University 
Press 1967. 
Miliband, R. The State in Capitalist Society, Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson 1969. 
Milward, A. S. "French Labour and the German Economy, 
1942-1945: An Essay on the Nature of the Fascist 
New Order" in The Economic History Review, 1970, 
vol. 23, pp. 336-351. 
521. N 
i 
Milward, A. S. New Order and the French Economy, 
Oxford University Press 1970. 
Minogue, K. "Galbraith's Wit and Wisdon" in Encounter, 
A 
December 1977. 
Mishan, E. J. "On the Road to Repression and Control" 
in Encounter, July 1976, pp. 5-17. 
Moore, B. Jr. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, 
Penguin 1969. 
Morgan, D. H. Social Theory and the Family, Routledge and 
Kegan Paul 1975. 
Musgrove, F. "Curriculum, Culture and Ideology" in 
Journal of Curriculum Studies, 1978, vol. 10, no. 2, 
pp. 88-111. 
NICHOLS, T. Ownership, Control and Ideology, George Allen 
and Unwin 1970. 
Nisbet, R. "Equality: the Fatal Ambivalence of an Idea" 
in Encounter, December 1976. 
Nove, A. "Is there a Ruling Class in the U. S. S. R.? " in 
Soviet Studies, 1975, vol. 27, no. 4, pp. 615-638. 
O'KEEFFE, D. J. "Some Economic Aspects of Raising the 
School Leaving-Age in England and Wales in 1947" 
in The Economic History Review, second series, 
vol. XXVIII, no. 3, August 1975, pp. 511-513. 
522. 0-p. 
O'Keeffe, D. J. "Towards a Socio-Economy of Old Age" 
in Jones, S. (ed. ) Liberation of the Elders, 
The Beth Johnson Foundation, 1976. 
O'Keeffe, D. J. "Towards a Socio-Economy of the Curriculum" 
in Journal of Curriculum Studies, November 1977, 
vol. 9, no. 2. 
O'Keeffe, D. J. "Profit and Control: The Bowles and 
Gintis Thesis" in Journal of Curriculum Studies, 
September 1978, vol. 10, no. 3. 
O'Keeffe, D. J. "Capitalism and Correspondence: 
a critique of Marxist analyses of education" in 
ri i9her Education tCC V 1CW , 701.1L , no. i, rain uaua 
1979, pp. 40-54. 
O'Toole, R. "Educating the Educators". Open University 
Course, E. 352, Education, Economy and Politics, 
1972, Block 6, Reading 1. 
/ 
PALOCZI-HORVATH, G. The Facts Rebel, Secker and Warburg 
1964. 
Parkin, F. Class, Inequality and Political Order, Paladin 
1975. 
Parsons, T. Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative 
Perspectives, Prentice Hall 1966. 
- -- ---- .1- 
Bendix, R. and Lipset, S. M. (eds. ) Class, Status 
and Power, Routledge and Kegan Paul 1970, pp. 240-265. 
Parsons, T. "On the concept of political power", in 
ýý' 
523. 
a 
Peel, J. D. Y. Herbert Spencer: The Evolution of 
a Sociologist, Heinemann 1971. 
Pelling, H. A History of British Trade Unionism, 
A Macmillan 1963. 
P. 
Phelps-Brown, Sir H. "What is the British Predicament? " 
in The Three Banks Review, December 1977, no. 116. 
Plamenatz, J. Man and Society, Longman's 1963, vol. 2. 
Plamenatz, J. Ideology, Pall Mall Press 1970. 
Plamenatz, J. Karl Marx's Conception of Man, Oxford 
University Press 1975. 
Plumb, J. H. (ed. ) Crisis in the Humanities, Penguin 1964. 
Pole,. J. D. "Mass Radiography -- A Cost-Benefit Approach" 
in MacLachlan, G. (ed. ) Problems and Progress in 
Medical Care 
Pollard, S. The Development of the British Economy, 1914- 
1914-1967, Arnold 1970. 
Popper, Sir K. Conjectures and Refutations, Routledge and 
Kegan Paul 1963. 
Popper, Sir K. The Open Society and Its Enemies, Routledge 
and Kegan Paul 1966,2 volumes. 
Postman, N. "The Politics of Reading" in Keddie, N. (ed. ) 
Tinker, Tailor: the Myth of Cultural Deprivation, 
Penguin 1975. 
Poulantzas, N. "The Problem of the Capitalist State" 
in Urry, J. and Wakeford, J. (eds. ) Power in 
Britain, Heinemann 1973. 
524. 
Psacharopoulos, G. assisted by Hinchliffe, K. 
Returns to Education: An International 
Comparison, Elsevier 1973. 
Psacharopoulos, G. and Layard, R. "Human capital and 
earnings: British evidence and a critique. " 
Centre for the Economics of Education, London 
P-R. 
School of Economics, Discussion Paper No. 2,1976. 
Psacharopoulos, G. "Family background, education and 
achievement" in British Journal of Sociology, vol. 28, 
7L -1 n"-7 3 nI ý+ý. r ä1C. 
., r 
Septeimber 
i i' pp. JGl-JJJ. 
Psacharopoulos, G. and Tinbergen, J. "On the Explanation 
of Schooling, Occupation and Earnings: Some 
Alternative 
Nr. 4,1978, 
Psacharopoulos, G. 
and Inventor, 
Institute of 
Path Analyses" in De Economist, 126, 
pp. 505-520. 
Education and Work: An Evaluation 
V of Current Research, International 
Educational Planning, UNESCO 1978. 
Psacharopoulos, G. and Wiles, P. "Early Education, 
Ability and Earning Capacity", L. S. E. mimeo. 
ROBINSON, - J. AND EATWELL, J. An Introduction 
to Modern 
Economics, McGraw 1974. 
Rostow, W. How It All Began, Methuen 1975. 
Rostow, W. W. "No Random Walk: A Comment on Why Was 
England First? " in The Economic History Review, 
second series, Vol. XXXI, no. 4,1978. 
525 "R-S. 
Rutter, M. et al. Fifteen Thousand Hours: Secondary 
Schools and their Effects on Children, Open 
Books 1979. 
1 
SAGGS, H. W. F. The Greatness that was Babylon, 
Sidgwick and Jackson 1962. 
Samuelson, P. Economics, McGraw Hill 1961 
Schumpeter, J. History of Economic Analysis, Allen and 
Unwin 1954. 
Schumpeter, J. Capitalism, Socialism 3. rd Deriacra cy 
George A1112r_ and Unwin, 1961. 
Seliger, M. Ideology and Politics, George Allen and 
Unwin 1976. 
Sharp, R. and Green, A. Education and Social uontroi., 
Routledge and Kegan Paul 1974. 
Slater, A. W. (ed. ) "Autobiographical Memoir of Joseph 
Je:.:. i " in Camden Miscellany, Royal Historical 
Society, 1974, vol. 22. 
Smith, D. "Selection and knowledge-management in education 
s, gstems" in Hopper, E. (ed. ) Readings in the 
Theory of Educational Systems, Hutchinson 
1971. 
526. 
ab 
S-T-V. 
Solzhenitsyn, A. Letter to Soviet Leaders, Fontana 1974. 
Strachey, J. Contemporary Capitalism, Victor Gollancz 
1956. 
A 
Supple, B. "The State and the Industrial Revolution 
1700-1914" in Cipolla, C. M. (ed. ) The Industrial 
Revolution, Fontana/Collinsl973, pp. 301-357. 
Szamuely, T. "Comprehensive Inequality" in Cox, C. B. 
and Dyson, A. E. (eds. ) Black Paper Two, The 
Quarterly Society, 1969, pp. 48-56. 
H. The Rise of the Gentry, 1558-1640" 
in Carus-Wilson, E. (ed. ) Essays in Economic 
History, Edward Arnold 1963, vol. 1. 
The Times, 5th January 1980: "State of the Professions". 
Thompson, E. P. The Making of the English Working Class, 
Gollancz 1965. 
Thomson, D. Europe Since Napoleon, Longman's 1962. 
Trevor-Roper, H. Historical Essay, Macmillan 1963. 
VAIZEY, J. "The Roulette of Public Spending" in 
New Statesman, 13th February 1976. 
527. W. 
i 
WEBER, M. "Class, Status, Party" in Essays in Sociology, 
Oxford University Press 1946. 
Weber, M. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, 
A 
The Free Press 1964. 
Weber, M. Economy and Society, Bedminster 1968,2 volumes. 
Weber, M. Gesammelte Aufsaetze zur Wissenschaftslehre, 
(Tübingen 1922), quoted in Gerth, H. H. and 
Wright-Mills, C. From Max Weber, Routledge and 
Kegan Paul 1970. 
the Spirit : "ieber, M. The Protestant Ethic an d of 
Capitalism, Unwin 1971. 
Weisbrod, B. "External effects of investment in education" 
in Elaug, Ii. (ed. ) Economics of Education, Penguin 1968, 
vol. 1, p. 156-192, "women working", p. 173-4. 
Westoby, A. "The Economics of Education" in Pateman, T. 
(ed. ) Counter Course, Penguin 1972. 
Westoby, A. "Economists and Human Capital" in Holly, D. 
(ed. ) Education or Domination, Arrow 1974, pp. 38-57. 
Wiles, P. J. D. and Markowski, S. "Income Distribution 
under Communism and Capitalism" in Soviet Studies, 
1970-1971, vol. XXII. 
Wiles, P. (J. D. ) "The Correlation between Education and 
Earnings: The External-Test-Not-Content Hypo- 
thesis (ETNC)" in Higher Education, vol. 3, no. 1, 
1974, pp. 43-57. 
Wiles, P. J. D. Economic Institutions Compared, Blackwell 
1977. 
528. W-Y 
i 
Wiles, P. (J. D. ) "World Technological Leadership" in 
Lloyd's Bank Review, January 1978, no. 127. 
Willis, P. Learning to Labour, Saxon House 1978. 
Wilson, C. England's Apprenticeship, Longman's 1965. 
Wittfogel, K. A. Oriental Despotism, Yale University 
Press 1963. 
Wolin, S. Politics and Vision, Allen and Unwin 1961. 
YOUNG, M. F. D. Knowledge and Control, Collier Macmillan 
1971. 
Young, M. F. D. "On the Politics of Educational 
Knowledge" in Bell, R., Fowler, G. and Little, K. 
(eds. ) Education in Great Britain and Ireland, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul 1973. 
/ 
529. 
A 
P0STSCRIPT 
We have sought in this thesis to derive the sociological 
implications of human capital theory. We have done this, 
generally speaking, not by attempting the wholesale 
translation of such theory and its many ramifications 
into the language of sociology, but by bringing the central 
phenomena which human capital theory tries to conceptualize 
and explain -- . human capital formation and its 
attendant calculus -- into social theory. We have argued 
that the Marxist tradition, predicated on the social 
relations of physical capital, must now be regarded as 
definitely superceded. This is so not merely on account 
of the false theory of value on which that tradition is 
based; some contemporary Marxists are equally willing to 
admit the falsity of such theory. More importantly, 
Marxism is capable of only partial explanations of the 
conflicts of contemporary capitalist society, and incapable 
of explaining convincingly the consensus which characterizes 
such society. 
By contrast the search for the sources of social 
integration in advanced capitalist society, a search central 
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to the Durkheimian-functionalist tradition, can be fortified 
enormously by the concept "human capital". So also can 
the Weberian concept of "rationalization" be strengthened, 
a fortiori, insofar as the idea of human capital formation 
illumines and extends it. 
Thus we have argued that consensus (the functionalist 
concern) and the structure of voluntarist economic action 
(the Weberian concern) are intimately related phenomena. 
Men cohere as they act, and advanced capitalist society 
is characterized by a huge extension of relatively velunta- 
rist economic action, an extension in which those economic 
decisions which lead to human capital formation play a 
signally important role. 
Moreover, we have attempted to show that the concept 
human capital can to some extent be employed to bring all 
three of Weber's variables of stratification -- class, status 
and party -- into one analytical net. Status and party 
can sometimes be numbered among the intangibles which 
economists claim need to be taken into account when we 
analyze the "raw" income effects of decisions to engage in 
human capital formation. In our chapter on socialism we 
argued that_ such intangibles are even more important in 
socialist than in capitalist society. 
We have repeatedly stressed that modern industrial 
capitalism is an unprecedentedly open society, resting more 
thoroughly than any other large-scale social formation, 
either historically or actually, on consensus. We admitted, 
531. 
however, that while the ubiquitous phenomenon of human 
capital is of crucial significance in this open-ness and 
in this consensus, at the same time human capital formation 
can be privatized and lead to closed, semi-corporatist 
social arrangements. We argued that this is in particular 
the case with the professions of medicine and law. 
Nevertheless we have in general argued that advanced 
capitalist society is increasingly characterized by the 
achieved hierarchies of scarcity -- the social relations of 
the market. a scr; ptive h; erarc "es comparable to ý l- ýr iiV LL Lýrýi ývLllpu1y, LVSG 
of slavery or feudalism are of dwindling significance 
in the advanced capitalist world. Neither does this world 
have any real counterpart to the semi-ascriptive dichotomy 
between party members and non-members under modern socialism. 
The socio-economic uniqueness of the hierarchies of 
modern capitalism is precisely that they turn fundamentally 
on scarcity. Characteristic of contemporary Marxist thought 
is its inability to assimilate theories of scarcity and of 
power. The trend in Marxist writing is to deny the reality 
of scarcity as a major determinant, for example, of the 
pattern of income distribution, and to prefer to identify 
differential income distribution as resulting from power 
hierarchies. The proclamation of scarcity is only the 
ideological mask of power. However, the power theory is 
weak predictively as we have seen, for in order to explain 
prices it must be harnessed to notions of supply and demand 
7 
which in the event can explain such prices independently. 
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In any case a power theory of profit maximization cannot 
avoid the logical entailments of neo-classical economics. 
We have argued that the reality of the ubiquitous 
money economy and of the highly developed specialization 
of labour, is that they create a social world where, 
confronted with the inexorable fact of scarcity, men can 
express genuine economic preferences as to the use of 
scarce resources for consumption, saving and investing. 
That people do not express these preferences in a world 
where all men and women have equal access to information, 
to resources and to decision-making, is clearly true. 
This consideration, however, does not render illusions such 
as the abolition of money or the dispensability of hierarchy, 
anything less than the fantasies which we have insisted 
that they are. Indeed the partial enactment of these 
fantasies at different times in socialist society is part 
of the generally coercive character of such society, torn 
as it is between genuflexions to Marxist soteriology and 
the relentless imperatives of rationalization. We have seen 
that socialist society has been quite unable to prevent 
the emergence of human capital formation and a human capital 
order. 
In the case of the advanced capitalist society itself, 
we came to spell out the following central and related 
propositions: 
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1. Under advanced capitalist society the occupational 
structure is the main social hierarchy, the 
main pivot of stratification. 
2. This hierarchy is largely consensualized. It is 
a source of perennial conflict, but in general men 
accede to it, and internalize the principles of 
scarcity and of mutual inter-dependence which the 
hierarchy embodies. 
3. The main element in this social hierarchy is 
different, a?? y distributed human capital formation. 
4. The main source of such human capital formation 
is. the education system of advanced capitalist society. 
5. The emergence of a complex of voluntarist economic 
actions, especially vis-a-vis human capital formation, 
both depends on, and generates, two of the most 
striking aspects of liberal capitalism: the 
tendency for the public realm and the private realm 
to be strongly classified; and the tendency for social 
consensus to become so influential a source of social 
control that the apparatus of coercion characteristic 
of all other major social formations becomes largely 
redundant. The frames which govern socio-economic 
decision-making come to be significantly internalized. 
In our section on the socio-economy of education we 
tried to unravel the fascinating implications of the fact 
that the main agency of human capital formation -- a 
phenomenon integral to advanced capitalist society -- is 
C "f n 
J J`'F : 
itself mainly a non-capitalist agency. Out conclusion 
was that while human capital formation is the main 
economic function of the education system of an advanced 
liberal society, and while its main, parallel, sociological 
functions are the socialization of the young and their 
occupational placement, none of these functions is very 
efficiently secured. 
The strong classification between the educational 
economy and the market economy tends to desensitize the 
former to the requirements of the latter. The "nationali- 
zation" of the former modifies the organizing principles 
of cultural transmission and the composition of educational 
htlm an capita form? +; o Curr; cu L 
-L.. - Vi. +alu ... 1 ý1a" ý. ui y. iv\. ai cýr 
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is 
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ged in the case of the successful children while the 
ability of many, especially working-class children, to 
engage in educational human capital formation is impaired. 
It may be claimed, in fact, that while the human capital 
stock and the physical capital stock are inter-dependant, 
that is to say, presuppose each other, yet the economies 
which create them are not well integrated. Obviously re- 
turns are not equalized at the margin, as they would be 
were the whole economy a purely market economy characterized 
by perfect knowledge and the absence of any impediments 
to the rational allocation of resources. It would be 
absurd to expect the flow of scarce resources into schooling 
to be an optimal flow. Nevertheless the sensitizing of the 
educational economy to real scarcities in the market economy 
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would tend to secure greater efficiency in the use of 
scarce resources by the education system. It might also, 
, 
if it improved the educability of many working-class 
children, serve to increase the socializing force of 
schooling. It is a repeated theme of this work that 
active economic decision-making and social control are 
linked phenomena. A strong a priori case can be made 
for the view that it is the inadequacy of his exposure to 
rational economic decision-making at school which alienates 
the working-class child. It is diminution of the principles 
of market capitalism in the curricular experience of the 
working-class child, not the deadly urgency of such 
principles, which makes it hard for him to succeed 
educationally. Allowing myself an untypical lapse into 
policy prescription, I would argue that educationists 
anxious to improve working-class performance at school, 
or economists anxious to expand and improve the human 
capital stock, would be advised to find ways of improving 
the fit (weakening the classification) between the educa- 
tional and market economies. Capitalized wage-labour 
is a sine qua non of advanced liberal society; but the 
social organization of cultural transmission is such that 
the capital generating function of the educational economy 
is gravely impaired. 
None of this involves the retraction of my central 
claim that by all historical and actual comparisons modern 
liberal capitalism is a brilliant civilization, characterized 
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by deeply internalized consensus of a markedly tolerant 
kind, and by generally benign governments. Our condition 
involves perpetual uncertainties; there are no Utopias, 
no final safe havens. There will always be injustice 
and folly in human affairs. The way to remedy these is 
through open and rational discussion, not through the 
espousal of the malevolent and intolerant fantasies 
of Marxism. 
We have sought in this thesis to argue that the 
mod. el of supply and demand, ý tho J1 loº7l l: 0.111 .. 1 1LZV. 7"L beauti- 
ful 
aüýl 
ful and elegant model yet evolved by modern social science, 
possesses an explanatory potential in relation to sociology, 
almost as compelliiiy as its contribution to economics. 
We have also argued that the attempt to suppress the forces 
of supply and demand in advanced society will not only 
involve a despotic system of government, but will also, 
pace Orwell's mightmarish animadversions, prove impossible 
in the long run. We hold that the right to make rational 
calculations as to the use of their labour is an inalienable 
right of free men. We hold, against the trend of much 
contemporary social theory, that our society is not corrupt; 
that our economy is not predatory; that our institutions 
are not moribund; and that our civilization is not doomed. 
5j/. 
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